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Abstract
Despite their economic, political and cultural similarities, Portugal and Spain experienced dif-
ferent trajectories of civil-military relations during the twentieth century. After having handed
power over to a civilian dictator, Salazar, the Portuguese military eventually caused the down-
fall of his authoritarian Estado Novo regime and led the transition to democracy. In contrast,
in Spain the military, which had helped Franco to defeat the Republic in  remained loyal
to the dictatorship’s principles and, after his death, obstructed the democratisation process.

is research sheds light on these different patterns by comparing the policy instruments that
governments used to control the military throughout Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships
and transitions to democracy. First, it applies Christopher Hood’s () ‘’ (nodality,
authority, treasure and organisation) framework for the study of tools of government in order
to identify trajectories and establish comparisons across time and countries. 
ese tools can
be considered as the institutions that structure the relationship between the governments and
the military. 
is thesis documents that the tools used in both counties differed consider-
ably and evolved over time and that only from  onwards a process of convergence can
be observed. Second, this thesis contrasts two types of neo-institutional explanations for the
evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations. One based on historical junctures and
path-dependence (historical causes) and the other on the continuous impact of environmental
factors (constant causes). 
is research demonstrates that both approaches are largely inter-
twined and to a great extent become complementary and necessary to capture complexity
in tool choice. In sum, this thesis shows that dialogue and exchange between different ana-
lytical approaches contributes to a deeper understanding of multifaceted social phenomena.

e utilisation of public policy analytical frameworks, such as the  scheme and neo-
institutionalism, provides a new angle on the evolution of civil-military relations in Portugal
and Spain.

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Part I
OBJECTIVES AND CHOICES


1 Civil-military relations and
methodological considerations
1.1 Introduction

e civil-military relations of Portugal and Spain have taken different trajectories during the
twentieth century. Especially during the periods of Salazar’s and Franco’s authoritarian rule
and the transitions to democracy that followed, different patterns of military subordination
to civilian rule can be observed. In Portugal, the military, which had overthrown the First
Republic in  and peacefully handed power over to a civilian dictator, António Oliveira
Salazar, became a threat for the regime and ended up causing the downfall of the authoritarian
Estado Novo with the Carnations revolution in . In Spain the military, which had helped
Francisco Franco to defeat the Republic in  remained loyal to the dictator’s principles and
posed a threat to democracy, culminating in the  coup attempt in . 
is research sheds
light on this empirical puzzle by exploring three questions: How did Portuguese and Spanish
governments use tools over time to control their military? Did they use different combinations
of tools? Why did their choices diverge or converge?
To answer these questions this thesis analyses and compares the policy instruments that gov-
ernments used to control the military throughout two stages of Portuguese and Spanish con-
temporary history: first, Salazar’s and Franco’s dictatorships and, second, the transitions and
early democratic periods (until ). It applies Christopher Hood’s () ‘’ (nodality,
authority, treasure and organisation) framework for the study of tools of government in order
to identify trajectories and establish comparisons across time and across countries. 
is thesis
shows that there was no one single ‘Iberian’ government style or model of civil-military rela-
tions nor a constant country-specific style throughout the period analysed. Authoritarian as
well as transitional governments adopted different combinations of control tools in Portugal
and Spain. Only from  onwards, can a clear process of convergence be observed in both
countries. Finally, this thesis draws on neo-institutional theory to interpret the evolution of
tool choices and civil-military relations. It explains that macro-historical events, i.e. regime
formation periods and wars, generated junctures and new trajectories in the control toolkit
and that these trajectories were also shaped by institutional and ideational environmental fac-
tors.

is research addresses both civil-military relations and policy instruments literatures com-
bining political science and historical analysis. It seeks to contribute to the elements of knowl-
edge accumulation in historical comparative analysis defined by Mahoney (:): specific
knowledge claims and knowledge generation tools.

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At the level of specific knowledge claims, it provides descriptive and causal findings. 
e
descriptive findings are the result of a historical examination of Portuguese and Spanish civil-
military relations using extensive primary and secondary sources. In addition to new facts,
this thesis provides — through the systematic application of the  framework — a new
angle on pre-existing empirical evidence. It thus builds an alternative narrative about the
evolution of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain based on the control tools that the
governments used. 
e causal claims result from the analysis and comparison of trajectories in
tool choice against the backdrop of neo-institutionalist concepts and mechanisms. 
is thesis
assesses two alternative explanations regarding the evolution of choices of policy instruments:
one based on the impact of historical legacies and path-dependence and the other on the
continuing action of environmental factors. It outlines their strengths and limitations against
the background of the empirical evidence collected, showing that both types of explanations
are intertwined in several ways.
It also contributes to knowledge-generation at the methodological and meta-theoretical lev-
els. Using the empirical evidence collected on Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations,
this thesis tests the virtues and limitations of the  framework as a method for systematic
historical comparisons and as a basis for theory building. Likewise, this thesis substantiates
some of the meta-theoretical arguments that defend further dialogue and exchange across dif-
ferent research disciplines and traditions. First, it shows that adopting a policy-instruments
approach can be very elucidating for the study of civil-military relations. Second, it combines
historical research with comparative and analytical frameworks of political science. 
ird, it
contrasts two competing neo-institutionalist approaches to tool choice and shows that they
are not incompatible but complementary.

is chapter, first, analyses the state of art in the civil-military relations literature providing
a brief overview of the essential contributions and limitations in this sub-field which inspire
this research (Section .). Next, it justifies the adoption of a tool approach (Section .)
and introduces the main theoretical claims concerning control styles and tool choices that
animate this thesis (Section .). It explains the fundamental methodological choices made
in this thesis, including the use of the comparative method and a qualitative approach, case
selection and sources (Section .). Finally, this chapter specifies the plan of the thesis.
1.2 Why civil-military relations?

e armed forces are an essential instrument in the creation and maintenance of social com-
munities and consequently in the building of nation-states (Finer :–). However,
history shows that the military have also used their strength to influence, blackmail, displace
or even supplant governments (Finer  []:). Even in the twenty-first century, the
tensions between the political and military sphere are more than evident in many contexts.

e coups in the Central African Republic (), Mauritania (), Fiji (), Guinea
(), Madagascar (), Honduras (), Niger () and Guinea-Bissau () are
the latest evidence on how the military can successfully overturn the government of a country.
To these it is possible to add a much longer list of coup attempts with the collaboration of military forces.
For instance Venezuela (), Mauritania (), Chad (), Democratic Republic of Congo (), 
ai-
land (), Timor () and Ecuador ().

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e interest of studying civil-military relations derived from the special institutional features
of the armed forces and in the paradox that the organisation created to protect the polity is
granted enough power to overthrow it (Feaver :). 
is has led scholars to consider the
military as a ‘necessary evil’ for the maintenance of peace (Mills :). A key challenge
of civil-military relations is the balance between the need for defence and a potential threat to
the political system. Since there has been a longstanding normative consensus on the necessity
of military subordination, the central issue in the literature is not whether the military should
be controlled but how the military should be controlled.
Historians, sociologists and political scientists have studied the military, their relations with
the political power and society at large, as well as the mechanisms or strategies to control them.

ese concerns that were already present in classical military studies (Sun Tsu  [c. 
]; 
ucydides  [ ]; Machiavelli  []; Clausewitz  []) have
been expanded by a sub/stantial body of modern literature which emerged in the twentieth
century. 
ere are several different waves of civil-military relations literature, although as will
be explained later, the underlying concerns and discussions have not evolved greatly.

e first wave appeared before the Second World War and supported the idea of demil-
itarisation. Its main proponents are Vagts (), who — based on Prussian and German
history — reviews the concept of militarism and Lasswell (), who points at the dangers
of evolving into a ‘garrison state’ in which all aspects of government action would fall under
military control.

e second wave of literature emerged during the early Cold War period and discusses
the need for a permanent army given the threat to liberty that such an arrangement would
pose. Most of the works form this period study the  and stresses the differences between
the military, civil servants and other societal groups. For instance, Smith points to the need to
reconcile military power and democratic ideas and institutions (Smith :). He studies
the relations with the executive, legislative and even the judiciary. Mills portrays the military as
a rising power elite that renounces to exert political power thanks to a process of indoctrination
and a system of symbolic or status related rewards (Mills ). Finally, Huntington ()
defends the professionalisation and autonomy of the military as a means to attain ‘objective’
control on them. For him, the clear separation of responsibilities and functions and the non-
interference of civilians in military issues would ensure political neutrality.

e third wave of literature that emerged in the s may be divided into two streams.
First, a sociological examination of the military developed as a reaction to Huntington’s ideas
and, second, an institutionally oriented examination of civil-military relations in developing
countries, with a special focus on the problem of military coups (Feaver :). Sev-
eral prominent authors can be categorised in the sociological stream. For instance, Janowitz
() opposes the Huntingtonian idea of military subordination based on the separation
from society and the development of a different ethos. He argues that military subordina-
tion is reinforced if they share the values of society at large. Abrahamsson () rejects
Huntington’s apolitical depiction of the professional soldier and claims that professionalised
military are a corporatist conservative interest group and that external institutional mech-

e waves presented here are based on Feaver ().
For Huntington the alternative is the ‘subjective’ control that entails the politicization of the military and
occurs in undemocratic regimes.

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anisms are necessary to control them. Moskos () overcomes the dominant Hunting-
ton/Janowitz debate by proposing a dynamic model of military organisation: the influential
‘institutional/occupational’ model. He suggests that the military are changing from a tradi-
tional, more institutional type of organisation, based on corporatist values and a distinct ethos,
into a more occupational type with lower levels of corporatism, higher emphasis on individual
material rewards and greater proximity to civilian professions. Finally, Schiff’s ‘concordance
theory’ ( and ) uses a cultural and institutional perspective to challenge Huntington’s
civilian objective control theory. She shows how some countries with relatively low separation
between the civilian and military spheres manage to prevent military intervention.
Other authors in this third wave shift the attention away from Western developed countries
and focus on military intrusion in politics in developing countries. For instance, Finer (
[]) examines the history of military intervention in different socio-economic systems and
concludes that the development of a political culture in a country strengthens civilian con-
trol. Similarly, Welch (:) stresses that the strength and legitimacy of civilian political
institutions deter intervention. Perlmutter () introduces the concept of ‘praetorian state’
as one in which the military play a dominant role in the political institutions. Drawing from
the example of Turkey, he warns that modernisation does not necessarily diminish the capac-
ity for military supremacy. In a comparable line of argument, Feit () suggests that with
modernisation and bureaucratisation of the armies the military become ‘armed bureaucrats’
with concerns for efficient government similar to those of civilian administrators, and that
in case of incapable political leadership they become prone to intervene. Stepan () and
Nordlinger () put forward that threats to the military institution and corporatist inter-
ests motivate their participation in coups, and that otherwise the military prefer to confine
themselves to the barracks.
After the end of the Cold War, a new wave of civil-military literature has emerged. It fo-
cuses on new challenges faced by democratic governments and adopts an approach closer to
mainstream political science (Feaver :–; Burk :). For instance, Avant’s
() neo-institutional interpretation of civil-military relations based on a principal-agent
model suggests that unified political settings, as in the , facilitate that the military embrace
civilian doctrine, while in more divided principal structures, such as in the , civilian in-
tervention becomes more difficult. Desch’s () cultural-structural approach argues that
the new post-Cold War environment with low internal and external threats weakens civilian
control. Feaver’s (a; ) strategic bargaining principal-agent model warns about the
incentives for the military to shirk and for civilian leaders to monitor intrusively. Moskos et
al. (/eds.) introduce a ‘Postmodern’ military model based on the comparative analysis
of thirteen Western democratic countries. 
e model points at new civil-military challenges
See also Moskos (), Luckham (), Segal () and Sorensen () for a revision of Moskos
Intitutional/Occupational model and its relation with the Huntington/Janowitz debate.
Many authors following this line of research delve into specific cases or regions, among others: Horowitz
() who writes about Sri Lanka, Pion-Berlin () about Latin America, Welch () about Africa and
Latin America, Decalo () about African countries, Danopoulos () about Southern Europe, Herspring
() about Russia and Staniland () about India and Pakistan.
See a similar approach in Sowers ().

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associated with the new security and defence environment and organisational changes. Con-
tinuing this line of research, Forster () extends the analysis to all European countries but
concludes that the postmodern model masks important differences that exist across Europe.
Despite the variety of approaches and the interesting lessons that all these works have pro-
vided, there is still room for the advancement of research in this field. 
is thesis marks a
clear departure from the discussions that have dominated the literature and further connects
the study of civil-military relations to public policy analysis. Rather than developing a general
explanation of military control, it attempts to tackle one of its components, namely the tools
of control that governments choose. It provides a more fine-grained analysis that results in a
more nuanced understanding of this complex phenomenon of military control.
As Forster (:) argues, the literature on civil-military relations has been excessively
self-referential and backward looking which resulted in the slow evolution of the discus-
sion and approaches to the field. 
e traditional sociological debates in civil-military rela-
tions are centred around the concept of professionalisation, the political or apolitical ethos
of the military, the need for insulation or integration, military autonomy, or the institu-
tional/occupational model of organisation. 
ese debates, after having dominated the field for
more than three decades, seem to have reached a dead-end and have exhausted their capacities
of theory generation (Feaver :). 
e ‘old’ Huntington/Janowitz debate on military
autonomy and the military’s normative role in sustaining democratic values is still well en-
trenched in the literature. Most works have focused almost exclusively on civilian control as
dependent variable and generally study one or few explanatory variables such as the degree
of professionalism, political institutionalisation, legitimisation of the civilian government and
the existence of internal and/or external threats.
Williams identifies five challenges: the increasing permeability of civilian and military spheres; fewer dif-
ferences in service and branch, new missions, use of multinational forces under supranational supervision and
the internationalisation of the armed forces themselves (Williams :).
See a similar argument in Olmeda’s (forthcoming) meta-analysis based on the scrutiny of Armed Forces &
Society.

e debate on military autonomy continues to be central in many works in the last wave of literature. Some
recent works stress the importance of civilian management of defence and military affairs. For instance Cottey
et al. () suggest the necessity of extra layers of control on the military in what they call the ‘democratic
governance of defence and security sectors’. Cohen () also argues that active civilian control has positive
effects on military performance. On the other hand, some works argue that civilian interference on military
affairs may have created problems of subordination, for instance, Feaver (a and ), Dauber (), and
Desch (a; ). See also Burk’s () and Bacevich’s () critiques of Feaver, Desch and Dauber and the
reply by Feaver (b) and Desch (b). Finally, it is important to mention Feaver and Kohn’s (/eds.)
project on the American civil-military ‘gap’ that has revived Huntington/Janowitz debate and its implications.
See a similar argument in Burk (:).
See Nielsen (). Desch and Feaver distinguish five different dependent variables explored in the lit-
erature: coups, military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, and delegation and monitoring
(Desch :–; Feaver :–). However these, at least the first four of them, can be considered
merely different facets and degrees of the same phenomenon that is the military subordination to civilian rule.
See Bland (). For instance, the development of a distinct professional ethos is the underlying ex-
planatory variable, although with opposite effects, in Huntington () and Janowitz (). Finer (
[]), Huntington (), Cottey et al.() and Bruneau (; ) explain subordination by the de-
gree of institutionalisation and political culture in society. For Finer ( []) countries with a ‘low political
culture’ are vulnerable to intervention. Huntington () looks at the level of political participation and in-
stitutionalisation. Cottey et al. () argue that civilian supremacy requires the establishment of an effective
bureaucratic-administrative defence policy making structure, parliamentary oversight and wider civil society

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In addition to the limited diversity in approaches, most existing political science efforts in
the area of civil-military relations produce overly parsimonious explanations to very complex
problems. 
ey tend to treat both dependent and independent variables as dichotomous and
usually rely on descriptions and inductive case studies. Few works have attempted to generate
and test hypotheses following a deductive logic (Feaver :–). It also seems that there
is no broad consensus concerning the applicability of the theories. 
e lack of consensus has
hindered cumulative progress. Staniland (:) highlights that there is enough empirical
evidence to challenge the best-known theories in the field and that more fine-grained analyses
and theories are required. It is necessary to dissect civil-military relations into finer categories
that can be operationalised across cases and make findings transferable to any political model
(Bland :, ).

is thesis proposes a distinct approach that attempts to counter some of the limitations in
the existing literature. It assumes that governments are concerned about military subordina-
tion but it goes beyond the traditional sociological debates and beyond the typical dependent
and independent variables. It scrutinizes a narrower dependent variable: the policy instru-
ments or tools used by governments to control the military. Control is usually studied as a
dependent variable. Scholars that aimed to focus on different aspects of civil-military rela-
tions have used civilian control as independent rather than dependent variable in order to
explain further phenomena such as military effectiveness, military technological and doctrine
innovation or military expenditure (Zuk and 
ompson ; Van Evera ; Avant ;
Rosen ; Biddle and Zirkle ; Nielsen ). 
is research moves in another direc-
tion: it seeks a better understanding about what is actually done to control the military and
why. 
is entails moving back along the causal chain aiming to provide some less divisive
common ground of knowledge and a more stable basis for further academic attempts to assess
the degree of civilian control and its implications.

is thesis also introduces a public policy comparative framework and a neo-institutional-
ist theoretical background into the study of civil-military relations. 
ese analytical elements
contribute not only to understanding the aforementioned what and why but also to blur the
artificial boundaries that have separated the niche study of civil-military relations from some
major advances in the core of political science.
1.3 Why a ‘tool’ or ‘policy instrument approach’?

is research on civil-military relations employs the ‘ scheme’ for the study of tools of
government as comparative framework (Hood :).  is an acronym that refers to the
engagement with defence. Bruneau () points at four institutional dimensions that need to be enhanced
for civilian control: the ministry of defence, the legislature, inter-agency processes and the intelligence system.
Similarly, Welch () and Plattner and Diamond () stress that civilian success and legitimacy precludes
intervention. Lasswell () and Andrzejewski () base their explanations on the degree of external threats.
Lasswell argues that high levels of external threats foster military intervention. In contrast, Andrzejewski claims
that inactive militaries in the context of low external threats are more prone to interfere. Finally, for Desch
() a high external threat paired with a low internal threat produces stronger civilian control. Staniland’s
() more ambitious explanatory framework combines degree of institutionalisation, external and internal
threats, and the level of civilian legitimacy.

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four basic resources that governments possess (nodality, authority, treasure and organisation)
and from which policy instruments draw their power (Chapter ). 
is section justifies the
choice of a ‘tool’ or ‘policy instrument’ approach in the light of some theoretical considerations
and the existing literature.

ere are many definitions of policy instruments and tools of government in the literature
but most of them stress their role as means of social control that governments have at their
disposal. For instance, Salamon calls them ‘techniques of social intervention’ (:).
For Vedung they are ‘techniques by which governmental authorities . . .wield their power in
attempting to ensure support and effect social change’ (:). Landry and Varone de-
fine tools as ‘means of intervention by which governments attempt to induce individuals and
groups to make decisions and take actions compatible with public policies’ (:–).
According to Lascoumes and Le Galès, a policy instrument ‘constitutes a condensed form of
knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it’ (:). In sum, policy instruments
are the manifestation of the governmental power and consequently, instrument choices reflect
different government strategies or styles. Since an understanding of governments and the way
they exercise their power is important for civil-military relations, taking a closer look at the
tools government employ seems a logical endeavour.

e tools can also be considered the building blocks of policies (Linder and Peters :;
Salamon :). 
e deconstruction of multifaceted entities, such as policy programmes,
into their basic components, tools, allows scholars to make sense of the growing complexity
involved in modern government action. By prioritising the analysis of a reduced set of
basic tools that compose the myriads of different types of policy programmes observable in
reality, it is possible to pin down some patterns or properties that may be hidden at first sight.

is knowledge serves to devise new policies as well as to identify trends and establish cross-
temporal and cross-country comparisons (Hood :–). In addition, since government
tools are basic components of policies they are also very good indicators to understand and
trace policy change (Lascoumes and Le Galès :). 
erefore, the dissection of complex
policies into a set of basic policy instruments paves the way for further cumulative research.
Similarly, using the tools or instruments as units of analysis helps avoiding some research
design problems common in policy analysis. Focusing on the policy output, the tools, rather
than on decision-making processes or on the evaluation of outcomes, reduces subjectivity
simplifies the analysis. Focusing on ‘what government does’ rather than on ‘how it is decided’
or ‘what are its ultimate goals’ diminishes the room for speculation and misunderstandings in
the analysis.
In this thesis the terms ‘policy instruments’ and ‘tools of government’ are used as synonyms. 
is seems
to be Hood’s approach who, as many other authors, uses the terms ‘tools’ and ‘instruments’ interchangeably.
‘Techniques of government’, ‘governing instruments’ and ‘policy implements’ are other terms that appear in the
literature referring to the same concept. Conversely Lascoumes and Le Gàles (:) differentiate between three
levels in the study of policy instruments, from a micro to a macro approach: tools, techniques and instruments.
A similar idea is suggested by Bruneau and Matei (:) who claim that the (democratic) control on
the military depends on the combination of control instruments used and their institutionalisation.
An increasing number of scholars seem to agree that the study of governance is inextricably linked to the
study of the sets of instruments used to ‘steer’ complex networks of actors with a public purpose (Bressers and
O’Toole ; Commission of the European Communities ; Salamon /ed.).
See a similar argument in Hood (:).
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Moreover, it is interesting to observe the contribution of this thesis against the backdrop of
the still not very well-developed literature on policy instruments. So far, policy instruments
have not been sufficiently studied (Vedung :) nor considered central in political science
(Lascoumes and Le Galès :). However, some recent works such as Eliadis (/ed.),
Hood and Margetts (); Howlett ; Jennings and Lodge ) as well as the special is-
sues in ‘Governance’ (), ‘West European Politics’ () and ‘Revue Française de Science
Politique’ () indicate an increasing return to scholarly interest in policy instruments.
Although there is not a very extensive body of literature on policy instruments, the topic
can be traced back to the pioneers of political science. Lasswell, Dahl, Lindblom and Lowi
can be considered the fathers of the study of policy instruments. Inspired by these initial
path-breaking contributions, a first wave of policy instruments literature appeared in the area
of public policy and administration from the late s to the early s (Anderson ;
Salamon ; Trebilcock et al. ; Doern and Phidd ; Hood ; Woodside ;
McDonnell and Elmore ; Linder and Peters ; Salamon and Lund ; Schneider
and Ingram ). 
is first wave of studies on policy instruments proposed typologies of
instruments and evaluation criteria to assess the suitability of different tools. However, as
Howlett claims, this first wave did not resolve the disjuncture between complexity of policy
practice and simplicity in instrument analysis (Howlett :).
More recent works, mainly based on case studies or single policy areas, have attempted
to investigate policy instruments and their choices through several different approaches. For
instance, some works have focused on the impact of the political context and on the combi-
nations of tools (Nispen and Ringeling , Bruijn and Hufen , Bemelmans-Videc and
Vedung ). Others have relied on the application of transaction-cost economic models
in order to explain instrument choices (Horn ; Wood and Bohte ), on the analysis
of potential optimal instrument design (Grabosky ; Gunningham and Young ), on
coherence in policy design (May et al. ; Bressers, Fuchs and Kuks ) and on the
value of instrument research for the study of network management or governance (Bressers
and O’Toole ; Salamon /ed.; Eliadis et al. /eds.).
Still, the second wave of literature has not solved most of the problems that were present in
the first one. For instance, empirical studies are still scarce and their comparability is limited
(Landry and Varone :). Too much attention continues to be devoted to single instru-
ment studies ignoring that the action of the government in practice always involves a mixture
of the whole range of types of tools available (Hood :; Ringeling :; Howlett
:). So far, the existing literature has failed to address the interplay of explanations based
Lasswell ( []:) argues that there is a limited set of ‘strategies’ available for governments and
that understanding these strategies and the instruments that compose them require the understanding of the
resources available. Lasswell () also suggests the manipulation of symbols, signs and icons as fundamental
tools for the government. Dahl and Lindblom () note the almost infinite possible combinations of policy
tools, provide a set of criteria to evaluate their performance and stress their important political and economic
implications. Finally, Lowi () develops some of the theoretical implications of the study of the means of
government intervention and introduces a threefold typology, according to which policies could be classified as
distributive, regulatory and redistributive.

ese authors introduced new political dimensions to be considered in instrument choice (such as electoral
calculations, ideological considerations, degree of coercion, administrative feasibility) that contrasted with the
explanations proposed by economists who usually offer ‘technical models’ assuming optimal matches between
market problems and policy instruments.
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on historical legacies and contextual factors in policy choices. On the whole, the approaches
of this second wave remain somewhat idiosyncratic and fragmented, and a cohesive body of
policy instrument literature or a strong common ground on which base further cumulative
research does not exist (Lakatos ).

e fundamental purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the policy instrument literature
filling some of these gaps. 
is research provides new empirical evidence drawn from compar-
ative cases from the sub-field of civil-military relations that help testing Hood’s  typology
and its capacity to become a standard framework for future comparative studies. 
is thesis
does not focus on a single type of tools. It shows that governments generally use combina-
tions of several different types of tools. Finally, this thesis explores historical and contextual
explanations of tool choice.
In sum, a series of theoretical considerations and the opportunity to contribute to a de-
veloping body of literature justify a policy instrument approach in this work. First, policy
instruments are manifestations of the government’s power and their stance on social control,
which makes them relevant objects of study. Second, the dissection of policies into their basic
components, i.e. policy instruments, facilitates and strengthens the analysis because it helps
making sense of the growing complexity in policy issues, identifying trends, tracing policy
change and establishing comparisons. 
ird, by focusing on ‘what government does’, a tool
approach reduces the room for speculation and subjectivity in the analysis. Fourth, the many
questions unresolved and the very few empirical comparative works in the incipient policy
instruments literature create an invitation for further research and theoretical contributions.

is thesis grasps this opportunity.
1.4 Research questions and claims19
Two puzzles have motivated this thesis. 
e first one is a theoretical/methodological puzzle.
Hood’s ()  scheme has attracted more academic attention than any other framework
for the analysis of policy instruments and has served as basis for many theoretical discussions.
However, so far there have been very few attempts in the literature to apply the framework
in an empirical comparison. 
is raises the question whether the  framework, beyond
its capacity to generate abstract arguments and debates, is well suited for in-depth empirical

ese combinations are referred to here as the control or government ‘toolkit’ or ‘tool-mix’. 
is approach
is consistent with recent claims in the literature. For instance, Howlett suggests that policy instrument research
should be extending the analysis to what he calls ‘policy-instruments mixes’, ‘portfolios’, ‘governance strategies’,
‘implementation styles’(Howlett :–, ) or ‘governance modes’ (Howlett ). Bressers and O’Toole
(:–) suggest passing from the study of single instruments to that of ‘instrumentation strategies’ or
‘blends of instruments’.

e use of the term ‘claim’ instead of ‘hypothesis’ aims to avoid confusion. 
e methodological approach
of this thesis is fundamentally qualitative; the hypothetical-deductive model is not strictly followed in statistical
sense. Due to the scope of the thesis in terms of time period and intervening factors this thesis aims to provide the
most plausible explanations extracted from the comparative analysis of extensive primary and secondary sources
without formally testing all rival hypotheses.
 citations in Googlescholar.com.
Vabo and Røiseland’s () working paper and Jennings and Lodge’s () article are probably the sole
exceptions.

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comparative analysis. 
is thesis aims to test the heuristic value of Hood’s taxonomy as a
knowledge-generating instrument (Chapters , ).
Second, this thesis attempts to solve an empirical puzzle: very similar countries experiencing
similar political regimes and transformations developed very different civil-military relations
and levels of control of the military. Whereas in Spain the armed forces remained the bastion
of authoritarianism and loyal to Franco, in Portugal the military overthrew the dictatorial Es-
tado Novo. 
e attitude of the armed forces during the transition in both countries may be
considered almost diametrically opposed. 
us, this research throws light on the empirical
puzzle and addresses the questions whether Portuguese and Spanish governments used differ-
ent combinations of tools to subordinate the military and why their choices of tools diverged
or converged.

is thesis examines four claims or hypotheses linked to these questions. 
e first and
second claims deal with the styles of government and civil-military relations. 
e third and
fourth claims deal with the type of factors that shape civil-military relations and the choices
of tools.
Different styles of government or control linked to meta-policy preferences have been ex-
plored in the sub-fields of policy instruments and civil-military relations. 
e first claim
examined here is about the existence of well-defined styles for governing the military, which
are contingent upon geopolitical features. Historians and political scientists have debated the
existence of some underlying Iberian ethos. For instance, Herr and Polt’s () edited work
assesses the existence of an Iberian identity. Telo and Torre () argue that parallel and
similar processes of internal change in Portugal and, constant interrelations and joint actions
support the idea of the Peninsula as a unit in the system of international relations. In their anal-
yses of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, Wiarda () and Magone ()
suggest the existence of a common political culture in the Iberian Peninsula. 
e existence of
academic publications such as the ‘International Journal of Iberian Studies’ and the ‘Journal
of Iberian and Latin American Research’ as well as several research institutes and groups de-
voted to ‘Iberian Studies’ implicitly support this assumption. 
is research assesses, through
the observation and comparison of the mixes of tools of control employed in these countries,
whether it is appropriate referring to an ‘Iberian style of government’ or ‘Iberian model of

ese two claims are assessed in Chapter . 
e trajectories identified in tool choice thanks to the 
framework are compared between Portugal and Spain as well as between the dictatorial and the later transitional
and early democratic periods.

ese two claims are contrasted in Chapter .
For instance, Hood (:–) distinguishes regulatory government, government by propaganda,
cheque-book government and government by duress. Later, grounded in grid/group cultural theory, he intro-
duces four public management styles that could be applied to governments’ choices: fatalist, egalitarian, hier-
archist, individualist (Hood ). Howlett (: ) identifies four basic ‘implementation styles’ according
to the nature of the policy target and severity of state constraints: institutionalised voluntarism, regulatory cor-
poratism, directed subsidisation and public provision with oversight. Later Howlett (:–) refers to four
‘governance styles’: legal, corporatist, market and network. Ringeling (:–) distinguishes between
four ‘governance models’: command and control, governance along main policy lines, selective governance and
facilitating governance.
For instance, Huntington () distinguishes between objective and subjective type of control; Janowitz
() identifies four models of the state: aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian and garrision state; Luckham
() suggests eight models of control: objective, constabulary, apparat, nation-in-arms, revolutionary nation-
in-arms, guardian state, post-colonial buardian state, praetorian state.
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civil-military relations’. 
is thesis shows that there was no one single ‘Iberian’ government
style or model of civil-military relations, nor a constant country-specific style throughout the
period analysed.

e second claim is about the existence of a style for governing the military linked to the
type of regime. Many political scientists have studied the regime type as explanatory factor
for economic and political outcomes (Przeworski and Limongi ; Olson ; Linz ;
Cheibub ; Geddes ; Lijphart ). Portugal and Spain experienced important
regime changes during the period analysed and the literature on democratisation and regime
transition has often treated Portugal and Spain as paradigmatic cases of authoritarian regimes
and transitions to democracy (O’Donnell et al. ; Chilcote ; Huntington ; Linz
and Stepan ). It seems a logical exercise to test if the type of regime is associated with
a specific style of control. 
is research investigates if there are distinctly ‘authoritarian’,
‘transitional’ and ‘democratic’ styles of control and civil-military relations. It shows that the
strategies and means for the subordination of the military within each type of regime varied
across time and across country and that it would therefore not be accurate to refer to a single
‘authoritarian’ or ‘transitional’ style. 
e research also stresses the convergence in tools and
civil-military relations from  onwards, implying that the existence of a ‘democratic’ model
of control cannot be rejected.

e third and fourth claims on the factors that shaped the trajectories in civil-military re-
lations and tool choice are inspired by neoinstitutionalist theory. Policy instruments are
institutions (Lascoumes and Le Galès :; Halpern and Le Galès :). 
e tools of
control studied in this thesis can be considered as the institutions that structure the relation-
ship between the governments and the military. 
eir evolution can, therefore, be analysed
as any other type of institutional change. Neo-institutionalist literature provides many var-
ied interpretations for processes of institutional stability and change. 
e third and fourth
claims correspond to two of these alternative (but not mutually exclusive) neo-institutional
explanations.

e third claim is about the evolution of civil-military relations and tool choice as the re-
sult of ‘historical causes’. 
e impact of macro-historical events such as the rise of Fascism,
the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War,  membership, colonial conflicts and
transitional political processes have been constantly highlighted by historians and other social
researchers studying civil-military relations in Spain and Portugal. Neo-institutional authors
have suggested the capacity of past events to trigger institutional change by creating ‘critical
Ringeling (:) argues that instruments need to fit within the political-administrative setting of a
country and are the result of political ideology, legal traditions, styles of governance and governance model.

ere is, nonetheless, an extensive corpus of alternative literature analysing micro-level policy choices that
will not be addressed in this thesis. For instance, Simon (), Lindblom (), Vickers (), Dror (),
Cohen et al.() and Williamson (). See Parsons (:–) for an assessment on decision analysis
literature.

is is consistent with the more widely accepted definitions of institutions. For instance, Hall states that
institutions are ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ (Hall :) and North argues
that institutions are ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North :).
See for instance March and Olsen (), North (), Powell and DiMaggio (/eds.), 
elen (),
Pierson () and Hay ().
See abundant examples from Chapters  to .
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junctures’ and setting into motion some self-reinforcing dynamics and inertias also known as
‘path dependent’ processes. Moreover, the causal power of past events and inertia in pol-
icy choices has already been a feature of policy instrument literature. 
is research assesses
whether these macro-historical events shaped governments’ choices and if they were respon-
sible for the evolution observed. It shows that critical junctures and inertias are present
but that explanations, exclusively based on path-dependence do not account for all changes
observed in the toolkit.

e fourth claim concerns the role of context as a ‘constant cause’ shaping trajectories in
tool choice. Many theorists in the policy instruments literature have suggested that the con-
text in which choices are made strongly influences the selection of tools (Anderson ; Hall
; Woodside ; Linder and Peters ; Bressers and O’Toole ). Here, context
is understood in a broad sense, encompassing ideational features such as perceptions, ideolo-
gies, values and interest as well as institutional, organisational, and systemic aspects. 
is
research examines whether tool choices were shaped by environmental factors such as ideas,
the institutional political structure and international actors. It shows that these environmental
factors altered the desirability and availability of choices thus impacting change and stability
in the toolkit.
In sum, this thesis examines the capacity of Hood’s  typology as comparative frame-
work. It investigates whether the choice of tools of control to subordinate the military can
be linked to geopolitical features or regime type as well analyses two alternative neo-instituti-
onalist explanations for the evolution observed. It shows that Portugal and Spain developed
different patterns of tool choice and civil-military relations and that there is no Iberian style of
control or civil-military relations. Moreover, it reveals that there were no common trajectories
associated with ‘authoritarian’ and ‘transitional’ types of regimes. Finally, this research shows
that ‘orthodox’ path-dependence based on ‘historical causes’ needs to be complemented by
other accounts that take into consideration the continuing effects of the ideational and insti-
tutional context.
1.5 Methodology

is is a qualitative comparative analysis of Portugal and Spain based on the historical ex-
amination of civil-military relations and the application of Hood’s  framework. 
is
section outlines the main choices and assumptions in terms of method of analysis, case selec-
tion and sources. 
e comparative and neo-institutional frameworks of analysis are developed
in Chapter .
For instance Krasner (), David (), Collier and Collier (), 
elen (), Hacker () and
Pierson ().
For instance, using the example of Canadian policy programmes, Doern and Phidd (:) illustrate
that debates about instrument choice are a cumulative product of previous debates and choices; Linder and
Peters (:) stress that the collective memory of an organization tends to be associated with the repetitive
utilisation of some instruments and that institutions limit choices. Hood () and Howlett () suggest
the existence of somewhat stable government or national policy.

e analytical concepts used are introduced in Chapter  and the analysis is developed in Chapter .
See Linder and Peters for an interpretation of the ‘ecology of contexts’ related to tool choices (:–).

e environmental factors are explained in Chapter  and the analysis is developed in Chapter .

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1.5.1 Comparative historical analysis

is thesis combines historical inquiry with comparative politics. It identifies the main pat-
terns of the utilisation of control tools by applying the framework to wide-ranging histor-
ical evidence and then establishes (non-statistical) inferences about the factors that motivated
government choices in Portugal and Spain. Although comparative historical analysis has pro-
duced remarkable contributions to social research, it also presents some dilemmas and choices
which require further clarification. 
is section justifies the choice of a small-n comparative
analysis based on historical evidence and presents some of its theoretical assumptions.

e complexity involved in social phenomena limits researchers’ ability to establish and test
inferences from a pure empiricist stance. 
e nature of the actors involved in this work, gov-
ernments and the military, makes it impossible to conduct experiments or quasi-experiments
(Campbell and Stanley ). 
e inability to replicate the circumstances from which the
theoretical puzzles emerge makes it necessary to collect additional historical data, in this case
on civil-military relations, from other similar episodes in the same or other countries in order
to deepen the understanding and corroborate the hypotheses.
Most civil-military studies have either focused on one single country or compared many
countries. Single-case studies allow a ‘thick description’ (Geertz ) and deeper under-
standing of processes but have been considered less suitable to infer and test general propo-
sitions. Conversely, the comparison of many different countries allows for inferences that
are more accurate and a higher level of confidence in the rejections or verification of the hy-
pothesis tested (King et al. ). Nonetheless, the larger the number of countries involved
the lower the attention that may be devoted to each case (assuming limited resources) and the
greater the problems adapting conceptual categories for comparisons (Sartori ; Collier
and Mahon ). Some influential authors have tried to reconcile both approaches to so-
cial research and have defended the capacity of small-n qualitative analysis to generate causal
inference (Bennett and George ; Mahoney b; Brady and Collier /eds.). 
is
thesis, inspired by these approaches, seeks a nuanced position between the virtues of inference
and those of complexity. It studies two countries but throughout different periods of their
history.

is thesis avoids the epistemological and methodological battles while keeping rigor and
the generation of cumulative progress as basic principles. 
e utilisation of Hood’s resource-
based framework involves a bias towards qualitative analysis and away from rational choice
See in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer () provide an extensive list of works and introduce unresolved
dilemmas and open epistemological debates.
For instance, Huntington (), Stepan () and Herspring ().
For instance, Finer ( []), Decalo () and Forster ().
For instance, Geddes argues that a single observation gives ‘no information about the direction or mag-
nitude of the possible relationship between any hypothesized cause and the outcome’ (Geddes :). Li-
jphart claims that a single case study ‘can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalisation nor the ground
for disproving an established generalisation’ (Lijphart :), and Rose warns about the frequent dangers of
‘uniqueness through false particularisation’, this is, the absence of generic qualities, and ‘false universalism’ that
assumes that theories tested in one country or context can be applied to others (Rose ). See also Gerrings’
() critique on single Eckstein’s ‘crucial cases’ () as a base for testing theory.
Due to the multiplicity of episodes analysed it would not be accurate to refer to this research as an ‘n=’
comparative study.

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paradigms that have been dominating political science recently. Historical and interpreta-
tive analysis can elicit not only descriptions but also explanations and generalisations and
therefore contribute to a coherent and rigorous body of research (Adler :; Wendt
:–). Although some of the policy tools are numerically measured here, a purely
quantitative template would fail to capture the salience of some of the instruments in the con-
trol toolkit and the impact of the historical legacies and contextual factors on tool choices.

e selection of tools cannot be reduced to utility calculi and the action of individuals. Ideas
and institutions affect choices. 
is thesis assumes that actors are both strategic and socialised
and that it is possible bridge the traditional ‘structure vs. agency’ and ‘culture vs. calculus’
divides (Giddens ; Wendt ; Hall and Taylor ). 
e criticisms that this type of
middle-ground stance may attract do not invalidate its heuristic value. Moreover, as Sil and
Katzenstein () argue in their defence of ‘analytic eclecticism’, borrowing from different
paradigms and combining different methodological approaches and causal explanations can
be very beneficial in terms of stimulating dialogue between research traditions and opening
new paths for innovative contributions.
Finally, this thesis goes beyond the mere description of a sequence of events regarding civil-
military relations. It pays attention to historical particularities while aiming to construct the-
oretical generalisations. 
is thesis anchors its explanations at several levels. 
e factors that
shape civil-military relations and tool choices are found at the micro, meso and macro levels,
ranging from decision-makers’ preferences and personal experiences to international armed
conflicts.
1.5.2 Case Selection

ere are several reasons for choosing Portugal and Spain as objects of the study. First, the
comparison of similar regimes within a geo-cultural region, such as the Iberian Peninsula,
helps explaining institutional change (Luong ). Portugal and Spain share many common
features, such as geographical location, social structure of the population, traditions, religion,
emigration, colonialist past, long-running dictatorial regimes or parallel and interdependent
democratisation experiences. 
e choice of these countries is inspired by Mill’s ( [])
‘method of difference’ or Przeworski and Teune’s (:) ‘most similar cases’. 
ese cases
exhibit the ‘sufficient similarity’ to make meaningful the comparisons between them (Pier-
Fundamentally military expenditures and budgets are measured.

is fundamentally qualitative comparative study assumes the possibility of multiple causation without
abandoning the goal of establishing legitimate analytical (not statistical) inferences. A similar argument can be
found in Munck (:–).

is type of middle-ground approaches have become increasingly popular in political science, and usually
are associated with constructivism. See for instance Onuf (), Wendt (), Adler (), Checkel (),
Campbell (), Blyth (), Hay (). See some criticisms to constructivism in Smith and Hollis (
and ).

e excessive emphasis on description has been a criticism directed at traditional historical research (Roberts
; Bennett and George ). 
ere are also authors that oppose to this. For instance, Oakeshott states that
history is a ‘complicated world, without unity of feeling or clear outline: in it events have no overall pattern
or purpose, lead nowhere, point to no favoured condition of the world and support no practical conclusion’
(Oakeshott :).

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son and Skocpol ). 
e resemblances between these countries help isolating the causes
responsible for choices and ruling out alternative factors or explanations.
Second, most arguments and claims in civil-military relations have been extracted from the
analysis of the . Most representative authors, including Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos
and many authors in the latest wave of literature, have focused on the . 
e  military
and government, although extremely important, cannot be considered as archetypal cases.
Using them as the main source for theory building is therefore problematic. Moreover, civil-
military relations in other countries face different challenges of nature and degree (Cottey
et al. ). 
us, the study of Portugal and Spain throughout different political systems
may provide a more representative picture of an average country and the findings of such an
investigation might be applied into a wider range of contexts. Moreover, these are innovative
cases. 
e policy instruments literature has never used Portugal or Spain as case studies and,
although these countries have been often compared by political scientists, their civil-military
relations were very rarely emphasised.

ird, as the New Southern Europe literature sufficiently develops, Portugal and Spain are
two different paradigmatic cases of political transitions and democratic consolidations. 
e
new wave of democratisation that the Arab world is experiencing today makes the study of
these Southern European countries increasingly relevant. Many of the lessons they pro-
vide can help understanding the complexities and problems faced at the level of civil-military
relations by countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Spain and Portugal successfully imple-
mented civilian control of the armed forces and developed new democratic political systems.
Academics and practitioners concerned with the role of the military in regime change and
democratisation should therefore consider their experiences.
Finally, Portugal and Spain are comparable to a great extent and at the same time interesting
and idiosyncratic enough to produce a rich analytical outcome. 
e paths they followed from
dictatorship into consolidated democracy differed widely:
In Portugal, a military coup ended the First Republic in . Salazar, a former university
professor, was appointed Finance Minister in . 
anks to his success dealing with the
economic problems, the military handed the political power over to Salazar. In , he be-
came Prime Minister and inaugurated the civilianised dictatorship with fascist reminiscences:
the Estado Novo. 
e Estado Novo was an autarkic, colonially based, corporatist regime in-

e literature about military coups in developing countries is an exception (Section .).
Feaver (:–) refers to it as ‘an American renaissance’. For instance see Roman and Tarr (),
Dauber (), Desch (a, ), Moskos (), Feaver and Kohn () and Feaver ().
For instance, Forster () shows that the postmodern new paradigm elicited from the analysis of the 
does not fit in other contexts. Bruneau (:) acknowledges that the  becomes a problematic source for
cumulative comparative analysis.
For instance Linz (, ), Chilcote (); O’Donnell and Schmitter (); Wiarda ();
Sánchez Cervelló (), Gunther et al.(), Linz and Stepan () and Telo and Torre ().
Danopoulos’ () article comparing civil-military relations in Greece, Spain, and Portugal is an excep-
tion.
See for instance Gunther et al. (/eds.), Diamandouros and Gunther (/eds.), Gunther et al.
(/eds.) 
is literature also covers the cases of Italy and Greece.

e study of other cases in the Mediterranean area such as Greece and Turkey would also be extremely
helpful in this regard. See Brown (), Kourvetaris and Dobratz (), Karabelias (), Narli () and
Cizre ().
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spired by Catholic principles in which political and individual liberties were subordinated to
socio-economic priorities (Porch :; Nataf :).
In Portugal, the military did not exercise direct control of the regime but maintained im-
portant prerogatives. 
e armed forces were autonomous with little interference from civilian
oversight organs, there was important military presence in the government and regime ad-
ministration and diverse political views were tolerated among the ranks. Although Salazar
experienced many military coup attempts (at least  between  and ), overall the
military remained subordinated to his regime (Ferreira :–). Salazar used the Span-
ish Civil War, the Second World War and the cooperation with the  allies to reinforce his
sway on the armed forces. However, the Colonial Wars (–) emerged as an impor-
tant source of disagreement between the government and the military. Civil-military tensions
were aggravated during Caetano’s rule (–). Caetano’s ability to implement policies
was undermined by the very strong pressures exerted by hard liners.
A military coup put an end to the Estado Novo on the  April . 
e so-called Car-
nations Revolution opened a transitional process which, from the civil-military perspective,
was very convoluted. 
e Portuguese transition can be divided in two different phases. Dur-
ing the period of provisional governments (–), the military controlled not only the
armed forces but also all of the governing institutions. During the period of constitutional
governments (from ), the military influence dwindled gradually. 
e dissolution in 
of the Council of the Revolution, a military institution with far-reaching political powers, was
a milestone in Portuguese civil-military relations. Portugal’s  membership in  marks
the conclusion of the process of democratic consolidation.
In Spain, the socio-political situation was very unstable during the Second Republic (–
) (Jackson ). On  July , important sectors of the military with the support of
conservative political forces and the Church rebelled against the left coalition ‘Frente Popular’.

e uprising failed in many zones and a civil war began dividing Spain into two camps: the
loyalist Republicans and the rebel Nationalists, who — led by General Franco — won the war
in . 
is war conditioned the life of Spain for the next four decades.

e features of the dictatorship evolved over time but similar to the Estado Novo, the Fran-
coist regime was for the most part a civilianized regime (Linz and Gunther ). Nonethe-
less, the military became the backbone of the dictatorship. Franco was the ‘Generalísimo’ of
the victorious armed forces and enjoyed the loyalty of the military who gained important
privileges and high levels of prestige (Payne :; Preston :–). Franco thor-
oughly purged the armies, established personal ties with the military leadership, promoted a
mythical image of the armed forces and granted the military a central role in the fight against
the ‘internal enemy’. 
e military also became important as a vehicle to disseminate the ‘new’
values and the Castilian language in multi-cultural Spain (Olmeda :–). 
us,
Franco did not have to face any major threat from the military, which remained loyal and
perceived themselves as guardians of its traditions and values even after his death.
According to Payne (:), the policies and structure of the dictatorship can be characterized as ‘prae-
torian in  and , fascist or semi-fascist from  to , Catholic corporatist from  to  and
modernizing, bureaucratic and authoritarian from  to ’.
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e death of Franco in  initiated a transition process that culminated in the peace-
ful transfer of power to the Socialist Party, , after the  elections (Linz and Stepan
:). 
is transition has been extensively studied and is considered an example of suc-
cess (Preston ; Linz ; Gunther et al. ). Many factors contributed to the process
of democratisation, such as economic growth, industrialisation, urbanisation or skilful elite
leadership; however, it is very difficult to understand it fully without examining civil-military
relations. 
e military played a prominent role during the dictatorship and the early stages
of democracy, jeopardising and conditioning the transition. 
e coup attempt on the rd
February  () has caught the attention of many scholars but it was only one among at
least six military plots against democracy between  and , including a plan for the
assassination of the King and the Government in Coruña in June  (Gilmour :–
; Preston :–; Díaz Fernández :–). However, less attention has
been paid to the question of how and why the military disengaged from politics in Spain
(Rodrigo :; Agüero :–).
1.5.3 Sources

is thesis conducts an in-depth historical analysis of primary and secondary sources con-
cerning civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain from the early s to , from the
origin of the right-wing authoritarian regimes until the countries’ membership into the Euro-
pean Economic Community which marks the consolidation of the new democratic regimes in
both countries. 
is thesis adopts a process of quasi-triangulation (Lustick :) which
mitigates problems of selection bias concerning the historical data and accounts. All narra-
tives about tool choices have been constructed by combining several different authors and
primary sources in order to increase the level of confidence in the accounts and the thickness
of description. Controversial or disputed data have been explicitly acknowledged.

e primary research focuses on the examination of defence and military internal reports,
laws, decrees, budgets, speeches, interviews and letters. In the case of Portugal, the main pri-
mary resources scrutinised were the personal archives of António Oliveira Salazar and Marcello
Caetano as well as the Council of the Revolution and Portuguese Military History archives.

ese historical archives provide also valuable information on Spanish political transforma-
tions and the relationships between the Iberian countries, which for the most part have not
been explored in previous analyses of Spain.
For the case of Spain, the most important sources used were Franco’s personal archives and
the extensive audio collection of the ‘Fundación Ortega y Gasset’, which contains interviews
with political and military leaders as well as recordings of conferences on military issues held
during the early years of democracy. 
ese archives have hitherto been underutilised by re-
searchers of Spain’s public policy and civil-military relations.
Portuguese and Spanish legislation on defence has served as another fundamental base of
evidentiary support. Newspapers and military magazines as well as books and correspondence
written by some of the most relevant actors (such as Salazar, Caetano, Franco, General Spínola,
General Gutierrez Mellado and Narcís Serra) have been used here.
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Finally, due to the length of the periods covered, the complexity of the subjects analysed and
the existing gaps in the primary resources available, this research also covers a wide range of
secondary sources, including an extensive history, sociology and political science bibliography
related to defence, military affairs, international relations, and politics as well as biographies
of political and military leaders.
1.6 Thesis plan

is thesis is divided in four parts: Part I (Chapters  and ) outlines the objectives and
choices of the thesis. Part  (Chapters ,  and ) and Part  (Chapters ,  and ) analyse
civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain, respectively. Part  (Chapters ,  and )
compares and explains trajectories in choices of control tools.
Chapter  focuses on the comparative and explanatory frameworks. First, it introduces
a revised version of Hood’s  resource-based framework for the comparison of tools of
government and explains why this framework has been selected over other typologies of policy
instruments. Second, it presents the two institutionalist explanations of the evolution of tool
choice. One relies on macro-historical events as generators of path-dependence dynamics and
the other on the capacity of environmental factors to shape choices.
Part  and  are the result of the analysis of empirical historical evidence from primary
and secondary sources. Chapters  and  explore chronologically the contemporary history
of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain from the inception of Salazar’s and Franco’s
dictatorial regimes until . Appendices A and B complement these chapters summarising
civil-military relations from the Napoleonic Wars. 
ese chapters set the background for the
posterior analysis hinting at the historical processes and contextual factors that conditioned the
evolution of governments’ approaches to military subordination. Chapters , ,  and  have
same structure and classify according to the  framework the tools that Portuguese and
Spanish governments used for the subordination of the military. Chapter  covers the period
of the Estado Novo (–), Chapter  the Francoist regime (–), Chapter 
the transition and early democratic stages in Portugal (–) and Chapter  in Spain
(–). 
ese chapters synthesise the actions of governments and in doing so identify
the main trends in tool choice. 
eir purpose is to constitute a database or baseline on the
governments’ tools of control to facilitate the analysis in the subsequent chapters and to serve
as a test for the  framework.
Building on the previous empirical chapters and the comparisons established thanks to the
 framework, Chapter  analyses and contrasts the most striking features in terms of tra-
jectories in tool choices, and establishes whether these can be associated with a specific country
or type of political regimes. Chapter  develops two neo-institutionalist explanations on the
Much of the information related to government tools surrounding some critical periods such as the Spanish
Civil War, the Portuguese Colonial Wars and the  coup has been destroyed or remains classified. Even less
controversial information about periods of apparently relative stability is still often unavailable. 
is is especially
the case with the documentation of the Spanish Ministry of Defence. Access to documents and internal archives
has been repeatedly rejected during this research; sometimes on the basis of the restrictive Law of Official Secrets
/ (still in force since its enactment during the Francoist regime), sometimes on the basis of the lack of
resources to conduct a security assessment required for the access to on the information requested.
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causal processes that triggered and shaped these trajectories. First, it examines the evolution of
the control toolkit from a path-dependence angle looking at ‘historical causes’. It shows that
some macro-historical events (i.e. the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Colonial
Wars and political transitions from authoritarianism) produced critical junctures in the gov-
ernments’ toolkits and that some features of the trajectories in tool choice can be explained by
concepts such as exogenous shocks, punctuated equilibria, self-reinforcing mechanisms and
sequence. However, it is argued that orthodox accounts based on path-dependence fail to
capture all the dynamics observed in the toolkit. Second, it examines the continuing action
of context on the trajectories of tool-choice by focusing on three sets of environmental factors
(i.e. ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment).
Finally, Chapter  summarises the main descriptive and causal findings as well as the
methodological and meta-theoretical contribution of this research. It stresses that the util-
isation of public policy analytical frameworks helps developing a better understanding of
civil-military relations. 
e  scheme provides a different angle and a solid ground for
comparison between the two countries. It enables the identification of previously unrecog-
nised patterns in civil-military relations.


2 Analytical framework
2.1 Introduction

is chapter specifies the comparative and explanatory frameworks used in the analysis of
Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations. 
e first part of this chapter introduces the
comparative framework: Hood’s  resource-based typology for the classification of tools
of government (). It explains some adaptations made to the original  framework;
in particular the introduction of subcategories within each of the four basic typologies; and
how this classification scheme is operationalised. Next, it maps the advantages of Hood’s
framework vis-à-vis other alternative approaches to policy instruments and its contribution
to the civil-military and policy instrument literatures.

e second part of the chapter argues that the tools used by the government to control
the military are institutions and that change and that stability in tool choice can be analysed
through neo-institutional theoretical paradigms for the study of institutional change. 
is
chapter introduces two alternative types of explanations (later developed in Chapter ): one
based on the impact of historical legacies and the other on the continuing action of context.
‘Historical causation’ and the basic analytical concepts associated to path-dependence are pre-
sented. Finally, this chapter outlines the impact of context on civil-military relations and in
particular on the control toolkit, by looking at three sets of environmental factors, namely
ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment.
2.2 Comparative framework
2.2.1 Developing a tools perspective: a revised NATO framework
Hood’s ()  framework sums up the four basic resources that government possess
and according to which policy instruments can be classified: nodality, authority, treasure and
organisation. Instruments are categorised according to the main resource from which they
draw their power.
Nodality is the ‘property of being in the middle of an information or social network’ (Hood
:). Governments use their nodal situation, i.e. their location in relation with the for-
mal and informal network of communication channels to transmit and receive information.
Nodality is used through messages, such as notifications, public announcements or propa-
ganda, as well as by means of information gathering and management.
Some tools draw their power from more than one basic resource, however for the sake of simplicity hybrid
categories will not be considered and tools will be classified according to the predominant resource.

A 
Table : NATO Typology: ‘constraint’ and ‘depletability’
Contingent (low) depletability Immanent (high) depletability
High-constraint
on the subject
Authority Organisation
Low-constraint on
the subject
Nodality Treasure
Source: Hood and Margetts (:)
Authority refers to the ‘possession of legal or official power . . . to demand, forbid, guaran-
tee, adjudicate’ (ibid :). By definition, governments are granted the power or the right to
give orders or make decisions concerning others. Authority is used through tokens such as
certificates, laws, and sanctions.
Treasure indicates ‘the possession of a stock of moneys or fungible chattels’ (ibid :). Gov-
ernments can spend their financial resources to attain policy goals. Treasure is spent in salary,
rewards, materials and other equipment.
Organisation denotes ‘the possession of a stock of people . . . land, buildings, materials and
equipment somehow arranged’ (ibid :). Governments can utilise the structure or machinery
of the state as an instrument. Organisation as a resource is employed in what Hood calls ‘treat-
ments’, namely the use of people’s efforts and other material capabilities of the organisation.

ese resources can be organised according to the criteria of ‘depletability’ and ‘constraint’
(Hood and Margett :–). Treasure and organisation are considered ‘immanently
depletable’. 
e financial and material capabilities of a government are limited. 
ese re-
sources are depleted as they are used; their use diminished the government’s capacity to use
them in the future. Authority and nodality are ‘contingently depletable’ because the utilisation
of these resources does not necessarily diminish them; it may even augment or strengthen
them. On the other hand, organisation and authority are considered to have the potential to
set high constraints on the actions of policy subjects while nodality and treasure are usually
less restraining (Table ).

is thesis adapts the  framework to the context of civil-military relations. Some
clarifications are important to understand how this framework is operationalised:
First, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the government and the armed
forces and not on the relationship between the government and society at large as in Hood’s
study. In this thesis, the military constitute the subject or ‘problem’ addressed by the govern-
ment tools. Although governments and the armed forces are by no means unitary entities but
composed by several sub-entities and individuals, for analytical and comparability purposes
they will be treated as units in the adapted framework.
Authority and nodality operate fundamentally at a cognitive level.

e armed forces are also tools that governments utilise for defence or control purposes.
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Second, this thesis does not evaluate whether tools were successfully or intelligently de-
signed and implemented, nor does it provide a comprehensive typology of government pol-
icy styles. A systematic assessment of the historical success of military subordination policies
would involve great subjectivity at two levels: the selection of evaluation criteria and the col-
lection of evidence. On the other hand, as Howlett (:–) suggests, in order to create
a generalisable theory that links policy instruments and governing styles, more cross-sectoral
and cross-country comparative research would be necessary. It would also require additional
theoretical clarification around the concept of government policy style. Such an endeavour is
the scope of this thesis.

ird, this thesis introduces new subcategories to the  framework (Table ). Hood’s
basic fourfold typology is parsimonious and flexible enough to be used in the context of civil-
military relations. A preliminary analysis of the empirical evidence showed that all tools of
government observed could be linked to (at least) one of the four categories without diffi-
culty. However, the fact that there is a large degree of variance within each of these categories
is problematic (Linder and Peter :). Each of the categories captures very dissimilar
approaches to military subordination. For instance, armed paramilitary forces, military edu-
cation and the provision of jobs in the administration are three common organisation control
instruments. Legal limitations and the prohibition of military unionism, as well as promo-
tions and privileges rewarding obedience are all authority tools. 
e acquisition of military
materials and weaponry, salary raises and individual economic incentives are treasure tools. In
the nodality category, too, there are disparate tools ranging from information and disinforma-
tion campaigns to the collection of information through official internal reports or the action
secret services.
To overcome this problem, Hood divides each of the four categories of tools into two types
of ‘applications’ or subcategories: ‘detectors’ and ‘effectors’. For Hood, detectors are ‘all the
instruments that government uses for taking in information’ and effectors those ‘that gov-
ernment can use to make an impact on the world outside’ (Hood :). 
is distinction
provides an elegant and homogeneous subdivision of the tools but it also introduces a sig-
nificant element of ambiguity. It is very difficult to distinguish empirically Hood’s nodality
detectors (‘nodality receivers’), from the detectors within the other categories: ‘rewards’ (trea-
sure), ‘requisitions’ (authority) and ‘ergonomic detectors’ (organisation). Nodality seems to be
indissolubly linked to the capacity to use information as a means of control. In fact, Hood
specifies that ‘[n]odality gives government the ability to traffic in information on the basis of
“figureheadedness” or of having the “whole picture”’. He stresses that nodality enables govern-
ments to ‘dispense’ and ‘draw in’ information and that the ‘coin’ how they spend this resource
is ‘messages sent and received’ (Hood :). In contrast, Hood’s definitions of the other
For instance Hood (:) suggests four ‘canons of good application of government instruments’ (Hood
:): the examination of alternative possible tools, match to the job, ethical considerations, and economy.
Hoods and Margetts (:), refer to appraisal criteria for ‘intelligent’ design: deliberative choice, fitness for
purpose, economy and moral acceptability. Other authors propose alternative criteria (see next section).

ese concepts originate from cybernetics, the science of general control systems (Dunsire :–).
Hood also introduces additional subsets within these subcategories; he suggests a third and fourth-tier subdivi-
sions of tools (Hood :, ; Hood and Margetts :–). 
ese are nonetheless beyond the scope of
this thesis. As explained later, excessive compartmentalising of tools hinders comparability.
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three basic resources do not mention their function as detectors of information and their role
seems to be circumscribed to that of effectors more or less directly impacting policy targets.

e extension of the concept ‘information detectors’ beyond nodality contributes to a blur-
ring of the boundaries between the different resources and complicates the classification of
tools. In terms of symmetry, it also seems that for the other three categories a subdivision
between ‘effectors’ and ‘detectors’ does not produce a balanced distribution of instruments.
It is not surprising that most interpretations of Hood’s typology equate nodality to ‘informa-
tion’ tools and ignore the subdivision between effectors and detectors in the other categories
(Linder and Peters :; Vedung :; Howlett and Ramesh :).

us, for the sake of clarity, this thesis employs the subcategories ‘effector’ and ‘detector’
only within the nodality category and assumes that all information detection tools are nodal-
ity tools. 
is approach deviates from Hood’s logic for practical reasons. 
e subcategories
chosen for the other resources have been constructed inductively from the empirical evidence
collected and are better suited to establish distinctive trends and thus trace policy change in
the context of Iberian civil-military relations. 
ese subcategories not only reflect substan-
tially different approaches to control but also allow a balanced distribution of tools in terms
of observations between them:
Nodality-based instruments, as explained above, are classified into ‘information effectors’
that serve to disseminate information, and ‘information detectors’ that enable the government
to gather information.
Organisation tools are divided into ‘coercive’ and ‘non-coercive’ tools according to whether
control is to be achieved by force/threat or by other means that do not entail violence or phys-
ical power. 
e level of coerciveness has been a general criterion widely used to discriminate
tools of government (Anderson ; Doern and Phidd ) but it is much better adapted
to organisation tools than to any of the other categories.
Authority tools are divided into ‘rewards and incentives’ on the one hand and ‘sanctions
and constraints’ on the other. 
e former are those that enable and/or stimulate specific be-
haviours and the latter to discourage them. 
is distinction follows a logic similar to that
of Ajzen () and Howlett (:) who draw a distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘neg-
ative’ instruments, i.e. tools that encourage or discourage behaviours which are aligned or
incongruent with policy goals.
Finally, treasure tools are divided into ‘staff’ and ‘equipment expenditure’. Staff expenditure
denotes the utilisation of a government’s financial resources spent directly to pay salaries,
pensions and other types of benefits to the target group. ‘Equipment expenditure’ refers to
the money spent to acquire goods, in this case essentially materials and weapons, with the
aim to create some conditions that would reinforce a certain behaviour. 
ese subcategories
also capture the distinction between money being transferred directly to the target group or
resources spent in a way that shapes the target group’s actions indirectly (Table ).
Similarly Vedung (:) refers to ‘affirmative’ (promoting) and ‘negative’ (restraining) tools.
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Table : Revised NATO framework
Hood’s Tools of
Government
Subcategories Examples of the tools in the context of military subordination
Organisation Coercive: utilisation of the stock of people, buildings and equipment in order to
directly impose a desired behaviour (or deter by force a non-desired one).
⇒ Examples: paramilitary or police forces, special military units, disciplinary
and political tribunals, penitentiary system.
Non-coercive: utilisation of the stock of people, buildings and equipment in
order to persuade or stimulate behaviour without the direct use of force.
⇒ Examples: military education and training, exploitation of the organisational
design and geographical deployment, provision of services, goods and jobs.
Nodality Information effectors: utilisation of the government’s central position to dissem-
inate, modify or omit information in order to induce a desired behaviour.
⇒ Examples: posters, publications, public speeches, mass media. Organisations
in charge of propaganda and censorship.
Information detectors: utilisation of the government’s central position to gather
information about observance or deviance from the desired behaviour.
⇒ Examples: action of intelligence services, informants, official reports.
Authority Rewards and incentives: utilisation of the government’s legal power to enable and
stimulate actions in accordance with the desired behaviour.
⇒ Examples: promotions, appointments and privileges granted to loyal officers,
functions granted to the military (e.g. participation in public order and justice).
Sanctions and constraints: utilisation of the government’s legal powers to punish,
forbid or hinder actions in disagreement with the desired behaviour.
⇒ Examples: limitations, prohibitions, removal of officers from crucial posi-
tions.
Treasure Staff expenditure: utilisation of the government’s financial resources by transfer-
ring money directly to the target of the policy as a means to ‘buy their will’ and
follow government wishes.
⇒ Examples: salary raises, pensions, economic incentives.
Equipment expenditure: utilisation of the government’s financial resources on the
acquisition of materials as means to increase the satisfaction of individuals and
their compliance.
⇒ Examples: acquisition of modern equipment and weapons, better facilities.
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2.2.2 Why the NATO framework?
Several authors have proposed alternative classifications and criteria for the analysis and com-
parison of policy instruments. 
e question is why choosing the  framework when it
has still has to be adjusted (as explained above)? 
is section shows that even with these
adaptations, the  framework offers advantages over other alternative policy instrument
approaches which are either too complicated to operationalise in comparative study or do
not fit well the empirical evidence collected on civil-military relations. It first explains why
a multi-dimensional classification has been ruled out and then specifies why  has been
selected over other generic classification schemes as a basis for establishing comparisons.
Two different approaches compete in current policy instrument literature; one favours the
development of multi-dimensional evaluation criteria and the other prefers simpler, mostly
one-dimensional, taxonomies, such as the  framework.
Authors such as Majone (), Kingdon () and Linder and Peters () claim the
importance of identifying several valuation criteria or attributes as a means to classify policy
instruments and, most importantly, understand their choice. Salamon goes further and defines
tools as ‘bundles of attributes’ (Salamon :–). Several multi-dimensional frameworks
can be found in the literature (Table ). 
ese frameworks classify each instrument according
to several qualities that decision-makers take into consideration in their tool choices. Most of
these models assume that these attributes are intrinsic to the tools; that the differences are not
in kind but in degree; and that decision-makers can discern the best mix of attributes required
to solve each problem.
Multi-dimensional approaches study different elements intervening in tool choice and,
prima facie, could be considered more apt for the endeavour of theory building than sim-
ple, generic classifications. However, in practice they entail some serious problems. First, as
Landry and Varone (:) stress, putting too much emphasis on the analysis of attributes
is problematic. Evaluating the ‘goodness’ or ‘fitness’ inherent to the instruments can divert
the attention away from important historical and contextual factors, which might be more
decisive in shaping the evolution of instrument choice and which are central to my research.

us, these frameworks present an implicit bias towards technical or rational choice expla-
nations that this thesis, as most of the of the policy instrument literature in political science,
have rejected.
Second, from a practical point of view, a multi-dimensional classification adds complex-
ity that makes it difficult to establish comparisons. If these dimensions were discrete and
several values were possible for each of them, their combination would produce many dif-
ferent types of tools. For instance, an approach using four dimensions for the classification
of policy instruments would have elicited a minimum of  possible types of instruments,
in case of only two possible values for each dimension,  in case of three possible values,
See for instance Linder and Peters’s ( and ) critiques to Hood’s typology and Hood’s rebuttal
().
Linder and Peters (:–) refer to ‘good’ policy instrument and ‘close fit’ or ‘goodness of match’.
Most authors in the literature emphasise the need of contextualising choices (Anderson ; Phidd and
Doern ; Linder and Peters ; Howlett and Ramesh ; Ringeling ). See next section.
Even one of the main proponents of this type of approaches, Salamon (:), acknowledges that mul-
tidimensionality complicates the task of describing and sorting tools.
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Table : Multi-dimensional approaches
Authors (date) Dahl and
Lindblom
()
Salamon and
Lund ()
Linder and
Peters ()
Bemelmans-
Videc
()
Salamon
()
Sandfort et al.
()
Criteria,
attributes or
dimensions
Instrument
ownership
Effectiveness Resource
intensiveness
Effectiveness Directness Management
capacity
Government
influence
Political
support
Targeting Efficiency Visibility Management
outcomes
Government
control
Administrative
feasibility
Political risk Legality Coerciveness Program capac-
ity
Instrument
membership
Efficiency Constraints to
government
activity
Democracy Automaticity Program
outcomes
Instrument
autonomy
Equity
Linder and Peters (:) later in the same article decouple these attributes into eight design criteria: com-
plexity of operation, level of public visibility, adaptability across uses, level of intrusiveness, relative costliness,
reliance on market, chances of failure and precision of targeting.
Sources: Howlett (); Salamon and Lund (); Linder and Peters (); Bemelmans-Videc
(); Salamon (/eds.); Sandfort et al. ()
 types of instruments in case of four, and so forth. Alternatively, if these criteria were
to be considered as a continuum, as suggested by most of their proponents, the problems of
assigning values to these (quite broad and difficult-to-measure) criteria would be added. 
e
fact that, with the exception of Salamon’s compilation (/ed.), practically no systematic
attempt of application of any of these multidimensional approaches has been made confirms
this problem.

ird, there is a trade-off between depth in terms of dimensions studied and breadth in
terms of tools covered. 
e application of multi-criteria evaluation analysis is in practice re-
stricted to the study one or very few instruments. However, instruments do not usually operate
alone but are used in bundles or combinations (Hood ; Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung
; Howlett ). Policy outcomes and government action can rarely be understood by
studying one or very few policy instruments only.
In brief, although multi-dimensional approaches are a useful basis for policy evaluation
and in-depth description they are not well-suited for systematically classifying and compar-
ing government action across time, space and policy areas. 
e utilisation of parsimonious

e formula is the number of possible values raised to the power of the number of dimensions. Some
non-multidimensional but maximalist tools inventories suffer from this inconvenience as well. For example,
Kirschen et al. () who identify  different types of basic policy instruments and Linder and Peters, who
identify  different tools (:).

eory building about governments’ control stance based on one single or few instruments amplifies the
risk of selection bias and the generalisation of the findings (Linder and Peters :–).
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Table : Other generic typologies of policy instruments
Authors
(date)
Anderson
()
Bardach
()
Doern and
Phidd
()
McDonnell
and Elmore
()
Schneider
and Ingram
()
Howlett and
Ramesh ()
Vedung
()
Criteria Degree of
coercion
Government
resources
Degree of
coercion
Intervention
strategy
Behavioural
features
State capacity and
policy subsystem
complexity
Basic
resources
Categories of
policy
instruments or
tools
Market
mechanisms
Money Self-
regulation
Mandates Authority Market or subsidy Sticks
Structured
options
Administrative
competency
Exhortation Inducements Incentives Direct provision Carrots
Biased
options
Creative
leadership
Expenditure Capacity
building
Capacity Regulatory or
information
Sermons
Regulation Political
support
Regulation System
changing
Symbolic
and
hortatory
Voluntary,
community or
family-based
Public
ownership
Learning
Sources: Anderson (); Bardach (); Doern and Phidd (); McDonnell and Elmore ();
Schneider and Ingram (); Howlett (); Vedung ().
typologies, such as the  framework, facilitates identifying trends in tool choice, estab-
lishing meaningful comparisons and therefore generalisations, which is the purpose of this
thesis.
Once multi-dimensional frameworks have been discarded as basis for comparison in this
dissertation it is necessary to explain why the  scheme was chosen among other basic
taxonomies. In the literature on policy instruments, there are several alternative generic tool
classifications that could be used as framework for tracing patterns and change in instrument
choice and establishing comparison (Table ).
Analytical reasons suggest the utilisation of the  framework to compare civil-military
relations in the Iberian Peninsula. First, resource-based classifications, such as Hood’s, offer
an important advantage. Concentrating on the basic resources from which instruments ob-
tain their power, rather than on intentions, capacities or degrees, simplifies categorisation and
reduces the impact of subjectivity. It seems easier to use Hood’s four basic resources than to
categorise the observed tools according to the behavioural mechanisms they supposedly aim
to trigger (Schneider and Ingram ), the level of state capacity (Howlett ) or the de-
gree of legitimate coercion the government is willing to employ (Anderson ). Moreover,
many of the non-resource approaches classify tools as a continuum. 
ey suggest technical
substitutability by formalising differences in degree not in nature (Howlett ; Landry and
Varone :). Hood’s resource approach escapes this shortcoming.
Lasswell ( []:) was the first to emphasise the need to identify the basic governing resources.
A distinction between ‘resource’ and ‘choice’ tools is used by Vedung (). It is inspired by Howlett
() who differentiates ‘resource’ and ‘continuum’ approaches. Resource taxonomies classify instruments based
on their nature. ‘Continuum’ models show differences in degree according to the choice criteria or attribute
employed. Doern and Phidd’s () and Schneider and Ingram’s () generic classifications are examples
of basic or generic ‘continuum models’. Multidimensional approaches tend to consider instruments alongside
several continuum dimensions.
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Second, the  framework fits the empirical evidence on civil-military relations better
than any other generic classification. 
e analysis of the tools employed to subordinate the
military in Portugal and Spain provides several examples for each of the categories and subcat-
egories; all instruments scrutinised can be easily identified with (at least) one of them. 
is
is not always the case with other generic typologies. When attempting to use other frame-
works, tools in the field of military control could often not be readily categorised and, more
importantly, in some cases instruments could not be clearly allocated to any of the categories
proposed in the typologies. For instance, Anderson’s (), Doern and Phidd’s () and
McDonnell and Elmore’s () typologies do not comfortably cover instruments of con-
trol based on the collection of information in order to prevent deviant behaviour (nodality
detectors in Hood’s terminology). Similarly, Vedung’s () classification, as the author ad-
mits, does not give room for the utilisation physical resources such people, lands, buildings
or equipment (organisation tools in Hood’s terminology).
Finally, a further reason for the choice of Hood’s typology over other generic ones can be
construed from Howlett’s division of policy instruments between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’
instruments (Howlett ). Substantive instruments are those designed to deliver or affect
the delivery of goods and services, while procedural instruments are used to alter aspects of
advisory deliberations, this is the policy process itself. Many of the generic typologies of policy
instruments, such as Anderson’s and Howlett and Ramesh’s, are much better suited for the
classification of ‘substantive’ instruments than for that of ‘procedural’ ones. Hood’s typology
offers the advantage to include both of them (Howlett :–, Howlett ).
In sum, on the one hand multi-dimensional approaches to tools complicate comparisons
when working with a variety of not easily quantifiable tools. On the other hand, classifi-
cations that are more generic can be collapsed into the  framework. As Howlett ac-
knowledges, ‘the virtues of Hood’s model are that it is relatively straightforward and serves as
an admirable synthesis of many other, earlier, resource-based models of policy instruments’
(Howlett :). Many of these categories are interchangeable with one of the four resources
or could be captured within them. 
is is especially the case after the addition of new subcate-
gories. From the perspective of simplicity in categorisation as well as its capacity to encompass
the empirical evidence and to overcome the theoretical substantive-procedural divide Hood’s
typology seems the appropriate choice.
2.3 Explaining change in tool choice: history and context

is thesis considers the tools of control as the institutions that structure the relationship
between the governments and the military and relies on neo-institutional theory to explain
the evolution of the choices of tools. In particular, it analyses the impact of macro-historical
events and environmental factors. It shows that some macro-historical events produced crit-
ical junctures that altered the control tool-mix that governments employed. It then analyses

is does not exclude the possibility that some instruments may portray characteristics of more than one
category.
Vedung’s threefold typology of ‘organisation strategies’, based on Etzioni’s dimensions of power (), is
also a resource approach that distinguishes among regulation, economic means and information as basic govern-
ment resources (Vedung :, –).
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whether civil-military relations and tool choice were locked in specific paths or trajectories by
the legacies of these events or whether the action of the ideational and institutional context
shaped these trajectories between two critical junctures.
Technical or rational choice explanations on policy instruments have been explored in eco-
nomics (Posner ; Stokey and Zeckhauser ; Mitnick ; Wolf ; Weimer and
Vining ). Nonetheless, the generalisability of their findings remains limited and most
studies in political science agree that tool choices are not merely a matter of rational or tech-
nical deliberation. For instance, it has been argued that policy instruments are not neutral
and that they are not selected on the bases of an optimal relationship between policy goals
and means (Nispen and Ringeling :–; Ringeling :–). Similarly, Mac-
donald (:) argues that no theory on instrument choice assumes a metric evaluation
along a single dimension and that there is no best or most efficient instrument without taking
into account values or normative considerations. Hood and Margetts (:) claim that
given the millions of combinations of tools faced by decision-makers, the choice of instrument
cannot be a fully rational process. Even Trebilcock, who initially approached policy tools
from a public choice stance (Trebilcock et al. ), later recognises that that a public choice
approach to tool choices ‘does not provide a well-developed, dynamic account of what sorts
of forces disrupt existing political equilibria and lead over time . . . to nonincremental pol-
icy changes’ and stresses the role of ideas in the policy making process (Trebilcock :,
–, –).
Most authors adopting a policy instruments approach in political science defend the ex-
planatory value of both history and context. For instance, Anderson (:) highlights
that policy choices are made according to the possibilities in a given historical and cultural con-
text. Macdonald () rejects the hypotheses that instrument choice is ahistorical. Wood-
side () maintains that the social and political constraints limit the choice of instruments.
Linder and Peters (:, –) argue that decision-makers do not always pick the same
instrument for the same problem and signal the important role of the cultural and social con-
text. Hood shows that instrument choice is rarely a matter of neutral deliberation and that
choices are shaped by politics, ideology and culture (:). Ringeling claims instrument
choice is not constant and changes over time: new instruments, the intervention of inter-
national actors and other developments in the national or international context make some
instruments more popular while other fall into disgrace (:). Doern and Phidd argue
that ‘instruments are not matters of mere technique but are the object of normative dispute
and are inextricably linked to structure and process’ (:–).
Neo-institutionalism provides alternative theoretical angles to rational-choice, giving room
to explanations grounded in history and context. 
e trajectories in tool choice and civil-
military relations in the Iberian Peninsula can be explained by drawing from two alternative
but largely complementary approaches to neo-institutionalism. 
e first one can be associated
with orthodox path-dependence accounts and focuses on the legacies of past historical events.

e second one observes the specific ideational and institutional context in which decisions
are made.
Similarly, Weyland (:), drawing from cognitive psychology, argues that the cognitive limitations
and high computational costs hinder decision-makers’ ability to evaluate systematically all options as proponents
of rational choice would assume.
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Table : Analytical plan for explaining change in tool choice
History: path-dependence Context: continuing action
Macro-historical events Analytical concepts Environmental factors Analytical concepts
 Spanish Civil War
 Second World War
 Colonial Wars
 Political transitions
from authoritarianism
Critial junctures
Exogenous shocks
Punctuated Equilibria
Self-reinforcing (and
self-defeating)
mechanisms
Sequence and timing
 Ideas
 Political institutional
structure
 International
environment
Logic of apropriateness
Isomorphism (coercive,
normative and mimetic)
Search for legitimacy
Power asymmetry
Veto Power
Although both approaches have been usually associated with historical institutionalism,
they entail fundamental differences. In short, the first one based on ‘historical causes’ refers
to the impact of previous events inhibiting or stimulating present choices (by having triggered
endogenous self-reproductive mechanisms). 
e second type of explanation is by no means
ahistorical; it looks at ‘constant causes’ and explains change by looking at the impact of the
current (historical) context on present choices. Table  presents the factors and analytical
concepts utilised in this thesis to develop both types of explanations.

is thesis argues that the analysis of some sets of contextual factors serve to fill the gaps left
by explanations that purely rely on path-dependence. It shows a certain degree of overlapping
between both approaches and concludes that while history matters, it does not explain the
whole picture of the evolution in the governments’ control toolkit.
2.3.1 Historical legacies and path-dependence

is thesis studies the impact of past events in the evolution of the control toolkit. It focuses
on the legacies of four different macro-historical events that shook civil-military relations in
the Iberian Peninsula altering the trajectories of tool use by governments. It examines conti-
nuity and change in the toolkit against the backdrop of the fundamental concepts associated
with path-dependence explanations such as critical junctures, punctuated equilibria, external
shocks, self-reinforcing mechanisms and sequence.
One of the fundamental ideas in neo-institutional theory is the importance of history and
its legacy. As Pierson (:) suggests, many of the classical figures in social sciences such
as Tocqueville, Marx or Weber adopted historical approaches and stressed the importance of
temporality. Past events and choices leave ‘policy legacies’ that shape decision-makers’ ideas
For further details about historical institutionalism see for instance Steinmo et al.(/eds.), Hall and
Taylor (), Peters () and Sanders (). 
e second type of explanation can also be associated with other
streams of neo-institutionalism such as sociological (Hall and Taylor ) or constructivist institutionalism
(Hay ).

us, in the first approach history is equated to ‘past’ and in the second more broadly to ‘time’ or the
current environmental conditions. A similar distinction is suggested by Raadschelders (:–) who
distinguishes between the impact of ‘distant pasts’ and of present circumstances.

A 
and interests (Weir and Skocpol :). Social scientists have shown that in order to
understand policies and institutions it is necessary to look at earlier choices and formation
periods (Heclo ; Hall ; Skocpol ; Weir ; King ; Lodge ). 
e
analysis of large-scale processes, such as the evolution of civil-military relations and the control
toolkit, requires sufficient perspective and attention to how events unfold over time (Mahoney
and Rueschemeyer :).
Neo-institutionalism provides theoretical perspectives on institutional change. Stinch-
combe originally introduced the concept of ‘historical causation’ referring to where the ‘effect
created by causes at some previous period becomes a cause of that same effect’ (Stinchcombe
:). Inspired by this, neo-institutional social scientists such as, Krasner (), David
(, ), 
elen (, ), Hacker (, ) and Pierson (, , )
have developed explanations on why ‘history matters’ in the context of institutional change,
using the notion of ‘path-dependence’. ‘Path-dependence’ refers to the fact that historical
events can trigger some institutional changes and self-reinforcing mechanisms that contribute
to establishing certain trajectories or patterns that persist even in the absence of the original
event. 
is thesis examines the extent to which the evolution of civil-military relations and
tool choice fit path-dependence explanations.
Path-dependence explanations identify and explore ‘critical junctures’ in history. 
e con-
cept of critical juncture, first introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (:), refers to ‘a period
of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other
units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies’ (Collier and Collier
:). 
us, these critical junctures entail some specific paths of action, inertias or his-
torical legacies that may have a continuing effect on tool choice and civil-military relations.
Critical junctures are associated with ‘punctuated equilibrium’ models. Gould and Eldredge’s
() model of ‘punctuated equilibria’ in biology was transferred to social science by Krasner
(). 
ese explanations suggest that sometimes longstanding institutions, or in this case
control toolkits, are punctuated by exogenous shocks, producing a shift towards a new equi-
librium (Jones, Baumgartner and True ; Capoccia and Kelemen ). Path-dependence
accounts explain that new equilibria are sustained by self-reinforcing (positive-feedback or in-
creasing returns) dynamics triggered by past exogenous shocks (David ; Arthur ;
Pierson ). Alternatively, a trajectory could be reversed to a previous equilibrium due to
the absence of reinforcing mechanism or appearance of self-undermining (negative feedback
or decreasing returns) dynamics. In sum, from a path-dependence angle the evolution of an
institution, in this case the tool-mix used to control the military, can be explained by past
exogenous shocks activating endogenous mechanisms of reproduction (and/or extinction).
Following the path-dependence logic of change, the effects of early events and choices,
such as those during the formation periods of a regime, can be amplified overtime (Pierson
Neo-institutional theory has also been criticised for being better suited at explaining persistence or inertia
than change (Peters :; Peters et al. ).

erefore these explanations assume that all institutional change is originally triggered by external forces.

e path-dependence models of Redding () and Greif and Laitin () are exceptions because they also
capture endogenously- generated change.

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:–). Initial or early choices can reinforce later choices in the same direction while
some paths of action can disappear definitively or become increasingly difficult overtime.
Works influenced by path-dependence have often focused on the impact of small ran-
dom events shocks and insufficient attention has been devoted to macro-historical processes
(Katznelson :). In contrast, this thesis examines the legacies of four macro-historical
events that the literature has continuously associated with changes in civil-military relations
and the patterns of utilisation of control tools: the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War,
the Colonial Wars and the political transitions from authoritarianism.
Figure  captures the path-dependence explanation examined in this thesis. Macro-historical
events, such as those mentioned above, act as exogenous shocks creating critical junctures
and change in the mix of tools utilised to control the military (TC ⇒ TC). Moreover,
these macro-historical events leave a legacy in tool choice; they trigger endogenous self-
reproducing (positive feedback) mechanisms that sustain the new ‘path’ or mix of tools (TC).
In the absence of self-reinforcing mechanisms or the appearance of self-undermining (negative
feedback) mechanisms, the path is reversed to a previous equilibrium (TC⇒ TC).
Figure : Path-dependence explanation of trajectories in tool choice
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Following the path-dependence logic of change, the effects of early events and choices, 
such as those during the formation periods of a regime, can be amplified overtime (Pierson 
2004:63–78). Initial or early choices can reinforce later choices in the same direction 
while some paths of action can disappear definitively or become increasingly difficult 
overtime.
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Works influenced by path-dependence have often focused on the impact of small random 
events shocks and insufficient attention has been devoted to macro-historical processes 
(Katznelson 2003:292). In contrast, this thesis examines the legacies of four macro-
historical events that the literature has continuously associated with changes in civil-
military relations and the patterns of utilisation of control tools: the Spanish Civil War, the 
Second World War, the Colonial Wars and the political transitions from authoritarianism.  
 
r  1 captures the path-dependence explan tio  exam ned n this the is. Macro-
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 self-reproducing (positive feedback) mechanisms that sustain the new ‘path’ 
or mix of tools (TC1). In the absence of self-reinforcing mechanisms or the appearance of 
self-undermining (negative feedback) mechanisms, the path is reversed to a previous 
equilibrium (TC1=>TC0).  
 
Figure 1: Path-dependence explanation of trajectories in tool choice 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, this thesis analyses to what extent the observed trajectories are the result of 
historical legacies and the degree to which they fit the mechanisms and concepts 
associated with path-dependence explanations. It explores whether the evolution of civil-
military relations and tool choice follows a punctuated equilibrium model in which change 
was only the result of accidental exogenous shocks (macro-historical events) eliciting self-
reinforcing endogenous dynamics and persisting paths (Chapter 10.2). 
 
                                                 
73 See Arthur (1994) who uses Polya’s urn model to illustrate that shifts in paths become increasingly 
difficult further along the process.  
74 These are considered endogenous because once activated they do not require from any exogenous factor to 
continue operating. 
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In sum, this thesis analyses to what extent the observed trajectories are the result of historical
legacies and the degree to which they fit the mechanisms and concepts associated with path-
dependence explanations. It explores whether the evolution of civil- ilitary relations and
tool choice follows a punctuated equilibrium model in which change was only the result of
accidental exoge ous shocks (macro-historical eve ts) eliciting self-reinforcing endogenous
dynamics and persisting paths (Chapter .).
See Arthur () who uses Polya’s urn model to illustrate that shifts in paths become increasingly difficult
further along the process.

ese are considered endogenous because once activated they do not require from any exogenous factor to
continue operating.

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2.3.2 Environmental factors
Even the proponents of historical explanations suggest the existence of rival accounts based
on the ongoing impact of exogenous mechanisms or ‘constant causes’ (Stinchcombe :
–; Collier and Collier :–; 
elen :–) that contribute to the per-
sistence (or reversal) of a given trajectory in tool choice. In addition to the impact of past
events and self-reinforcing mechanisms, this research assesses the continuing effect of context
on the trajectories of tool choice. Context can be defined as the set of factors and circum-
stances that surround a particular episode at a specific time. 
e impact of context can be
traced at different levels and encompasses several environmental factors that have a bearing
on tool choice through mainly cognitive but also material mechanisms. 
is research anal-
yses the impact on tool choice patterns of three sets of factors: ideas, political institutional
structure and the international environment.

e utilisation of these three sets of factors seeks to facilitate explanations on how context
affects tool choices but it is not an attempt to create holistic model. 
e goal is to assess the
role of the specific structural and ideological setting in which decisions are made in contrast
with the deterministic interpretations based on historical legacies. 
e selection of these cat-
egories is justified by theoretical considerations deriving from the public policy and policy
instrument literature and the by their heuristic value. 
is thesis acknowledges the possibility
of alternative categories of factors that could be used in the analysis.‘
Ideas’, the first category studied, points to the relevance of a cognitive dimension of con-
text influencing decision-makers’ preferences on tools strategy. Ideas play an important role
in policy choices and change. 
e independent role of ideas in determining the course of
events has been sufficiently demonstrated in public policy in the last three decades. 
e
study of policy instruments also emphasises the role of ideas. As Linder and Peters () put
forward, the impact of context is not linear but it is mediated by the ideas and perceptions
of the participants. Tools often take ideological connotations than can ‘make them attractive
on a priori grounds regardless of their fit with the problem to be solved’ (Salamon :).
Policy instruments ‘are also partly the components of the ideologies of political movements’
(Ringeling :). Different sets of principles or worldviews may lead to different ap-
proaches to governance. Ideas and perceptions, however, influence decisions by specifying
the nature of the problem, policy goals and the instruments considered available in a given
situation (Hall :; Hall and Taylor :).

ese mechanisms are considered ‘exogenous’ in contrast with the endogenous mechanisms of reproduction
(self-reinforcement) or extinction (self-undermining) used in path-dependence accounts. See a similar argument
in Rixen and Viola (). Note that the endogenous mechanisms are nonetheless triggered by past exogenous
shocks in path-dependence accounts.

is conception of context is broader than that used by some historical neo-institutionalists who focus
exclusively on the temporal context and not on the specific circumstances in a given situation (Pierson :).
Vickers () refers to four dimensions of context in decision-making: mental, institutional, situational
and ecological.
An example of a very influential alternative is the categorisation of factors into ‘ideas, interests and institu-
tions’ (Goldstein ; Garrett and Weingast ; Majone ; Hall ; Hay ).
See Keynes (), Wilson (/ed.), Kingdon (), Majone (), Mashaw and Harfst (), Rose
(), Goldstein and Keohane (/eds.), Hood and Jackson (), Blyth ().
See also Doern and Phidd () and Hood ().

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As cognitive psychology shows, the rationality of decision-makers is bounded (Weyland
). Roles or functions normally carry embedded norms of behaviour. In order to under-
stand the choices of policy tools and the responses to them (which indirectly influence the
choice, too), it is necessary to consider the interpretations that the individuals in the gov-
ernment and the armed forces make of their roles and responsibilities. Several comparable
theoretical perspectives such as the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen  and
), ‘isomorphism’ (Meyer and Rowan ; DiMaggio and Powell ) and ‘search for
legitimacy’ (Beetham ; Tyler :) can be used to link the cognitive dimension of the
context to the choice of policy tools.
It is important to note that the ‘interests’ of decision-makers in the government and the
military are here included in the category ‘ideas’. 
is thesis avoids the methodological in-
dividualism that prevails in most rational choice studies. It assumes that actors are both
socialised and strategic and therefore their actions are not merely a direct reflection of mate-
rial interests. 
e perceptions (or ideas) that individuals have of their own material interests
define their choices. Discerning the weight of interests versus ideas on decision-makers’
choices and the interactive effects that ideas may have on interests and vice-versa goes beyond
the scope of this thesis. Moreover, the introduction of interests as an independent category
in the case of civil-military relations would not be as elucidating as in other fields of politi-
cal science where interests are usually measured in economic or voting terms and modelled
mathematically.

e second factor, ‘political institutional structure’ captures how the political and admin-
istrative setting within a country stimulates or constrains not only the availability of the gov-
ernment’s basic resources but also the capacity to introduce changes in the utilisation of policy
instruments (Doern and Phidd :; Ringeling :; Jennings and Lodge ).

e underlying theoretical assumption is that the political and administrative structures shape
political action and reform (Immergut ; 
elen and Steinmo ; Huber et al. ;
Knill ; Pollit and Bouckaert ). In line with other neo-institutional works, this the-
sis examines the distribution of power among political and societal actors (Hall and Taylor
:–). It focuses on the configuration and transformations of the executive and
legislatives powers as well as on the administrative state apparatus throughout the dictator-
ships, transitions and democratic periods. It examines centralisation/fragmentation, symmet-
rical/asymmetrical relations of power, the administrative entrenchment and veto power of
some actors and institutions in Portugal and Spain in order to establish whether they con-
tributed to changes or stability in tool choices.

e last factor, the ‘international environment’ aims to capture how actors and institutions
outside the national context affected tool choice in Portugal and Spain. 
is divide between
‘national’ and ‘international’ factors, serves to account for the existence of various levels of
causal forces and to show that even apparently very closed Salazar and Franco regimes were
not impervious to external influence.
Bressers and O’Toole (:) argue that both policy-makers and the target group must be considered
to develop a theory of instrument choice. Bruijn and Hufen (:) follow a similar logic and stress the
importance of policy networks and mutual dependency between policy-makers and the target of the policy.
See a similar argument in Blyth (:) and Checkel (:) and Wendt (:–)
See for instance Goldstein and Keohane (/eds.), Wendt (:–) and Blyth (:) and
Hay (:–).

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e international environment influences government choices both actively and passively.

is impact can be captured by the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism proposed
by DiMaggio and Powell (): ‘coercive’, ‘normative’ and ‘mimetic’. First, foreign coun-
tries and international bodies may intentionally attempt to impose a certain structure, stan-
dard or operating procedure on domestic public policy, including military issues. 
e in-
ternational community can exert control through ‘coercive’ mechanisms such as direct de-
mands, edicts, sanctions and formal requirements. For instance, the international embargo
and sanctions against Spain and the requirements for  membership imposed on Portugal
are example of coercive mechanisms.
Second, international actors can exert influence through international templates, proto-
types or other methods of ‘normative’ pressures. 
ese devices seek voluntary adherence to
some principles so that governments shape their domestic policy making according to in-
ternational standards (Radaelli ; Sahlin-Andersson ; Halpern and Le Galès ).
Countries searching for legitimacy and resources, as was the case of Portugal and Spain from
the dictatorial period until the first years of democracy, may become especially sensitive to the
normative influence of international organisations.

ird, the international environment can unintentionally or passively condition tool choice.
Under conditions of high uncertainty, governments tend to mimic choices made by other
governments. Mimetic isomorphism was common Spain and Portugal. 
ese countries often
imitated each other as well as other Western European countries. Nonetheless, in this research
the impact of the ‘international environment’ is circumscribed to the analysis of the coercive
and normative processes. 
e mimetic processes linked to uncertainty but not directly asso-
ciated to planned foreign action are dealt within the ideas section.
Figure : Explanation of trajectories in tool choice based on context
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4 Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced the comparative and explanatory frameworks (the NATO 
scheme and neo-institutional theory) that constitute the analytical backbone and make this 
thesis a unique work in the field of civil-military relations. 
 
The NATO scheme is a resource-based framework that classifies the tools of government 
alongside four categories: nodality, authority, treasure and organisation, each of which 
has been here divided into two subcategories:  
 
Table 6: Subcategories in the revised NATO framework 
Basic Resources Subcategories 
Organisation Coercive / non-coercive 
Nodality Information effectors / information detectors 
Authority Rewards and incentives / sanctions and constraints 
Treasure Staff expenditure / equipment expenditure 
 
The NATO framework has been selected, among several other one-dimensional and multi-
dimensional approaches, to establish trends and comparisons in choice of control tools 
made by Portuguese and Spanish governments. Multi-dimensional models have been ruled 
out because they complicate comparisons. If their attributes or dimensions are considered 
continuous, they require assigning quantifiable values to the tools, which in the context of 
civil-military relations does not seem viable. If their attributes are considered discrete the 
tools would be scattered in the many categories elicited from the intersection of the several 
dimensions. Analytical reasons justify advise the utilisation of the NATO framework 
among other existing one-dimensional generic typologies. Basing the distinction on kind 
and not on degree facilitates the classification effort. The NATO framework is 
parsimonious but flexible enough to capture all the empirical evidence encountered in the 
analysis of civil-military relations in the Iberian Peninsula. Its four resources synthesise 
most of the categories proposed in other generic typologies and none of them is redundant. 
Finally, this classification accommodates both substantive and procedural types of 
instruments. 
 
Alongside the NATO comparative framework, this thesis uses an explanatory framework 
grounded in neo-institutionalism. The policy instruments or tools of government utilised 
Environmental Factors: 
• Ideas 
• Institutional Political Structure 
• International Environment 
Tool 
Choice 
As Figure  shows, explanations based on the continuing action of environmental factors
do not necessarily formulate institutional evolution in terms of persistent paths, critical junc-

ese mechanisms through which international actors shape policy choice are inspired by the Lukes’s ()
three-dimensional approach to power.

S
tures and endogenous (although exogenously generated) self-reinforcing mechanisms. 
ese
explanations are less deterministic than the path-dependence ones and envisage trajectories
that are more flexible. 
ey usually do not refer to equilibrium situations and portray a more
gradual evolution of tool choice. 
e current action of some environmental factors causes
both stability and change.
2.4 Summary

is chapter has introduced the comparative and explanatory frameworks (the  scheme
and neo-institutional theory) that constitute the analytical backbone and make this thesis a
unique work in the field of civil-military relations.

e  scheme is a resource-based framework that classifies the tools of government
alongside four categories: nodality, authority, treasure and organisation, each of which has been
here divided into two subcategories (Table ):
Table : Subcategories in the revised NATO framework
Basic Resources Subcategories
Organisation Coercive / non-coercive
Nodality Information effectors / information detectors
Authority Rewards and incentives / sanctions and constraints
Treasure Staff expenditure / equipment expenditure

e  framework has been selected, among several other one-dimensional and multi-di-
mensional approaches, to establish trends and comparisons in choice of control tools made by
Portuguese and Spanish governments. Multi-dimensional models have been ruled out because
they complicate comparisons. If their attributes or dimensions are considered continuous,
they require assigning quantifiable values to the tools, which in the context of civil-military
relations does not seem viable. If their attributes are considered discrete the tools would be
scattered in the many categories elicited from the intersection of the several dimensions. An-
alytical reasons justify advise the utilisation of the  framework among other existing
one-dimensional generic typologies. Basing the distinction on kind and not on degree fa-
cilitates the classification effort. 
e  framework is parsimonious but flexible enough
to capture all the empirical evidence encountered in the analysis of civil-military relations in
the Iberian Peninsula. Its four resources synthesise most of the categories proposed in other
generic typologies and none of them is redundant. Finally, this classification accommodates
both substantive and procedural types of instruments.
Alongside the  comparative framework, this thesis uses an explanatory framework
grounded in neo-institutionalism. 
e policy instruments or tools of government utilised to
maintain the military subordinated can be interpreted as institutions structuring civil-military
relations. 
is research contrasts two alternative neo-institutionalist explanations for the evo-
lution of the Spanish and Portuguese governments’ control toolkits. One is based on the im-
pact of history in tool choice: the evolution of tool choice is shaped by macro-historical events

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producing exogenous shocks in civil-military relations and triggering endogenous mechanisms
of self-reproduction and new stable paths. 
e other angle emphasises the role of context and
studies three sets of environmental factors (ideas, political institutional structure and the in-
ternational environment) that act as constant causes shaping trajectories. 
is thesis explores
the advantages and limitations of the two approaches but it is beyond its scope to categorically
refute or validate either one of them. 
is research suggests the complementarity of the two
views and, more importantly, serves to illustrate that neo-institutionalism can be productively
integrated in the analysis of civil-military relations and tool choice.

e following chapters now turn to the empirical evidence collected from the historical
analysis of Portugal and Spain.

Part II
PORTUGAL


3 History of contemporary civil-military
relations in Portugal
3.1 Introduction

is chapter outlines the political and military developments essential for the understanding
of tool choices and the historical and environmental factors that stimulated them. Civil-
military relations were very turbulent from the Napoleonic Wars and the fall of absolutism to
the end of the First Portuguese Republic. During this convoluted period of over a hundred
years, the military took a leading role in a process of redefinition of political power. 
e
level of military participation in politics is reflected in the number of military uprisings or
‘pronunciamentos’, by their involvement in the enactment and modification of constitutions
and fundamental laws and by the fact that most Portuguese governments were led by military
men (Appendix A). Military participation in politics became a tradition entrenched in the
ideational and institutional setting. 
e military continued to threat Salazar’s governments,
provoked the fall of Caetano in  and later shaped the democratisation process. Many
officers, as well as politicians and other societal actors in Portugal, understood the recourse
to force as legitimate instrument to reach power or achieve certain political goals. 
us, the
control of the military was a top priority for any Portuguese government.

e analysis of the civil-military relations follows a roughly chronological structure. It
scrutinises the history of civil-military relations, first during the period of the Estado Novo
(Section .) and, then during the transition and initial stages of democracy in Portugal (Sec-
tion .). 
e section on the Estado Novo dictatorship is divided in six subsections dealing
with the emergence of Salazar and the Estado Novo; the political institutional setting of the
regime; the Estado Novo’s international relations; the impact of  membership; the ethos
and views of the Portuguese military and the downfall of the regime during Caetano’s rule.

e subsequent analysis of the transition and the early stages of democracy is divided into two
periods. First, the period of provisional governments, from the Carnation Revolution to the
enactment of the  Constitution, in which the revolutionary bodies selected governments
and the military controlled policy and politics. Second, the period of constitutional govern-
ments until , when a civilian president, Mario Soares, replaced General Eanes, the last
military president, and Portugal became member of the . During this period, the military
were gradually disentangled from politics.
Note that the analysis of the tools will be developed in Chapters ,  and  and that of the explanatory
factors in Chapter .
See an extensive list of internal conflicts in Portugal with the participation of the military (Valério
:–).

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is chapter explains the context in which the government operated and introduces most
of the factors and forces that conditioned governments’ policies and tools. 
e explanation of
which will be developed in the following chapters.
3.2 Estado Novo
3.2.1 Salazar and the inception of Estado Novo
Military infighting, financial problems and civilian political pressures weakened the military
dictatorship that had replaced the First Republic in  (Appendix A; Ferreira :). In
, António de Oliveira Salazar, a former university professor, was appointed Minister of
Finance and granted special powers to tackle the economic crisis. Although its inability to cope
with the problems of Portugal discredited the military government, the initial success of the
corporatist economic system consolidated Salazar as the political leader of Portugal. In ,
he was appointed Prime Minister and launched a Constitutional project to create a civilian-
led dictatorship: the ‘Estado Novo’ (New State). 
e Estado Novo should not be considered
an extension of the military dictatorship established in  nor a radical depart from it.
Military officers continued to occupy crucial positions in the government and administration
and during the Estado Novo, the military were more politicised and unruly than in Spain.
However, the Estado Novo, like Francoism, was a civilianised authoritarian regime (Linz and
Stepan :). 
e Estado Novo became an autarkic and complex system of equilibriums
between the interests of elite groups, with an important level of dependence on the colonies as
source of commodities and as market for Portuguese manufactured products. Conservatism,
traditionalism, Catholicism, ruralism and paternalism were the markers of its identity (Rosas
; Medina :).

e autocratic ideologies that emerged in Europe in the s and s shaped the regime
from its beginnings (Campinos ). Salazar believed authoritarianism was not a transient
trend but the political model of the future (Salazar :–). Salazar defined the Estado
Novo as a ‘national and authoritarian state’ (Salazar :) and in  he wrote: ‘[w]e
are anti-parliamentarians, anti-democrats, anti-liberal, and we are determined to establish a
Corporatist State’ (Salazar :). Salazar despised the liberal concept of citizenship which
he considered as being against common interest. Social and economic rights were above

e Constitution that officially inaugurated the Estado Novo (//) was grounded in the ‘Carta
Constitucional da Monarquia’ (), the  Constitution, the Weimar Republic Constitution () and
in the institutional model of the military dictatorship (–) (Caetano :). 
e  Constitution
together with the Colonial Act of  became the legal foundations of the Estado Novo (Salazar :).
Salazar claimed ‘although the Dictatorship ends, the revolution continues’. (Speech, //, Salazar
: ). Salazar had justified the necessity of the military dictatorship as a means of restoring the ‘order’
in Portugal, ‘imposing silence to some’ and ensuring the necessary conditions of ‘tranquillity and security’ for
public governance (Speech to military officers, //, Salazar :).
For instance he said that ‘[t]he absolute liberty does not exist’ and ‘there cannot be liberty against the
general interest’ ( n.d.:), In the Congress of National Union (//) he claimed that Portugal was a
‘national and authoritarian’ system, although different from a totalitarian state (Salazar :–). Salazar
also wrote that ‘it is not necessary to believe that authority is to be found in the masses, that justice is ruled by
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individual rights. Everything was subordinated to the ‘national interest’. 
is autocratic and
interventionist ideology explains some of the choices made concerning information control
and coercive organisation tools (Chapters , ).

e military coup had the support of a wide range of parties and pressure groups. 
ere-
fore, the ideology in the Estado Novo was an amalgamation of different conservative groups’
doctrines. Although conservative traditional ideas dominated the government since its in-
ception, the Estado Novo had an eclectic position vis-à-vis the different doctrines and was
designed to enhance the cohabitation and consensus among the ruling elites. 
e birth of
the single party National Union aimed at the reconciliation of the different political streams of
the Portuguese right. Like Franco, Salazar did not endorse any particular doctrine or political
stream. He used them to counterbalance each other avoiding the concentration of power in a
single faction and thus enhance his own personal power.

e Estado Novo was a system of limited pluralism, with a less well-defined guiding ideol-
ogy than the totalitarian regimes and a less relevant role of the single party and paramilitary
forces (Linz  []:–). Due to his religious beliefs and law education, Salazar
rejected totalitarianism (Salazar :–; Braga da Cruz :). In , Salazar
banned the extremist National-Syndicalist party, also known as ‘camisas azuis’ (blue shirts),
that imitated the Italian Fascism and German Nazism. 
e government strategy was to min-
imise the use of terror (Martins :). Compared to the Franco’s regime, the Estado Novo
had a low level of political imprisonment and violence (Pimlott and Seaton :). 
is
was also reflected in the relatively soft punishments applied to military insurgents (Chapter
). Overall, the Estado Novo can be considered as authoritarian regime of corporatist nature
but not a totalitarian regime (Lucena , ; Linz and Stepan ).
Salazar was concerned by the political activity of the military. Salazar publicly expressed
that they should be detached from politics and subordinated to the government. He believed
that the military, which were becoming used to civilian life, would gradually lose their esprit
de corps and sense of discipline. Salazar advocated the professionalisation, reorganisation the
military and the improvement of the equipment and conditions of the armed forces would
help the military to detach themselves from politics (Ferro  [–]:–; Salazar
:). However, the evidence suggests that in practical terms Salazar was less concerned
numbers, and that the administration of the law can be carried out by the mob instead of an élite whose duty is
to lead and to sacrifice itself for the rest of the community’ (Salazar :).
See number  and  of the ‘Decalogo do Estado Novo’, (Salazar :–). See picture in Medina
(:) portraying the structure of the Estado Novo.
See for instance Porch (:), Pinto (:–), Azevedo () and Medina (:). 
e Por-
tuguese Estado Novo was not the result of a party or political movement (Schmitter :). God, Fatherland
and Family constituted the basic elements of Salazar’s ideological discourse (Medina :–). Martins
Barata was the artist that best reflected Salazar’s conception Estado Novo. His design ‘A lição de Salazar’ (in
Medina :) is the most clear example of the ‘pax ruris’ ideal in the Estado Novo, portraying the ideal life
with clear references to religion, nationalism and family. Salazar was extremely religious. His discourse was very
nationalistic, but he was pragmatic, distrustful and not close to the sebastianist or messianic streams of thought
or to the radical revolutionary right (Pinto ; Medina ).
Pinto (). 
e movement, led by Francisco Rolão Preto, reached , members, while the coetaneous
falangista party in Spain that did not surpass , members (Antunes :). Salazar believed that violence
was not a suitable method for Portugal and even labelled the ‘camisas azuis’ as ‘heretics’ (Medina :–
). Salazar’s discourse also lacked the anti-semitic and racist references common in other European fascist-like
movements (Medina :).
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with developing military professionalism and modernisation than with co-opting their lead-
ership so they remained subordinated (Wheeler b; Faria ). He did not succeed in
establishing strong and clear boundaries between politics and the military, which periodically
threatened his government. 
e numerous coup attempts that Salazar faced (Section ..)
show that Salazar was in a weaker position vis-à-vis the military than Franco, who was essen-
tially unchallenged. 
is discrepancy in the relative strength of each dictator is also reflected
in the type control mechanisms utilised by them (Chapters , , and ).
3.2.2 The political institutional setting
Salazar defined the Portuguese Republic as a Corporatist State (Salazar :). According
to him, all the sovereignty rests with the Nation, independently of the form of the regime.

e Nation was composed of ‘natural organs’, among which the military was one of the most
important. 
e longevity of the Estado Novo was based on Salazar’s management of elites’
equilibria rather than on his personal supreme authority (Rosas , ).

e Estado Novo was a highly centralised political system in which Salazar held extensive
powers and managed to offset gradually the sway of the military who had previously helped
install him (Almeida and Pinto :–). Since his appointment as Finance Minister in
, Salazar held a strong grip on the government. He was granted special powers over
the rest of the ministries; to the extent that he became known as the ‘Finance Dictator’
(Nunes ). Within a year, he managed to balance the budget and stabilise the Portuguese
currency (Gallagher :). 
e positive economic results in – increased his
personal prestige enormously (Antunes :–). Finally, in  he was appointed Prime
Minister. During the s, Salazar’s influence and powers grew. 
e Spanish Civil War
and Second World War accelerated the process of personal empowerment. On top of being
Prime Minister (–), Salazar accumulated other positions in the government, such
as Finance Minister (–), War Minister (–), Minister of Foreign Affairs
(–), Defence Minister (–) even the interim President of the Republic (in
).

e Estado Novo had an elected president and a prime minister (). 
e executive power
was held by the  (Graham ; Campinos ). Officially, the  was appointed by
the President of the Republic, who in turn was elected by the people in often unfair elec-
tions. However, Salazar effectively had the upper hand in the power relationship because he
controlled the official party National Union Central Commission, which nominated the pres-
idential candidate. 
e centralisation of powers in the hands of Salazar was so evident that
Caetano referred to the Estado Novo as a system of ‘prime-minister presidentialism’ (Caetano
:).
Salazar defended the notion of organic society in which the basic unit was not the individual but the ‘natural
groups’, among which the family was the basic one ( undated :).

e Finance Ministry could exert veto power on any type of augmentation of expenses in the other min-
istries and led plans to reduce expenses and increase revenues (Salazar :–; Salazar :). 
e sessions of
the Council of Ministers were replaced by individual meetings with the ministers (Almeida and Pinto :).

e concentration of executive power under Salazar is revealed by the surprise and malaise of President
Craveiro Lopes when he learnt in  that he was not nominated for re-election by Salazar (Caetano 
[]:–).
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Salazar strengthened his executive power and repeatedly rejected parliamentarism, which he
feared. 
e chambers of the Portuguese parliament, the National Assembly and Corporative
Chamber merely had a symbolic role. 
e legislative power of the Chambers was very limited.
According to Schmitter (:–) they were employed by Salazar and Caetano as a ‘divide-
and-rule’ device and a source of internal and external legitimacy. 
e National Assembly
was an institution inherited from the First Republic. It had a higher autonomy than the
Francoist Cortes (Fernandes :–) but did not control the actions of the government
or the military. Caetano referred to it as the organisation where the ‘little political activity’ in
Portugal took place. 
e Corporative Chamber was comparable to an upper chamber where
the productive sectors and institutions such as the Church, the universities and the armed
forces were represented. 
ere was a National Defence Section in the Corporative Chamber
but the military were also represented among other corporative or interest groups. Such was
the extent of military representation that . of its members had a military education
(Ferreira :). However, as Caetano expressed in a private letter to Salazar in , just
before becoming the president of the Chamber, the institution was still far from representative
(Antunes :–).

e absence of a strong party system empowered Salazar. 
e single party National Union
was founded in , inspired by the Spanish Patriotic Union of Miguel Primo de Rivera. It
was defined officially as a non-partisan organisation independent from the state with voluntary
membership ( :) that did not interfere in the government actions and had very
little influence in the selection of the members of the government and senior officials. 
e
National Union was less autonomous than the Spanish Falange (Moore :) and did not
have any significant influence on the strategy of control of the military.
In sum, the concentration of executive and legislative powers and the absence of political
veto players increased the resources at Salazar’s disposal and placed him in a position to impose
his personal preferences in terms of choices of control tools.

e military institution was very prominent during the Estado Novo and held much po-
litical influence. Due to the general weakness of civil institutions and especially the political
ones, the armed forces acquired a stronger role. Especially during the initial years of the Estado
Novo, the army was granted a large degree of autonomy as means to incentivise its support
for the regime (Ferro  [–]:–). However, later Salazar, concerned with the
military subordination, took direct control of the War Ministry during critical periods such
as the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War and the beginning of the Colonial Wars.
Moreover Salazar surrounded himself with trusted officers in order to strengthen his control
on the military. Fernando Santos Costa provides the best example: in , the Army Cap-
tain and former Salazar student became Undersecretary of State and, in , War Minister.
See Salazar (:–; :–). Salazar confessed to Ferro that he feared the Parliament: ‘O Par-
lamento assusta-me tanto que chego a ter receio [. . . ] daquele que há-de sair do novo estatuto’ (Ferro :;
Ferro  [–]:). Salazar blamed the parliamentary system for the failure of Portuguese democracy
( undated:).
Letter to Salazar on // (Antunes :).
Antunes (:). 
e National Union acted as the single party in Portugal with the exception of the
 legislative and the  presidential elections to which the opposition Democratic Unity Movement also
concurred.
It was called ‘associacão’ or ‘voluntariado politico’.
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Table : Military Ministers as a Percentage of Total Number of Ministers.
Cabinets
( of military) Jun.
Apr.

Feb.

May

Jul.

Jul.

Feb.

Jul.

Oct.

Mar.

Spain . .  . . . . .
Portugal . . . . . . . . . .
Sources: Aguero :; Antunes :–. Author’s own analysis.
For  years, until , when he was replaced by Botelho Moniz as National Defence Min-
ister, Santos Costa’s power in the State apparatus was second only to that of Salazar (Antunes
:).
Salazar awarded his military supporters with important positions in the State apparatus.
Although slightly lower than in Spain, the participation of the military was always important
in Estado Novo’s governments, . of the ministers had a military occupational background
(Almeida and Pinto :, see also Table ). Many officers were also members of the
Chambers and occupied high-level positions in the administration. For instance, from 
to , . of the members of the Assembly and . of the Corporative Chamber were
military officers. From  to , the representation of the military in the top political-
administrative positions was only inferior to that of the groups of ‘professors and educators’
and to that of ‘lawyers and judges’ and much higher than the representation of landowners,
industrialists, engineers, physicians or workers (Schmitter :, , ). 
e military were
also very well-represented in the Censorship Services, the Republican National Guard ()
and the Legion. In sum, the military had a privileged position in the Estado Novo from which
they could influence politics and civil-military relations, including the control mechanisms
themselves (Chapter ).
3.2.3 The Estado Novo and the foreign powers

e Estado Novo’s civil-military relations have to be examined against the backdrop of Por-
tuguese international relations. Spain had opted for a certain isolationism, especially after the
Napoleonic invasions and the Congress of Vienna. In contrast, Portugal due to its histori-
cal alliance with the , its colonial possessions as well as its fear of its larger neighbour al-
ways sought to be more actively involved in international affairs than Spain (Ferreira :;
; ; Oliveira ). 
e strategic importance placed by the  and its allies on the
Portuguese Atlantic isles and the longstanding Anglo-Portuguese treaties enabled Portugal to
play an important role in the complex system of international relations during both World
Wars. 
e international environment constrained some of the choices of policy instruments
but also provided opportunities to strengthen government control over the military. Salazar’s
foreign policy aimed to consolidate internally the Estado Novo regime (Ferreira ).

e special nature of the Portuguese-Spanish relations can be considered the main factor
shaping Portuguese foreign policy (Ferreira :–). During the Spanish Civil War, the
Portuguese government sided with Franco’s camp in order to reinforce and legitimise the
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authoritarian Estado Novo. Salazar could not completely refuse the British pressures for an
embargo but delayed its application (Rosas :). Especially during the initial months
of the war, material support to the Francoist troops was very important (Oliveira :–
). Salazar and the military were extremely concerned about the possibility of a Spanish
invasion by either the Republican or Francoist camps. Salazar took advantage of the threat
of Civil War to take over the War Ministry in  and strengthen his leadership. In ,
Salazar and Franco signed the Iberian Pact of Defence, which was extended by the Additional
Protocol in .
However, despite the good relations between the neighbouring regimes, the fear of Spain
remained entrenched among the Portuguese military and political elites. 
us, during the
Second World War Salazar campaigned for Spanish neutrality (Nogueira : ; Beirôco
:–) and later for Spain’s integration in  (Vicente :–). Salazar
considered the Iberian Peninsula as the last bastion of a Christian and conservative Europe,
with Spain acting as a gatekeeper that helped maintaining stability in Portugal and protect its
borders against a communist attack (Telo :, ).

e Axis powers also affected Portuguese civil-military relations. Salazar sought recognition
and material support from them. Portugal became one of the targets of the intensive Nazi pro-
paganda in the second half of the s. Germany put pressure on Portugal, collaborating
with the Portuguese secret services and cultivating institutions such as the paramilitary Por-
tuguese Legion and ‘Mocidade’ (Stone :). 
e use of these paramilitary organisations
and military police forces as a check on the armed forces was directly inspired by Italy and
Germany. Germany became the main supplier of armaments in the late s until 
in exchange for wolfram and food and as a means to counterbalance British influence (Telo
:–).
Notwithstanding, Salazar feared that its relative weakness in the European context could
make Portugal the target of German or Spanish expansionist ambitions. Salazar opted for
declaring neutrality, adopting a non-belligerent stance but facilitating the action of the Allies.

is was also meant to honour the historical alliance with the  and gain support among the
See for instance  confidential report in  about the Spanish Civil War denouncing that the Spanish
Republican Government was already instigating the revolution in Portugal (//-, Folder , Page ).
Salazar among his personal documents kept a news clipping of the ‘Evening Standard’ (//) indicating
there was a strong movement among Franco’s supporters in favour of the annexation of Portugal (//-,
Folder , Section , Pages –) and another one of the ‘Reynolds News’ (//) arguing that Portugal
for the  was rather a liability than an asset because ‘her military forces are negligible and her territory might
be invaded by Franco’ (//-, Folder , Section , Page –).
Gallagher (:). Salazar was so concerned with Spain that the Portuguese National Propaganda
Service edited books in Spanish, such as ‘Habla Salazar’ ( undated:) or ‘Portugal ante la guerra civil de
España: documentos y notas’ ( undated).
For instance, in a report on  June , the Corporative Chamber advised Salazar to sign the North
Atlantic Treaty without any hesitation but explicitly lamented the exclusion of Spain (//-–, Folder
, Pages –).
Up to  German civil servants worked permanently on Portuguese territory from  to  produc-
ing and distributing pamphlets, publications, radio programs and films. 
ey stressed the similarities between
the German Nazi government and the Estado Novo and attacked the  and communism (Telo ; Paulo
:–). A  report to Salazar (//) indicates that German professors in Portugal distributed
Fichte-Bund pamphlets (//-, Folder , Section , Page ).
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senior ranks, which were traditionally anglophile and considered Portuguese military mate-
rial capabilities clearly insufficient to undertake an active role in the war (Ferreira :).
Salazar, who initially showed some anti-American preconceptions did not fully realise that,
after the Second World War, the  occupied the traditional role of the  as the main power
in the Western world (Oliveira :). He rejected the first stage of the Marshall Plan
(–) missing the opportunity to use the  economic support to increase military
expenditure. Later, Salazar quickly changed his views. Portugal requested the participation in
the second stage of the Marshall Plan (–), agreed to the American use of the Lajes
military base in the Azores (), became a founding member of  (), and signed
a Defence Agreement with the  () (Beirôco :–; Ferreira :–). 
e
alliance with the  and other major Western powers reinforced most of the Estado Novo’s
basic resources and influenced tool choice (Chapters , ).
3.2.4 NATO membership
Portugal was offered to become a founding member of , mainly due to the strategic
value of some of its overseas ports. 
e position of the armed forces, expressed through the
War Minister General Santos Costa, was clearly in favour of  membership (Nogueira
:–). Salazar saw an opportunity to finally consolidate the subordination of the
military and was also supportive of  membership. Although the Portuguese government
was genuinely worried with the defence of its territory, the main reason for joining  was
to increase the prestige of the regime (Crollen :–).

e integration into the Alliance in  had special relevance in terms of civil-military re-
lations.  pushed the regime to launch some measures to adapt its structures and multiply
the contacts with members of other more modern armed forces at different levels.  intro-
duced a new doctrine, procedures, organisational techniques and methods of action (Ferreira
:; Telo :).  contributed to the idea that civilians should monitor military
and defence issues.  experts, after evaluating the Portuguese Armed Forces, considered
the organisation too complex and inadequate and military training, including the preparation
of the generals, to be deficient (Matos :). 
e government implemented the 
recommendations by restructuring the armed forces within the new National Defence Min-
istry. 
e pressure of the  through the Military Assistance Advisory Group () and
Despite the fact that the entourage of Salazar was fundamentally Germanophile (especially the Marine
Minister).  report in  (//-, Folder , Section , Page ).
For instance, Washington barred a Portuguese Army General, who was covering the absence of the Defence
Minister, from attending the  Defence Committee . 
e  representatives stressed that the committee had
to be composed of civilian representatives. 
e Portuguese Ambassador 
eotonio Pereira was finally named
representative for the Committee (Confidential memo addressed to Salazar, //, //-–, Folder
, Section , Pages – and  document, //, //-–, Folder , Section , Pages –
).

e Chief of the Joint Staff, the Higher Council of National Defence, the Higher Council of War and
the Higher Military Council were also reformed. A report from the Army Chief of Staff Barros Rodrigues
(//) refers to the process of introduction through regulations, instructions and handbooks with 
doctrine. 
ese documents were elaborated in collaboration with the officers that had attended courses abroad
(//-, Folder , Pages –).  suggested improving the education and training of military
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important military leaders was fundamental to the development of a policy strategy based
on non-coercive organisation tools (Chapter  Section ..). 
e  suggested reinforcing
the instruction of Portuguese officers, concentrating efforts on the preparation of one modern
division, and eliminating the elitist Corps of High Staff. 
e government followed most of the
Group’s suggestions. For instance, the Santa Margarida division became the first truly modern
one; many officers were trained by  military staff and others went to American academies
Although the Corps of High Staff was not eliminated the entry requirements were broadened
(Matos :). Furthermore,  also fostered the government’s use of treasure tools
(Chapter  Section .).  advised Salazar to increase military salaries and equipment ex-
penditure.  allies and especially the  supplied weapons and materials and contributed
to the development of a Portuguese defence industry. In sum, the reforms imposed by 
in the late s and s aimed to facilitate the coordination of the Armed Forces and to
increase the operational capacity.

e officers that in the s were sent abroad to be trained in other  member states
became known as the ‘ Generation’. 
rough their international experiences, many of
these officers changed their negative opinions about the Western democracies and their de-
fence methods. 
ey soon occupied high positions in the hierarchy and influenced successive
generations of officers supporting the introduction of the  doctrine and templates (Telo
:–). 
e hundreds of officers trained in the  later trained thousands of other Por-
tuguese military. 
ese officers had embraced and were promoting the ‘occupational’ compo-
nent of the military profession among the ranks (Carrilho ). Owing to the influence of
, they developed a new understanding of their profession as well as new preoccupations
and claims. Many of these officers opposed the regime and participated in conspiracies from
the early s.
Portugal remained the sole non-democratic member of , perceived as a strategic ally
but an inconvenient colonial power. 
e path of the transformations induced by  slowed
down when the Colonial Wars erupted.  had excluded the Portuguese colonies from its
scope even though the  and some of its European members benefitted from the overseas Por-
tuguese ports. 
e dictatorial character and methods of the Estado Novo were not seriously
contested until , partly due to the country’s declared anti-communism. 
e disagree-
ments around the Portuguese colonial policy made the  reduce the number of Portuguese
officers in American schools, especially after . In , the  apparently backed the De-
fence Minister Botelho Moniz’s plot against Salazar. However, the loyal military with the aid
of the  and the Portuguese Legion kept the situation under control (Maxwell :–
; Rodrigues ; Ferreira :). Salazar, aware of the American collaboration with
the plotters and the independence movements in Africa (Mahoney :–; Antunes
), decided to distance the Portuguese Armed Forces from the  and  and reduce
cadres and specialists (internal report of the Army General Staff, //, //-, Folder , Pages
–).
For instance, Marshall Montgomery criticised that the education was based almost exclusively on human-
ities, and that there were some examples that illustrated the backwardness of the Portuguese military, such as
the fact that the officers still used horses and riding boots, and different uniforms from the rest of the soldiers
(making them perfect targets for snipers). Montgomery insisted in the necessity of multiplying the contacts of
Portuguese officers with  (Telo :- ).
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the military cooperation and exchange with them. 
is departure had an important impact
on tool choice; the government abandoned most of the -sponsored changes introduced
in the control mix (Chapter , , ).
Salazar, however, did not manage to reverse the impact  had had on the on the way
the military perceived their profession and government policies. 
e contacts with  had
produced profound changes in the mentality of many officers. 
e military claimed better
training and instruction programmes, a new territorial organisation, provision of housing,
health care and education for the families, as well as better equipment and material facili-
ties.  had served as a yardstick to diagnose the deficiencies of the Portuguese Armed
Forces.  reforms made the military adopt a more critical stance on their profession and
government policies. Many young officers lost part of the respect for their older superiors and
the government that maintained a more traditional or outdated vision of the armed forces.

is damaged the level of discipline within the ranks (Telo :–, ). Many mil-
itary leaders requested political changes andmost of those involved in Botelho Moniz’s coup
belonged to the ‘ generation’. 
e influence of  can be traced up to the military
that led the Carnation Revolution in . In sum,  produced a ‘quiet revolution’ (‘rev-
olução serena’) in the armed forces (Telo :). 
is revolution had a direct impact on
the level of professionalism of the military but also an indirect one, raising awareness of the
problems of the Estado Novo and the Portuguese Armed Forces. Ultimately, it became one
of the triggers for the overthrow of the regime in .
3.2.5 Attitudes and views of the military

roughout the Estado Novo period, Portuguese military held more political power and were
more prone to intervene in politics than their Spanish counterparts (Gunther :). 
e
rebellions in Madeira (), in Marinha Grande (), in the river Tagus (), in Meal-
hada (), the ‘Abrilada’ revolutionary plot (), the rebellion of Sé (), the Botelho
Moniz’s coup (), the rebellion in Beja () and the Carnation Revolution (), are
probably the best known expressions of military discontent and opposition but not the sole
ones. 
e sheer number of military plots and coup attempts, up to twenty between 
and  (Manuel ), shows that subordination was not fully achieved. Moreover, senior
Salazar declared in : ‘I want this country poor but independent’ and ‘I do not want it colonised by
the American capital’. Salazar cited in Franco Nogueira’s diaries (Antunes  v.:).
For instance, the Army report ‘
e great problems of the Army’ (January ) makes continuous refer-
ences to the need of modern equipment and techniques, better integration of the operational capacities of the
three branches and problems of preparation of the Portuguese Army. 
is report set the basis for the reforms
from  to  (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ).
See references and comparisons to other  countries in the General Programme for the reorganisation
of the Army (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ). 
is programme or reform was
truncated by the colonial conflict and the  coup. See also the secret declassified document of the Army
Minister ‘Politica Militar Nacional’ of April , for comparative tables with the other  countries (,
divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
According to Telo (:).  pushed Portugal to democracy. See also the ‘Chronicle of events
of April ’ by Captain Salgueiro Maia in pointing at  membership as one of the antecedents for the
Revolution claiming that the more intense contact with the exterior fostered the criticisms about the internal
situation (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
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officers led most political opposition movements. 
is section shows that the role of the
military as guardians against the internal enemy, their approach to discipline and authority
and the diversity of ideologies are fundamentally linked to the diverse sociological composi-
tion of the armed forces. 
eir unfulfilled corporatist claims worsened their attitude vis-à-vis
the civilian leadership.

e Portuguese military developed a strong interest in politics. 
e military power of the
Portuguese Armed Forces was relatively low compared to other European countries. 
e Por-
tuguese Armed Forces were corporatist and very bureaucratic, and did not value internal com-
petition or innovation. Patriotism took precedence over technical skills (Telo :–).

eir lack of material, preparation and discipline was revealed during their participation in
the First World War (Ferreira ; Marques ). Portugal did not have the capacity to
guarantee the defence of its territory through military means and the colonial map did not
allow further conquests. 
ese factors contributed to the redefinition of the role of the mil-
itary whose mission became to act as guardians of the internal order, a sort of police patrol
that had to deal with radical political opposition movements and revolts, as in the case of
Spain. 
eir role as guarantors of law and order and in the country made them more prone
to intervention in politics (Welch : ). 
e military coups were justified by the alleged
dangers or stability problems in Portugal.

e concern about military intervention was very high in the government but also among
many young officers. Most military reforms during the regime aimed to diminish the mil-
itary’s involvement in politics and to subordinate them to the civilian power. However, they
did not manage to radically change the perception of the military as responsible for maintain-
ing order in the metropole and especially in the overseas territories. 
e type of involvement
of the armed forces in the colonial conflicts later reinforced their self-perception as guardians
of the internal order.

e military conception of discipline and authority was another important factor explaining
civil-military relations. 
e supreme authority they had historically obeyed, the monarch, had
been ousted in . Discipline in the Portuguese Armed Forces was based on the perceived
capacity of leadership rather than on a strict legal-rational authority (Carrilho :).
Salazar had earned a reputation as a skilled leader especially during the times of instability
and crisis of the military dictatorship. In the s, the young officers that had participated
in the  coup were those that more strongly supported Salazar. 
ese young military had
seen their careers obstructed by the inherited excess of officers from the First World War and
had blamed the senior ranks for the poor situation of the armed forces and Portugal. Salazar
decided to introduce a set of reforms, mainly aimed at subordinating the military to his civilian
authority (Chapter  Section .; Faria ). 
e senior ranks wanted to maintain greater
autonomy but did not manage to block the reforms (Telo :–). In the process,
For instance, José Norton de Matos (), Manuel Quintão Meireles (), Humberto Delgado ()
and Craveiro Lopes (–) (Antunes :)
By , Major Barros Rodrigues presented a plan for the reform of the armed forces, requesting a military
policy closer to that of the  and stressing the need for the demilitarisation of politics. Barros asked for the
substitution of all military currently occupying political or administrative positions by civilians, as a means of
initiating ‘a neutralisation of the War Minister in political terms, absolutely indispensable for the progress and
well being of the Nation’. Internal report sent to Salazar (//) (//-, Folder , Document ,
Pages –). Barros’s proposed reform was not accomplished.
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many of the old officers were forced into retirement and were replaced by younger military
officers whose allegiance to Salazar and his government was reinforced.

e emphasis on leadership rather than on hierarchical rank was accentuated during the
Colonial Wars, albeit not to the advantage of the government. 
e colonial wars were fought
in small units, and in most of the field operations, there was no officer above the rank of
captain. Loyal senior officers mainly stayed in Lisbon, far from the conflict zones, devoting
themselves to administrative tasks. 
is weakened the authority of the senior officers vis-à-vis
the middle-rank officers that had created a reputation by fighting. Moreover, some military
leaders in the colonies, such as Spínola in Guinea, Kaúlza in Mozambique and Luiz Cunha in
Angola, exhibited caudillistic traits and did not follow a strategy that was fully coherent with
government policies. 
e government also lost part of its authority with the substitution
of Salazar by Caetano, who did not enjoy the popularity or legitimacy of his predecessor.
Contrary to Franco, Salazar did not make any effort to groom a successor. In the eyes of
the military, this resulted in a lack of legitimacy of Caetano and provoked a decrease in the
utilisation (and effectiveness) of authority-based control tools during his rule (Chapter ).

e composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces was more heterogeneous than that of
Spanish ones. 
e Portuguese military were not as ideologically homogeneous and monolith-
ically supportive of the government as in Francoist Spain. Different ideological factions existed
within the armed forces (Fernandes :). 
e sociological composition of the armed
forces was also diverse (Carrilho ). 
e Second World War entailed massive recruitment
and the mobilisation of troops stimulating the influx of young militia officers with diverse
backgrounds (many from urban areas) and political ideas (liberals, monarchists, integralists
and socialists). 
e sociological composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces further diver-
sified from the late s due to  and the Colonial Wars. Recruitment patterns changed
when Salazar, following  advice, abolished the tuition fees in the Military Academy and
offered salaries to cadets in  (Schmitter :). Most of the officers that later plotted
against Caetano had graduated after  and their socio-economic backgrounds were mod-
est (Porch :). 
e colonial wars resulted in an extension of the period of service and
made a military career a less attractive means of social mobility for middle and upper-middle
class youth. At the same time, the incorporation of middle to lower class officers contributed
to the introduction of less conservative ideas that sometimes clashed with those of the regime
and the senior ranks. Moreover, several regulations sought to attract and keep in service
the militia officers (‘milicianos’). 
ey dominated the lower levels of the officer corps and
For instance, the Governor of Mozambique Rebelo Sousa criticised Kaúlza’s ambitions and demeanor since
his arrival to Mozambique (letters to Caetano on // and //) (/–). See also Fernandes
(:, ).
However, after the Second World War, a process of de-mobilisation took place. It aimed specifically those
young officers that did not share the ideas of the regime (Telo :).
For instance in a letter to the Defence Minister, the undersecretaries of state of the Air Force, Kaulza, and
the Army, Almeida Fernandes, warned about the process of ‘proletarianisation’. 
ey claimed that the members
of upper and middle classes were attracted to liberal professions due to the higher salaries and only those of lower
classes considered the armed forces as a status improvement. 
ey already forecasted that this process would be
aggravated in the future, which the Colonial Wars later confirmed (//)(, divisão , secção , caixa
, numero ).
For instance the Decree-Law  (//) allowed the ‘milicianos’ to choose their destination when
they renewed their engagement. Decree-Law  (//) exempted them from the customary requirement
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were composed of many former university students, including some that had been actively
involved in left-wing organisations since the s (Maxwell :).
Finally, the grievances linked to military working conditions and the reforms undertaken
by the government show that hostility to the regime was common in the ranks and that the
military often dared to express their concerns. After the reforms of the s, many of these
criticisms concerned the policies of retirement and promotion. 
e promotions based on
political criteria instead of seniority created some anxiety among the military but facilitated the
government control of the military (Antunes :–). 
ere were also many complaints
about the material and working conditions, especially amongst the lower ranks. After the
Second World War, older officers opposed the reforms undertaken with the help of the 
(Chapter  Section .), because they implied more effort and profound changes in the way
they had been working for years.

e Colonial Wars exacerbated military unrest. In , Portugal surrendered Goa, Damao
and Diu to the Indian Armies and an independence war broke out in Angola. 
e military
considered the government plans of maintaining all the overseas territories by sheer force as
unrealistic. 
e military were sceptical about Portugal emerging victorious from this interna-
tional crisis. 
ere were many complaints about the insufficient material conditions, lack
of expertise and about the negative treatment that the regime’s propaganda machinery was
giving the armed forces, especially after the loss of the possessions in India. 
e military
insurrection in  was also stimulated by the perception that the international community
was greatly in favour of the position of self-determination of the colonies. In the colonies,
of obtaining a permit in order to get married and Decree-Law  (//) enabled them to become career
officer (, divisão , secção , caixa , numeros , , ).
For instance, in the margin of a letter Salazar is accused, in a menacing tone, of substituting the old officers
by the Legion and militia military. In the body of the letter there is a request to maintain the new salaries
but paralyse the reform concerning the substitution of old officers. Letter to Salazar (undated, probably )
(//-, Folder , Document , Page ). In January , General Domigos Oliveira posed an
ultimatum to Salazar. Telegram from Gibraltar informing about the ultimatum by General Domingos Oliveira
against Salazar (//-, Folder , Page ). 
ere are also other signs of protests against  reforms,
usually by officers forced into early retirement, militia officers who saw their rights undermined or officers who
complained about the favouritism showed with the High Staff Corps (//-, Folder , ).
An officer, Sebastiano de Sousa Correia, in a letter to Salazar, criticised the conditions of equipment and
food of the Army and the privileges for those serving in the Colonies (//) (//-, Folder ,
Document , Pages –). In , there militia officers protested against  reforms (//-, Folder
, Sections –, Pages –). A confidential report from the Commander of the First Military Region
Schiappa de Azevedo to the War Minister in August  showed that the lower ranking officers had been badly
paid for long, which created serious problems of discipline among the ranks in the region of Porto. 
e report
enclosed a protester’s manifesto that called for a revolt and the use of force against Salazar (//-, Folder
, Pages –). Several other documents prove the unrest among the lower ranks (//-, Folder ,
Pages –).
For instance Brigadier Rezende’s letter to Kaúlza (//) (, divisão , secção  caixa , numero
, documento ).
See for instance the transcript of the letters that Colonel Costa Gomes sent to the journal ‘Diario Popular’
the one Botelho Moniz sent to Salazar in  following the criticisms in the media directed at the armed forces
at the onset of the colonial conflict. 
ese letters are part of Captain Ferreira Valença’s report ‘A Abrilada ’
() (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento , ).
For an account on the reasons of the coup attempt see the personal letter from General Albuquerque de
Freitas who had just resigned from the  to Brigadier Rezende (//) (Declassified document ,
divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ) and letter from Brigadier Rezende to Colonel Kaúlza in
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the discontent was amplified by the large gap between the military’s and the white settlers’
salaries and by the difficulties working outside the barracks. 
e dissatisfaction originating
in the economic disparities led many military to detach themselves from the government’s
policies as well as from the white colonial elites, internalising leftist and revolutionary ide-
ologies and in some cases even sympathising with the African insurgents. 
e Colonial Wars
that were initially exploited by the government to consolidate the Estado Novo regime, ended
up becoming one of the main causes of military contestation and ultimately of the fall of the
regime (Ferreira :).
3.2.6 Caetano and the downfall of the Estado Novo
In , Marcello Caetano, former professor and politician, was appointed  after a domes-
tic accident left Salazar disabled. Caetano’s reform plan ‘Renovation and Continuity’ aimed
at limited liberalisation in order to revitalise the Estado Novo (Sánchez Cervelló :–;
González Hernández :–). Caetano legalised some opposition movements, increased
the powers of the National Assembly and, emulating Spanish governments, gave preference
to civilian technocrats over military in his governments. Following the Spanish model of the
s, in  Caetano recruited a new generation of technocrats (‘a camada nova’) in order
to reform the economy and move closer to Europe. Policy-making became a more collective
responsibility and the Council of Ministers gained relevance during Caetano’s rule (Graham
:). However, these reforms were superficial and did not substantially modify the
regime (Lucena :; Graham :). 
ey faced the resistance by part of the mili-
tary and the conservative President Américo Tomás, two institutional barriers that held back
the evolution of the regime including the tools of control (Chapter ). 
e power struggles
between different political streams weakened Caetano’s power and its control tools (Rebelo
de Sousa :; Fernandes :–). 
e half-hearted reforms only served to stress
the latent contradictions of the regime and to point out that the radical substitution of the
regime was the only solution to the institutional crisis (González Hernández :).

e attitude of the government vis-à-vis the colonial conflict was especially controver-
sial. 
irteen years of expensive Colonial Wars in Africa undermined the support to the
Estado Novo from the Church, business and intellectual elites (Sánchez Cervelló :–
; Manuel :–). However, for Caetano, the most difficult challenge was to maintain
the armed forces under control (Antunes :). Caetano’s government failed to respond
to military claims and to settle the colonial conflict. During his rule the corporatist claims and
discontent grew drastically. 
e military requested rights of association, salaries and pensions
rises, earlier passage to the reserve, free public transportation, longer holidays, better condi-
tions for the veterans disabled during the Colonial Wars, pensions for children and widows,
which he questioned that the overseas territories were parts of Portugal similar to the regions such as Minho or
Alentejo (//) (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ). See an alternative approach
on the report ‘
e  April’ by Colonel Kaúlza where he explained his view of the events stressing his differences
with Moniz (non dated, , divisão , caixa , numero , documento ).
See for instance Rebelo Sousa’s letter to Caetano (//) (/–) and Caetano’s letter to
Kaúlza (//) (/–) which stress the problems between civilians and the military in Mozambique.
Salazar suffered a stroke after he fell from a chair in his summer house. Until his death in , Salazar
could not speak again and remained in hospital.
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elimination of the High Staff Corps (which was perceived as a cast system), and better selec-
tion process in the Military Academy. 
e military realised that their materiel was inferior
to those of the insurgents. Many of them, such as the influential Generals Costa Gomes
and Spínola, tried to transform the foreseeable military defeat into a political victory and
requested a political solution along the lines of British and French decolonisation processes.

at solution may have reduced the levels of discontent in the armed forces and prevented
the coup. However Caetano chose to remain close to the camp of the President Tomás and
the ‘ultras’ and discharged the reformist officers (Manuel :).
An increasing number of episodes of military indiscipline due to disagreements with the
Colonial Wars and corporate grievances took place during Caetano’s rule. 
e enactment
of the Decree-Law / (//), which aimed to enhance the control of the armed
forces granting privileges to the conscript officers, became a landmark in the deterioration of
civil-military relations. 
e decree fostered academy officers’ discontent and internal frag-
mentation. A month later Decree / (//) amended Decree-Law / but due
to the continuation of protests it had to be finally revoked shortly afterwards (//).

is incident shows Caetano’s weakness and inability to introduce changes in the control strat-
egy. 
e government’s legitimacy was questioned and the loss of control of the situation was
evident. Decree / became an excuse for the organisation of career officers’ reunions in
which the scenario of a military coup to terminate the dictatorship gradually became salient.
For instance, General Kaúlza tried to take advantage of the unrest created to plot against the
government. Major Carlos Fabião denounced the conspiracy and the coup was prevented in
December .

e Armed Forces Movement (), constituted in September , was a clandestine pro-
gressive movement of junior officers that conspired against the regime and triggered the events
of the Carnations Revolution. Initially, the  demanded that Caetano revoke the decrees
/ and /, increase military salaries and reconsider colonialist positions. However,
in the meeting in December  in Obídos, some began to call for military intervention.

us, Captains Vasco Lourenço and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho were assigned the preliminary
preparations for a hypothetical coup. On  March , two hundred  members met
in Cascais and approved Major Ernesto Melo Antunes’ document ‘O Movimento das Forças
Armadas e a Nação’. 
e manifesto stated a ‘three d’s political programme’: democracy, de-
For instance General Spínola’s letter to Caetano stressed the ‘absolute impossibility’ of success in the military
effort in Guinea due to structural deficiencies. (//) (/–).
Gomes was the Military Governor in Angola (–) and Chief of the Joint Staff (–) and
Spínola Military Governor of Guinea-Bissau (–) and Vice-Chief of the Joint Staff ().
See the report ‘Chronicle of events of April ’ by Captain Salgueiro Maia (, divisão , secção ,
caixa , numero ).

is law established that conscript veterans of war could attain a Military Academy degree through an ac-
celerated course of only two semesters and recognised their seniority previous to their attendence of the Academy
for the purpose of promotion and pay.
See for instance complaint letters rejecting the Decree-Laws / and / sent to Caetano by army
officers from Guinea-Bisau (signed by  officers, //) and from Mozambique and Evora (signed by
almost  officers, //) (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ). See also the ‘Chronicle of events
of April ’ by Captain Salgueiro Maia (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ); letter from Santos
Costa to the new Army Ministry General Sá Viana (//) in which he advises to revoke the decree; and
a letter from Santos Costa to Caetano on the same subject expressing alarm about the situation in the Army
(//) (/–).
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velopment and decolonisation. Caetano’s government failed to satisfy their claims. Changes
in the military strategy were constrained by the highly legalistic and institutional framework
that slowed down any reform and precluded more energetic actions to counter the imminent
upheaval (Maxwell :). On  March, some soldiers rebelled in Caldas da Rainha, one
hundred and fifty soldiers were imprisoned. On  March, the  decided to attempt a
coup. Caetano underestimated the capacity of the rebels and tried to use them as a threat to
counterbalance the influence of the reactionary groups that had held up almost any type of
change in policies.

e coup eventually took place on  April . Captain Otelo led an operation carried
out exclusively by junior officers. He took control of Lisbon airport, radio and television
broadcast centres and of the military headquarters in Lisbon and Oporto. He moved troops all
over the Portuguese territory to give the sensation of a general uprising and sealed the borders
with Spain to avoid any kind of intervention of Francoist troops. 
is well-planned operation
became a success quickly. Caetano surrendered to General Spínola at the  Headquarters.
Many people went to the streets to celebrate the fall of the regime. Some clashes between
police and youths took place until the morning of the  April when the secret police 
headquarters, last focus of resistance to the rebellion, surrendered. Five people died by 
shots, these were the sole victims of this otherwise ‘peaceful revolution’ (Porch :–;
Robinson :–). In sum, the tools of control in place (Chapter ) such as the
paramilitary organisations and intelligence services did not suffice to preclude the military
coup. 
e Estado Novo was defeated by the same element that created it: the military.
3.3 Transition and democracy
3.3.1 Provisional governments (1974–1976)
After the April  coup, the process of design and development of the new democratic institu-
tions was launched. Political parties and class organisations were legalised and decolonisation
initiated. During the Portuguese transition the military and in particular the  shaped the
process of institutional change. Military and government affairs were extremely intertwined
during this period of instability. 
e militarisation of politics accelerated the politicisation
of the armed forces. Military structures proliferated and overlapped with the political system
(Chapter  Section .). 
e struggles in the civilian political sphere were intertwined with
those experienced in the military arena. 
is was a period of instability; six different provi-
sional governments and two military coups took place between the Carnations Revolution
and the enactment of the new Constitution in , which officially opened the period of
democratically elected governments. Although changes in the political arena were swift and
radical, the evolution of the control toolkit was marginal until the end of . A failed mil-
itary coup in November  served to consolidate the moderate reformist agenda and to
Declassified documents from the / show that Caetano had information about the coup attempt at
least one week before the  April (Porch :–; Opello :–; Manuel :–).
Although General Spínola was not a member of the , they selected him following Caetano’s demand
of surrendering only to an officer of the highest rank.
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reduce the power of those that claimed for more radical political transformations but at the
same time signalled a turning point in the mix of control tools (Chapter , , ).

e period of provisional or pre-constitutional governments may be subdivided in four dis-
tinct stages clearly marked by changes in civil-military relations (Manuel ). First, from
April to September , the new President of the Republic Spínola and the First Provisional
Government headed by Adelino da Palma Carlos tried to moderate the ’s revolutionary
programme. 
ey attempted to increase the powers of the executive at the expense of the mil-
itary, to slow down the devolution of the colonies and to re-establish a traditional hierarchical
conception of the military. 
ey failed to impose their views over those of the  Coordina-
tion Committee and were obliged to resign. Palma Carlos was substituted by General Vasco
Gonçalves in July and Spínola by General Costa Gomes in September following important
social mobilisations orchestrated by the left.

e second period, from September  to March , was characterised by the dis-
putes among different factions within the  that tried to impose their approach to the
revolutionary process. After the crisis of September , the  tried to reinforce its po-
sition by purging non-revolutionary officers (Porch :–) and by institutionalising
its power (Robinson :). 
e creation of the Higher Council of the , the  As-
sembly and the first Pact between the  and the political parties are examples of this effort.

e Pact -Political Parties granted the  the surveillance and control of the constituent
process and a decisive role in the election of the President. 
e political parties (mainly from
the left) approached the  to acquire influence on the government, in exchange providing
legitimacy to the military.

e  sheltered three main ideologically idiosyncratic subgroups. 
e -Moderates,
headed by Major Antunes and Vasco Lourenço, were linked to the Socialist Party, . 
is
group gradually attracted many of the conservative officers and dominated most of the mil-
itary regions. 
e -Radicals or ‘gonçalvistas’, led by Vasco Gonçalves, were close to the
Portuguese Communist Party () and controlled the information services Fifth Division, the
Navy and the radical military group ‘Soldados Unidos Vencerão’. Finally, the -Populists,
led by Otelo, were inspired by the third world liberation movements, linked to left-wing par-
ties such as the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat () and the Popular Democratic Union
(), and controlled the Special Forces Unit . Outside the, many military were
in favour of change but in less abrupt terms than their counterparts in the . 
ey opposed
the construction of a socialist state in Portugal. Many of them were close to the centrist Demo-
cratic Popular Party () and to the centre-right Social Democratic Centre (). 
e most
prominent figure of this group was General Antonio Spínola (Manuel :–; González
Hernández :). 
e disputes about trade unionism, economic plans, and the institu-
Carrilho (:). See Structure of the political institutions in the first and second -Political Parties
Pacts on April  and  February  (, /Partidos (), Pacto -Partidos Parte I, Document 
and Parte  Document ). Annexe B to the Minutes of  reunion, //, and Annexe F to the minutes
of  reunion, // (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ).
‘Soldados Unidos Vencerão’ was a left-wing anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement that organised
several demonstrations and claimed the improvement of the conditions of the lowest ranks in the Armed Forces
(Porch :–; Carrilho :–).

e terms -Moderates, -Radicals and -Populists were coined by Mujal Leon ().
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tionalisation of the  reveal the internal divisions in the Armed Forces and the government
during this period.

e third stage of the period of provisional governments began on  March  with
the failure of the right-wing coup, which strengthened the -Radicals. 
e revolutionary
agenda gained momentum. Some of the most important revolutionary measures were land
seizures from the rich proprietors and the nationalisation of big companies. 
e Council of
the Revolution () was established to promote the objectives of the  Programme and to
guarantee security during the process of transition. 
e first elections after the fall of the
regime took place on  April  to form a Constituent Assembly. 
e political parties
actively approached the military. Some of them, dissatisfied with their electoral results such
as the , supported the ’s ideal of revolutionary legitimacy against that of electoral le-
gitimacy (Carrilho :). 
e level of social tensions increased especially within the left.

is happened not only at the political level where there were struggles between  and ,
but also at the military level between -Radicals that controlled the government and the
-Moderates and Populists. Pressures from the -Moderates and social mass mobilisa-
tions forced the resignation of Gonçalves as  in September , marking the end of the
third stage.

e decentralisation of decision power, the emergence of many new veto actors and the
political instability can be construed as factors that, during these first three stages, maintained
a strategy of control very similar to that in place during the dictatorship (Chapters , ).
However, many changes took place in the control toolkit during the fourth stage which
coincided with the sixth provisional government (from September  to July ). 
e
new  Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo tried to reverse the revolutionary transformations at-
tracting the criticism from the -Radicals, the -Populists and the left-wing political
parties, except for the . At least  protests and acts of indiscipline took place in the Por-
tuguese Armed Forces between September and November  (Carrilho :). 
e ris-
ing tensions culminated in a left-wing military coup on  November . 
e moderate
Lieutenant-Colonel António Ramalho Eanes successfully led the military operations to con-
trol the putsch. 
e failure of the coup contributed to discredit the most radical revolution-
ary theses and consolidated the hegemony of the -Moderates. 
is was a tipping point in
the political transformations and in the evolution of the control toolkit (Chapter ). Many
political and military figures understood then that the role of the military in politics should be
See different views, within the political parties and the ranks, about the institutionalisation of , 
(, /Partidos (), Institucionalização do , Documents –)
Law / (//). 
e  replaced the Junta and the Council of State. See Minutes of the  reunion,
// and Political Action Plan of the Council of the Revolution, in Annexe B to the Minutes of  reunion,
// (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume  and , Correspondência classificada do
secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).

e-Moderates signed the ‘Document of the Nine’, that denounced the Gonçalves attempt to create an
East European style dictatorship and urged for a ‘democratic socialism’. 
e -Populists launched their own
critical document, the  Document, against Gonçalves ‘Autocrítica Revolucionária do  e Proposta
de Trabalho para um Programa Político’ (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume
, number , document ).
According to the minutes of the  reunion, //, there were more than  officers involved in the
coup (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ). See Sánchez Cervelló (:–) for an
account on the events surrounding the coup.
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reduced. 
e second pact between the  and the political parties in February  reflected
this changing trajectory. For instance, it introduced the direct universal suffrage for the elec-
tion of the President abandoning the system of election through a joint session of the  and
Legislative Assemblies agreed on in the first Pact -Political Parties (Rato :). 
is
choice meant not only the introduction of a democratic component in Portuguese political
system but also initiated the military disengagement from politics (Ferreira :–).

e  Constitution confirmed the process of military disengagement from politics and
the new trajectory in tool choice (Chapters , , ).
3.3.2 Constitutional governments (1976–1986)

e transformations in civil-military relations from  to  were crucial for the consol-
idation of democracy in Portugal (Graham :–). Electoral legitimacy substituted the
revolutionary legitimacy and the political parties were emancipated from the  (Gonzalez
Hernandez :). 
e Constitution which was approved on  April  established that
the governments should take steps towards the construction of a socialist state and restricted
the participation of the military in politics to the Council of the Revolution (). Eanes, the
candidate of the -Moderates, became the President after the elections on  June 
and Mario Soares, leader of the , was elected  of first constitutional government after the
general elections on  April  (Manuel ). 
ese political developments reinforced
the process of military detachment from politics and the new trend in the control toolkit
(Chapter ).
However, the political instability continued due to the fact that the elections produced mi-
nority governments, the fragmentation of the political spectrum and the continual tactical
changes in political alliances. From the legislative elections in  to the interim elections
in , Portugal had five brief constitutional governments. 
ese governments had to deal
with numerous socio-economic issues, such as the normalisation of relations with the former
colonies, absorption of the , refugees (‘retornados’), the reactivation of Portuguese par-
ticipation in , negotiations for  membership, high levels of inflation, unemployment
and budget deficits. All these problems diverted resources and attention away from the policy
for military subordination, slowing down some reforms (Chapters , )
After , the  was the only military institution that could directly participate in pol-
itics. 
is was an important step in order to take the political debate out of the barracks but
not the definitive one. 
e participation of the military in politics remained higher than in
most Western democracies. 
e functions and scope of the , although delimited by the
Constitution, were still far-reaching. 
e  held complete control over the military and veto
power over important political decisions. 
e  was guarantor of the constitutional institu-
tions with capacity to enact military laws, control military promotions and to authorise the
President to declare war, peace or curfew. Many politicians, including the President, were
For an account of the political parties see Manuel (:–) and González Hernández (:–)
 only received . and  out of  seats in the s. Different coalitions were explored. 
e first
government of Soares lost a vote of no confidence in December . Soares’ coalition government with  was
dissolved by President Ramalho Eanes a few months later. Eanes appointed successive Prime Ministers: Alfredo
Nombre da Costa (), Carlos Mota Pinto () and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo ().
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military men and they did not consider the  as an anti-democratic institution. Even the
moderate military officers that had controlled the rightist and leftist military upheavals were
considered too interventionist for a European style democracy (Maxwell :–). 
e 
Constitution had also granted the  with a legitimacy superior to that of the Assembly. 
is
was problematic because part of the military leadership still championed the spirit of the revo-
lution and a socialist type of democracy which contradicted the ideas held by the mainstream
political parties that represented the majority of Portuguese voters (Gallagher :–;
Manuel :–; González Hernández ).

e Social Democratic Party,  (previously ) and the  became the main opposi-
tion to the power of the  (Manuel :–). In the  interim elections and 
legislative elections, the centre-right coalition ‘Aliança Democrática’ obtained the majority
of the seats in the Assembly.  Francisco Sa Carneiro and, after his death,  Francisco Pinto
Balsemão conducted a programme of austerity that gave priority to the relations with the
 and  and declared the will to reform the Constitution, reverse the agrarian reform,
enhance the private sector and limit the powers of the President and armed forces. Finally,
Balsemão even obtained the support of the , the main party in the opposition, in order to
get two thirds of the Assembly seats required to circumvent President Eanes’ veto and launch
the  Constitutional Reform. 
is reform eliminated all references to the goal of achiev-
ing a ‘socialist democracy’, sensibly reduced the powers of the President of the Republic and,
most fundamentally, abolished the  and reduced the role of the armed forces.
 became the model and driving force for the reforms in the armed forces initiated by the
Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces of . 
is new law, approved despite the
initial opposition of Eanes, was crucial in the redefinition of Portuguese civil-military relations
and was the result of an agreement between the different political parties (Silva :). It
passed the control of the military and defence decisions from the President to the  and
the government, charging the Defence Minister with managing day to day military affairs.

e organisational reform became an important mechanism of civilian control (Chapter 
Section ..). President Eanes and his supporters eventually understood that in order to
build a democratic regime and enter the , the armed forces should disengage completely
from politics, undertake a process of professionalisation, reform their structure and participate
more actively in  (Graham :). 
e gradual process of transfer of powers from
President Eanes and the military to the civilians in the government and parliament continued
during Soares coalition government / (–) and later with Cavaco Silva’s 
governments (from ). By the time Soares won the  presidential elections peacefully,
replacing General Eanes, and Portugal joined the , the reorganisation of the armed forces
that consolidated a democratic Western type of civil-military relations had been launched
and the principle of civilian supremacy was uncontested. Portuguese civil-military relations
Democratic Alliance was a coalition formed by the /,  and .
Carneiro died in a plane crash in . Diogo Freitas do Amaral led the interim sixth constitutional
government. Balsemão led the seventh and eighth constitutional governments (–).
Law / (//). See Carrilho (), Manuel () and González Hernández ().
Law / (//). See Balsemão (:).
According to Graham the reorganisation of the Armed Forces has been finished and a Huntingtonean
‘objective’ control of the military had been achieved (Graham :–). Graham’s claim can be considered
excessively optimistic; several important military reforms were launched after .
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and control toolkit were finally converging with those of its Western allies, including Spain
(Chapters , , , ).
3.4 Summary

is chapter has shown that the military had a central role in most major political transforma-
tions in Portugal. 
e military were not submissive vis-à-vis the civilian power and remained a
source of concern for governments and political elites throughout the dictatorship and transi-
tion into democracy. 
e façade of stability and endurance of the Estado Novo (–)
conceals the much more volatile civil-military relations during that period. 
e military had
initially appointed Salazar and granted him extensive powers. However, they never completely
accepted a subordinated role and frequently threatened his rule. Later they provoked the fall
of his successor, Caetano, in  and became central political actors shaping the transitional
process. 
is chapter has also highlighted that that political and institutional context as well
as several historical junctures such as the Spanish War, the Second World War, the Colonial
Wars and the transition to democracy had an important impact on military attitudes and on
civil-military relations. 
e following chapters (, ) explain how the tools utilised by the
government to control the military capture this effect.
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4 The Estado Novo’s tools of
government
4.1 Introduction

is chapter analyses the Estado Novo’s strategy for military subordination according to Hood’s
four basic resources (organisation, nodality, authority and treasure) and the sub-categories intro-
duced in Chapter . It outlines the most significant tools and the main trajectories observed
in their usage from  to . Although there is evidence of the utilisation of all cate-
gories and sub-categories of policy instruments, the relative magnitude in which they were
employed was different. In order to guide the reader throughout this chapter, Table  sum-
marises some of the most important empirical findings. For instance, Salazar used coercive
organisation tools such as security forces, the paramilitary Portuguese Legion and loyal mili-
tary units to prevent and control military plots throughout all the period analysed (Section
..). Non-coercive organisation instruments, such as military education, training and the
capacity of the government to shape the organisational design of the defence institutions be-
came central to the control strategy during s, mainly due to the influence of  and
the Western allies (Section ..). Nodality effectors, such as propaganda and censorship in-
struments, were central in the s and early s but gradually lost relevance later (Section
..). Conversely, information detectors such as the secret police  (later ) and the
network of informants grew in salience (Section ..). Authority incentives and rewards were
very important, particularly from  to , when the regulations that introduced the
system of ministerial approval, ‘escolha’, made possible the substitution of all senior ranks by
young loyal officers. 
e regime also granted great autonomy and prerogatives to the military
(Section ..). Sanctions and legal constraints were not very severe (Section ..). Finally,
the use of treasure tools was very limited, the military’s living and working conditions were
never good enough to contribute positively to military subordination (Section .). Table 
also shows that many important changes in the trajectories of tool choice can be linked to the
Spanish Civil War, the Second World War,  membership and to the Colonial Wars.
4.2 Organisation
Salazarist governments used the organisation capacity of the state to achieve military subordi-
nation both through coercive and non-coercive means. Loyal units of the armed forces were
the main deterrent against military plots, although police and paramilitary organisations such
as the , ,  and the Portuguese Legion also contributed to this task. 
e use of
these coercive organisation instruments remained stable throughout the regime. More vari-
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Table : Summary of tools of government during the Estado Novo (–)
Tools Trajectory
Organisation Coercive (Section ..): Loyal army units, security forces
(, , //) and the Portuguese Legion
helped countering military plots. Martial courts, impris-
onments and executions were avoided
Stable
Non-coercive (Section ..): Formal military education
and training.  and  support. Training periods
abroad
Low intensity although some actions from the late s.
Very important during s. Abandoned during the
Colonial Wars
Organisation design: introduction of coordination bod-
ies, centralisation of decision making, inter-branch com-
petition, geographical deployment of troops
Important reforms in the mid-s and in the s (in-
stilled by ). 
e Colonial Wars forced changes in the
organisation design, hampering military control
Provision of goods, services and jobs Provision of services and goods grew during the Colonial
Wars
Nodality Information effectors (Section ..): Propaganda (via pub-
lic speeches, cinema, pamphlets, books, military maga-
zines, pre-military training in Mocidade). 
e /
coordinated the action
Very strong during the s and the first half of s,
then declining
Censorship. , //, Portuguese Legion Very strong during Spanish Civil War and Second Civil
War. 
e Colonial Wars hindered the capacity to censor
the information within the ranks
Information detectors (Section ..): //,
, Network of informants (‘bufos’), letters and internal
communications
Increasing utilisation
Authority Rewards and incentives (Section ..): System of min-
isterial approval and appointment (‘escolha’) for military
promotions and membership in the High Staff Corps
Introduced in . Very important during Salazar’s rule.
Caetano relied less on military promotions and appoint-
ments
Appointments of officers loyal to the government and top
positions in the administration
Important representation of the military in all the regime
institution. Declining from s
Wide powers and responsibilities granted to the military
in the maintenance of public order. Military led the secu-
rity forces, judged political crimes, worked in prisons and
censorship
Stable
Other privileges conceded: autonomy, tolerance with sec-
ondary jobs, guarantees and military awards
Autonomy reduced after the Second World War. Rights
and decorations increased during the Colonial Wars
Sanctions and constraints (Section ..): Reduction of re-
tirement age and limitations to the size of the armed forces
Introduced in . Important after the Second World
War. Decreasing during Colonial Wars
Punishment of officers involved in conspiracies (expul-
sions, demotions)
Stable. In general punishments were not severe.
Prohibitions in order to enhance a distinct esprit de corps
and detach the military from politics
Stable
Treasure Staff expenditure (Section ..): General salary rises (fun-
damentally to compensate inflation). Salary differentials
to get support from some groups. Pensions and benefits.
Overall low intensity. 
e most significant salary raises
occurred in  and 
Equipment expenditure (Section ..): Successive efforts
of rearmament and modernisation of military materials
insufficient. Dependence on foreign suppliers such as
Britain, Germany and later the 
Overall very low intensity. 
e most significant rearma-
ment and modernisation attempts were undertaken dur-
ing the mid-s, the Second World War and s
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ability can be captured among non-coercive organisation tools. 
e utilisation of education
and training acquired special salience during the s. With the Colonial Wars this was
reduced and the provision of good services was fostered.
4.2.1 Coercive organisation

e utilisation of coercive organisation tools was not very intense or systematic. Salazar did
not reach power by violent means and in general the oppression in the Estado Novo was more
subtle than in the Francoist regime (Rosas :, ). Even during late s, when Salazar
was at the height of his power and the regime was more repressive than ever agains the leftist
political movements, there was no strong systematic pattern of coercive organisation tools of
control on insubordinate military. 
is does not mean that coercion was absent from the
control toolkit but that it was not as central as for the Francoist regime in the late s and
early s.

e government mainly used loyal military units as coercive tools to neutralise other muti-
nous military units, as in the cases of the rebellions in , , , , , 
and . However, Salazar also used the security forces  and  as well as new organi-
sations, such the powerful secret police  (later called  and eventually ) and the
civilian paramilitary Portuguese Legion, to control and deter military insubordination. 
e
surveillance and later arrest of military officers in September  and April  are exam-
ples of how these organisations combined their forces to avert plots against Salazar (Pinto
:–).
Although their fighting capacity was very small compared to that of the Army, the , 
and //, actively helped loyal Army units to neutralise many of the plots against
the regime. 
e  and the  were especially well-trained police forces and very loyal to
Salazar (Medina :–). In addition to the military and police forces, the paramilitary
Portuguese Legion could be considered as a means to challenge the monopoly of violence to
the armed forces (Faria :). Founded in , in  the Legion counted up to ,
members (Pinto :). 
e Legion maintained its character of an armed militia and its
loyalty to the government throughout the Estado Novo. 
ere is evidence in the plans to
counter possible military coup attempts that the Legion was to be deployed. However, in
terms of military subordination its overall importance remained relatively low. 
e Legion was
a lightly armed organisation and did not have the power that similar paramilitary organisations
such as the Blackshirts (Camicie Nere) and  (Sturm Abteilung) had acquired in Italy and
 was created by the Decree-Law  (//), transformed into  by the Decree-Law 
(//) and finally into  by Decree-Law  (//).  participation was participation was
very important in rebellions in , , , , and  (Pimentel : , –).

e Portuguese Legion (‘Legião Portuguesa’) was as a nationalist and anti-communist voluntary militia
created by the Decree-Law  (//). From , the Legion was in charge of the Civil Defence of
the Territory (Decree-Law , //). See Silva () and Rodrigues ().
 For instance, due to the discontent generated by  reforms the government decided the mobilisation
of some Army,  and Police units with the assistance of the Legion (Faria :). 
e government plans
for the Lisbon Military Region in  declared that in case of an eventual coup the ,  and Legion had
to act in a first instance, the Army should only intervene in a second phase if needed (Telo :–).
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Germany. Quickly it became obvious that the Legion was not in real competition with
the armed forces (Gallagher :). 
e Legion remained subordinated to the military,
independent from any political party and acted as an organisation of second line and civil
defence linked to the State (Caetano  []: ).
In case of rebellion, all armed entities, Legion, , ,  and armed forces, were placed
under direct command of the government through the War Minister (Telo :–).
Insubordinate military sometimes suffered torture, exile and harsh conditions in Salazarist
prisons. However summary executions, martial courts or long term imprisonments were
generally avoided. Prison confinement was usually for short periods; authority instruments
such as exile or expulsion from the armed forces were preferred. For instance, Captain Mendes
Norton’s coup attempt planned for  May  was quickly neutralized by the military and
the police. 
e officers involved were arrested, but released soon afterwards. Only after a
second attempt on  September , did the government decide to deport Norton and the
rest of the plotters to the Azores (Faria :). 
e reaction to the rebellion in Beja, in
, is the main exception to the general absence of imprisonments. 
ere were  prison
sentences, including a -year-sentence for Captain João Varela Gomes, the military leader
(Wheeler b:). 
e assassination of the regime opponent General Humberto Delgado,
in Spain in , apparently by agents of , is probably one of the darkest examples of
the use of a coercive organisation instrument. Although some deaths of military men have
been attributed to , there is no solid evidence of a strategy of extra-judiciary executions
of military officers in any period of the regime.
Caetano, like his predecessor, trusted his secret police (), the Legion and the paramilitary
security forces  and  with the task of defending the regime (Porch :–). 
e
real deterrent capacity of these organs of control and repression vis-à-vis the armed forces was,
nonetheless, very limited and drastically reduced in the last years of the regime. In general,
army officers led all security forces. 
e heavier weapons, better training and the experience
fighting the insurgency in the Colonial Wars gave the military a coercive superiority. More-
over, the geographical dispersion of the troops made it more difficult to control them. 
e
detention by the  of two hundred soldiers and officers, following an uprising in March
, did not suffice to prevent the April revolution. During the military coup on  April
, the loyal ,  and Legion showed a complete incapacity to defend the regime from
Army units.
It can be concluded that Estado Novo’s governments used coercive organisation instruments
upon the military. However, they were not extensively employed and mainly used as a last
resort. 
e security and paramilitary forces at the service of the regime were a limited deterrent
against the armed forces due to their inferior material means and lack of combat readiness.
After the Second World War, the Legion began its decline, the Colonial Wars showed that the Legion had
definitively lost any capacity to act as a praetorian guard for the regime (Azevedo :).
For instance, see report in  of anti-regime involvement of some military officers by Colonel Manuel
António Correia (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
In the plot of , among the  people arrested,  were military (Pinto :).
 was often portrayed as the Portuguese Gestapo. See for instance (//-– Folder , Pages
).
According to Pimentel (:–, )  was responsible of the deaths of Captain Almeida Santos
or Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Valente as well as many civilians (Pimentel :–).
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4.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

e organisation power of the state was also used in a non-coercive fashion in three ways.
First, through education and training so that the military could improve their professional
skills and learn the necessity of remaining separated from politics and subordinated to the
government. Second, the government used its capacity to shape the structure of the armed
forces (including changes to the hierarchy, attribution of functions and the deployment of
the troops) to enhance the subordination of the military. And third, through the provision of
goods, services and even employment to the military and their families as a means to improve
their living standards and levels of satisfaction with the governments.
Salazar believed that if the military were concentrated on their professional duties they
would be less prone to intervene in politics. Military education and training had to be re-
inforced in order to increase military professionalisation and as well as to correct the serious
deficiencies of the Portuguese armies. 
us, in the late s and s, some reforms were
launched aiming to introduce a more technical approach in military education and training.

e Military School was transformed into the Army School in  and in  a reform of
military education was launched to eliminate all content related to political science and soci-
ology (Ferreira :). 
e High Military Studies Institute was created in  and the
Naval High Institute of War in . Salazar’s concern with military education and subordi-
nation was portrayed by his personal involvement in the reforms. 
ese reforms, however,
were insufficient and the general level of instruction and professional preparation remained
deficient. Salazar was afraid that the military that had government skills could challenge
him. 
us, the education that officers received was outdated and ignored politics, sociology
and, at least partially, economics, administration or modern management (Wiarda :).
Training and education became central in the s and due to  influence. From ,
many Portuguese officers travelled to the , to undertake military training. In parallel, the
, examined the command, logistics, training, and maintenance systems in Portugal. As a
For instance, in January , General Julio Ernesto Moraes Sarmento blamed the lack of efficiency on
the absence of military training and field practical activities due to the lack of material means (Report about
the situation of the Army addressed to Salazar //-, Folder , Section , Pages –, –). A new
report in February of  shows the efforts made in military training in , although concludes that the
situation of the Army was still precarious (//-, Folder , Section , Pages –, –). A 
report to Salazar in  explains that British were disappointed with the lack of preparation of the Portuguese
army (//-, Folder , Section , Page ).
For instance, see reports for the reform of of High Staff Courses (//-, Folder , Sections –,
Pages –).
Salazar was involved in the reform of the High Staff Courses and the configuration of the High Military
Studies Institute and High Command Courses. See Salazar’s handwritten comments and amendments to the
project (//-, Folder , Section –, Pages –). Salazar also supervised the project of reform
of the Military College in  (//- Folder , Pages –). See Borges and Canas () for a
chronology of the higher military education in Portugal.
See for instance Telo (:) and Matos (:). According to a report to the British Foreign Office
(//), the Portuguese Army was incapable of effectively contributing to any organised force, lacking ex-
perience, modern equipment and training (Telo :–). In a letter to the  Ambassador (//),
Salazar claimed that the reform project of  would have to be delayed due to the lack of officers with enough
preparation (//-–, Folder , Section , Page ). A document presented by the Portuguese dele-
gation in Ottawa in a  conference acknowledges that despite the recent efforts, Portugal was still far from
the minimum required number of prepared officers (//) (//-– Folder , Pages , ).
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result of these exchanges, a series of reforms were launched in the s. From  to ,
many regulations inspired in the  armed forces were approved. 
e education programme
for senior officers, the High Staff Course, was reformed. New courses were offered, often
run by the military that had been previously sent abroad. New schools were created, such
as the Electromechanic Military School. Logistics and operational methods were improved
following American assistance. Military careers were opened to different social strata (Telo
:–, –). Military exercises were reinforced following the  model (Duarte
:).
From  to , the government introduced another wave of  inspired reforms,
related to military education and training, territorial organisation or some of the support
services. Nonetheless, from the outbreak of the Colonial Wars, the collaboration with the
 and the emphasis on military instruction were reduced. 
e Colonial Wars negatively
impacted formal military education, which at the end of the regime remained deficient both in
tactical-technical terms and in terms of socio-economic and political instruction. Moreover,
the -led advances in education and training ended up being counter-productive for the
subordination of the military to the regime. 
e new approach to their profession brought
new preoccupations and claims. 
e officers that participated in the exchanges with 
allies realised the qualitative gap that separated them from other Western armies and became
more critical with the state of the Portuguese armed forces and with the government (Telo
:–). 
ey led the opposition movements against the regime from the late s
onwards.
Second, in addition to the efforts on military training and education, some of the changes in
the organisational design of the armed forces were employed to achieve military subordination.

e organisation reforms in the s constitute the best example. With these reforms
Salazar sought to centralise the decision making power by creating several coordinating bodies
that he or one of his ministers headed. 
e Higher Council of National Defence (), the

ere is evidence of important military allocations for training purposes, for instance in training camps,
language courses, training missions abroad, handbooks, publications and even the translation of  publica-
tions in Portuguese. See for instance Supplementary Defence Budget –; –; ; and 
(//- Folder , Pages –; //- Folder , Pages –; //- Folder , Pages
–; //- Folder , Pages –).
Decree-Law  (//)
For instance, the reform of the Military Academy by the Decree-Laws  and . See Army Ministry
memo (//, , divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ). See also a list with 
different reforms most of them organisation based in annexe to an Army Ministry memo (// , ,
divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ). Among them the Decree-Law  (//)
for the reorganisation of the Army Ministry and many directives concerning the education and preparation of
officer; the materials, dactylographic and health services; recruiting and military service, etc. See continuous
references and comparatives to other  countries in the General Programme of Improvement of the (,
divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documento ).
See Ferreira (:). 
e only aspect that was intensified was anti-guerrilla training, fundamentally
with the support of the Belgian, Spanish and French Armed Forces (Telo :–).
In , the military demanded a reform with the main goal of rearming and upgrading the equipments of
the armed forces. For Salazar this was the opportunity to introduce organisation changes that would consolidate
his control on the military. 
e rearmament (treasure indirect tool) was only partial and did not provide the
Army with capacity enough to defend the land frontiers against an external threat. However, for Salazar it was a
success given that it allowed him to enhance his control on the military thus diminishing the internal risks for
the regime.

O
Higher Council of War Planning and the Mixed Commission of the High Staff were all created
in . Other important changes were the diminution of the size of the army, the creation of
the exclusive and loyal High Staff Corps, the direct subordination of the Chief of Staff of the
Army () to the War Minister (a position that Salazar occupied from  to ), and
the reduction of powers of the Higher Council of the Army and the Army Major General.

e underlying military subordination goal to the reforms became evident soon. By ,
the head of the Army Major-General Morais Sarmentos expressed the opposition to the reor-
ganisation project because it withdrew an important part of the political powers and autonomy
that the Army held. Later, in , a letter exchange between Salazar and the War Minister,
General Passos e Sousa, shows that the re-organisation of the Army was not made following
the dictate of the  but that of the Council of Ministers in which Salazar had the upper
hand Salazar was in a strong position vis-à-vis the military and pushed forward his idea of
creating smaller armed forces under civilian control.

e opposition of many senior officers, who wanted to preserve the autonomy of the
armed forces, did not halt Salazar’s reorganisation (Telo :). In , he took over
the War Ministry and in  launched some further reforms aiming at higher levels of polit-
ical control. 
e fundamental change was that instead of the War Ministry being subordi-
nated to the army, the metropolitan army became subordinated to the War Ministry (Duarte
:–). In the new structure the Undersecretary of State, Santos Costa, became very
important because he led many of the reforms and shielded Salazar from many internal prob-
lems (Faria ).

e new organisation also preserved the separation between the continental and colonial
forces and the separation of the branches in different ministries which reduced the internal
cohesion of the Armed Forces and the likelihood of a coordinated conspiracy while enhancing
inter-branch competition and oversight. 
is seems to confirm the hypothesis of a divide-and-
rule tactic (Wheeler b:).
After the Second World War, the Army was reorganised and downsized (Ferreira : ,
–), the  became a consultative body and government became responsible for the
definition of defence policies. Nonetheless the most important changes followed the signa-
ture of the North Atlantic Treaty in . In  a National Defence Ministry and a Chief
of the Joint Staff () were introduced. 
eir functions were to coordinate the military
branches (which still maintained distinct ministries). In , following the  doctrine,
the government redefined the bases for the organisation of the armed forces to consolidate the
Laws  and  (//). See Carrilho (:–), Matos (:), Duarte () and
project for the reorganisation of the armed forces (May , //- Folder , Section  Pages –).
Report to the War Minister (//) (//-, Folder , Document , Pages –).
Passos e Sousa complained about the lack of technical expertise of the Council of Ministers (Letter to
Salazar, //, //-, Folder , Document , Page –). Salazar replied that these were political
decisions not technical ones (//, //-, Folder , Document , Page –)
Law  (on the organisation of the Army), Law (on recruitment and military service) and Decree-
Laws , , ,  and . See reports and correspondence about the decrees (December
, //- Folder , Sections –, Pages –).
Law  (///). See Duarte (:).
Decree-Law  (//).
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subordination of the defence structures and policies to the government. 
e , which
was subordinated to the Defence Minister, was reinforced and the participation of military in
the  reduced (Duarte :–). Finally the adaptation to the  model culmi-
nated in  by a reorganisation of the Army and reinforcement of the Army information
services, . 
e new organisational design was a  requirement but was perceived by
the government as an opportunity to reduce the autonomy of the branches. Moreover, in the
new integrated structure, the Air Force, Army and Navy had to compete for resources from
limited budget, which introduced competition and mutual oversight among the branches.

e geographical distribution of troops also served a control purpose, as a means to neu-
tralise of military attempts against the government. Loyal and elite units, such as the battalion
of ‘Hunters’, ‘Machine Guns’ and the brigades of cavalry, were strategically located in the ter-
ritory to defend the regime (Teixeira :). 
e decision power was fundamentally located
in Lisbon and centralised under Salazar and a few loyal officers. Even the armed forces in the
colonies were deployed such that they could support the metropolitan troops in an possible
war in the peninsula. However, from , the defence of the overseas territories became
the main goal, which required new geographical organisation and operating procedures. 
e
armed forces grew from , men in  to , in . 
e command structure
was adapted. 
e new war techniques and the bigger and decentralised structure weakened
the authority of the senior officers and the government. Top rank officers were rarely in the
theatre of operations. Many lower rank officers felt far from the centres of decisions and
became alienated. 
us, the new organisational design launched by the government with a
specific defence purpose indirectly contributed to undermine their control on the military.

ird, the government used its organisational resources to provide and subsidise services
and goods for the military and their families in order to increase satisfaction with the govern-
ment and compensate for low salaries. 
is use of the state capacity acquired relevance in the
late s. 
e Social Services of the Armed Forces were created in  to assist military
families with housing and health problems. 
e government also created a supermarket
that offered credit and low prices for the military. From , the acquisition of housing was
also financed by the government (Matos :). 
e provision of goods and services was
intensified during the Colonial Wars. 
e Caetano government also tried to increase mili-
tary satisfaction by providing free transportation to the overseas territories, medical care and
Law  (//).
Decree-Law  (//). See Ferreira (:, ).
See memo about the military mission in Angola and Mozambique (December , //- Folder
, Section , Page –).
Including , men mobilised in the conflict areas not counting mobilised African regulars and militia
forces (Teixeira :).

e Decree Laws  and  in  changed the military organisation in the overseas territories.

e priority was not was not providing support for the defence of the metropole but of the colonies and the
troops were not obliged to remain in the capitals of the provinces (Telo :). New military regions were
created in Angola and Mozambique. Guinea, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Principe, Macao and Timor became
also autonomous military territories (Teixeira :).

ere is little evidence of the provision of services or goods for the families of the officers in the early stages
of the regime. See for instance the detailed reports about military procurement of the War Minister in 
(//- Folder  Pages –).
Decree-Law  (//).
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housing benefits to the families of the military fighting the war. 
e public sector served as
a source of employment for many officers not only after they retired but also as a second job
while in active service. Although salaries in the administration were low, often they provided
power, prestige, perks and facilitated access to better paid positions in the private sector after
retirement from active service (Pimentel :).
4.2.3 Conclusion

e Salazarist regime used coercive and non-coercive organisation instruments to control the
military. 
e regime used loyal Army units, the security forces ,  and / /
as well as the paramilitary Portuguese Legion. Although these tools were primarily used by the
regime to control the civilian population, they held some deterrent capacity vis-à-vis military
insurrections. 
e recourse to these coercive tools was stable throughout the regime. From
the military rebellions in the s to the Carnation Revolution in , the government
always relied on its coercive power to force subordination or deter further rebellion.

e non-coercive use of the organisation of the state was more varied. 
e regime used
military education and training, the institutional design and the provisions of services, goods
and jobs to maintain the military under control.
First, the government believed that a better preparation would enhance professionalisation
and separate the military from politics. Some initiatives were undertaken in the late s
and s but overall education and training remained clearly deficient.  membership
produced a small revolution intensifying training and military exercises throughout the s.
Many officers were trained abroad and new techniques and ideas were introduced. 
e mili-
tary became more professional but also more critical with the regime. 
e Colonial War cut
short this trend and during the s and s, military education ceased being a priority.
Second, Salazar used the organisational design to control the military. 
is was especially
important in the s and s. In the s, Salazar created coordination organs, such
as the , that he could dominate to exert control over the three branches of the military.
In the s, further organisational changes were made following the dictates of  to
consolidate civilian supremacy in defence. 
e most important measures were the creation
of the National Defence Ministry and  and the reinforcement of the . 
ere
are some signs of the utilisation of the geographical deployment of troops as instruments to
prevent internal threats to the regime. However, the Colonial Wars forced the growth and
decentralisation of the defence structures hampering previous efforts to control the military
through the institutional design.
Finally, the government used its organisational capacity to provide services, goods and jobs
for the military and their families as a means to increase their support. 
eir use increased
from the early s to compensate for the penuries of the Colonial Wars.
Including support for education of the sons of the military (Decree-law /) and for disabled veterans
(Decree-law /). See internal Army Ministry memo (//) (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero
).
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4.3 Nodality

ere is much evidence of the use of nodality through both information effectors and detectors.
Like other authoritarian regimes, the government intensively manipulated the information
available for the military in order to project a positive image of Salazar and to avoid discon-
tent. 
us the selective production (propaganda) and restriction of information (censorship)
became central in the strategy of military subordination. Additionally, the regime employed
several mechanisms to retrieve information, such as the secret police and other information
services, networks of informants, and the internal communications in the administration,
in order to prevent military insurrection. In general the information effectors reduced their
intensity throughout the regime while the detectors grew in salience.
4.3.1 Information effectors

e use of propaganda and censorship was especially important during the s and early
s. 
e control of the information exerted by the Estado Novo was similar to that of
other fascist-like regimes such as Franco’s. Although information effectors continued to be
used throughout the regime, their relevance decreased. 
e fall of the Axis, the exchanges
with  allies and the Colonial Wars ended up decreasing the utilisation and effectiveness
of information effectors upon the military.
In , Salazar, influenced by the journalist António Ferro, launched his ‘Política do Es-
pírito’ (politics of the spirit) that aimed to strengthen the regime through propaganda and
censorship (Ferro ; Pimentel :). 
e National Propaganda Secretariat () es-
tablished in , became the core of the Estado Novo’s propaganda machinery. Military
speeches, the radio, press, cinema, specialised publications, pamphlets and books were the
information channels through which the government transmitted the official discourse to the
military. 
e fascist-like youth movement ‘Mocidade’ became also a nodality instrument
contributing to the control of the military through the moral and civic indoctrination of fu-
ture soldiers and officers. 
e projected representation of Portugal was that of a unitary,
rural, religious and traditional country with a glorious past and a strong leader, very similar
to Francoist representations of Spain. Moreover there was an effort to personalise the regime
in the figure of Salazar (Paulo :). Attacking Salazar would mean attacking the new
regime.

e theme of the armed forces was recurrent in the regime’s propaganda. 
e always pos-
itive depiction of armed forces aimed to increase the military’s professional reputation and
self-esteem (Soares :–). Since the inception of the Estado Novo, the government
discourse emphasised the necessity of keeping the military separate from politics in general
For instance,  (, , , ), Galvão (), Ferro (), Moniz (), Freyre ().
Some were published in other languages, for instance  (undated , undated ,undated  and undated ). See
also Salazar’s own books of speeches and political ideas (Salazar ,  and ).

e Portuguese Youth or ‘Mocidade Portuguesa’ was created by the Decree-Law  (//). ‘Mo-
cidade’ was a patriotic youth movement that also collaborated with the armed forces thanks to the provision of
a pre-military training. In this organisation young Portuguese were taught to praise Salazar, as exemplified by
their motto: ‘Who rules? . . . Salazar!’ (Arriaga ; Caetano  []:).
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and from communism and totalitarian views in particular. 
e use of nodal effectors was
intensified whenever the stability of the regime was threatened. For instance propaganda
was intensively used to counter the effects of leftist Navy rebellion in September  (Faria
; Freire ) and the unrest triggered by the  military reforms (Paulo :;
Faria :–). Moreover, the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War were
propagandistically used to drive military attention away from internal politics. 
e goal
of depoliticisation can also be observed in the specialised military publications that prolifer-
ated during the regime, most of which tried to stimulate the esprit de corps and introduced
technical content (Melo ).
Propaganda continued to be used after the Second World War. For instance the propa-
ganda machinery magnified the ‘Soviet menace’ to maintain the military united, supported
Salazar’s candidate, Admiral Américo Tomás, against the opposition leader, General Hum-
berto Delgado, in  presidential elections, and more importantly used the Colonial Wars
to produce a patriotic exaltation and military support for the regime. Nonetheless, from the
mid-s, there was a gradual decline in the utilisation of propaganda. In , the 
was renamed National Information Secretariat () and although it continued to carry out
similar tasks it did it with a lower intensity. In the end,  was re-oriented to the promotion
of Portugal abroad becoming in  the Information and Tourism Secretariat.
Censorship was also widely employed. In , Salazar transferred the responsibility of
censorship from the War Ministry to Interior Ministry and created the Directorate for Cen-
sorship Services, . Many different bodies of the administration collaborated in the cen-
sorship effort including the Legion and, in particular, the // (Azevedo :–
; Pimentel :–). 
e elimination or modification of the content of articles related
to military affairs became a fundamental control mechanism. News concerning the military
were suppressed and the journalists often intimidated by the secret police (Ferreira :).
Expressions of discontent were silenced. Censorship was so entrenched that in an inter-
view in  Salazar declared that censorship ‘constitutes the legitimate defence of the free
independent States against the big disorientation of the modern thought’ (Ferro  [–
]:). 
e regime tried to limit the exposure of the military to any information that
could undermine the morale or raise doubts about the government.
See Salazar (:) and Faria (:–).
For instance Salazar’s speeches to Army and Navy officers (//) in and in the National Assembly
(//) (Salazar :– and –).
See military publications such as ‘Revista Militar’, ‘Defesa Nacional’, ‘Revista do Ar’, ‘Infantaria’, ‘Revista
da Marinha’, ‘Revista de Cavalaria’, ‘Revista de Artilharia’ and ‘Revista de Engenheria Militar’.
For instance Salazar’s speech (//) (Salazar ).
For instance, speeches of the Defence Minister Santos Costa (// and //) (Ferreira :–
).
See abundant correspondence with the journalist Jorge Tavares Rodrigues related to propaganda in Cae-
tano’s archive (also in Antunes , vol. :–).
See Azevedo (: –) for the legal foundations of the censorship in Portugal.
Decree-law  (//).
Decree-law  (//).
For instance, Generals Norton de Matos, Humberto Delgado, Vassalo e Silva and Spínola suffered the
action of the censorhip (Antunes , vol. :; Ferreira ).
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During the periods of the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War censorship most
intensive (Azevedo :–). Later its intensity diminished until the outbreak of the
colonial conflict. Salazar and Caetano used censorship to prevent an open debate on the colo-
nial question (Ferreira :–; Ferreira :). Although there were no substantial
changes in Caetano’s censorship policy, gradually it became more lax and the media began
to criticise the government (Pimlott and Seaton :). 
e government lost its grip on
information, especially in the colonies. Moreover growth of the armed forces led a more het-
erogeneous social and ideological composition (Schmitter :; Porch : ). 
e
military were exposed to alternative sources of information and to new progressive ideas. 
e
regime ended up being blamed for the conflict and Caetano discredited (Soares :).

e publication of General Spínola’s book ‘Portugal e Futuro’ in  in which he criticised
the government exemplifies the regime loss of control on information.
4.3.2 Information detectors

e Estado Novo also relied on information detectors to subordinate the military. Several
state organisations collected information critical for the stability of the regime. 
e most
important was the secret police //. Salazar and Caetano also relied on a wide web
of informants and on their central location within the Estado Novo information network.
Although the use of information detectors grew throughout the dictatorship they failed to
prevent the military insurrection that precipitated its fall.

e secret police (), created in , quickly became a fundamental control tool em-
ployed not only to counter opposition among civilians, usually communist and far-right ac-
tivists, but also threats from the quarters (Pimentel :–). 
e well-armed secret
police was used as a coercive organisation tool (see .) and as an information effector fun-
damentally thanks to its role in the Estado Novo censorship strategy (see .). However, its
main contribution to military subordination derives from its function as information detector.
From , the  ran politico-ideological checks on military officers and the candidates
to the Military Academy (Carrilho :).  was notorious for its inquisitive surveil-
lance which techniques had been learnt from German and Italian police (Gallagher :).
In , it was transformed into  and its powers increased. 
e interception of letters,
tapped phones, interrogations and even torture were common methods to obtain informa-
tion. 
e secret police became notorious internationally especially during the Colonial Wars
when its action was intensified. In  it was renamed . 
e utilisation of the secret
police increased progressively, its personnel increased from  in  to , in  (Pi-
mentel :–). Rather than the use of violence, the key of success of the secret police
was maintaining an important network of informants, ‘bufos’ (Gallagher :– Pi-
mentel :–). In , there were , informants working for them (Pimentel
:). 
e information collected by the secret police served to neutralise several military
plots.
See Azevedo (:–). When Caetano was appointed, Portuguese journalists expected the abolition
of the Censorship. Due to the unstable situation and the pressures from the hardliners this was not achieved.
See for instance Jorge Tavares Rodrigues’ letter to Caetano (//) (Antunes , vol. :–).
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e government also used other information detectors to prevent military conspiracies such
as the , the  and the Portuguese Legion. 
ere is also evidence that Salazar relied on
personal informants in order to assess what units in the Armed Forces should be suspected
of anti-Salazarist views. However, since the military strongly disliked being scrutinised by
external bodies, and especially by the /, the utilisation of non-military information
detectors was used with caution. 
e regime complemented their action with the help some
loyal officers and military services, such as the Army information services, .
Additionally, Salazar and Caetano used their nodal position within the state apparatus.
Letters, internal memos and reports served to obtain valuable information concerning the
military. Salazar and Caetano maintained extensive correspondence with other figures in the
administration and the armed forces. Moreover they constantly received reports and copies
of internal communications concerning the armed forces and in particular about military
reforms, defence budgets and discontent within the barracks. To a lesser extent than Franco,
Salazar and Caetano used informal friendship networks as a tool for the control of the military.

ey had no military background themselves and maintained a more distant rapport with their
entourage. Despite those efforts, the coup attempt in  by the Defence Minister Botelho
Moniz and the inadequate assessment of the risks of military plots against Caetano shows the
deterioration of the information detection mechanisms.
4.3.3 Conclusion
Information control was a very important aspect of the regime’s military subordination strat-
egy. On the one hand, Salazar and Caetano manipulated the information available for and
about the military through information effectors. On the other, they closely monitored the
military to anticipate discontent and insurrection through information detectors.
For instance, in May  the Legion informed the government of the circulation of critical document
signed by opposition groups within the Armed Forces (Ferreira :).
For instance a report from a lawyer called Angelo César, in , assessed the levels of loyalty within
different units of the army,  and  (//-, Folder , Document , Pages –).

e military despised the / and Salazar and Caetano did not want them to feel humiliated or feel
their autonomy threatened (Pimentel :, –).
See evidence on Salazar’s personal documentation. For instance secret report from the rd Military Region
informed about a military officer that was visiting different garrisons to promote a military opposition movement
(//) (//- Folder , Section , Page ) and report from the War Ministry identifying ten sup-
posedly subversive officers (//) (//- Folder , Section , Pages –). Military intelligence
reports also inform about problems of public order outside the barracks. For instance reports from the st, nd
and rd Military Region of  and  (//- Folder , Section –, Pages –).
See Melo (), Antunes (,), Oliveira et al. () and the abundant correspondence in Salazar’s
and Caetano’s personal archives. See for instance exchanges with Army Minister Abranches Pinto and Defence
Minister Santos Costa in  (//-, Folder , Pages –). Salazar paid great attention to the
letters received from military officers. Salazar highlighted what he considered important in the letters he received
from military officers, often these were compliments but also protests. Salazar kept  letters addressed to him
as a reaction to the  military reforms (//-, Folder , Sections –, Pages –).
See Salazar’s and Historical Military archives.
See extensive documentation about the coup in Captain Fernando Ferreira Valença’s report (,
divisão , secção , caixa , numero , documentos –A) and about the  plots in Captain Salgueiro
Maia’s report (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
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e government’s propaganda was very intense and involved many different means such as
public speeches, books, pamphlets, press and specialised publications. 
e government pro-
jected an idealised image of Salazar, Portugal and the armed forces. 
e very powerful /
was in charge of coordinating the propaganda action. Additionally, several organisations ex-
erted censorship in the Estado Novo, such as the , the // and the Legion. 
e
goal was to eliminating any information that could cause concern or raise discontent amongst
the military. Both propaganda and censorship were very strong during the Spanish Civil and
the Second World Wars. Later, they gradually declined. After the fall of the Axis, the type
of information manipulation used by the Estado Novo became questionable in the Western
sphere. During the Colonial Wars the new, larger and more decentralised organisation of the
armed forces as well as its more heterogeneous composition undermined the effectiveness of
the government information effectors.
Conversely, the utilisation of information detectors grew continuously throughout the
regime. Most of the institutions involved in propaganda and censorship were also employed to
detect potential threats. Among them the // was the most important. Its inquis-
itive surveillance helped to neutralise many military plots. 
e government also relied on a
wide network of informants as well as on Salazar’s and Caetano’s priviledged position vis-à-vis
the information flows within the Estado Novo’s administration. Letters, internal communica-
tions and reports received from senior officers and civil servants contributed to the assessment
and prevention of risks coming from the armed forces.
4.4 Authority

e authority-based rewards and incentives played a very important role in the military con-
trol strategy. 
e capacity of the government to shape military promotions, the appointment
to top positions in the state apparatus and the functions and privileges granted to the mili-
tary were used to increase loyalty within the ranks. 
e Salazarist regime also used authority
sanctions and constraints as control mechanisms. 
e government limited the retirement age
and size of the armed forces, punished disloyal military and introduced some restrictions to
enhance the esprit de corps and detach them from political activities. Overall, the utilisation
of authority tools was very important and slightly more stable than those of organisation and
nodality tools. However, an important peak in the use of authority tools can be observed in
the late s, when Salazar managed to substitute all the top senior officers by loyal younger
officers through a combination of authority tokens, and a progressive decline from the s,
associated to the Colonial Wars and the loss of legitimacy of the government.
4.4.1 Rewards and incentives
First, military promotions became control tools. Most of the young officers that had partici-
pated in the  May  coup were supportive of Salazar. Salazar gradually replaced senior
officers, who in general kept a more critical attitude towards his reforms, by young, loyal ones.

e use of promotions and military appointments was intensified after , when Salazar be-
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came self-appointed War Minister. Salazar took advantage of the ongoing military reforms
to institutionalise a mechanism of political appointment and ministerial approval, ‘escolha’,
for senior ranks (Matos :). In , ministerial approval became a condition for
the admission to the elite High Staff Corps and a merit-based system of appointment re-
placed the traditional seniority principle for military promotions from the rank of Captain
upwards. Loyalty and subordination became highly rewarded. 
e political-ideological fil-
ter made at the top of the hierarchy was reproduced down to the rank of Captain (Carrilho
:). 
e High Staff Corps was very appealing for most military because it involved
a higher salary, fast-track promotions and access to the most desired positions such as those
in the urban centres and embassies. Since ministerial approval was a prerequisite to enter
the Corps and to reach the top ranks in the armed forces, ambitious officers publicly showed
their allegiance to the regime. 
ese authority-based instruments introduced in  were
those with a highest impact on the control of the military during the Estado Novo (Pinto
:). 
e ‘escolha’ was extremely important from the late s to  and served to
replace the top ranks with loyal officers. 
e ‘escolha’ persisted during Caetano’s rule but he
was less involved in the appointment of military chiefs than Salazar (Matos :). He
did not enjoy the same legitimacy among the ranks as his predecessor and was afraid he could
create unrest by interfering in the promotion system reactions (Fernandes ).
Second, Salazar and Caetano used their capacity to influence appointments in the admin-
istration as control tools. 
ey systematically reserved some of the most important positions
in the regime to loyal military officers, including many ministerial positions (Table , Page
) and that of the President of the Republic. Although Presidents were formally elected,
candidates had to be approved by the Prime Ministers who controlled the single party, Na-
tional Union. 
ese appointments served to reward allegiance and held important symbolic
value for the armed forces. Moreover, many other top positions in the administration were
allocated to the military. From  to , about  of the Civil Governors and almost
all the Colonial Governors were military men. 
e military had significant representation
in the National Union, the Corporate Chamber and the National Assembly (Faria :–
). 
ere is evidence that the appointment of military personnel to top positions in the
For instance, in  Colonel Tasso Miranda Cabral was promoted to Brigadier and charged with the
reorganisation of the army, Colonel Raul Esteves became General and Captain Santos Costa was appointed
Undersecretary of State (Faria :, –, ).
Decree-Law  (//). 
e High Staff Corps was fundamental for Salazar’s control strategy
(Carrilho : –). Salazar personally drafted all documents related to the admission process and re-
quirements for the High Staff Corps. See his handwritten amendments in the reform project (//-
Folder , Section , Page ) and in the regulations of the High Military Studies Institute concerning the
requisites for the High Staff Course (//-, Folder , Section –, Pages –).
Decree-Law  (//). 
e ranks of Captain, Major and Colonel could be reached by seniority
and appointment, the ranks of Brigadier and General only by appointment (Article ). However in the case
of members of the High Staff Corps, the promotion to the level of Major and Colonel had to be done by
appointment from the War Minister. See for instance the Regulations of the High Military Studies Institute,
 (//-, Folder , Section , Page ). Even the professors of the Military School were directly
appointed by the War Minister. See Project of Decree-Law for the reform of the Army School (November ,
//-, Folder , Section , Pages –).

e three Presidents were military: General Fragoso Carmona (–), General Craveiro Lopes
(–) and Admiral Américo Tomás (–). Salazar did not allow Craveiro Lopes to run for re-
election in  and Caetano blocked Spínola’s candidacy in , in both cases to prevent tensions among
generals (Fernandes :–).
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state apparatus continued throughout the regime. However, from the late s, there was
a gradual decline in their representation in the government and state institutions (Schmitter
:–; Carrilho :).

ird, some of the the functions entrusted to the armed forces and some of the privileges
that the military enjoyed can be considered authority-based rewards and incentives. According
to the  Constitution the military were the guarantors of the ‘National Revolution’ and
the ‘maintenance of order and public peace’. 
is was not merely a symbolic function andn
the military held important power concerning public order during the Estado Novo. 
e
security forces , ,  and Fiscal Guard were always led by senior military officers.
Until , the military were in charge of judging political crimes through special military
courts and from , the responsibility of the defence of the empire was transferred from
the Overseas Ministry to the armed forces. Military officers also worked in prison services,
in the Legion and Mocidade, in the censorship services, and in the colonial administration
(Wheeler b:).
Additionally, there was a tacit agreement from the early s between the government and
the military according which the military maintained their autonomy, privileges and some rep-
resentation in the administration to compensate their extrication from politics. For instance,
there was a great level of tolerance for holding second jobs and until  the military were
immune from arrest by the civilian police. In , the first Army Officer’ Statutes were
launched, introducing new guarantees for the military. During the Colonial Wars some new
privileges were introduced. For instance, in , the Estado Novo reintroduced the right to
vote in the legislative elections (eliminated in ) and, in , the Armed Forces Officer’s
Statutes increased officers’ rights and guarantees. Moreover, numerous military decorations
were awarded every year to combatants, often personally by Salazar. All these functions,
privileges and formal recognitions aimed to make the military feel empowered and increase
their satisfaction.
See General Kaúlza’s letters to Caetano proposing military candidates to some state jobs (and thanking him
for some favour concerning Kaúlza’s brother in law)(//) and undated letter ( or ) (/–
).
See for instance Article  of the  Constitution and Salazar’s early speeches and writings (Salazar ,
, ;  undated ).

e reforms approved in  and  diminished both military autonomy and political influence. From
 to  military autonomy and political influence grew. After , Salazar managed again to reduce their
autonomy (Telo :–).
For instance a secret report from the st Military Region denounces that the poor salaries oblige the military
to work in their spare time having a negative impact in their military occupation (//- Folder , Section
, Page ).
In  immunity from arrest was removed (Wheeler b:–, )

e Statutes of the three branches were revised to conform the new guarantees of the Navy (), Army
and Air Force ().
See Matos (:). An internal memo in the Army Ministry (//) explains that military honours
and decorations were going to be made in public ceremonies as a means to elevate the morale of the troops, their
families and the population (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
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4.4.2 Sanctions and constraints
Authority tools were also used to restrain the capacity of the military to oppose to the govern-
ment. 
ese can be organised in three groups: limitations to the size of the armed forces and
retirement age, punishments to rebellious officers and regulations to enhance their esprit the
corps and separation from politics.
First, the  reforms were essential to reinforce civilian control of the military. In addi-
tion the ‘escolha’ system, these reforms introduced legal limitations to the size of the army,
to the length of the military service and to the retirement age. 
e oversized army was
problematic. 
e government believed that smaller armed forces could be better paid, trained
and equipped thus reducing the risk of military disaffection. 
e government also aimed to
rejuvenate the senior ranks by stimulating early retirement. 
is measure was enhanced by
financial incentives. In some cases the pensions of early retirees became higher than salaries.

e measure resulted in the reduction the total number of officers in active by  and the
complete renewal of the top ranks by . 
is was extremely important from a control
point of view because together with the newly introduced ‘escolha’ system, it gave Salazar the
opportunity to promote many loyal military to the top of the hierarchy. From  to 
fifteen new generals were appointed. 
anks to this combination of authority tools, the gen-
eration of young officers that had participated in the  May coup quickly attained most of
the high positions within the ranks (Telo :).

e government enacted new regulations to reduce the size of the army, which had grown
during the Second World War to face a possible invasion. 
is process included a fast process
of de-mobilisation of militia officers (‘milicianos’) recruited during the war period, among
which many did not share the ideas of the regime (Telo :). 
e size of the armed
forces was reduced by more than  from  to  (Matos :). Later, however,
the Colonial Wars hindered again the goal of maintaining a small army.
Second, the governments used their official capacity to discharge or demote officers when
their behaviour was disloyal. 
is served to punish military involved in the several anti-
government plots while creating opportunities for the appointment of loyal officers. 
ere
are many examples. For instance in May , the government dismissed generals Mendes
Ribeiro, Norton de Matos, Mendes Cabeçadas, Colonel Ferreira Guimarães and Major Rodir-
gues Areosa Feio for conspiring against the regime (Matos :). After the Tagus revolt
in  there were purges in the Navy (Freire :–) and after that of April 
Colonels Silva Casqueiro, Lello Portela, Ferreira Guimarães and Brigadeiro João Almeida were
forced into exile (Pinto :, ). Captain Henrique Galvão was arrested in  and
later forced into retirement for criticising the colonial policy. In April  Botelho Moniz
and Costa Gomes were fired, and Craveiro Lopes forced to retirement after their failed coup.
Law  (//) of Organisation of the Army.
Law  (//) of Recruitment and Military Service.
Decree-Law  (//).
See amendments to the drafts of Decree  by Salazar (, //- Folder , Sections –,
Pages –).
See Carrilho (:) and Faria (:–). 
e number of generals was limited to eighteen. 
is
instrument was so effective that in only  years produced the retirement of all generals that had participated in
the reorganisation (Faria :).
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In  ten officers were expelled from the army for disobeying government orders to de-
fend Goa against the much larger Indian troops in , including General Vassalo e Silva
who was in charge of the colony (Gallagher :–). Notwithstanding, overall the
government’s stance was comparatively soft and often military plotters were reintegrated into
the military. 
e authority disciplinary measures were not very stringent and did not have a
strong deterrent capacity.

ird, the governments used restrictive regulation to enhance the military’s distinct esprit
de corps and detachment from politics. For instance, the right of association was restricted
and secret societies were prohibited due to their historical connexion with republicanism,
career limitations for militia officers were introduced , the military were not allowed to
exercise liberal professions, they needed permission to get married and were restricted to non-
divorced Portuguese women and from  to  they were not allowed to vote. Military
were even commanded to avoid areas were anti-government demonstrations were likely to take
place.
4.4.3 Conclusion
Authority tools can be considered those with the greatest impact on military subordination the
military, at least during Salazar’s rule. 
e system of appointment and ministerial approval,
‘escolha’, combined with the limitations to the retirement age introduced in  allowed
Salazar to replace completely the, often critical, senior ranks with younger loyal military offi-
cers. Pro-salazarist officers were appointed to key positions, not only in the armed forces but
also in other parts of the regime Administration. 
e use of the government’s capacity to shape
appointments and the presence of the military in the State institutions was very important un-
til the mid-s, but then it declined. 
e regime also reserved some special powers for the
military concerning the maintenance of public order so that they feel empowered. More-
over the military enjoyed formal rewards and incentives to increase their satisfaction, such as
high degree of autonomy, tolerance with secondary jobs, immunity to civilian arrest and they
received often military decorations. 
ese rewards were intensified during the Colonial Wars.
For instance see the reintegration of conservative military rebels approved in November and December
 (Salazar correspondence //-, Folder , Section –, Pages –). After the failed coup on 
April  the government merely dismissed some of the conspirators but did not take any further disciplinary
measure (Gallagher :–). See also the antecedents to  coup.
Law (//) prohibited secret societies. 
is measure affected many officers who belonged to the
Freemasons and the Carbonari (Antunes : ). It was a request of the young officers that had participated
in the  May  coup who were very concerned with influence of the freemasons on the military hierarchy
and government.
Project of military reform of December  personally amended by Salazar limited the rank to Captain
(//-, Folder , Section , Pages –, ).
Regulation draft of military marriage in Salazar’s archive (undated, //–, Folder , Section –,
Pages –).
For instance internal memos by the  (// and //) commanded the military that from
 to  May  and on  of May  the military, after finishing their duties, had to return home by the
shortest way and avoid the Baixa area in Lisbon due to the foreseeable subversive acts organized by the  (,
divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
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In addition to lowering the retirement age that facilitated the renewal of the military hier-
archy there were other authority-based sanctions and constraints used to enhance the control
on the military. 
e government established formal limitations to the size of the armed forces.
Smaller armed forces could be better paid, trained and equipped increasing the levels of sat-
isfaction. Moreover, the government wielded its authority to demote or expel those involved
in anti-government plots or opposed to the regime’s colonial policy. However, in most cases
punishments were not severe. Finally, some restrictions were imposed on the military in order
to enhance a distinct esprit the corps and to keep them separated from politics.
Overall, the use of authority was fundamentally stable with an important peak around the
 reforms. Later, with the outbreak of the Colonial Wars () and the arrival of Caetano
() most authority tools became less important in the government control toolkit. 
is
points at the gradual depletion of authority as a government resource, the culmination of
which may be observed in the failure of Caetano’s authority-based measures.
4.5 Treasure
Salazar and some of the young officers of his entourage regarded the rearmament and moderni-
sation of the armed forces and salary raises as incentives for the military to develop profession-
alism and encourage a return to the barracks. However, these ideas collided with the generally
very poor economic situation of Portugal and with the austerity measures that Salazar champi-
oned and earned him his reputation. Military budgets increases were connected with reforms,
such as in the second half of the s and in the s and with external threats, such as the
Second World War and the colonial conflicts. 
ese increases had, nonetheless, little impact
on military living and working conditions and therefore on their level of subordination.
4.5.1 Evolution of military budgets

e Military Dictatorship (–) and the Estado Novo did not produce significant
growth in military budgets (Figure ). Although the impact of the Great Depression was
comparatively lower in Portugal than in other Western countries (Mateus :–) Por-
tugal’s general economic situation was poor. Portugal industry was not competitive and had a
high dependence on imports and emigrant remittances (Rosas ). 
e Great Depression
accentuated the trade deficit and the depreciation of the Escudo. Exports and remittances
diminished drastically (Mata and Valério :–). Salazar, influenced by the new to-
talitarian regimes in Europe adopted a highly autarkic economic policy (Mateus :).
His protectionist and austerity policies served to counter the effects of the international crisis
and legitimised his rule in the early s. However, they also hampered the utilisation of
treasure tools. For instance, the salary increases and modernisation of equipment requested by
the armed forces in the early s were not approved due to austerity imposed by Salazar.

e higher budgets in – coincide with the rearmament plans first in the Navy and
See for instance the reform proposed by Major Barros Rodrigues (//) (//-, Folder ,
Document , Pages –). Barros resigned due to insufficient funding for the project.
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then in the Army. 
e reforms of  and the threat of the Spanish War produced new
increases in military budgets.
Figure : Defence expenditure in constant million escudos of  (Military Dictator-
ship and Estado Novo)
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Source: Based on Mata and Valério (:–; –)
It includes expenditure in the overseas territories.
During the Second World War, exports grew drastically correcting temporarily the trade
deficit. However, the crisis of supply and an inflationary process linked to the war affected
the purchasing power of the military. 
e increases in defence budgets during the war did not
positively affect military satisfaction. 
e increase in military expenditure was associated with
the reinforcement of the garrisons in Cabo Verde, the Azores and the frontier with Spain and
did not contribute to the improvement of the salaries and working conditions of the military.

e Portuguese economy grew without interruption from  to  (Mata and Valério
:, ) but this growth was not reflected in the military budgets. Portugal remained
the second poorest European country after Greece and suffered some structural deficiencies
that made Salazar prioritise other expenditures such as health, education and infrastructures
over defence. In real terms, military expenditure grew slowly until late s. 
e weight
of defence expenditure vis-à-vis total public expenditure decreased until the membership in
 and then remained stable until the colonial conflict (Figure ). During this period, the
financial resources devoted to military and defence purposes were comparatively low (Table
).
From , the military budgets quickly soared. 
e war effort necessitated enormous
sums of money, which constrained the capacity of the government to use treasure for control

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Figure : Defence expenditure as percentage total public expenditures in Portugal and
Spain (–)
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Source: Based on Olmeda (: ) and Mata and Valério (: –; –)
Portuguese data include expenditure in the overseas territories.
purposes. Moreover, emigration and the wars provoked a dramatic shortage of man-power
that worsened the state of the Portuguese economy.
4.5.2 Staff expenditure
General salary raises, differentiation of wages, as well as pension and other complementary
remunerations were used to maintain the military under control. However, the intensity and
frequency of their use was very limited due to factors such as the size of the army, economic
crises and the special needs during war periods.

e economic problems and the austerity imposed by Salazar limited the capacity to in-
crease military salaries without introducing structural changes in the armed forces. In the
early s, the government rejected to increase salaries. 
e reduction of personnel in 
Secret correspondence among the Finance, Army and Defence Ministers about the economic situation of
the Army in  denounces a budgetary deficit in  of  million escudos and serious problems in the
provisions of materials. 
e situation was so bad that the Army Ministry was advised to ask for a loan from
private banks (//-, Folder , Sections – Pages –).
 of the population had emigrated between  and  due to the transformations in Portuguese
economic structure and the unequal distribution of wealth. In  a fourth of the adult male population was
in the armed forces and almost , men were deployed in Africa (Maxwell :).

T E N’   
Table : Defence expenditure as a percentage of the GDP (NATO countries + Spain)
       
 . . .  . . . .
  . . . . . . .
France . . . . . . . .
Canada . . . . . . . .
Greece . . . . . . . .
Netherlands . . . . . . . .
Turkey . . . . . . . .
Norway . . . . . . . .
Italy . . . . .  . .
Germany . . .
Portugal . . . . . . . .
Belgium . . . . . .  .
Spain . . . .  . . .
Denmark . . .  . . . .
Luxembourg  . . . . . . .
Sources: Carrilho (: ) and Olmeda (: )
created the conditions to increase salaries without hugely increasing budgets. 
us, the gov-
ernment approved an important general raise to bridge the gap with civil servant salaries,
increased in , and also to prevent criticism of the other more controversial reforms that
the government was launching in .

e government also used salary discrimination among different ranks and Corps to rein-
force military loyalty. For instance raises approved in  were especially high for the senior
ranks to keep their loyalty. 
eir salaries were higher than those of equivalent positions in the
civil service (Faria : ). 
is aimed to compensate the reduction of the political power
of the military elites (Carrilho : –). Membership to the new High Staff Corps
also meant higher salaries for equivalent ranks (Table ). Since ministerial approval was a
requisite for the senior ranks and for High Staff Corps membership, ambitious officers had
strong incentives to show allegiance to the regime.
In addition, there were other economic supplements for critical units like those in Lisbon
and Porto, or for pilots and ‘observadores’ and for some especial tasks. By targeting some
specific units that could have an important impact in an internal uprising Salazar was securing
his position vis-à-vis a potential military threat.
Due to the inflation during the Second World War, salaries became insufficient and the mil-
itary often were needed secondary jobs to sustain their families. 
e government approved a
 general salary raise in February  following military criticism on the plans intending

e salary raise was approved by the Decree-law  (//). Salazar was personally involved in
this reform. See his correspondence (//- Folder , Section –, Pages –) and comments on the
project of salary raises (//-, Folder –, Pages –, –).
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Table : Military monthly salaries in January  (in escudos)
Ranks Generals High Staff
Corps
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery,
Engineering, Air Force, Mil-
itary Administration, Health
and Veterinary
Support services, chiefs of
military bands
General 
Brigadier 
Colonel  
Lieutenant-
Colonel
 
Major   
Captain   
Lieutenant  
nd Lieutenant  
Source: Decree  (//). Salazar Archives //- Folder , Document , Pages
–.
to freeze military expenditure. Again, salary raises were made possible thanks to the down-
sizing process launched in . 
is general raise was, nonetheless, insufficient and did not
successfully manage to curb military discontent.
Salazar was asked by  to augment military budgets and officers’ salaries to incentivise
exclusive dedication and attract qualified personnel (Matos :, ). Despite 
aid, the financial problems persisted and no relevant salary increases were made. In 
Portugal was the second European  country which devoted the highest percentage of the
army budget to staff expenditures: .. However salaries continued to be insufficient
to guarantee exclusive dedication. In  the salary of a Colonel covered only  of the
minimum living expenses for his household, that of a Captain between  and , and
that a Sergeant between  and  percent.
Defence expenditure grew rapidly from late s. Money was spent to assure the defence
of the overseas territories, not on improve military salaries. 
e government introduced some
See letter to Salazar explaining that the  rise had relieved the military momentarily but that the effects
of this measure would not last long (//, //-, Folder , Page ).
See complaints about the loss of purchasing power in secret memo from Santos Costa (//,
//- Folder , Document , Page ), secret reports from the rd Military Region (//), from
the nd Military Region (// and //)(//- Folder , Section , Page ; Section , Page
; Section , Page ).
See for instance the cancellation of some military promotions due to lack of economic resources. Letter
from Caetano to Salazar (Antunes :–).
Second after Turkey (.) and far ahead of the Netherlands (.),  (.), Italy (.) and
France (.) (, divisão , secçao , caixa , numero , documento ).

e estimate was made assuming a household of four people. Army Ministry report about the bases for
military salaries (, divisão , secçao , caixa , numero , documento ).
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economic perks. For instance, in  the government created a fund to compensate the
families of deceased officers. In , exemptions and reductions in the payment of some
services were introduced for the families of the military killed or handicapped during the
war and in  and , military pensions were increased (Matos :). However,
given the complexity of the colonial conflict and the size of the armed forces mobilised the
increases in budgets overall did not have a positive impact on military salaries, which remained
very low compared to other European armed forces (Porch :–). Military discontent
at the end of the regime proves it (Chapter  Section ..).
In sum, although there is evidence of the utilisation of salaries and other economic incen-
tives, the contribution of staff expenditure as control tool was very limited throughout the
regime.
4.5.3 Equipment Expenditure
Salazar considered the rearmament and modernisation of the armed forces as an incentive
for the military to return to the barracks. However, similar to Spain, most defence expen-
diture was earmarked for officers’ salaries and living costs of the troops. Salazar’s austerity
economic policies contributed to curtail expenditure in materials and weapons. Moreover the
insufficient capacity of the defence industry made Portugal very dependant on foreign aid.

e modernisation of the armament and equipment remained very limited during the Estado
Novo.
In the early s, there was scarcity in terms of equipment, weapons and ammunition
(Faria :–). In , Salazar’s government adopted a budget of  million escudos
for the acquisition of equipment for the armed forces. Salazar prioritised the Navy. On top
of the strategic reasons, such as the defence of the Lisbon port, the maritime communications
and the colonies, the consolidation of military subordination was central to the decision. Tra-
ditionally, republican ideas had flourished in the Navy. Despite some initial purges during the
military dictatorship, the opposition to the regime enjoyed important support in the Navy.

us, Salazar intended to buy their loyalty. However, shortly after, the Army became again the
privileged recipient of funds as means to prevent a land invasion from Spain where growing
political instability was alarming Portuguese military and political elites. 
e plan of rearma-
ment of the Army initiated in  was the most ambitious ever undertaken by Portugal in its
contemporary history. In , the rearmament was partially hindered by Salazar’s support
to Francoist camp. 
e  and France did not satisfy Portuguese demands for the acquisition
of artillery to prevent weapons from reaching Franco (Telo :). Germany replaced the
‘Cofre de Previdência das Forças Armadas’. Decree-law  (//).
In average , men were mobilised in Africa between  and  and a total of ,, men
participated in the three main operations theatres (Ferreira :)
Army reports, August  (//-, Folder , Pages –) and June  (//- Folder 
Pages –). See also Telo (:–).
See Telo (:) and internal government reports about equipment acquisition in . For instance
 million escudos spent for maritime defence (//-, Folder , Pages –), over  million on
planes and equipment for training (//-, Folder , Pages –), and over  million investment on
weapon factories (//-, Folder , Pages –).
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 and France as the main equipment supplier. 
e rearmament was financed by an increase
of exports of products such as wolfram, oils, cork, canned food and resins to Germany, as well
as by a  million marks credit to be repaid within  years (Faria :–).
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the supply of weapons and equipment from
Germany was quickly reduced. 
e situation of the armed forces in  was still very unsatis-
factory; only one division had modern equipment. All experts agreed that Portugal could not
resist an invasion from Spain Once the ‘Operation Felix’ for the attack of Gibraltar (which
included an eventual occupation of Lisbon) was postponed in , Germany continued to
support Portuguese rearmament to counterbalance British influence and remained its main
supplier until . In , after an agreement for the Allies’ utilisation of the bases in the
Azores, the  started to provide Portugal with some weaponry considered obsolete to fight
the Germans but sufficient to improve Portuguese fighting capacity. 
e material included
planes, tanks, machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aerial weapons, mortars, shells, trucks, aux-
iliary escort boats and communication equipment. However, the rearmament efforts only
enabled Portugal to fully equip three infantry divisions and a battalion of artillery and renew
partially the armament of two other divisions at the end of the war (Teixeira :).
After the end of the Second World War the government launched a programme a pro-
gramme of construction of quarters to improve military working conditions. Most of these
were inaugurated the s. However, the process of modernisation of weapons and ma-
terials continued to be very slow after the war. Portugal was the least benefitted among the
recipients of the Marshall Plan (Rollo ). Despite  membership, the  military aid
received by Portugal was very low.. 
e rearmament of Navy became again a priority fol-
lowing  demands and also as a means to compensate for the Navy’s loss of autonomy
and political influence. For instance, in  the  approved military aid of  million
See Telo (:–) and negotiations with German Government (November-December ,
//- Folder , Sections –, Pages –).
According to the British newspaper ‘Reynolds News’ (//) Portugal was a liability for the  because
‘her military forces are negligible and her territory might be invaded by Franco’ (News clipping and translation
sent to Salazar by , //-, Folder , Section , Page –). Army Chief of Staff Miranda
Cabral stated that the defence of Portugal from Spain was ‘unfeasible and utopian’ if they were not helped
by the  (letter to Salazar, //, , Fundo , secção , caixa , documento ). A military
assessment during the Azores negotiations with the  concluded that Portugal would need British military
support to defend from an possible Spanish invasion, and asked for their aid (Secret memos from the Portuguese
Delegation, //, //-, Section , Pages –). See alsoTeixeira (:).
For instance contract of acquisition of bomb shells from Germany (//) (//-, Folder ,
Pages –). See also Telo (:–).
See for instance the abundant documentation on the secret agreements of military cooperation in the Azores
in July and August  between the  and Portuguese governments (//-, Section –, Pages –).
See secret memo of the British delegation in the Azores negotiations (//, //-, Section ,
Pages –) and secret report from the British Embassy (//, //-, Section , Pages –
).
See Matos (:, ). In the s, many quarters were opened: in Porto (infantry in  and
general quarter of the North Military Region in ), Viseu (), Caldas da Rainha (), Abrantes (),
Beja (), Braga ().
For instance, the total amount received by Portugal from  to  was inferior to that allocated to
Spain in . 
e reason might be the equipment of the Spanish Armed Forces was even older and scarcer (Telo
:, ). From  to   military aid to Portugal continued to be lower than to most European
countries (Barrachina :).
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dollars for the Air Force,  million for the Army and  million for the Navy. Navy bud-
gets were increased at a higher pace than those of the Army. However, the economic needs
of the Navy overseas in order to defend the colonies hindered the modernisation efforts in
continental Portugal and did not have a considerable impact on military satisfaction (Telo
:–, –).

e Colonial Wars produced a growth in the armed forces and their budgets without a pos-
itive impact on military material conditions. 
ere was little flexibility in personnel budgets
and the government made clear that salaries were the priority over equipment. For instance,
from January to May ,  million escudos out of  million requested were authorized
for staff expenditure while only  million out of  million requested were authorised for
equipment. 
e minimal material needs could not be satisfied, to the extent that in 
there were only two rifle bullets per man/day. Dissatisfaction grew and corporatist claims
multiplied. 
e use of treasure through equipment expenditure continued to be minimal and
not considered central to the strategy for military subordination until the end of the regime.
4.5.4 Conclusion
Treasure tools were used to improve military living and working conditions but did not play
a major role during the Estado Novo. 
e precarious economic situation of Portugal limited
treasure as a resource. Overall, salaries were comparatively low and more a source of unrest
than satisfaction. General salary raises, such as those in  and , served to compen-
sate the effects of inflation and to appease the military when other controversial reforms were
launched. 
ese raises were made possible by policies aiming at the reduction of the size of
the Army.  also pushed the government to improve salaries as a means of profession-
alisation but the colonial conflict hindered the process. In addition to general salary raises,
salary discrimination was used to enhance loyalty of the senior ranks and some key corps and
units. During the Colonial Wars, pensions and economic benefits for military families were
introduced too.
Equipment expenditure was also very limited. Not only were military budgets low but most
of them were earmarked for officers’ salaries and troops’ living expenses. Despite the rearma-
ment plans in the s, during the Second World War and in the s, the Portuguese
Armed Forces remained comparatively poorly equipped throughout the regime. Salazar’s aus-
terity policies and Portuguese dependence on foreign suppliers were limiting factors. 
e
insufficient investment in equipment and the prioritisation of personnel expenses shows that
the government was more concerned with maintaining the military relatively satisfied than
with developing a strong fighting capacity. 
e financial penuries during the Colonial Wars
also limited the capacity to equip the military, which worsened working conditions. In sum,
although there is evidence of the utilisation of staff and equipment expenditure for control
purposes their intensity and frequency was very low and their overall impact very limited.
See confidential report by the Army Minister to the Defence Minister on points at the precarious situation
in terms of materials and weapons of the Army due to budgetary problems (//, //- Folder
, Section , Pages –) and in an urgent confidential report the Army Minister complains about the un-
sustainable financial penuries of the Army and proposes the reduction of the personnel as last resort (//,
//-, Folder , Section , Pages –).

S
4.6 Summary

e Estado Novo used many different tools to maintain the military subordinated and their
use evolved throughout the regime.
Although the Estado Novo developed organisation instruments with coercive capabilities to
control the population, such as the police forces //, , , and the paramili-
tary Portuguese Legion their overall relevance in the control of the military was limited. 
ese
bodies helped deterring some military plots, but the action of loyal Army units was more de-
cisive in neutralising by force military coups. Non-coercive organisation tools were extremely
important. Salazar shaped the organisation of the armed forces following a divide-and-rule
logic. During the s, the  and the  induced important changes in military educa-
tion and training as well as in the Armed Forces organisational design. 
ese changes were
intended not only to improve Portuguese defence capabilities but also to consolidate military
subordination. Additionally, the provision of jobs, goods and services for the military officers
and their families proved to be effective tools. 
e Colonial War meant a reduction in the
utilisation of non-coercive tools except for the delivery of services and goods.
Nodality tools were very important in government control strategy too. 
e government
used several state organisations such as //, , Legion, , and the  usually
as both, information effectors and detectors. Inspired by Italy and Germany, the government
used these organisations to produce and restrain the information available to the military and
about military issues and at the same time served as ears for the regime identifying sources
of unrest and conspiracies in the ranks. Propaganda and censorship were especially inten-
sive from the inception of the regime until the end of the Second World War. Afterwards,
information manipulation tools became less acceptable in the West and the exchanges with
 allies open new alternative sources of information for the military. 
e Colonial Wars
and Caetano’s timid attempts of liberalisation also helped diminish the effectiveness of infor-
mation effectors. Conversely, the utilisation of information detectors increased in salience.
// acquired more power and growing networks of informants, ‘bufos’ collected
sensible information for the regime. Additionally, internal communications, reports and cor-
respondence exchanges helped Salazar and Caetano.

e authority-based incentives and rewards were extremely relevant, especially until the
Colonial Wars. 
e ‘escolha’ system of promotions and retirements introduced in  en-
abled Salazar to completely renew the top tier of the Armed Forces placing loyal military in
the most important positions. 
e military had a strong incentive to comply with the govern-
ment that had the power to approve or veto the appointments to the senior ranks and the elitist
High Staff Corps. 
e appointments to top positions of the administration; the wide powers
granted to the military related to the maintenance of public order; and other privileges, such
as great autonomy, tolerance with secondary jobs and military awards can be also considered
relevant authority-based incentives for subordination. On the other hand, the authority-based
sanctions and constraints were less significant to control the military. Restrictions to the size
of the armies and to retirement age contributed to facilitate the actions of other types of tools,
such as salary raises and promotions of loyal officers. In general, Sanctions to the military
involved in conspiracies were not very severe. Moreover, some restrictions were introduced to
enhance a distinct esprit de corps and detach them from any political activity. 
e contacts
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with other  armies, the Colonial Wars and later the arrival of Caetano gradually depleted
government’s authority and limited the utilisation of this type of tools.
Finally, treasure tools were the least important in the government toolkit largely because this
resource was to a great extent depleted. General salary raises took place in  and  to
counter inflation and the unrest generated by military reforms. 
e salary differentials for the
members of the High Staff Corps and some units aimed to buy loyalty for the government.
Nonetheless, except for the senior ranks, Portuguese military were poorly paid throughout the
regime. Similarly equipment expenditure was insufficient and did not contribute to military
subordination. 
e acquisition of armament and other military materials was constrained
by the dependence on foreign suppliers and the austerity policies.  demanded increases
of military expenditure but budgets did not substantially grow until the beginning of the
Colonial Wars, when the important increases in budgets were absorbed by the growth of the
armies and defence effort. Material conditions of the military that in fact worsened during
the colonial conflict.
In sum, the most relevant tools were: authority incentives and rewards (especially in the
s and s), non-coercive organisation tools (in the s) and nodality tools (effectors
until  and detectors afterwards). It can be construed, therefore, that the regime relied
more on ‘carrots’ than on ‘sticks’. Even at the level of treasure government emphasised finan-
cial rewards over improving working conditions. At the level of trends it is worth mention
that Colonial Wars produced an overall depletion of the government resources which was
manifested by the decline in the utilisation and impact of many of the tools of government,
which in turn facilitated the success of the Carnations Revolution and fall of the Estado Novo
in .
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5 Tools of government in the Portuguese
transition to democracy
5.1 Introduction1

e Carnations Revolution in  did not bring immediate, radical changes in the govern-
ment control toolkit. However, after the failed military left-wing coup d’etat of November
, which marked the consolidation of the -Moderates and the abandonment of the
radical revolutionary agenda, the pattern of utilisation of most of the basic resources under-
went important transformations.
Establishing a clear divide between the government and the armed forces is problematic
until  when the Constitutional Reform eliminated the Council of the Revolution. As
chapter  explains, the two institutions were deeply intertwined. 
e members of the 
became political decision-makers and the executive power was fragmented in several bodies.
For the purpose of simplicity, this section considers as tools of government all those employed
by the Prime Minister (), the Council of Ministers, the President of the Republic, the
Junta of National Salvation (), the  Coordinating Committee, the  Assembly and
the Council of the Revolution ().
Table  outlines the main findings explained in this chapter. Coercive organisation tools,
in particular the special unit , gained salience until the coup attempt of November
 but they were abandoned afterwards (Section ..). 
is coup also marked the evo-
lution of non-coercive organisation tools. Organisational design was used to recentralise the
armed forces by eliminating the parallel  hierarchical structures that had emerged during
the Revolution. Military education and training, which had been marginal since the out-
break of the Colonial Wars, gained salience progressively from . However, there is no
evidence of any substantial change in the provision of goods, services and jobs as control tool
during this period (Section ..). Nodality also reflects deep changes after November .
Propaganda and censorship which were very intensively used by the provisional governments
were abandoned after . 
e successive constitutional governments aimed at an increase
in transparency to improve mutual awareness of the civilian and military spheres and enjoyed
the support of the media that campaigned in favour of military subordination (Section ..).

e information detectors that had been very active until the November coup were almost
completely abandoned as means of control afterwards. 
e introduction of political oversight
mechanisms in  and the reunification of the secret services in  brought information
detectors back to the control toolkit (Section ..). Authority was intensively use through-

is chapter refers to the transitional process in a broad sense, encompassing also the period of constitu-
tional governments and democratic consolidation until .
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out this period. Nonetheless, substantial changes in the trajectories of specific tools can be
observed after the coup in November  and most importantly after the Constitutional
Reform in . After , the use of military appointments and demotion for control pur-
poses decreased. After , the autonomy and special functions that had been granted to
the military were severely curtailed by the Constitutional Reform and the new Defence Law
(Section .). Finally the utilisation of treasure continued to be very low and only after 
did military investment and re-armament programmes acquire significance (Section .).
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Table : Summary of tools of government in Portugal (–)
Tools Trajectory
Organisation Coercive (Section ..): , , some loyal military units, the se-
curity forces, the judiciary and, penitentiary systems. Even civilians were
used as coercive tools during the peaks of instability in  and 
Increasing salience until November
. Almost no evidence of utilisation
after 
Non-coercive (Section ..): Organisational design. 
e new  institu-
tions created a parallel hierarchy. Later a process of re- centralisation by
eliminating the revolutionary institutions and concentrating power in the
civilian government
Decentralisation until , recentrali-
sation afterwards
Military education through , Military Academies and Institutes and the
organisation of joint activities and courses with civilians to improve mutual
awareness. Military exercises and exchanges with 
Education and training insignificant
during the revolutionary period. It grew
significantly from  and became a
priority from 
Provision of services, goods and jobs to compensate low salaries. Some
new services were provided. 
e administration employed many military
returning from the colonies
Stable
Nodality Information effectors (Section ..): Propaganda and censorship were used
to politicise the military to enhance loyalty to the . Fifth Division,
, Dynamisation Cabinets, . Media were instrumentalised and
censored. Military ad-hoc committees control the media
Very intensive use until the end of .
After  propaganda and censorship
were abandoned and the  informa-
tion effectors eliminated
Public and updated the information about the military and defence to im-
prove mutual awareness of the military and civilian spheres. 
e media free
of censorship campaigned in favour of the complete military subordination
From . Increasing
Information detectors (Section ..): , Fifth Division, , Second
Section of  and other state institutions collected information concern-
ing the political allegiance to  in the ranks and scrutinised the media to
avoid information that could create unrest in the ranks
Important until the November .
Abandoned in . Use of detectors
was extremely low until 
Political oversight mechanisms From . Increasing
New integrated secret services  (,  and ) From . Increasing
Authority Rewards and incentives (Section ..): Military promotions and appoint-
ments to the government institutions, administration and  institutions
within the Armed Forces
Very important during the revolutionary
period. Low intensity from .
Extraordinary level of autonomy of the armed forces Extremely high until 
Special functions granted to the military in the political arena and internal
affairs
Extremely high. Decreased in  and
finally eliminated in 
Amnesty laws Abundant amnesties from  to .
Sanctions and constraints (Section ..): Expulsions and demotions of the
Estado Novo supporters and those that rebelled against the government
Very important in  and , de-
creasing afterwards
Abolition of the institutions such as those linked to the Estado Novo con-
trol machinery and later of the revolutionary institutions
Very important in the aftermath of the
Carnations Revolution and November
 Coup. Suppression of  in 
Legal constraints aiming the de-politicisation and professionalisation (de-
mobilisation of troops, prohibition to political activities, unionism, accu-
mulation of jobs and function)
Low intensity until . Reinforced in

Treasure Staff expenditure (Section ..): Staff spending prioritised over equipment
spending. However military budgets decreased. Salaries and pensions were
updated regularly to compensate inflation but remained comparatively low
Low intensity. Stable
Equipment expenditure (Section ..): Re-equipment and modernisation
efforts limited due to budget constraints. 
e  was the sole military unit
well equipped. Portugal depended on the cooperation with  allies for
the acquisition of equipment and the reinforcement of Portuguese defence
industry
Very low intensity until 
New process for military planning and a general re-armament. 
ese mea-
sures contributed to improve the equipment and to establish civilian con-
trol on military investment and re-armament programmes
From 
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5.2 Organisation

e coercive power of the state and a decentralised organisational design aiming the political
control of the military were central for the -controlled provisional governments (–
). During this period political elites only played a secondary role. After the end of the
dominance of the -Radicals and the failure of the  November leftist coup, coercive
organisation tools were abandoned and the institutional design reversed. Politicisation and
decentralisation were replaced by professionalisation and centralisation. From , political
elites gradually recovered their power. 
e constitutional governments promoted military ed-
ucation and training in order to achieve mutual awareness of the civilian and military sphere
and to keep the military focused on their professional duties and far from politics. 
e pro-
vision of services, goods, and jobs to military continued to compensate poor salaries. 
ese
were especially important for those returning from the colonies.
5.2.1 Coercive organisation
During provisional governments the utilisation of coercive organisation tools to control the
military was more salient than during the Estado Novo. 
e use of loyal military units as
deterrent to prevent and neutralise insurrections was prominent during the peaks of instabil-
ity in September , and March and November . Additionally, the security forces,
the judiciary and penitentiary systems as well as some organisations of civil society acted as
deterrent against military insubordination. From , coercive organisation tools became
marginal.

e -controlled government wanted to show the break with the past and with the
Salazarist control machinery. Immediately after the  April Revolution and due to their
identification as repression forces some the traditional coercive organisation control tools of
the Estado Novo, such as the  and the Legion, were abolished and others, such as the ,
the Fiscal Guard and the , were put under public scrutiny. Nonetheless, at the same time
the government created the Continent Operational Command, . 
is was a military
structure consisting of several units of Special Forces with the function of controlling internal
threats to Portugal, including military insurrections. 
e  was led by Major Otelo
and formally subordinated to the Board of Joint Staff () but was in fact controlled by
the  (Rato :). 
e  held an ambiguous police-military character depriving
the security forces of the former regime, the  and the , of some of their traditional func-
tions.  also had access to intelligence. 
e  participated in the dissolution of
the right-wing mobilisations in September  and blocked the entrance to Lisbon in order
to prevent a right-wing military counter-coup. 
e  provided the -controlled gov-
ernment with a military advantage over the right-wing forces in March  Spínolist coup
(Graham :; Carrilho ; Manuel ).
When the -Moderates seized control of the government, the , which continued
to support the revolutionary agenda, became a threat. In September , the Prime Minister,
Decree-Law / (//).
See the project of reorganisation of  (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ,
Acta //)

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Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, complained about the government’s lack of authority especially
within the military sphere. 
e , the  and the information services were reinforced and
more importantly the Military Intervention Group () was created. 
e  was a strategic
emergency unit under direct orders of the President of the Republic established to counter the
threat of . 
e  was a strongly armed, cohesive and disciplined unit to neutralise
coups against the government. 
e  was a deterrent for the revolutionary insurrections in
October and November . However, as a coercive tool it was formally suppressed on 
November  as part of a wider strategy to destabilise the most radical revolutionary actors
and justify the elimination of the  on  November .

e security forces contributed to deterring military insubordination too. 
ere is evidence
on the reliance of the government on the paramilitary police forces,  and  and on the
Judiciary Police to counter military threats. However, the security forces were not sufficiently
armed to face the new tasks. 
ey lacked human and material means to undertake action
against heavily armed organisations.

e judiciary and penitentiary systems were also implicated in the action against military
disobedience. After the coup attempts on  March  and  November , the Higher
Councils of Discipline in the three branches processed many officers for their participation
in the plots. A military Revolutionary Tribunal was set up to judge the March  coup
plotters. Military rebels were often imprisoned and subjected to solitary confinement. A
Red Cross report in August  criticised the difficult conditions of the political prisoners
in the prisons of Caxias, Peniche and Alcoentre. About  officers were arrested and al-
most a thousand trials were held for the participants in the insurrections of November .
Although instability decreased after November  the problems of discipline continued.
A permanent committee was constituted in the Council of the Revolution () in charge of
military justice and discipline. 
e last significant example of coercive organisation was the
arrest, trial and imprisonment in  of Otelo, who was accused of membership to the leftist
terrorist group -.
Finally, it is important to stress the use of civilian population as an organisation tools during
the revolutionary period. For example, social mobilisation triggered by the information service
Minutes of  reunion (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume , Acta //).
Confidential Internal Report of the Army Ministry about the mission of  (//, , divisão
, secção , caixa , numero ).
Minutes of the  reunion on  November  (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ,
Acta //) 
e  was in fact integrated within the ‘Regimento de Comandos de Amadora’. See Sánchez
Cervelló for an interpretation of the strategy that led to the failed  November coup and to the (:–).
Secret memo from the Justice Ministry requesting the control function to be transferred from the Judiciary
Police to the military (//) and Interior Ministry requesting the urgent armament and reform of the 
and  (March , , Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number ,
document ).

ere is extensive evidence in the correspondence between the  and Military Staff of the three branches
(, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , , , numbers , , ).
Decree-Law / (//). It judged mainly ex-/ agents but also military officers. Min-
utes of  reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ). Later abolshed by
Decree-law / (//).
, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document .
, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , documents , , ,
, .
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Fifth Division helped in countering the coup of March  (Sánchez Cervelló :).
Military units could have easily defeated the civilians that opposed them but a violent action
would have produced many civilian casualties which was deemed unacceptable in that context.
Although the possession or arms was restricted and civilian militias were forbidden, some
civilian institutions linked to political parties also experienced a process of militarisation par-
allel to that of politicisation of the armed forces. For instance, armed civilians collaborated
with soldiers to carry out arrest warrants issued by  (Maxwell :). However
the landmark of this process was the mobilisation of the civilian forces around the left-wing
military coup attempt of November . 
e main leaders of the  went to the north and
put themselves under the command of Pires Veloso, the military commander of the North
Military Region to help neutralising the coup. Militants of  surrounded the paratrooper
unit that had rebelled in Monte Real and farmers from Rio Maior controlled the accesses to
Lisbon. Equally, far-left civilians were mobilised and ready to follow orders from the military
conspirators.

e failure of the November  coup and the suppression of the  and marked
also a change in the control toolkit of the government. 
e end of political instability and
overt actions of military rebellion was accompanied by the replacement of coercive organisation
tools by other less intrusive non-coercive organisation approaches.
5.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

e main non-coercive organisation tools during the transition followed very different tra-
jectories than during the Estado Novo. First, the organisational design of the armed forces
evolved from decentralised and fragmented structure resulting from the military effort to con-
trol the government and society into a centralised structure similar to that of other Western
allies, including democratic Spain. Second, professional education and training became cen-
tral to the strategy of control only after . 
ird, the government continued the supply of
services, goods and positions in the public administration but they were less important in the
control strategy.

e capacity to shape the design of military and political institutions was very important.
Two opposite trajectories can be observed: an initial decentralisation process introduced by
the  until the end of  followed by a re-organisation aiming to recentralise power and
avoid fragmentation and political and military infighting.

e  introduced several institutions to control both the political and military spheres.
Immediately after the Carnations Revolution the , seeking to reassert military power and
autonomy, created a military National Junta of Salvation (). 
e  was a new sovereign
Project of decree-law approved by the , in Annexe B to the minute of  reunion (, Actas Conselho
da Revolução - Originais, volume , Acta //).
For instance the  and -Radicals created the para-military Revolutionary Corps of Popular Defense
in imitation of the Cuban Committees of Defence of the Revolution. 
ey were dissolved in November (Sánchez
Cervelló :).
Sánchez Cervelló (:–) explains the civilian involvement in the events and points at Costa
Gomes as the great strategist that avoided the civil war. Carrilho (:) suggests that the military opera-
tions were more a strategic game than direct violent actions, so that the risk of civil war was not so strong.

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body composed of seven military officers, with the capacity to control the programme of the
provisional governments. 
e  undertook a process of ‘democratic institutionalisation’
that aimed at the active participation of all the military in the revolutionary process, insuring
their cohesion and discipline, controlling the democratisation of the armed forces and stimu-
lating the information flows from and to the government. In October , the  created
the Higher Council of the  and the Armed Forces Assembly. 
e institutional arrange-
ment included reunions at the unit, military region and branch level. 
ese organisations
coexisted with the  Coordinating Committee and the State Council that was an advisory
body with a strong presence of  members. 
e  organisation within the armed forces
acted as a parallel and alternative power structure to traditional military hierarchy aiming to
insure the support within the armed forces to the provisional governments appointed by the
.
However, the  was not a cohesive organisation. Power was fragmented across not only
different institutions but also different factions. 
e struggles among them provoked great
institutional instability. After the March  coup attempt, the  sought to consolidate
its rule by a less fragmented institutional structure that united political and military power.

us, the , the Higher Council of the , the  Coordinating Committee and the State
Council were merged into a single executive authority: the . 
e  accumulated political
and socio-economic functions. Most importantly it substituted the Board of Joint Chiefs of
Staff () as the supreme body of military authority. Moreover the Armed Forces Assembly
was replaced by the  Assembly that, for the first time, allowed non-commissioned officers
and enlisted men among its members. 
is organ was in charge of monitoring the .

e military coup of November  revealed the degradation of the  revolutionary
institutions and their incapacity to rule Portugal. It marked the beginning of a gradual mil-
itary withdrawal from politics and fostered the process of centralisation of power (Gonzalez
Hernandez :). 
e  apparatus was dismantled, including the  Assembly in
February . Under the  Constitution, the  remained the sole military body with
political functions. It exerted constitutional review and legislative powers on military issues.

e  was re-established as the supreme military institution. General Ramalho Eanes
Decree-Law / (//). See also Graham (:–). 
e power struggle between the 
and Spínola ended up with the resignation of the later and a clear  domination of the .
‘Estruturação Democrática do ’

e Council (also known as ‘Council of ’) was composed of  officers from the  Coordinating Com-
mittee, the  members of the  and the  ministers in the Provisional Government. Initially called ‘Assembly
of ’, it influenced the decisions of the Higher Council (Carrillo :)
Confidential internal Memo of the Army Ministry on the reorganisation of the , signed by  Gen-
eral Carlos Fabião (//, , divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
See the Minutes of  reunions in  to appreciate the ideological cleavages (, Actas Conselho da
Revolução - Originais, volumes  and ). 
e -Political Parties Pacts contributed to its institutionalisation
but also accentuated ideological cleavages. Different  factions dominated the Higher Council of the ,
Armed Forces Assembly and  Coordinating Committee (Graham :).
Law / (//).

e  Assembly increased its members up to . Decree-Law -A (//).
, /Partidos (), Pacto -Partidos Parte , Document .

e institutionalisation of the  in the  Constitution was an important step in order to take the
political debate out of the barracks and therefore facilitate the consolidation of democracy (Ferreira :;
Santos ).
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was elected President of the Republic and appointed Chief of Joint Staff of the Portuguese
Armed Forces (). Paradoxically, Eanes’ accumulation of political and military func-
tions was positive for the process of military disengagement from politics since he promoted
non-partisan and more professional Armed Forces (Graham :; Rato ). 
e tra-
ditional military hierarchy, supported by Eanes, used administrative rules to circumvent the
formal authority of the  on military issues. As a result the  gradually became a secondary
player in both the political and military arenas (Rato :).
Notwithstanding, the government still did not control the military aspects of defence and
the  and the President interfered in some of its reforms. 
e constitutional reform in 
eliminated the , reduced the competences of the President and concentrated the power in
the government. Moreover the new Law of National Defence and Armed Forces transferred
the supreme military authority back to the civilian government and integrated the branches
in the hierarchy of the Defence Ministry. 
e organisational design of the political and
military institutions thus became comparable to that of most Western  allies including
Spain and for the first time aimed to guarantee the supremacy of a democratically elected
civilian government.
Second, Portuguese governments relied on professional education and training to subordi-
nate the military, especially after November . Before this date, the organisational capacity
of the state, as well as that of the  and some left-wing political parties, was employed to
politicise the military and to gain their support for the  revolutionary principles (see infor-
mation effectors section below). During this period, cooperation with  and the Western
allies was reduced and there was little emphasis on military training. 
e politicisation of
the armed forces and the overlap of political and traditional military command structures led
to the multiplication of acts of insubordination in the ranks (Porch :, ; Sánchez
Cervelló :). Politicisation undermined the control of the military and their capacity
to carry out their defence functions.
After November , the government, aware that the previous politicisation strategy had
failed and created disunity and discontent in the ranks, reversed its approach to organisation
tools. It aimed at the depoliticisation of the armed forces and the increase of their operational
capacity and professionalism through education and training. 
e government recognised
the deficiencies in military instruction, the importance of bridging the gap between military
and civilian education as means to consolidate civilian supremacy and the need to further
Eanes had led the operational forces that had neutralised the November  coup.

e Defence Minister was merely in charge of coordinating the action of the other ministers concerning
national defence acting as an interface with the armed forces. 
e military component was explicitly excluded
from the functions of the government. See for instance Project of Organisation of National Defence (//,
, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ). 
e 
has been accused of obstructing the reform of the governments of the centre-right coalition ‘Aliança Democrática’
from  to , in particular the new project of Law of National Defence. 
eir opposition was such that
two members of the  told the French Defence Minister that if the law was approved they would overthrow
the government. 
e threat was never carried out (Amaral :–).

e  and Eanes opposed some reforms of the centre-right coalition ‘Aliança Democrática’ from  to
, in particular the Constitutional Reform and the new Law of National Defence. For instance Eanes vetoed
the former that had to be resubmitted to the National Assembly (Graham :).
Law / (//).
Law / (//).

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integrate and coordinate the branches (Ferreira ; Santos :–). Several actions
contributed to the new effort in military education and training. 
e National Defence In-
stitute () was created in  as a non-organisation tool for the professionalisation of the
armed forces. 
e curriculum of the Military Academy was adapted to the new laws, insti-
tutions and values of the Constitutional arrangement. 
e High Military Studies Institute,
the Air Force Academy and the Naval Superior Institute of War contributed to the develop-
ment of a new unified doctrine in agreement with the new political and military context after
 (Ravara :; Ferreira :).

ese institutions promoted a new concept of National Defence, introduced by the 
in , that went beyond the traditional military approach to defence by encompassing
economic, diplomatic and social efforts and therefore legitimising civilian defence leadership
(Correia ; Comprido ). Since , both civilians and military attended defence
courses. 
e official defence doctrine was again revised by the Defence Law of . 
e fun-
damental change was the elimination of the internal enemy component (Ferreira :).
In , education became a top priority. 
e government wanted to encourage mutual
awareness between the military and civilian spheres as a means to increase military prestige
and their voluntary subordination. From  the diplomas and courses of military education
were made equivalent to those in civilian higher education and joint research was actively pro-
moted (Almeida :, ). Many activities were introduced to promote the culture of de-
fence, coordination among the branches and mutual awareness between the armed forces and
society. In addition to the prestigious National Defence Courses, many seminars, conferences,
as well as visits to military and political institutions were organised (Lânhoso :–).
Military training also contributed to divert the attention away from politics and to improve
the defence capacity. During the Colonial Wars and the revolutionary period there was little
emphasis on military exercises and collaboration with the Western allies. From , the In-
dependent Mixed Brigade of the Army stationed in Santa Margarida became a very important
organisation tool aiming not only at the cooperation and normalisation of the relations with
 but also training the Portuguese military in the latest operational techniques and pro-
fessional principles. New military exercises were introduced. In the mid s, many units of
the three branches participated regularly in these exercises, many of which were organised by
other Western allies or  ( :–, –, , ). 
is renewed impulse
to military training and exchanges with other armed forces helped consolidate the change in
the military mentality shifting the attention from domestic affairs to defence issues.

ird, the provisional and constitutional governments continued to use the state capac-
ity to provide services, goods and jobs to the military and their families. 
ese prerogatives
served to compensate the poor salaries and working conditions that had generated widespread
support to the  April coup. 
e Social Services of the Armed Forces continued to provide
health, housing and financial services. New concessions to the prices of public transportation
Decree-Law -D/ (//).
Documents on civic education provided to recruits by the Army Staff Office on  (, Correspondên-
cia classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , documents –).
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were granted and the support for disabled veterans was reinforced. 
e state organisation
contributed to the intensification of the esprit de corps and cohesion of the armed forces, for
instance through the creation of common Military Clubs and homogenisation of the services
of catering and leisure for the enlisted men and officers. Moreover the state-owned com-
panies such as Military Laboratory of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products and Military
Maintenance provided not only cheap or free products to the military families but also jobs
(Barata ). In the military statutes there was no explicit prohibition of holding secondary
jobs but in  the  finally decided stop this practice and banned the military in active
service from having civilian jobs. Nonetheless the public sector continued to play a crucial
function absorbing many military (and civil servants) that had been forced to return from the
colonies to the metropole.
5.2.3 Conclusion
Organisation was a very important source of power for the ruling bodies during the transition
and consolidation of democracy. 
e failed November  coup marked drastic changes in
the patterns of utilisation of both coercive and non-coercive tools. On the one hand the coer-
cive use of the state organisation to neutralise attacks against the governments grew from the
Carnation revolution reaching its peak in . Military units, in particular the , the
security forces, the judiciary and penitentiary services and even groups of civilians contributed
to fight military insurrection. After the failure of the revolutionary coup of November 
the coercive component was abandoned.
Non-coercive organisation tools were very salient throughout the period. First, the capacity
to shape the state institutions was used by the  to ensure political loyalty in the ranks.
Its fundamental feature was decentralisation of political and military power in multiple insti-
tutions. 
e instability and displays of military indiscipline in  made the governments
reverse their approach to organisational design. 
ere was a gradual re-centralisation of power
and separation of the military and political spheres. After the coup of November , the
 apparatus was dismantled. Nonetheless, the military  continued to oversight political
developments until  when the constitutional reform and new Law of National Defence
abolished military participation in politics and integrated the armed forces into the Defence
Ministry.
Second, military education and training that had been neglected since the beginning of
the Colonial Wars became again relevant non-coercive control tools from . 
e ,
Military Academies and Institutes worked to inculcate military subordination through a new
defence doctrine and the development of mutual awareness between the civilian and military
For instance railway concessions up to  of railway ticket prices. Decree / (//). 
ese
were revised in April  (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number
, document ).
Decree-Law / (//).
Minutes of  reunions (//, //, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume
, ).
Minutes of  reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ).
Decree-Laws / (//), / (//), / (//), / (//),
/ (//), / (//) and / (//).

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spheres. 
e new military exercises and exchanges with the  allies also contributed to the
professionalisation and depoliticisation of the military. Finally, the provision of services, goods
and jobs by the public administration continued to be a source of reward for the military. 
e
end of the Colonial War forced a supplementary effort in order to integrate and compensate
ex-combatants.
5.3 Nodality
As in the case of organisation tools, two different trends can be observed in the utilisation of
nodality. 
e turning point was again the failed coup of November  that consolidated
the  moderates and initiated the process of depoliticisation of the armed forces. Before
the coup, information effectors were central to the government strategy. 
e  tried to in-
doctrinate and politicise the Armed Forces using newly created instruments such as the Fifth
Division, the Central Dynamising Committee () and the Information Detection and
Coordination Services () as well as the media. 
ese institutions also contributed to cen-
sor and collect information relevant to ensure political support. 
e military, political parties
and media were monitored as means to control political ideas and contestation in the ranks.
After November , there was a reversal in the government’s approach to control. Politi-
cisation was then considered counterproductive for stability and military subordination. 
e
organisations that had conducted the propaganda campaigns and spied on the military were
dismantled or transformed into public relation services that operated with civil society. 
e
government released its grip on the media, which then became very critical with the mili-
tary institution. Until  information detectors disappeared from the government control
toolkit.
5.3.1 Information effectors
As soon as the  overthrew the regime it launched an information campaign to win over the
military and society for the revolutionary cause. 
e psychological action on the local pop-
ulation and the enemy had been very important during the Colonial Wars. Many of those
who joined the  had experience with the use of nodality since they had participated in
the propaganda and information action against the rebels. Immediately after the revolution,
a strong information effort was required to ensure that the military in the overseas territories
would endorse the  and provisional governments. 
ere is evidence of communiqués to
the local media, internal memos and speeches to the military with that purpose. Transcripts
of important speeches in Lisbon and political manifestos were distributed in the ranks. 
e
delegations of the  became the interface with the military in the colonies. Given the po-
For instance, Kaúlza, Military Governor of Mozambique stressed this idea in his letters to Caetano
(//, //, /–).
See for instance abundant documentation on the information campaign in Guinea-Bissau in . Some
memos stressed the topics that should be treated in the communications in the barracks (, divisão , secção
, caixa , numero ).
For intance Spínola’s speech ‘Self-determination and Democracy’ (//, , divisão , secção ,
caixa , numero ) and the  Programme (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).

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litical and military instability during the transition, the  also intensively used information
effectors as means of control in the metropole.

e information services of the , the Fifth Division, were established in September
 and became very active in the propaganda campaign. 
e Fifth Division aimed to
promote the implementation of the  Programme and to improve the image of the armed
forces in the public opinion. It acted as a think tank on civil-military relations, organising con-
sultations, colloquia, debates and the study of the  doctrine (Ferreira :; Carrilho
:–). 
e Fifth Division also coordinated the actions of other important information
tools such as the Information Detection and Coordination Services, (), the Central Dy-
namisation Committee (), and the Unit Assemblies and Dynamisation Cabinets.

e goal of these nodality tools was the cultural and political education of the armed forces
following the logic of control through politicisation (Carrilho :–).

e media also became a control tool for the . 
e  published a bimonthly maga-
zine, ‘Movimento  de Abril: Boletim Informativo das Forcas Armadas’, and the members
of the  often participated in radio and television programmes. Although the  Pro-
gramme had requested at the end of censorship as means to promote people’s freedom, the
media continued to be censored and used by the -controlled governments to spread pro-
paganda (Pimlott and Seaton ; Pimlott and Seaton : –). Informing about the
acts of indiscipline within the barracks was prohibited by the . 
e infringement of this
norm entailed the sequestration of the publication. A Committee for the Control of the
Press, Radio, Television, 
eatre and Cinema was established in  to censor reactionary
ideas and confidential military issues. Information regarding the process of decolonisation
was also censored to avoid agitation. For instance, the  asked the  to undertake
judiciary action against the newspaper ‘A Capital’ due to ‘defamatory information’ about the
armed forces in Angola. 
ere are also examples of journalist arrests for their criticism of
the government or revolutionary agenda such as the arrest of the journalist of the magazine
‘O Tempo’ Vera Lagoa in September  by .

e Fifth Division was inspired by the  Army’s Fifth Department that during the Second World War has
acted as liaison between the military government and the civilian administrations of the territories liberated.

e , created by Decree-Law / (//), was under the direct command of the  and also
played an important role coordinating the different civilian and military organisations under control of the
revolutionary left (Sánchez Cervelló :).
 was part of the Social Communication Ministry but worked closely with the Fifth Division (,
Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).

ere were Dynamisation Cabinets at the branch, region, and unit levels. 
eir goal was the ‘non partisan
politicisation of the Armed Forces’. See for instance Internal Memo in the Army Ministry (, divisão , secção
, caixa , numero ).
Sequestration of  days for newspapers and  days for other publications. According to the  the
media should not broadcast or publish this type of information about military indiscipline (//, ,
Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume , Acta).
Decree-law / (//)
Minute of the  Assembly reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume
).
Letter from the  to the  (//, , Correspondência classificada do secretariado coorde-
nador, Assuntos Económicos Sociais- Cartas Particulares- Diversos, volume , document ).
Minutes of  reunion (// , , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ).

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e  leadership cultivated good relationships with many journalists and after the 
April coup the media intensively praised the new revolutionary institutions and military fig-
ures. Moreover, the action of the Social Communication Ministry and military teams working
in the public broadcasting corporation, , ensured the support to the  doctrine in pub-
lic radio and . 
e media influenced public opinion and promoted social mobilisation in
favour of different factions of the . For instance, during the initial stages of the transition
the press was often criticised for its partiality and pro-communist stance. 
e notion of
importance of the media was so entrenched among the military that the radio and  stations
as well as newspapers headquarters were priority military targets during all the revolts that oc-
curred in from the  April  to the  November  (Sánchez Cervelló ; Manuel
).
However, after November , the official revolutionary discourse was replaced by a mod-
erate one that insisted on the necessity of military subordination and warned about military
intervention as the main threat to democracy. In , following a series of severe criti-
cisms for its radical political bias, the Fifth Division was restructured and downsized and
later abolished in . 
e ,  and the Dynamisation Cabinets were abolished in
. 
e journal ‘Nação e Defesa’ created in  by the  became an influential infor-
mation effector that contributed to the evolution of the defence and military doctrine and to
mutual awareness between the civilian and military spheres. 
e Law of National Defence
and Armed Forces of  established that defence policy was to be object of constant and
updated public information (Article ). 
e government tried to increase its credibility and
obtain the support for its defence policy increasing its legitimacy vis-à-vis the military and
other societal actors.

e relationship with the media also changed. After the November coup the  wanted
to counter the ideological influence that the revolutionary left had on the media (Sánchez
Cervelló :). 
e nationalisation of many publishers and the suspension of many
publications due to their previous radical revolutionary stance was decreed. Many newspa-
pers were affected by this measure such as ‘O Século’, ‘A Capital’, ‘Diario de Noticias’, ‘Diário
de Lisboa’, ‘Jornal do Comércio’, ‘Jornal de Noticias’ and ‘O Comércio do Porto.’ From
 the media changed their attitude vis-à-vis the military and the . 
ey demanded
their de-politicisation and subordination to the political power. Publications such as ‘O País’,
‘Liberdade’, ‘Jounal Novo’, ‘A Rua’, ‘Tempo’, ‘Barricada’ and ‘O Diabo’ directed strong crit-
See general principles about information policy in annexe to the minutes of  reunion (//, ,
Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ).
In an extraordinary  Reunion Mario Soares stressed that most of the media are under control of the
. He threatened that the  would abandon the government if things would not change. Reference to the
case of the closure of the newspaper ‘Republica’ in minutes of  reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da
Revolução - Originais, volume ).
See for instance the speech of the former Defence Minister General Santos at the  (//) (Santos
).
See correspondence of  (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ) and  (, Correspondên-
cia classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).

e nationalisations approved on  November  claim not only the manipulation of information but
also financial reasons. Minutes of  reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais,
volume ).
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icism against the members of the  and published classified information about the armed
forces.

e information campaign against the  can be interpreted as part of a government strategy
to delegitimise the  paving the way for its dissolution in  (Ferreira :). It also
shows that the  had lost control of the media and censorship was disappearing.
After the dissolution of the  in , the media continued its advocacy of military sub-
ordination. Military expenditure, conscientious objection, military privileges and military
candidates to the presidential elections became widespread topics. 
e media and society had
so clearly embraced the civilian supremacy as a democratic principle that the  the presi-
dential electoral campaign was fundamentally focused on the defence of the idea of civiliani-
sation to the extent that for the first time there was no military candidate (Ferreira :).
However, by , there was still a lack of mutual knowledge and understanding between the
Portuguese society and the Armed Forces. 
is was due to deficient information, the lack of
a social communication strategy and coordination between the media and the armed forces
(Soares ; Begonha ).
In sum, from the fall of the regime to the end of , propaganda was an even more salient
tool than in the last period of the Estado Novo. Several organisations created by the  and
most media cooperated in an intensive propaganda campaign to promote the’s revolution-
ary agenda. After November  the idea of politicising the armed forces was abandoned.

e propaganda apparatus was dismantled. Information campaigns were launched to intro-
duce a new defence doctrine and to raise mutual awareness between the armed forces and
society. Censorship disappeared and the media contributed to promote the idea of depoliti-
cisation of the military and demilitarisation of politics.
5.3.2 Information detectors

ere was less emphasis on information detectors than on information effectors but these
still played an important function, especially during the period of provisional governments.
Several bodies monitored the military, the political parties and the media in order to detect
threats to the governments. 
eir action was fundamental to neutralise the military coups of
March  and November  and to weaken the factions that launched them. Afterwards
the use of information detectors decreased drastically until the s. 
e introduction of
See news clips in letters from the ‘Procuradoria-Geral da República’ to the  on ,  and 
(, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document –,
–). Probably the most extreme case was the letter published in the journal ‘O Diabo’ in which General
Galvão de Melo accused the members of the  of treason (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado
coordenador, volume , number , document ). 
e  decided to suspend the journal ‘O Diabo’. Resolution
of the  in the minutes of the  reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume
). See correspondence between the Justice Minister,  and  (November and December , ,
Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ) and complaint
from the  (//, , Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number
, document ) about the publication of secret information in breach of national security.
‘Sept-sur-sept’, a programme of  in  reported that censorship had disappeared from Portuguese
, Telegram from the Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Affairs Ministry (//, A, Correspondência
classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).
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parliamentary oversight on military affairs in  and the reorganisation of the information
services launched in  marked a new gradual increase in the use of information detectors.
Although all the information services linked to the Estado Novo had been abolished, new
organisations were used to detect information relevant to the control of the military. Most of
these bodies were also involved in the propaganda and censorship action. 
e , created
in May , was the main information detection tool for the  but not the only one. 
e
Judiciary Military Police () was established in September  under direct supervision
of the  to investigate military crimes and played a central role in the court case against the
November  plotters. 
e bodies in charge of political indoctrination within the armed
forces during the provisional governments also collected information related to the political
alignment of the military. 
e Fifth Division acted as information detector at the service of the
 and the President. 
e Fifth Division was used to detect anti-government movements
within the three branches of the armed forces. 
e  and the Dynamisation Cabinets
scrutinised the press and the internal communications in the armed forces and collaborated
with the Fifth Division and the government to detect the infiltration of insurgents in the
armed forces. 
e Second Section of the Army Staff Office () was in charge of the
Army internal communications and collected information from the , the Fiscal Guard
and Military Regions. 
e information gathered by the  on political activities outside and
within the armed forces was shared with the . Furthermore, the Military Committee for
the Control of the Press, Radio, Television, 
eatre and Cinema and the General Attorney of
the Republic monitored the media and collected information to prevent military unrest.
All these information detectors were especially relevant during the coup attempts in March
and November . 
e intelligence collected about the Spínolist military coup in March
 permitted reversing its effects. Officers linked to the Fifth Division and the Navy de-
cided to allow the military coup to be launched in order to create fear of returning to the Es-
tado Novo and, therefore, enhance revolutionary sentiments in the country (Sánchez Cervelló
:–). Similarly information detectors were very important to neutralise the coup
of November . Although the far-left rebels controlled the Fifth Division and the ,

e was created by Decree-Law / (//) and later integrated in the military structure by the
Decree-Law / (//). 
ere is evidence ’s important function in the coup investigation. Minutes
of the  reunion (//, A, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ).
See for instance the Fifth Division’s confidential report about the Infantry Regiment of Evora to 
(//, A, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , docu-
ment ) and confidential memos on denouncing that the activity of some political parties (especially ) was
affecting the cohesion and stability of the Armed Forces (June and July , , Correspondência classificada
do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document –).
See for example internal information produced by the Army Dinamizing Cabinet in  (, divisão
, secção , caixa , numeros , ,  and ).
See reports about infiltration attempts by the reactionary right in the Castelo Branco garrison in July 
(, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).
For instance correspondence between the  and  about political activities including manifestos,
demonstrations and land seizures – (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador,
volume , number , documents ,, , , )
For instance, an internal memo in the Army Ministry requested all military to urgently report to the Com-
mittee for the Control of the Press, Radio, Television, 
eatre and Cinema in case of broadcast or publication
to the Army (, divisão , secção , caixa , numero ). 
e General Attorney confidential reports in
,  and  about information in the media harmful for the interests of the  (, Correspondência
classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document –).
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the government prepared a successful counter-offensive based on the information collected
by loyal officers. As a result, the coup failed, the -Moderates consolidated their sway on
the , the moderate political parties were strengthened and the revolutionary agenda was
abandoned.
During the period of the constitutional governments discipline was gradually restored and
the information detectors disappeared from the control toolkit. After the abolishment of the
 in , the  and  in  and the Fifth Division in  there were no real
information detection mechanisms for the control of the armed forces and the information
exchanges between the military and the government were limited (Santos :–).
According to Brigadier Cardoso there was no information service capable of properly assess-
ing politicisation, cohesion and discipline within the ranks or of coordinating military infor-
mation with other areas of intelligence in order to prevent risks for the democratic order in
Portugal (Cardoso a, Cardoso b).
In , the armed forces were formally integrated into the hierarchy of the Defence Min-
istry, which stimulated the information flows on military issues from and to the government.
Parliamentary oversight and other mechanisms of inspection on the armed forces were in-
troduced. Finally, in  three new information services coordinated by and hierarchically
linked to the Prime Minister were created: the Service of Strategic Informations of Defence
(), the Military Information Service (), the Security Information Service (). 
ese
services integrated the new Information System of the Portuguese Republic () and imi-
tated those of other European countries. 
ey worked for the defence of democracy and the
constitutional order which included ensuring that the armed forces fulfilled their mission (
;  ). 
us, at the end of the period analysed information detectors acquired new
salience.
5.3.3 Conclusion
Two different trends can be appreciated in the utilisation of nodality tools. First, an intensive
information campaign was launched in the colonies and continental Portugal to politicise
and obtain the endorsement of the military for the . 
e Fifth Division was the military
unit that coordinated the propaganda campaign. Other bodies such as the , ,
and the Dynamisation Cabinets also contributed to political indoctrination. 
e  exerted
control on the media to protect the image of the military and . Although nodality was
primarily used through effectors, the role of detectors should not be understated. Most of the
organisations that participated in the revolutionary propaganda and censorship also collected
information about political views and sources of unrest in the ranks. 
e intelligence gathered
served to control some insurrections and to neutralise the coups of March and November
.
Second, after the failed coup of November  the  propaganda, censorship and po-
litical espionage machinery was dismantled. 
e , , the Dynamisation Cabinets
and the Fifth Division were eliminated. 
e new official discourse warned of the dangers of
politicisation of the armed forces and relied on mutual awareness between the civilian and
Law / (//).
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military spheres as a means to achieve military subordination. 
e media, which had strongly
promoted the more radical revolutionary agenda, was sanctioned immediately after the coup
but censorship was abandoned later. Freed from the previous military censorship, the media
launched information campaigns against the  and in favour of the complete subordination
of the military to civilian rule. After  the information detectors disappeared from the
control toolkit. Only after , when the armed forces were integrated into the Defence
Ministry, some oversight mechanisms introduced. Nonetheless, until the creation of the ,
the  and the  in  the government lacked any reliable information system that could
assess military threats.
5.4 Authority

e governing bodies used their authority to create incentives and rewards (appointments and
promotions, high autonomy, special powers, amnesty laws) as well as sanctions and constraints
(punishments for conspirators, curving the power of institutions, ban on political activities)
to maintain the military under control. Both subcategories of tools were intertwined and, as
in the case of organisation and nodality tools, after the failed November  coup, important
changes in their use can be observed. However, the most important adjustments to authority
tools took place in  when the Constitutional Reform and new Defence Law were enacted,
transforming the legal framework of civil-military relations. 
ese reforms contributed to
redefine the political and military functions reinforcing the civilian government and military
subordination. Afterwards the use of new authority tools as means of control became less
discernible.
5.4.1 Rewards and incentives
After the end of the Estado Novo, the governments used several types of incentives to to
achieve military satisfaction and support. Military promotions and appointments were granted
to reward loyal officers. At the collective level, the ruling bodies granted the armed forces an
enormous degree of autonomy, important special powers beyond their typical defence func-
tions and amnesty laws that benefited most military incarcerated or expelled from the armed
forces by previous governments.
Fist, the authority of the governments and ruling bodies was used also to reward individ-
uals. 
e military leaders that had participated in the fall of the regime were rewarded with
military promotions. 
e new military and political institutional structure introduced by the
 created new opportunities for the loyal military to acquire power and carry out functions
beyond those customary to their rank. Loyal military were appointed to the public adminis-
tration and to the executive bodies such as the Government, the , the Higher Council of
the , the Armed Forces Assembly and the  (Carrilho ). 
e process of ‘democratic
institutionalisation’ of the  elicited a parallel political hierarchy with representative bod-
ies at all armed forces levels, which collided with the traditional military hierarchy (Sánchez
Cervelló ). 
is new structure with ramifications in all military branches, divisions and
units created an incentive to endorse and promote the revolutionary programme of the .

T     P   

ose loyal to the  could become more powerful and influential in the armed forces than
many officers of a higher rank.
After the November  coup, officers loyal to President Eanes that had opposed the
coup were promoted and then appointed to lead strategic units and military regions (Rato
:–). For instance, three ‘moderate’ brigadiers were appointed by the government
as commanders of the military regions north, centre and south (Sánchez Cervelló :)
and military from the northern regions, traditionally less revolutionary, occupied the positions
of those involved in the incidents (Carrilho :).
However, from  the utilisation of military promotions and appointments decreased.

e ’s parallel political hierarchy had created disorder and unrest amongst the ranks (Gra-
ham :). After the November  coup, the separation of the military and political
spheres was decreed and the ‘democratic institutions’ of the  in the Armed Forces were
abolished diminishing, therefore, the opportunities for political appointments of loyal of-
ficers. Moreover although the  (until ) and the Government (from ) had the
capacity to validate or reject the promotions of senior rank officers in reality political in-
terferences in the system of promotions and appointments were rare. In most cases the 
and the Government were very respectful with the seniority principle (Santos ; Ferreira
:).
Second, the extraordinary degree of autonomy was an important collective incentive. 
e
autonomy that the armed forces enjoyed in Portugal until  had no match in any other
Western democracy (Graham ; Ferreira ). 
e  blamed Caetano’s government
for the failures in the Colonial Wars and excessive control on military issues. In May  they
decreed the autonomy of the armed forces from the government. 
e armed forces were led
by the , who had a rank equivalent to that of the Prime Minister and was subordinated
to the President of the Republic. 
e Chiefs of Staff of the branches were also autonomous
from the government, hierarchically linked to the  and had a rank equivalent to that of
a minister. Moreover, the  General Costa Gomes was appointed President in Septem-
ber . 
e accumulation of both positions continued during the mandate of Ramalho
Eanes until .

e  Constitution reduced the prerogatives of the armed forces but preserved their
autonomy (Santos ). Until , the legislative and administrative autonomy of the
military institutions remained intact. Governments did not have hierarchical authority over
See examples of proposals for promotions of Generals in confidential reports, from ,  and 
(–, , Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , documents
– and volume , number , documents –), equally in  reports to  for promotions of Admirals
– (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador volume , number , documents
–).
Law / (//). See the political institutional structure in the first and second -Political Parties
Pacts (//  and //) (, /Partidos (), Pacto -Partidos Parte I, Document – and 
and Parte  Document ).
Decree-Law  (//).
Except from March to November  when the command of the armed forces was transferred to the 
(Ferreira :–)
Until  the  passed about  rules and regulations concerning the military and the Chiefs of Staff
over  (Ferreira :–).
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the armed forces and were not responsible for the military aspects of defence and were merely
given a support role. Portugal can be considered as a diarchic system because, unlike the rest of
the Western European countries, the military were independent of the civilian power (Júdice
:).

e Constitutional Reform and the Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces set, in
, a new framework for civil-military relations and tackled several issues related to military
subordination such as the extensive powers of the President, the insufficient competences of
the Defence Minister and the excessive autonomy of the armed forces. 
e Defence Ministry
was then charged with the preparation and execution of defence policy and the armed forces
formally integrated in the Ministry. 
erefore, these laws subordinated the armed forces to the
civilian power both in legislative and administrative terms (Balsemão :). 
e goal was
to reproduce the system of civil-military relations of most  countries in which military
autonomy was much more limited (Amaral :–).

ird, not only were the military granted autonomy but they were also entrusted special
powers. From  to , the military controlled the government and all major State in-
stitutions. During this period the President and the provisional governments were not demo-
cratically elected but appointed by the military ruling bodies. 
e  was as an autonomous
body with far-reaching powers to oversee the transitional process. 
e members of the 
received honours equivalent to those of the ministers. 
e political power of the  was
such that in some organisation charts the government appeared hierarchically subordinated
to the .
In addition to the political functions the military were assigned many other functions re-
lated to internal affairs that strengthened their influence and pride. 
e military continued
leading the main security forces such as the , the  and the Fiscal Guard. 
e -
 had far-reaching powers regarding internal security. 
e military had the capacity to
intervene directly in civilian affairs in order to guarantee the provision of the essential public
services, the economic activity and electoral processes. 
ey were in charge of the very
important process of demise of the / and the Legion. In sum, the military fulfilled
Law / (//).
Decree-Law / (//).
See for instance, Annexe A to the minutes of  reunion (, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Orig-
inais, volume , Acta //)
was granted the power to decide over the liberation of all detainees that were not under the jurisdic-
tion of the  (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume , Acta // ). See also, 
documens in  dealing with issues such as treatment of ex- in prisons, ex- informants, military prison-
ers in Cabo Verde and even land seizures (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume
, number , documents –). Evidence that the  commanded the Fiscal Guard to make a rigor-
ous control of the borders for certain suspects (, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador,
volume , number , document ).
Decree-Law / (//). See Vieira (:).
For instance, the  decreed that the military should arrest everyone altering the normal development of
the electoral process (Annexe of the minutes of the  reunion, //, , Actas Conselho da Revolução
- Originais, volume ).

e liquidation of / involved , cases, , for its personnel and , to the informants
and collaborators. See correspondence between the  and the Government in  (, Correspondência
classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ). 
e  decided that the ex-
 and ex-Legion members were to have a summary trial by a Revolutionary Military Tribunal, see minutes

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many tasks and were implicated in decision making at many levels so that they were expected
to feel empowered and to endorse the regime.

e  Constitution tried to merge both the Western model of civil-military relations
in which military subordination was a principle with a socialist approach that gave room to
a certain level of military participation in politics. 
e  Constitution granted the mil-
itary many important functions in the new democratic system and confirmed the  as a
fundamental political institution (Articles ., .,, , .). 
e military were ex-
pected to ensure the equilibrium of the political system and provide guidance during crises
(Pires ). 
e Constitution also reserved legislative powers to the  concerning the or-
ganisation, functioning and discipline in the armed forces (article .) and Military Justice
(articles , , .). Laws and decrees approved by the Government had to be then ap-
proved by the President of the Republic and ultimately by the . In sum, no other Western
constitution recognised a higher level of military autonomy and involvement in the politi-
cal system (Miranda ). According to the Constitution the military were guardians not
only against external but also internal threats (Seixas ). 
ese prerogatives granted in the
Constitution can be construed as a truce among the rival political and military groups that
had disputed the supremacy during the transition.
However, the ambiguity and overlapping in functions that this system generated became
problematic for civil-military relations and defence purposes (Santos ; Moreira :).
In , the Constitutional Reform and the Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces
made profound changes in the formal distribution of power eliminating the  and reducing
the powers of the Portuguese Armed Forces.
Fourth, the series of amnesties launched during the transition were important authority
incentives applied to some specific groups of military. 
ese laws intended to produce a general
positive impact on the morale of the armed forces, which felt protected by the ruling bodies.
From  to  up to thirteen different amnesties concerning political and indiscipline
crimes were decreed by the authorities. 
ese amnesty laws responded to corporatist claims
and had a positive impact on the motivation and loyalty beyond those who directly benefited
from them. 
e officers that had been purged due to political reasons during the Estado Novo
and those who had been punished for having surrendered in Goa in  were re-admitted to
of  reunion (//, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ) and Law / (//).
In  still almost a hundred military worked in the Coordination Service for the liquidation of /
and Portuguese Legion. See  document (//, , Correspondência classificada do secretariado
coordenador, volume , number , document ).
For instance, Article . established that the  was the guarantor of the democratic progress and the
revolution and ‘participated, in alliance with the people, in the exercise of sovereignty’. Article . provided
that the alliance between the  and the political parties and other democratic organisations ensure the peaceful
development of the revolution. Article  consolidated the exclusive use of force by specifying the prohibition
of militarised or paramilitary groups other than those integrated in the State and the armed forces. Article 
stated that the  was guarantor of the functioning of democratic institutions and the respect of the Constitution
and revolutionary principles. Finally, Article . specified that they ‘have the historical mission to guarantee
the conditions that allows a peaceful and plural transition of the Portuguese society towards democracy and
socialism’.
For instance see correspondence about the approval of diverse regulations in  (, Correspondência
classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , documents –).
See Maxwell (:), Ferreira (:) and Rato (:–). Although the Constitution was
enacted in  it was drafted earlier during a period of great political instability in .
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the armed forces. Many of the crimes committed by military during the revolutionary period,
such as acts of public disorder and indiscipline, were also amnestied.
5.4.2 Sanctions and constraints

e governing bodies also used their authority to control the military by punishing or restrain-
ing their action. First individuals that had endorsed the previous regime or revolted against the
government were expelled or demoted. Second, the institutions that could threaten the ruling
bodies were abolished or saw their powers limited. Finally, legal constraints and prohibitions
were introduced to achieve de-politicisation and professionalisation of the armed forces.
First, there is evidence of purges, ‘saneamentos’, associated to each of the major civil-
military crises in the period analysed. After the  April coup, hundreds of officers were
sacked or forced to the reserve or retirement due to their support to the previous regime in-
cluding President Tomás and all the military in Caetano’s government. After the incidents
of September , in which the political centre and right tried to support Spínola’s political
programme through mass mobilisations, many renowned senior officers involved were sanc-
tioned. General Spínola was forced to resign as President and the Generals Galvão de Melo,
Diogo Neto and Silverio Marques were forced to quit the Junta. However, the fact that many
commanding officials were removed did not contribute to the control of the armed forces. On
the contrary, politicisation increased and discipline began to break down (Graham :–
). More severe punishments were applied to those involved in the counter-revolutionary
coup of  March . 
ose who had participated in the coup were expelled from the
armed forces and lost their political rights for  years. Some even saw their properties and
bank accounts confiscated.
Whereas initially the military linked to the Estado Novo and right-wing movements were
targeted, from November  those associated with the far-left were punished too. Gen-
eral Otelo was dismissed as Lisbon Military Governor on  November  and after the
 November coup, many  officers that had held important positions during the revo-
lutionary period were demoted. For instance, Vasco Gonçalves was removed from the High
Military Studies Institute and then forced to retirement; the Army Chief of Staff () Car-
los Fabião was relegated to do administrative tasks and replaced by Eanes; in , the 
Vasco Rocha Viera and the Lisbon Military Governor, Vasco Lourenço, were also discharged
(Rato :, ). -Moderates and some centrist military filled the positions left by
the -Radicals and -Populists. 
ese military favoured for the first time the process of
disengagement from politics. 
e utilisation of authority sanctions was part of a disciplinary
strategy for the de-politicisation of the armed forces was promoted primarily by General Ra-
malho Eanes and ended up being very important for the success of the transition into a plural-

e first was amnesty was formalised by the Decree-Law / (//). 
e Law / (//)
was the last important one. See also Vilar () and secret law project in  correspondence (//, ,
Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).

ese purges were formalised through the Decree-Laws / (//), / (//) and
/ (//).
Decree-Law -D/ (//).
Decree-Law / (//).  officers were attained by this law (, Correspondência classificada
do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).

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ist democracy (Santos :). After the  Defence Law, which transferred the power
to demote senior officers from the  to the Government, there are not many examples of this
type of sanctions. 
e most prominent one was the demotion of the  General Garcia
dos Santos in  for criticising the political system (Ferreira :).
Second, authority was also used to eliminate institutions or curb their power whenever they
were considered to damage or threaten military satisfaction and level of subordination. After
the Carnations Revolution, the  decreed the liquidation of the organisations that had con-
tributed to the control of the military during the Estado Novo such as the / and the
Portuguese Legion as well the High Staff Corps. 
ese were very unpopular institutions
among the military that had opposed to the regime. 
e  November  coup attempt
marked the end of the revolutionary period. 
e government wanted to send the message of
change and moderation and approved the elimination of many of the  institutions of po-
litical control. On  November, the  was dissolved and as series of restrictions to the
rights to its members imposed. Additionally, the  Assembly and all the political-military
assemblies in the armed forces that had been created during the process of ‘democratic institu-
tionalisation’ of the  were dismantled. Additionally all the political organisations that had
inspired acts of indiscipline appeared within the ranks during the revolutionary period, such
as the ‘Soldados Unidos Vencerão’, ‘Acção Revolucionária das Praças do Exército’ and ‘Forças
Armadas Democráticas’, were dissolved. From , the  remained the sole military body
with political functions.

e Constitutional Reform and National Defence laws in  can be construed as the
authority tools that completed the legal process of political neutralisation and subordination
of the military (Vieira :–). 
ese reforms, that meant the extinction of the , were
mainly drafted by the governments of centre-right coalition ‘Aliança Democrática’ (Ferreira
:). 
ese laws reduced the autonomy of the armed forces, eliminated their capacity to
intervene in politics and circumscribed their functions to the defence against external threats.

e legislative powers of the  were transferred to the Portuguese Assembly. 
e government
acquired the capacity to appoint the  and the Chiefs of Staff of the branches. Legal
mechanisms for the civilian control of the military through the Defence Ministry were intro-
duced (Rato :–). 
us, these authority constraints set the basis for normalisation
of civil-military relations and civilian supremacy.
Decree-Law / (//).
Decree-Law / (//). 
e elimination of the High Staff corps followed also longstanding
requests from ranks and  (Ferreira :).
See minutes of  reunion (, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume , //).
For instance ‘Soldados Unidos Vencerão’ was created by the communist  in August  and inspired
many actions of revolt in October  (Porch :). ‘Acção Revolucionária das Praças do Exército’ was
launched by the , after the -Moderate consolidated their power in the  Assembly in Tancos in Septem-
ber (Sánchez Cervelló :). ‘Forças Armadas Democráticas’ was a clandestine group of officers in favour
of the Carnation Revolution but that criticised the communist drift of the transition. See manifesto in a let-
ter from Secretary of the  Major Loureiro dos Santos informing the  about the group (//, ,
Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, Assuntos Económicos Sociais- Cartas Particulares-
Diversos, volume , document )
See Santos (:). Maxwell argues that many of these limitations and principles formally introduced
in  were ‘cosmetic’ and that until the s the government did not exert an effective control on the military
(Maxwell :).
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ird, authority was used to set legal boundaries to reduce their political activity and in-
crease professionalism. 
ese tools became salient in the governments’ toolkit after November
. For instance a specific regulation clarifying the concept of discipline and its imple-
mentation was enacted to limit the serious problem of insubordination. After the end of the
Colonial Wars the quick demobilisation of troops was decided. 
e limit to the size of the
armies responded to some corporatist claims from career officers and allowed a limited im-
provement of salaries and working conditions. 
e numbers in the armed forces were reduced
from , in  to , in  ( :). 
e Law / (//),
which launched the reorganisation of the armed forces, aimed at the professionalisation and
subordination to civilian authority and can be construed as an authority-based constraint. It
prohibited political partisanship in the armed forces and specified that the necessity of a ‘con-
scious discipline’ and the unity of the chain of command. 
e  Constitution and the new
Military Disciplinary Regulations also confirmed the prohibition of political membership and
participation in political activities for all the military in active duty or in the reserve. On 
August , the  approved the prohibition of accumulation of functions for the military.
Members of the  had to resign from their command functions. 
is also contributed to
reduce the power of the  over the military sphere (Ferreira :–; Rato :).
Moreover, any appointment outside the armed forces for public or private office had to be ap-
proved by the Chief of Staff of the branch and in some cases by the . Finally, the Law of
National Defence in  eliminated the right of union membership for the military (Article
).
5.4.3 Conclusion
Authority rewards and incentives became extremely important after the Carnations Revolution
but saw their salience decrease. Appointments to senior positions in the military, public ad-
ministration, the  organisation and Government rewarded and empowered loyal officers,
especially from  to . An extraordinary degree of autonomy and many functions
concerning political and internal affairs were granted to the armed forces as a means to re-
inforce collective military satisfaction and support for the regime. From  to , the
military controlled all ruling bodies including the provisional governments. Although some
military prerogatives were reduced after the coup of November , the  Constitution
Some of these types of authority constraints were used during the revolutionary period too. For instance,
military and civilian staff were banned from political activities within military areas, including weapons factories,
as a means to preserve the ‘impartiality, cohesion, security and discipline of the armed forces’. See internal in the
circular Army Ministry (//, , divisão , secção , caixa , numero ).
It stresses that the ‘notorious and progressive deterioration of the discipline’ within the armed forces could
transform the  April Revolution into one of the major catastrophes of the Portuguese history. See Annexe I to
the minutes of  reunion (//, A, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume ).
Decree-Law / (//). However the three branches rejected the complete interdiction for the mil-
itary to participate in politics. 
ey understood that military in reserve or with the age of reserve should be able to
participate in politics. See the reports from the  (//),  (//) and  (//)(,
Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ). 
ey ended up
requesting a reformulation of the military disciplinary regulation from the  in order to permit non-active mili-
tary to participate in political activities. Letter from the  to the  on  June  (, Correspondência
classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , document ).
Annexe to  reunion (, , Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume , //).
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still recognised a high degree of military involvement in the political system, through the ,
and a degree of autonomy - higher than in any other Western democratic country. Addition-
ally, numerous amnesty laws were approved to satisfy military corporatist claims from 
to . From , authority-based incentives and rewards almost disappeared from the
control toolkit.
Authority-based sanctions and constraints were also important. Purges were conducted aim-
ing initially at military officers identified with the Estado Novo and later with anti-government
insurrections. Similarly, some institutions were abolished for having contributed to the Sa-
lazarist control machinery, such as the /, the Legion, and the High Staff Corps, and
later for their involvement with the failed revolutionary experience, such as the , the
 assemblies and committees and finally the . Finally a series of prohibitions and con-
straints were introduced in the armed forces after the events of November  in order to
ensure de-politicisation and professionalisation. 
ese regulations included a ban political
activities and unionism as well as the restrictions to employment outside the ranks and the
accumulation of functions for the military in active.

us, the authority-based rewards and sanctions were intertwined. 
e expulsions and de-
motions were linked with the appointments and amnesties. Incentives such as wide degree of
autonomy and special powers were annulled through authority-based constraints. In general
the periods of higher instability and change of government were associated with a more in-
tensive use of authority tokens. 
e Constitutional Reform and new National Defence Law
in  contributed to consolidate a Western style legal framework of civil-military relations.

is new arrangement restricted the autonomy and other incentives and rewards previously
enjoyed by the military and confine them to the defence functions.
5.5 Treasure

e utilisation of financial resources as tool of control on the military continued to be very lim-
ited during the transition to democracy. Portugal’s economic problems had been aggravated
by the colonial conflict. 
e deficiencies in terms of social services convinced governments to
concentrate their economic efforts in non-defence sectors. 
is section first analyses military
budgets linking them to the general evolution of the Portuguese economy, then it explains
military staff expenditure as a tool of control and finally, military expenditure in equipment.
5.5.1 Evolution of military budgets
As explained in chapter , military budgets during the Estado Novo were in general low.

e increase in defence budgets at the end of the regime was due to increased costs owing
to the Colonial Wars and not to the attempt to improve military satisfaction via salaries or
equipment. From  to , budgets drastically decreased and then remained stable until
 both in real terms and as percentage of  (Figure , Figure , Figure ). 
e drastic
initial decline can be associated with the end of the colonial conflict and the policy of de-
mobilisation of the troops initiated by the  (Barros and Santos :–).

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Figure : Total expenditure in defence (in constant escudos of ). Colonial Wars pe-
riod in red.
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Source: Based on Mata and Valério (:–, –).
Data include the expenditure in the overseas territories.
Figure : Total defence expenditure (–) in constant escudos of 
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Source: Mata and Valério (:–, –). Transformation into constant escudos by author.

T     P   
Figure : Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Portugal
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Sources: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:) and Mata and Valério (:–, –)

e fall and stagnation of defence expenditure was also linked to the economic problems
that the successive governments faced. 
e provisional governments inherited from the Es-
tado Novo a high trade deficit (, million escudos in ), high unemployment ()
and a fall in  (-). 
e fast economic growth that the country experienced in the early
s was interrupted as a result of the political and social agitation and the process of de-
colonisation. During the revolutionary period numerous nationalisations of companies and
land seizures took place but they did not solve the serious economic problems, such as large
budget deficits, high rates of inflation and unemployment, shrinking commercial relations
with the former colonies, high costs associated with the estimated , people return-
ing from the colonies (‘retornados’), as well as the fall of tourists inflows and emigrants’
remittances (Robinson :–; Mata and Valério :–). 
ese problems,
especially unemployment, contributed to the fall of Gonçalves’ revolutionary government in
September  (Maxwell :).
From  the revolutionary agenda was abandoned and instability reduced. However the
efforts to address the economic problems limited the capacity to increase military budgets. 
e
governments undertook a fundamental reorganisation of the administration, public corpora-
tions and the agricultural sector. 
e expansionary policies to stimulate growth and absorb
See  Political Action Plan (Annexe B to the minutes of  reunion, //, , Actas Conselho da
Revolução - Originais, volume ).
According to the census in  in Portugal there were , ‘retornados’. 
is means more than more
than  of the total population. 
e repatriation and support of such an influx of people consumed significant
financial resources (Ferreira :–).

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the ‘retornados’ increased the deficit, debt and inflation. From  to  the economic
situation worsened as a consequence of the appreciation of the escudo and the continuation
of expansionary policy. 
e stand-by agreements with the  in  and  portray the
complicated financial situation. 
e austerity policies introduced in  had some positive
effects from  but did not solve the problem of inflation.

e economic setbacks reduced the availability of resources and diverted spending pref-
erences away from defence. Other sectors, fundamentally linked to social expenditure were
prioritised and absorbed most budget increases (Amaral :). Moreover the number
of civil servants grew faster than the armed forces staff (Mesquita :–). While total
public expenditure continued to grow in real terms, military expenditure shrank in the s
and in the s. 
e downward trend in the weight of defence expenditure in government
spending can be also observed in other European countries, including Spain. In Portugal this
reduction in the relative weight can be linked to the growth of the state and the correction of
some traditional social problems inherited from the previous authoritarian regime (Figure ).
Figure : Defence budget as a percentage of total public expenditure in Portugal and
Spain (–)
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Sources: Based on Mata and Valério (:–; –) and Pérez Muinelo (:).

e salience of treasure tools was very limited. Portuguese spending on military and de-
fence was low in comparison to other European countries (Figure ). Portugal was the sole
member of  whose military expenditure decreased from  to . While military
expenditure in most of them experienced double digit growth rated, Portugal’s military ex-
penditure decreased by  ( :). From  to  only Turkey had a lower per
capita military expenditure in  ( :;  :; :). Military
expenditure was so low that the basic defence functions and commitments with  could
. average annual inflation from  to  (Ferreira :; Mata and Valério :–,
–).
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not be guaranteed. As former , Amaral acknowledges, the funding of Armed Forces during
this period decreased below the ‘acceptable minimums’ (Amaral :). 
e fact that by
 a modern process of planning and budgeting to rationalise military expenditure was still
not an official requirement also points at the low relevance of treasure in the strategy of the
governments.
Figure : Defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP
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Source: Based on  (:)
5.5.2 Staff expenditure

e capacity of the governments to use staff expenditure to improve military living condi-
tions and therefore increase their loyalty was very limited. Although in Portugal military
expenditure was fundamentally devoted to salaries, pensions and staff-related costs (Figure
), salaries and pensions remained very low. Military budgets were shrinking and an im-
portant share was dedicated to the demobilisation process that followed the Colonial Wars.
Salary increases merely attempted to compensate inflation that was severely reducing military
purchasing power.

e big size of the armed forces, designed to maintain the occupation of the large colonial
territories, ruled out sufficient salary raises. 
e initial downsizing of the armed forces after
the Colonial Wars reduced the staff from , in  to , in . However,
See (Mesquita :–). A modern budgeting process inspired by  was introduced in Spain in
. Portuguese civil-military relations literature devotes little attention to the utilisation of financial resources
as means to appease or satisfy the military during the period of transition and consolidation of democracy
confirms this hypothesis. One exception is Ferreira (:) who stresses that Amaro da Costa, the first civilian
Defence Minister, used the  increase of military expenditure approved in  in order to gain support from
the highest ranks

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Figure : Percentage of defence budget allocated to staff expenditure in Portugal and
Spain
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Sources: Based on  (:) and Pérez Muinelo (:).
the numbers in the armed forces grew again from  reaching , in  (
:). 
e share of expenditure per member of the armed forces remained very low in
comparison with other European armed forces (Figure ).

ere were several general salary increases during the period but rather than improving
the living conditions of the military and their families, they served to compensate for the
effects of inflation had on their purchasing power. 
e economic situation of military staff
was so precarious for the military and their families that many deserted the ranks to take
up other jobs. 
e Decree-laws -E/, -V/, -A/, -A/, /, -
A/, / were treasure tools that updated salaries and pensions usually following previous
similar adjustments in the civil service. However, these raises did not fully compensate the
loss of purchasing power. As the Decree-Law / recognised, it was necessary to proceed
to the update of the military salary tables aiming to recover, as far as possible, their purchasing
power (Legislação.org ). 
e financial situation was so constrained that some economic
prerogatives were eliminated, such as some gratuities associated with the accumulation of
functions and to special tasks as well as the discrimination of salaries according to different
placements in continental Portugal. 
e military continued to rely on the Social Services of
the Armed Forces to compensate for their low salaries.
For instance a letter to the  from the Porto Military Region Commander, General Pires Veloso
(//), explains that there were around  processes of desertion opened in the Military Tribunal of
Porto fundamentally linked to the precarious economic situation of the military and their families (, Corre-
spondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume , number , documents ).
Decree-Law / (//).
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Figure : Defence budget per member of the armed forces in current dollars
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5.5.3 Equipment expenditure

e greatest part of the defence budgets was earmarked for staff expenditures and for covering
the exceptional cost of the repatriation and downsizing of the armed forces. 
is reduced the
flexibility of the governments with regard to the expenditure on equipment. 
e efforts to
modernise weapons and materials were motivated by  membership and enabled thanks
to the military aid from allies. However overall these efforts were insufficient and they were
not instrumental in the military control strategy.

irteen years of Colonial Wars had created a distortion in the structure and equipment
of the armed forces, which suffered from being oversized and reliant on obsolete material. In
order to adapt to the new context and to the new  defence doctrine launched in , the
Portuguese Armies required a fundamental process of modernisation (Pereira :–).

is modernisation was not undertaken during the transition and early democratic period.

e budgets during the transition were ‘survival’ budgets not adapted to ensure the missions
of the armed forces including the compromises acquired with  (Mesquita ). Barros
and Santos () even suggest a free-rider attitude of Portugal as the successive governments
relied on  to guarantee the defence of the country.
Since modernising all the armed forces was not possible given the financial constraints it
was decided to concentrate efforts on the Independent Mixed Brigade of the Army ().
From  the  was the flagship unit that channelled Portuguese participation in 
and became the first unit to be modernised fundamentally thanks to the arrival of armoured
vehicles from the German and  armies, which produced a qualitative leap forward for Por-
tuguese Armed Forces (Machado ). 
e Brigade made the Army increasingly involved

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with  and became a model for the rest of the armed forces in terms of preparation and
professionalism and a source of pride for the Portuguese military.
Nonetheless, the financial resources available for the procurement of weapons and ma-
terials continued to be very scarce for the rest of the armed forces. Even  Cavaco Silva
(:) recognised the shortages in terms of equipment and the need to increase budgets.

e government tried to compensate for the deficient material conditions by introducing in
 the  military planning process to rationalise investments and procurement and
by launching a rearmament programme from . 
ese measures also contributed to in-
crease civilian budgetary control on the military since they established that all programmes for
defence infrastructure and re-equipment required the approval of the Assembly. 
e military
had to justify their requests for funds and persuade the civilian authorities about the need of
the investment and re-equipment programmes (Almeida :–).

e government also tried to increase external aid and cooperation, in particular from 
allies, and the development of Portuguese defence industry (Silva :–; Lopes ).

e contacts with the more advanced armed forces of the  allies was considered to be
the starting point for the reorganisation and modernisation (Pereira :). 
e  was
the main contributor through subsidies and credits for re-equipment. Yet this aid was con-
siderably lower than that received by Greece, Turkey or Spain ( :). Germany and
France provided financial aid for the acquisition of equipment. Canada, , Netherlands,
Norway, Italy and Belgium provided some material assistance, too. 
anks to the support of
its allies, Portugal received tanks and other armoured vehicles for the Army, A- and C-
planes for the Air Force, as well as components for the new programme of frigates in the
Navy (Mesquita :–; Pereira :).  allies also provided technical support
for the manufacture of weapons and military materials in Portuguese factories. Finally the
Government introduced new more flexible regulation for the defence industry to facilitate
the rearmament (Almeida :).
5.5.4 Conclusion
In sum, the evolution of military expenditure in this period can be explained by the economic
hardship that the governments faced, the need to absorb the ‘retornados’ and to downsize the
armed forces after end of the Colonial Wars, as well as the higher priority that the governments
conceded to social spending and investment in infrastructures. Comparatively speaking, the
resources allocated to the military were scarce. Overall the use of treasure tools as means to
increase military satisfaction and adherence to the governments was not salient in this period.
Although the majority of treasure resources were destined to staff expenditure the impact
on military satisfaction was not considerable. Staff expenditure was constrained by the size of
the Army and the compensation associated with the process of demobilisations of the troops
after the colonial conflict. Although very often salaries and pensions were revised, these served
merely to balance partially the loss of purchase power suffered by the military due to inflation.
Law / (//).
Law / (/) and Law / (//).
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No significant changes can be observed in the utilisation pattern of staff expenditure vis-à-vis
the authoritarian period.
Equipment expenditure was also extremely stretched. Military budgets were low and staff
requirements were prioritised over material requirements. 
e overall situation of the Por-
tuguese Armed Forces was very precarious in terms of weaponry, ammunitions and materials.

e  was the only well equipped military unit that became a model for the rest of the
armed forces and the main Portuguese contribution to  Forces. 
e material moderni-
sation was highly dependent on foreign financial, material and technical support and did not
receive a definitive impulse until the mid s. 
en the Government launched a new mil-
itary planning process to rationalise acquisitions and a general programme of re-equipment
to improve the working conditions and defence capabilities. 
e new process introduced
made mandatory the approval of the Assembly to any major investment and re-equipment
programme.
5.6 Summary
Two different periods in the utilisation of basic resources to control the military can be oulined.

e first one corresponds to the provisional governments’ period and its zenith can be found
around the November  coup attempt. 
e control strategy was very different during the
period of constitutional governments and especially after .
Paradoxically, the approach to control developed by the provisional governments was to
a great extent similar to that of the Estado Novo. Salazarist coercive organisation tools were
abolished but replaced by a series of similar organisations and the actions concerning military
control were intensified. 
e special military unit , in charge of fighting insurgency,
was the most representative but not the sole coercive tool. Other military units, the security
forces, tribunals, prisons and even civilians acted as deterrent instruments against military
disobedience too. As during the last years of the Estado Novo military education and training
were neglected and the provision of services, goods and jobs continued as means to compen-
sate poor salaries. 
e capacity to shape the organisation of the state institutions and the armed
forces helped the  to create a series of institutions and a parallel hierarchy that worked for
the politicisation and subordination of both civilians and military. 
e reliance on politici-
sation as a mechanism of control can be also observed in use of nodality. New organisations
such as the Fifth Division,  and  collaborated on an intensive propaganda cam-
paign and the collection of information concerning political affiliation and adherence to the
 principles. 
e extraordinary degree of autonomy and the extensive functions granted to
the military in this period were important collective incentives to endorse the -controlled
governments. Amnesty laws, promotions and political appointments also contributed to re-
ward the military. Initially, sanctions were imposed on the military officers and organisations
identified with the Estado Novo and later with anti-government activities. Finally, the avail-
ability of treasure for control purposes was seriously compromised not only by the economic
crises but also due to the funds committed to the returning military and downsizing of the
armed forces. Salaries were not significantly increased in real terms and equipment was not
modernised.

S
Despite all these control efforts, the period was characterised for continuous acts of indis-
cipline and insurrection. 
e moderate faction that controlled the  from September 
and that consolidated its power after the failed coup in November  decided to abandon
the revolutionary agenda, devolve political power to the political parties and return to the
barracks. Deep transformations in the control toolkit were initiated, the underlying prin-
ciples being de-politicisation and professionalisation of the armed forces. For instance, the
abolition of the  marked the end of the coercive use of organisation. Organisational
design continued to be an important non-coercive mechanism of control but with opposite
purpose. From , the reorganisation efforts served to de-politicise the armed forces and
de-militarise politics. Political and military power was gradually centralised. Education and
military training were reinforced through the action of the , military academies and in-
stitutes as well as through joint exercises with  and allied countries. 
e nodality tools
of political control, ,  and Fifth Division were abolished, propaganda and cen-
sorship abandoned. 
e free media monitored the military, contributing to their extrication
from politics. Governments promoted mutual awareness between the military and civilian
spheres and a new doctrine of national defence seeking to persuade of the virtues of military
subordination to civilian rule. In terms of authority tools, the fundamental changes were: the
elimination of most non-defence functions attributed to the military, the limitation of their
degree of autonomy and the introduction of legal sanctions and constraints in order to pre-
vent politicisation and encourage professionalism in the ranks. In , the  was abolished
and the Constitutional Reform and the Law of National Defence and Armed Forces defined a
new legal framework for civil-military relations, formalising for the first time the principle of
civilian supremacy. Lastly, although treasure remained marginal in the control strategy, there
are some signs of the growing concerns of the government about the deficient material condi-
tions. For instance, the government created the , a brigade with full modern equipment,
tried to stimulate military foreign cooperation and Portuguese defence industry, and finally
in  launched a general programme of rearmament and modernisation.

e key arguments about the control strategy in Portugal that have been developed in Part
 (Chapters , , ) are picked up again in Part  (Chapters , ) in order to establish
comparisons with Spain and explanations of tool trajectories.


Part III
SPAIN


6 History of contemporary civil-military
relations in Spain
6.1 Introduction

e military uprising that initiated the civil war in  was by no means the first example
of military intervention in politics in Spanish contemporary history. As in the Portuguese
case explained earlier, the Spanish problem of military intervention in politics can be easily
traced back to the period of the Napoleonic invasions (Appendix B). 
e ‘pronunciamientos’
and other forms of military pressure on the governments were very common. Since 
more than fifty ‘pronunciamientos’ and coups have been documented (Busquets ). 
e
Army held extraordinary political power in Spain and was prone to act in order to defend its
corporate interests whenever these were threatened (Boyd : ).

is chapter examines the main features of the Spanish political and military history dur-
ing two periods: Franco’s dictatorship (–) and the transition and early stages of
democracy (–). 
ese political and military events become fundamental in order to
understand governments’ choices of control tools (Chapters , , ) and the historical events
and environmental factors that conditioned such choices (Chapter ). 
e analysis of the
Francoist regime is divided into six sections. 
e first one covers the Civil War and the Second
World War. 
e second section examines the period of insulation that followed the Second
World War. 
e third section outlines the regime’s political institutional setting. 
e fourth
and fifth sections analyse the functions developed by the military and their attitude vis-à-vis
Franco’s authority. Finally the sixth section briefly describes the final years of the regime. Later
this chapter examines civil-military relations from the death of Franco in  until . It
first explains the sources of military dissatisfaction during the period of Suárez’s governments.
Second it explains the main military plots during the  governments. Finally it analyses the
impact of the first socialist government (–) on military subordination. 
e transi-
tion to democracy is assumed to have started after the death of Franco on  November .
Despite the choice of this date, this thesis acknowledges that some changes were introduced in
the regime before the death of Franco, and that formally the transitional process into democ-
racy began in  when the Francoist Cortes approved their own dissolution and a popular
referendum confirmed this decision. 
e historical analysis is extended until  which was
the year in which Spain became member or the , a referendum endorsed membership
and the socialist government was re-elected.
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6.2 Franco’s regime
6.2.1 The Civil War and the Second World War
On  July  and in response to the electoral victory of the left coalition ‘Frente Popular’,
an important part of the armed forces with the support of conservative political parties and
the Church launched a coup d’état against the Second Republic. 
e rebels claimed that the
country was in serious danger of social and political disintegration (Cardona :–).

is initiated the Spanish Civil War (–) the implications of which conditioned the
life of Spain for the next four decades, including the strategy and tools governments employed
to control the military. General Francisco Franco Bahamonde reached power after a series of
hazardous events and strategic manoeuvres that eliminated from the race to the rebel camp’s
supreme command more senior generals, such as Sanjurjo, Cabanellas, Queipo de Llano,
Fanjul and Mola, and political leaders, such as José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Manuel
Hedilla. On  October  Franco was proclaimed ‘Generalísimo’ of the Nationalist Armies
in Burgos, a position that he was supposed to occupy provisionally but that he maintained
until his death  years later (Preston ; Cardona :–).
Hundreds of thousands Spaniards lost their lives as a result of the Civil War (Preston ).

e country was divided into two camps, the loyalist Republican and the rebel Nationalist. In
addition to the battlefield casualties many civilian and military were executed, imprisoned or
forced to exile during and after the war. As a result of the war, the military were confronted
with important challenges such as the reconstruction and integration of the structures that
during the war had been decimated and duplicated as well as the absorption of many militia
fighters, ‘alfereces provisionales’, that had fought for the rebels. 
e war also altered the basic
recruitment principles of military cadres. Formal military education was suspended. Political
ascription and combat experience became the driving principles until the restoration of formal
military education after the end of the war. 
e war nonetheless allowed Franco to consolidate
a personal power unparallel among other fascist leaders or Spanish rulers (Payne :;
Jerez Mir ). 
e Civil War left a very important and durable legacy not only on Spanish
politics and society but also on the armed forces and civil-military relations. 
e Civil War
also produced drastic changes in the resources available to the governments and on the tools
employed to control the military (Chapters , ).
Since , Italy and Germany had collaborated with the Francoist camp and their ide-
ological influence also reached Spanish civil-military relations and the government tools of
control vis-à-vis society and the military. In April , Franco dissolved the remaining polit-
ical parties and unified the Carlist and Falangist militias by creating the Single Party, ‘Falange
Española y Tradicionalista de la ’ following the templates of the Italian Fascist and Ger-
man Nazi parties. On  May , Spain pulled out of the League of Nations and pro-Axis
right-wing propaganda became pervasive in the press. 
e infiltration of Falange militants
in the Armed Forces, the appointment of military to top positions in Falange and the use of

ere is great controversy around the total number of victims. Recent demographic studies estimate the
number of deaths in excess of , and the fewer births to , during the war period (Ortega and
Silvestre ). See also Preston ( []) and Beevor () for more information on the Civil War.

e unions and parties belonging to the Popular Front had been banned in .
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paramilitary symbolism among civilians were inspired by these totalitarian regimes. 
e result
was a certain level of politicisation of the military and militarisation of politics. 
e special
influence of the military in the allocation of budgets, the doctrine of the internal enemy, and
the strategy of suppression of social conflict are manifestations of an overlap between the mil-
itary and political spheres. 
e confusion between military and political values hindered the
advancement of military professionalism (Bañón and Olmeda :–, –).

e Civil War and the popularity of totalitarian views in Europe until the decline of the
Axis temporarily legitimised Franco’s initial aggressive stance on control. Some control tools
persisted throughout the dictatorship, such as the intensive use of propaganda, censorship,
military speeches, and parades. However others, such as the use of armed militias or the
penetration of the armed forces by the single party, were soon abandoned. Fascism was weaker
in Spain and the Spanish military were less subservient than in the case of Germany and
Italy (Preston :). Although initially the regime expressed its wish to build a totalitarian
state and used control tools similar to those employed by Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy,
overall Franco’s dictatorship should not necessarily be considered a totalitarian regime but an
conservative civilianised authoritarian one (Linz  []; Tusell :–).

e regime was ideologically aligned with the Berlin-Rome axis but avoided direct involve-
ment in the war. Several reasons precluded Spain’s direct participation. Francoist Armies were
large, but they not suitable for the new type of warfare triggered by Germany; aircrafts and
mechanised forces were too scarce, men were poorly equipped. 
e military high command
did not support the entrance of Spain in the Second World War (Preston :; Cardona
:–). Many generals were not pro-Axis. 
e dreadful socio-economic situation of
post-war Spain, the expectation of a long conflict and the British and Portuguese diplomatic
efforts also discouraged Spanish participation (Preston :; Palacios :–). Fi-
nally, Hitler did not agree to provide the military equipment, food and industrial goods needed
nor did he guarantee the concession to Spain of the French Morocco requested by Franco for
joining the Axis (Serrano Suñer : ).
Despite its official non-belligerent stance, in Spain, unlike in Portugal, the Nazis had won
the propaganda war during the Second World War (Stone : ). Franco’s regime or-
ganised the expeditionary units Blue Division and the Blue Legion that fought alongside the
Germans in the Russian front. Around , Spanish voluntary fighters joined these units
(Moreno Juliá ). 
e Blue Division and the Blue Legion were a compensation for Ger-
man support during the Civil War and a means to appease pro-Axis sympathisers within Spain.

is enterprise was less expensive than a full scale involvement in the war to which Spain was
For instance the law launching the Single Party Falange referred to the ‘works aiming the definitive organ-
isation of a totalitarian new state’ (//), .
Whether Franco’s was an authoritarian or a totalitarian dictatorship is still subject to a contentious debate.
However, after the mid-s the regime exhibited very few traits of totalitarianism.
After demobilisation that followed the end of the Civil War, Franco still commanded an Army of over
, men (Preston :).
A  report sent to Salazar, claimed that the Falange propaganda office in London considered generals
Yague, Solchaga, Aranda and in particular, Queipo de Llano, as traitors and pro-Allies (//). Another
 report stressed that there was an atmosphere of revolt in the ranks directed against Falangist Serrano Suñer
(//) (//-, Folder , Section , Page , ).
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not ready in terms of equipment and arms and which was less disturbing for the monarchic
generals.
6.2.2 Insulation of the regime
After the Second World War the Francoist regime was insulated from the international arena
due to the defeat of the Axis and the adoption of an autarchic economic model. 
is insu-
lation was also reflected in a minimal evolution of the government’s control toolkit partially
provoked by the shortage of economic resources and low influx of new ideas (Chapter , ,
). 
e regime secluded itself from external influence and employed its strong propaganda
machinery to conceal a situation of deep socio-economic crisis and problems such as hunger,
droughts, anti-francoist guerrillas and the international boycott. Among the international
community, Spain was a pseudo-fascist state that had collaborated with the Axis. However
the western powers did not want to precipitate the fall of Franco or interfere in Spanish inter-
nal politics (Preston :). Roosevelt, a declared enemy of Franco was very ill, and died
 April . Churchill was too worried with Stalin to intervene militarily in Spain. France
and especially the Soviet Union pushed for strong economic and political sanctions against
Franco’s Spain.

e  resolution (I) of  December  condemned the regime, advised the with-
drawal of the ambassadors and established sanctions. Spanish membership to  was rejected.
For the next four years, most countries kept the diplomatic relations with Spain at minimal
levels. 
e international insulation and the sanctions imposed by the  worsened the Span-
ish socio-economic situation which in turn limited the capacity of the government to use
treasure tools (Chapter  Section .). Salazarist Portugal and Peronist Argentina were among
the few sources of external support. Spain had lost the opportunity to receive Marshall Plan
aid and later was not invited to join , the Council of Europe or the European Com-
munities. Contrary to the intentions of the actors that had launched the diplomatic boycott
against Franco, its outcome was the reinforcement of the position of the ‘Caudillo’. Franco
used the  boycott, the menace of the communist intervention and the nationalistic feel-
ings to gain internal support. Even the critical monarchist generals stopped opposing Franco
(Liedtke :; Portero :–).
In the s, new ties with the western world were gradually created. Franco sought in-
ternational recognition. Spain’s strategic location and Franco’s anti-communism, manifested
during the Korean War with declarations and symbolic offers of military aid to the  made
the regime an acceptable ally. In , Spain signed the Madrid Pact with the  approving
the creation of four  military bases on Spanish soil in exchange of economic and military
support. 
e support of the United States was crucial for the survival of the regime. 
e 
Since the loss of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba in  Spain had been to a great extent been
isolated and adopted a secondary role in the systems of international relations. Its absence from the First World
War illustrates this fact.
From , the  started considering that Europe north of the Pyrenees could not be defended from a
soviet invasion and that the Iberian Peninsula (as well as the ) had to become the bases for an eventual re-
conquest. Daily Telegraph (//) ‘U.S. need of Spanish Bases’, Daily Mail (//) ‘U.S. seeking ports
and airfields’, New York Times (//) ‘Western Europe Fears Spain Base’, Le Soir (//) ‘Franco ser-
t-il admis dans l’Union Occidentale?’ (Press clippings in Franco’s Personal Archive, , document ).
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facilitated Spanish integration into the  in  and to the Bretton Woods institutions in
. Spain also strengthened its commercial relations within Europe, becoming member of
the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation by . In the s, Spain un-
dertook a semi-liberalisation of the economy that transformed the economic structure of the
country and further integrated Spain into Europe. 
e influence of fascism in Spain had
been largely substituted in the s by the ‘developmentalism’ (‘desarrollismo’) of the Opus
Dei technocrats (Bañón ; Preston :; Rodrigo :–). 
is gradual socio-
economic evolution in Spain was also reflected in the armed forces and in the control toolkit,
especially from the late s. 
e  provided economic, material and technical support that
stimulated the utilisation of treasure and non-coercive organisation tools (Chapter  Sections
.., .).
6.2.3 The Francoist political institutional setting

e Civil War profoundly shaped the institutional configuration of the regime (Jerez Mir
). 
e new political structure was basically an instrument designed by Franco to stren-
gthen his personal power. Erasing the legacy of the Second Republic became a priority for
Francoist governments. In , all the previous political parties were dissolved and integrated
into the Single Party ‘Falange’, including a variety of ideological streams such as tradition-
alist Carlists, fascists, authoritarian Catholics and aristocratic monarchists (Preston :).
All traditional labour unions were suppressed and the new ‘vertical unions’ were controlled
by Falange. Moreover, the Law of Political Responsibilities in  paved the way for massive
purges in all state institutions (Richards :). 
is meant the elimination of the major-
ity of potential veto actors in Spanish institutions, which helped Franco to impose his own
personal preferences in terms of policy instruments (Chapter  Section ..).
In the Francoist authoritarian regime, the executive, legislative and the civil service were
indissolubly entangled. Spanish political institutions were a combination of highly legalistic
procedures with a certain military hierarchical style (Linz :; Comas and Mandeville
:). Franco had a military vision of political power, when he became the head of state
he asked to have a ‘Chief of Joint Staff of Politics’ to assist him. 
e political organisation
he designed was based on the principles of hierarchy and discipline.
Francoist governments and Parliament, ‘Cortes’, were fundamentally composed by profes-
sional bureaucrats, mainly lawyers, economists, engineers and military officers (Chapter 
Section .), all of them loyal to Franco. 
e unicameral Cortes had an origin and function
different to those of the Portuguese National Assembly. 
e Francoist Cortes were created in
 as a council body to assist Franco in the legislative tasks and did not approve laws. Cor-
poratism was the only form of limited pluralism allowed by the regime. Officially the term
of ‘organic democracy’ was used and the Cortes did not represent citizens but the ‘natural
organisations’, i.e. the local councils, the vertical unions, the corporations, the universities,

e end of the autarchy was precipitated by the economic collapse rather than by pressures from the 
(Preston :).
Decree  (//).
Interview José María de Areilza (, //, cassette J).
For instance in ,  of the s were civil servants (de Miguel :).
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the Church and the military. In , with the introduction of  elected seats the Cortes
slightly increased pluralism and independence (Alba :–).
After the defeat of the Axis, the single party Falange was relegated to secondary role and be-
came a mainly a patronage-dispensing machine in the service of Franco (Preston :,
–). In a personal conversation with the lawyer and diplomat Antonio Garrigues,
Franco said that the role of Falange was like that of the ‘claque’. Moreover, there were no
serious checks to Franco’s powers outside the state apparatus. 
e only strong independent
organisation was the Catholic Church that from the beginning firmly supported the regime.
Franco’s administration was extremely centralised but not as bureaucratised as other European
ones. 
ere was a profusion of administrative norms that tried to regulate every aspect of
the state and society, although many of them were not observed (Olmeda :). Bu-
reaucratic entrenchment in general did not affect important decisions concerning the military.

e formal legalism could be easily curbed by the government whenever required. Franco was
the sovereign and as such he could quite freely choose the types of policies and tools without
major constraints from Spanish institutions.
Different political factions or ‘familias’ of the Spanish political right dominated the gov-
ernment and administration throughout the regime: the falangists from  to , the
Catholic conservative from  to  and the Opus Dei technocrats from  to .
Power struggles among different ‘familias’ within Francoism were common. Changes in the
administration’s personnel and ministerial reshuﬄes were made with the objective of the sur-
vival of the regime and in accordance to changes in the international context. Despite the
influence of these ‘familias’, Franco always maintained absolute control of the regime. Like
Salazar, Franco never clearly endorsed one single family, but his personal power was much
higher than that of Salazar in Portugal. He was head of State, of the armed forces, of Falange
and head of the governments. Franco held the absolute authority and was not to be held
accountable for his actions. A common quote by the dictator and his followers that captures
this was: ‘Franco only answered to God and History’ (Aguilar Olivencia :–).
Many military occupied top positions in the political and administrative apparatus. Around
a third of ministers during the regime were military officers. 
e military maintained their
Two seats were elected per province with restricted voting rights for ‘heads of families’ only.
A professional body of professional applauders. Interview with Antonio Garrigues Díaz-Cañabate (,
//, cassette J).
In , Spain there was a civil servant for each  inhabitants compared to  in Italy,  in France or 
in Germany (Feo and Romero :).

e regime was self-defined as an ‘Estado de Derecho’ (rule of law). Although that notion was propagan-
distically used, it also shows an unwieldy legalism that surrounded most of the decisions and the use of authority
as a source of power.
From  to  there is no clear predominance of any specific family (Preston , ). 
ere are
slightly different interpretations of the evolution of conservative ‘familias’ in the governments (De Miguel ).
Especially important were the frictions between Falange and non-falangist military that started in the Civil
War and were aggravated during the Second World War. See for instance complaints from falangist José A.
Girón in a report to Franco (//) (, document ) and note of Franco’s personal secretary on the
attitude of Falange vis-à-vis the military (// ) (, document ).
See Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste (:), Chapter  Table , Chapter  Table , Table .
According to De Miguel (:),  out of  were military and according to Graham  out of
 (Graham :). 
e most accurate figure is probably  out of  (.) according to Linz et al.
(:)
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strength in the public administration until the early s. 
e military can also be consid-
ered the most important pressure group until the rise of the technocrats in the s (De
Miguel ; Bañón ; Jerez Mir ). At the end of the regime, the military continued
to enjoy exclusive competences in military and defence issues and an important participation
in other areas of policy and state-owned companies.
In sum, the institutional setting provided Franco with absolute control of the regime and
its resources. 
ere was no clear division of powers. His decisions and actions, including those
regarding the military and the tools of control, were not contested (Chapter ). 
e military
actively participated at different levels in the political-administrative Francoist system and, as
next section shows, developed important functions in the regime.
6.2.4 The role of the military in Franco’s regime
Although the Francoist was a civilianised regime (Ballbé :iii; Danopoulos, :), the
armed forces and the military were a crucial institution during the dictatorship. In addition
to their traditional defence function, the military became guardians against the ‘internal en-
emy’ and key in the post-war reconstruction and social integration in Spain. Franco used
many different policy instruments to promote these special functions and thus, the sense of
responsibility and their engagement with the regime (Chapter ).

e Spanish military traditionally felt a strong sense of mission according to which they
had the power and obligation to defend and reconstruct Spain (Fontana :). 
ey
were convinced of holding the monopoly on patriotism (Preston :) and considered
themselves guardians of traditions and national values (Blanco Ande :). 
e military
intervention that overthrew the Republic and established Franco’s dictatorship was justified as
a fight against an internal enemy. Franco fuelled this sense of mission constantly promoting a
mythic image of the military which he even called ‘apostles of the Fatherland’ and portraying
the Civil War as a crusade (Aguilar Olivencia :). Franco ensured that the military
remained the bastion of his regime maintaining a discourse around internal threats such as
communists, separatists and masons. 
e military became inquisitors and repressors. Military
courts maintained wide competences and were in charge of the fight against communism and
masonry (Olmeda :). Moreover, Army officers were appointed to lead the forces
of public order, Police and Civil Guard that fought against the anti-francoist militias known
as ‘maquis’ (between , and , fighters) who were very active until  and later
maintained a low-intensity insurgent activity until  (Aguado Sánchez ).

e armed forces had an important function in the reconstruction of Spain after the Civil
War. 
ey were important re-activating the economy by consuming great quantities of fuel,
textiles, food and clothing and creating a significant military industrial complex. 
e armed
forces also had the logistics and organisational expertise necessary to re-build the destroyed in-
frastructures and state apparatus (Olmeda :–). Finally the military, alongside the
Catholic Church, became the most powerful tools for social integration (Bañón and Olmeda
:). 
e mandatory military service was instituted after the Civil War on  August

ere is abundant evidence of the persecution of masonry in the s found in Franco’s personal docu-
mentation ( documents , , , , , ).

H   -   S
. One of the main tasks assigned to the Armed Forces was the integration and homogeni-
sation of Spanish society through the use of the Castilian language, favouring interregional
mobility and the indoctrination in the values of the Francoist regime (Olmeda :).
Franco was more concerned with the internal threats and establishing mechanisms of polit-
ical control to guarantee loyalty to the regime than with external threats. 
e organisation and
equipment of the armed forces were outdated, which hampered professionalism (Bañón and
Olmeda :; Payne ). 
e Second World War had revolutionised warfare not only
at the material but also at the tactical and organisational levels. However, the Spanish military,
and in especially those in the Army, considered themselves as experienced fighters that had
prevailed in the Civil War and did not have a sense of urgency of deep transformations in
the armed forces. 
e resistance to professionalisation and change as well as the frustration of
the cadres with advanced technical skill, due to the archaic and politicised organisation, were
common features. Officers were permitted to take other parallel jobs in private business or the
public administration to compensate the very low salaries which negatively affected profes-
sional preparation. Moreover, Franco had divided the War Ministry into three independent
ministries and reserved for himself the role of coordinator, strengthening his authority on
the military. 
is made more difficult the emergence of military leaders that could have a
broad support across branches and challenge his personal rule but also lowered the level of
coordination against a potential external threat.
Many of the pitfalls of the Spanish Armed Forces were evidenced during the Sidi Ifni War
(–). In addition to the logistics and coordination problems, the scarcity and in-
adequacy of material means was obvious. 
e weapons dated from the Second World War,
there was penury of fuel, vehicles, food and boots. Even the most basic military training ex-
ercises such as shooting practice were rare. Only the support of the French Armed Forces,
which were much better prepared for guerrilla warfare saved Spain from a disaster (Azcona et
al. ; Fernández-Aceytuno :–; Segura Valero :–, –, –
). As Preston asserts, ‘Franco used the Army not as an instrument of national defence but
as a mechanism for guaranteeing the survival of his regime’ (Preston :).
6.2.5 Military subordination

e armed forces never seriously threatened Franco’s position. 
e victory in the Civil War
and the central position that they occupied in the regime enhanced military pride and main-
tained military contestation at the lowest levels. Military discipline and cohesion also favoured
military subordination. 
is was an important difference, with the Portuguese military far less
cohesive and docile than the Spanish military.
Only a small minority of officers dared to express their discontent with some aspects of
Franco’s rule such as the mandatory membership of the military in Falange, Franco’s attempts
to enter Spain in the Second World War, and especially for not having restored the monarchy
(Preston :). From  to , there were several manifestations of unrest among
monarchist sectors which became the sole menace for Franco’s supreme authority. For
Interview to Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (, //, cassette Jbis).
Abundant evidence on the monarchic contestation within the ranks can be found in Salazar’s (//-
, Folder  and ) and Franco’s personal archives ( documents , ).
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instance in ,  s and other prominent figures of the new regime signed a monar-
chic manifesto (‘Manifiesto de los Veintisiete’) and Generals Orgaz, Dávila, Varela, Solchaga,
Kindelán, Saliquet, Monasterio and Ponte co-signed a letter, on  September , request-
ing Franco to restore the monarchy (Bravo Morata :–; Palacios :–).
Moreover, several senior officers and other personalities maintained contacts with the exiled
heir of the Spanish Monarchy, Don Juan, in order to plan his return. Franco used hon-
ours, promotions, economic incentives, relocations and demotions and one-to-one meetings
to silence contestation from the monarchic generals. 
e symbolic enactment of the Law
of Succession in  that declared Spain a Catholic Monarchy contributed to appease pro-
monarchic generals. In addition, Franco enjoyed the loyalty of the middle-rank and militia
officers (Payne :; Preston : –) and by the early s, most of the senior
generals with legitimacy to contest Franco’s leadership had already died.
Loyalty to the regime was reinforced by an extreme sense of discipline inculcated in the
Spanish military (Allendesalazar Urbina :–). Discipline was the most fundamental
value. Religious and military values were to a great extent interpenetrated during Franco-
ism (Oltra and de Miguel ). Obedience, abnegation, honour and religious belief were
exacerbated by the official discourse as a means to guarantee military discipline. 
e military
were led to believe that discipline was intertwined with their Christian feelings; obedience was
considered an act of faith or expression of religiosity. For the military the prestige and hon-
ours were fundamental sources of reward, more important than material ones. 
e renewed
fixation with discipline contributed to eliminate the problem of military interventionism and
to reinforce Franco’s authority. 
e notion of discipline was so entrenched in the military
imaginary that even those trying to promote disobedience to Franco justified their claims in
terms of discipline.

e strong conservatism and cohesion of the Spanish military also contributed to prevent
deviant attitudes against the dictator (Aguilar Olivencia ). 
e Spanish Armed Forces
surpassed the usual levels of conservatism due to the purges of republican and liberal officers,
the incorporation to the ranks of thousands of militia fighters whose ideology was often ultra-
rightist, and the recurrent anti-communist, anti-liberal, pro-authoritarian rhetoric fomented
by the regime apparatus and the reactionary press (Preston :–). 
e active role
Orgaz died in , Queipo de Llano, Varela in , Yagüe, Monasterio, Ponte in  and Solchaga in
 (Preston :–, ).

e classical verses from Calderón de la Barca: ‘Here the most fundamental exploit is to obey, and the way
how it should be is without requesting or refusing . . . ’ became the motto of the Army. 
e exaggerated value
conceded to discipline can be perceived in the Francoist military doctrine.
For Vigón, the military oath was similar to a ‘military sacrament’ (Vigón  []:). 
e ideal is
that of the Catholic soldier, similar the Spanish soldiers fighting in the religious wars in the middle ages and in
the  century. In the same direction points the highly influential ideologist of Falange, José Antonio Primo
de Rivera who defended the unavoidable connection between religion and military life (Primo de Rivera 
[]:).
See for instance the interview with Lieutenant General Jesus Gonzalez del Yerro (Mérida :–).
For instance General Kindelán in  asked the military not to accept a ‘passive’ approach to discipline
but to adopt an ‘active discipline’ according to which they should wish to receive orders from their superiors. He
continued that the type of passive discipline led the French Army to the defeat in  and that he preferred the
sort of indiscipline evidenced in May  against the pro-Napoleonic government or in July  against the
Republican government. Kindelán, through a rhetorical exercise, was asking for a move against Franco (Kindelán
:).
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played by the armed forces in Francoist indoctrination and propaganda campaigns made them
especially vulnerable and acquiescent to these types of control tools. 
e new generation of
officers that in the s took over senior positions in the armed forces meant a radicalisation
of the ideology. 
e new generals had always been subordinated to Franco and had never
considered him as ‘a primus inter pares’ as some of the older generals had. For these new
generals Franco had always been the supreme leader. 
ey were extremely obedient and loyal
to Franco and had been strongly influenced by Franco’s propaganda especially during the
s (Cardona :).

e ideological military cohesion was fostered by their gradual divorce from society at large.

ere was little ideological evolution in the Francoist army, which became more insulated in a
changing society (Preston :). Several factors had favoured this isolation: their elitism,
social endogamy, self-recruitment, military housing, separation of education and work from
civilians, a ritualised system of values and territorial uprooting (Busquets  []). Ac-
cording to the social origin the Francoist Military were the most, or at least among the most,
elitist in the world (Olmeda :–). 
e provision of housing for the families rein-
forced the esprit the corps but also stimulated the endogamy in the officers corps. According
to Payne, from –,  of the new officer candidates were sons of other officers. 
at
was a higher percentage than in any other western country (Payne :). Fifty percent
of the officers married the daughters of other officers (Preston :–). 
us peer
pressure was strong and the Armed Forces in Spain were fundamentally united in support of
Franco and his regime.
6.2.6 The final years of the regime
Despite the great degree of cohesiveness and support for Franco, during the last years of the
regime, two different groups of military began to stand out. On the one hand the ‘liberal’ or
‘reformist’ group of military primarily concerned with the professionalisation and moderni-
sation of the armed forces. On the other hand there was a reactionary group, the ‘bunker’,
which favoured a praetorian view of the state and was preoccupied with the prolongation of
the dictatorial regime after the death of Franco. 
is was a more powerful group that dom-
inated the senior ranks of the armed forces through the former Blue Division combatants,
‘Generales Azules’, and the secret services.

e military cooperation with the  and  convinced some officers that change and
modernisation of military methods and doctrine were necessary (Puell de la Villa ; Fer-
nández López ). As in Portugal, the international exchanges had created a sense of non-
conformism in some sectors of the military. For instance some of the prominent liberal mil-
itary that later promoted reforms such as Manuel Díaz Alegría, Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado
Generals Alfonso Pérez Viñeta, Tomás García Rebull, Carlos Iniesta Cano, Ángel Campano López were
considered part of the bunker. Some secret service officers such Colonel José Ignacio San Martin and Colonel
Federico Quintero were later involved in the reactionary  coup attempt in  (Preston :, –
).
Although Spain was not a member, the country began to collaborate with  to the extent that the Navy
can be considered facto integrated in the alliance after  (Olmeda :).
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and Sabino Fernández Campo, had participated in the negotiations with the  in the early
s and later in the renewal of the agreements in the late s.
In parallel to the moderate liberalising socio-economic reforms in the s and early s
some changes were introduced in the armed forces. However these were not as fundamental
as the liberal military had expected. 
e unification of the three branches that had become a
request from military scholars and from within higher education system was not undertaken
(Salas López :–). In the s, the armed forces and especially the Army contin-
ued to have poor salaries and equipment and many officers were confined to administrative
tasks (Olmeda :). Although in the government the military ministries had fought
against the reduction of the military budgets, the more influential technocrats managed to
convince Franco of the opposite. 
e Army did not benefit from the economic boom the
Spanish economy experienced during the s. Still, the priority of many officers was the
continuation of the authoritarian regime rather than enhancing the operational capacity of
the armed forces.

is scenario did not considerably reduce the support for the regime. 
e ‘Matesa’ cor-
ruption scandal in , that tainted the reputation of the technocrats in the government,
as well as the increasing  terrorist attacks, whose most important action was the assassi-
nation of the  Carrero Blanco in  contributed to the radicalisation of the hardliners
who publicly expressed the need to reinforce authority in Spain. 
e extreme right exerted
pressures to secure the dominance of reactionaries among the top tiers of the administration
and questioned the attempts to modernise the political system.
Finally the Carnations Revolution in Portugal in  inspired the Democratic Military
Union, ‘’. Founded in summer , the  was a clandestine group of officers that
sought for a reorganisation and democratisation of the armed forces and the end of the author-
itarian regime. 
e  wanted to provoke a ‘pronunciamiento’ similar to the contemporary
military rebellions of Portugal, Greece and Abyssinia or nineteenth-century Spain in order to
force a transition to democracy (Fortes and Otero :–). Although  reveals the
existence of liberal ideology within the ranks, the fall of  in  and the severe punish-
ment suffered by its members indicates the supremacy of the reactionary views in the Spanish
Armed Forces that after the death of Franco complicated the transition to democracy. 
e
‘liberal’ military championed the reforms of the armed forces, which also affected many of
the tools of control. However, these were to a great extent slowed down by the ‘reactionaries’
and many of them took place several years after the death of Franco (Chapters , ).
See Viñas () and documents on the negotiations conducted by Díaz Alegría with the  in  and
 (, documents , , ,, , , ). Fernández Campo had studied in
the .
For instance the campaign against the modernisation attempts of Arias Salgado, called the Gironazo
(//) that ended up with the dismissal of some ‘progressive’ ministers and influential civil servants (Pre-
ston :).
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6.3 Transition and Democracy
6.3.1 Suárez’s governments

e socio-economic modernisation in the s and early s can be considered the main
accomplishment of the Francoist regime but also an important factor for its demise. Spain
had become an urbanised and industrialised country that attracted tourists and foreign capital.
By the time of Franco’s death, in there was a majoritarian belief Spanish civil society of the
necessity of a democratic political system. Spanish political elites, including the clandestine
opposition parties and members of Francoist administration, with the support of intellectual
and economic elites launched a transition into a western-type pluralistic democratic system
(Viñas :–). 
e Spanish transition was not the result of a military intervention
as those of Portugal and Greece. It was basically a civilian led process, initiated by pressures
from inside the regime and its apparatus (Fishman ; Linz et al. ).
Franco died on  November  leaving King Juan Carlos as his heir and head of state
and Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. Social and political contestation and the inability
to conduct the reforms forced Arias Navarro’s resignation. In July , the King appointed
Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister. Suárez, a former general secretary of the single party, became
a key figure who launched and conducted the main the political reforms that led Spain into
democracy. His party, Democratic Centre Union () won the first two democratic general
elections since , in June  and March .

e military who continued to be loyal to Francoist principles (Aguilar Olivencia :
) did not fully endorse the political reforms nor participated in the core decisions during
the transition. 
e military were persuaded that Franco’s appointed successor, Juan Carlos,
was the safeguard for the continuity of the regime and initially accepted a secondary role in
the reforms (Agüero :, –). Once the King and Suárez’s Government showed com-
mitment to a profound democratisation process, military discontent grew and subordination
weakened. 
e military that had considered themselves for decades as guardian of Francoist
traditions and national values (Blanco Ande :) thus became the main threat for the
transition to democracy.
Several factors contributed to military unrest. Some of the structural problems were inher-
ited from Francoism. For instance, officers were insufficiently qualified, badly paid and subject
to a system of promotion based almost exclusively on seniority. 
ere was an abnormal abun-
dance of high ranking officers, a scarcity of material means, a territorial distribution similar
to that of an army of occupation and strong isolation within Spanish society. Nonethe-
less, the military generally did not blame the dictatorship for their problems. Most of them,
even the reformists, continued to feel admiration for Franco (Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste
:–). 
e tolerance displayed for the structural problems during the dictatorship dis-
appeared during ’s governments.
See Preston (), Powell () and interview with Antonio Garrigues (, //, cassette J).
See Viñas (:–) and Bañón (:). 
e excess of officers can be attributed to the prepara-
tion for the Sahara conflict that accelerated the training period for the cadets in  (Fernández López :–
; Serra :).
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A series of decisions and incidents throughout the transition period contributed to military
dissatisfaction and complicated civil-military relations. First, the evacuation of the Spanish
Sahara protectorate that concluded in February  was a setback for military pride (Alonso
Baquer :–). Second, the Political Reform Act meant the legal self-dissolution
of the regime, to the extent that it was termed as the political ‘harakiri’ of Francoism. Al-
though half of the military representatives in the Cortes voted against this Political Reform
Act (Sánchez Navarro :), it obtained a landslide majority in the Cortes (November
) and in the subsequent referendum (December ). 
e majority considered Fran-
coist principles and laws as immutable, and therefore considered the Act as treason, puting
some generals in a state of ‘total dissonance’ with the reforms launched by the transitional
governments.

ird, the legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party () during Easter  was con-
sidered as a betrayal by many senior generals. 
e formal objection of the Higher Council of
the Army and the protest memorandum addressed to the king co-signed by several lieutenant-
generals (Játiva conspiracy) evidenced military discontent. Fourth, the restoration of the
Catalan regional government ‘Generalitat’ in September  and the ongoing decentrali-
sation process, initiated with the approval of the autonomy statutes of the Basque Country,
Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia in referenda between  and , was seen by the mili-
tary as a threat to the unity of Spain. Finally after the death of Franco, the growing spiral of
terrorist violence by ,  and other groups reached its peak in  with  attacks
and  persons assassinated (Reinares :–). 
e military were priority targets.
For instance, of those killed by  between  and , . were professional military
or policemen (Agüero :).
Suárez, aware of the risks that some military represented, had appointed the liberal General
Gutiérrez Mellado as deputy prime minister (–). Gutiérrez Mellado who also be-
came the first defence minister of democracy (–) launched a series of reforms that
aimed at the modernisation and professionalisation of the armed forces as a means to counter
the influence of the reactionary ‘bunker’ and to consolidate military subordination. 
ese
reforms were reflected in many different types of control tools (Chapter ). 
e government
created new coordination bodies such as the Board of Joint Chiefs of Staff () and the
Defence Ministry (). A new legal framework was enacted to regulate the armed forces,
including several important articles in the democratic Constitution (), the Organic Law
/ which regulated the basic criteria of National Defence and military organisation as
well as the Organic Law /, which reformed the Code of Military Justice (Ballbé ;
Rodrigo :).
Although the  government had set the process of normalisation of civil-military rela-
tions in motion, its reforms were widely criticised, considered incomplete and proved to be
 votes for,  against and  abstentions in the Cortes  in favour in the referendum.
Interview with Antonio Garrigues (, //, cassette Jbis).
See Bañón (:). Suárez had promised in a meeting with the top generals that this legalisation would
never happen under his rule (Iniesta Cano :; Preston :, ). Nonetheless others doubt that this
promise was explicitly made (Interview with General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez,  //, cassette
J).
See Powell (:–) and interview with former Presidency and Education Minister José Manuel
Otero Novas (, //, cassette J).
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insufficient to consolidate civilian supremacy (Serra :; Navajas Zubeldia :–
). Due to the strong military opposition, the changes eventually implemented at the level
of control toolkit were not as decisive as Suárez’s government had initially wanted. For in-
stance, the new legal framework left room for an ambiguous interpretation concerning the
chain of command (Puell de la Villa :). Honour Trials or the Francoist formula of
oath to the flag were not abolished, conscientious objection was not regulated and the promo-
tion of reactionary officers opposed to the government and reforms continued (Busquets and
Losada, :–). In addition, the problems with the implementation of some of the
norms also had a negative impact on military subordination. 
e practice often did not follow
the formal principles (Ballbé :–). Although the Constitution of  established
that military justice was limited to strict martial matters such as indiscipline, insubordination,
sedition or desertion, the military courts often exceeded their functions by judging civilians.
Military courts also imposed soft sentences on those responsible for aggressive police repres-
sion or anti-democratic actions.  governments failed to persuade the armed forces of the
necessity of reforms and were too permissive with anti-democratic attitudes (Busquets and
Losada :).
Finally, the socio-economic and political problems that Suárez’s government encountered
became an additional source of military discontent and an alibi for potential intervention.

e  government failed to solve the enormous economic problems fostered by the second
oil crisis in . 
e crisis affected the manufacturing industry and the banking system,
increased unemployment and the public deficit and constrained military budgets (Powell,
:, ). Suárez’s Government ruled in minority and had to face strong opposition, not
only from rival parties (, , ), but also from within the  (Hopkin :–).

e growing discontent in the Spanish society and armed forces and the political pressures
resulted in Suárez’s resignation in January .
6.3.2 Anti-government plots
Initially Suárez underestimated the threat posed by the military. He believed that their sense
of discipline and legalism would prevent them from interfering in politics (Fernández López
:). Suárez’s government carefully launched the major political reforms scrupulously
respecting the framework of Francoist legality so that the military could not question them.
However, most military rejected the advent of democracy and adopted and attitude of passive
resistance towards liberalisation. 
e dominance of the reactionary generals opposed to the
reforms and the discrepancies between the more liberal ones weakened civilian supremacy.
Some military even questioned the legitimacy of the government that had allegedly betrayed
See Armed Forces and Military Consolidation workshop organised by Powell and Bañón (, //,
cassette ).
Interview with Lieutenant General José Vega Rodriguez (, //, cassette J).
Although a group of reformist generals held important positions during the transition, such as Generals
Díez Alegría, Gutiérrez Mellado, Ibáñez Freire, Saenz de Santamaria or Fernández Campos, the conservative
generals still predominated; for instance, De Santiago, Iniesta Cano, Campano, Coloma Gallegos, Milans del
Bosch or Pita da Veiga. Moreover there was even a division among the liberal or reformist military, for instance
General Vega Rodríguez resigned as  due to discrepancies with Gutiérrez Mellado (Interview with Lieutenant
General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez, , //, cassette J). From the beginning, Juan Carlos feared
the military bunker (Interview with José María de Areilza, , //, cassette J).
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some of the principles agreed upon before initiating the process of transformation (Car-
dona :–). 
e high degree of military autonomy and the permissiveness vis-à-vis
the reactionary propaganda and acts of indiscipline (Chapter  Section . ) instilled anti-
government activity. During the transition and early years of democracy several conspiracies
and military plots took place.
After Franco’s death the ‘bunker’ had begun to organise large-scale strategic actions to sab-
otage the political reforms and to promote a military intervention. Extreme right newspapers
such ‘El Alcazar’, ‘El Imparcial’ and ‘Reconquista’ and magazines such as ‘Fuerza Nueva’ or
‘Servicio’ fuelled military discontent. 
eir discourse constantly stressed the necessity of mili-
tary autonomy vis-à-vis political power and their role as keepers of the public order against the
‘internal enemy’. 
ese publications projected a pessimistic vision of Spain, denouncing the
government’s ‘civil praetorianism’, the dissolution of the unity of Spain, terrorist impunity,
degradation of moral values and the planned destruction of the Military establishment. 
e
government failed to assess the impact of the bunker propaganda among the ranks (Preston
:).

e extreme right also committed acts of violence against left-wing students, workers, book-
stores and even clergymen and more moderate conservatives For instance, the assassinations
of five people in a law firm linked to left-wing unions in Madrid in January  tried to
provoke a violent reaction from the left and to escalate the violence, which would have legit-
imised a military intervention. 
e terrorist attacks of  and  were instrumentalised
by reactionary groups. Funerals of Civil Guards or military officers assassinated by terrorist
groups were used to hail radical positions and calls to resist the reforms (Gutiérrez Mellado and
Picatoste :–). 
e acts of military indiscipline against the government became re-
current. Moreover, after the bad results of the extreme right parties in the first elections in
June , the military bunker realised that maintaining the regime would only be possible
through non-constitutional means. Hard-line generals discussed the possibility of pushing
Juan Carlos to establish a stronger government and even a military coup.

e government miscalculated the level of discontent within the Armed Forces and the
capacity of the bunker to organise a military coup. 
e lack of sanctions to overt antidemo-
cratic attitudes within the ranks had reinforced the bunker’s conviction of the likelihood of
success of a military intervention. According to the Foreign Affairs minister Areilza, during
the transition there was a state ‘permanent military conspiracy’. 
e first important coup
attempt was the ‘Operación Galaxia’, which was planned for the  November  in or-

e severe sanctions imposed on the , whose members were expelled from the armed forces which
shows the extent of this reactionary trend in the armed forces (Preston :–; Reinlein ).  was
dismantled and all its members imprisoned while the acts of indiscipline by hardliners, that had become very
common during the transition, were seldom censored.
For instance, the violent attack to the traditional Carlist pilgrimage to Montejurra (//) (Cardona
:–).
See interview with Lieutenant General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez (, //, cassette J)
Civilians, such as José Antonio Girón de Velasco, Blas Piñar, García Carrés or Utrera Molina, also collab-
orated with military hardliners.

e government dispensed a ‘kid-glove treatment’ to the military; the lack of punishment of radical atti-
tudes ended up facilitating military conspiracies (Preston :).
Interview with José Maria de Areilza (, //, cassette Jbis).
‘Galaxia’ was the name of the coffee-shop where the plot was planned.
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der to prevent the Constitutional Referendum on  December . It took advantage of the
absence of the King, the Defence Minister and many senior officers that were out of Madrid
on that date. However, the secret services informed the government of the attempt. 
e lead-
ers of the plot Lieutenant-Colonel of the Civil Guard Tejero and Captain of Police Ynestrillas
were arrested. Although the government tried to play down the importance of the incident as
an isolated act of subversion the fact that many military were aware of the plot and did not
denounce it meant that military loyalty to the government was not assured anymore (Ballbé
:–; Preston :–; Busquets and Losada :).
Another attempt was aborted in . 
e Armoured Division () located in Madrid
was the key to control the capital. 
e  had become a bastion of reactionary ideas due to
the influence of the reactionary Generals Milans del Bosch and Torres Rojas. In , under
the command of the latter some unauthorised manoeuvres simulated the seizure of Madrid.
Apparently Torres Rojas was plotting to take control of the Presidential Palace of Moncloa
with the help of the Parachutist Brigade stationed in Torrejón and later use the  to control
the city. 
e coup was delayed due to insufficient supply of ammunition and fuel which
would have risked the operation. Eventually the government demoted Torres Rojas (Preston
:).

e  coup on  February  was the most important attempt and had a stronger
impact. A group of Civil Guards hijacked the congress during the investiture session of the
new Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo following Suárez’s resignation. 
e act was be-
ing broadcasted live by the television. Some officers such as General Milans del Bosch and
Colonels Tejero and San Martín had planned a Turkish or Chilean-style coup followed by
draconian measures. On the other hand, General Alfonso Armada preferred a coup along
the lines of De Gaulle’s. Armada sought to take advantage of the situation resulting from the
Milans and Tejero violent coup in order to force the king to approve the introduction of a
Government of National Salvation that would be headed by Armada himself. 
anks to
the action of the King, the royal military household, the political parties and some loyal mili-
tary, the coup failed and the plotters were incarcerated (Preston ; :–; Medina
).

e failure of the  had a great impact on civil-military relations. 
e coup attempt
shocked Spanish civil society which for the most part was unaware of the extent of the mili-
tary threat. Moreover the coup was covered live by the radio the , which amplified its im-
pact. Spanish society reacted strongly against the plot. 
e behaviour of the plotters during
the coup and their trials embarrassed most military and became a tipping point in the polit-
ical influence of the bunker and its ascendency within the ranks (Preston :). Calvo
Sotelo’s government undertook some important measures concerning military subordination.
It was the first government not to include any military member and to appoint civilians to top
positions in the ministry of defence. It reinforced the intelligence services CESID, appealed
against a military court’s ‘soft’ sentences of the  conspirators and signed NATO member-
Not only ideological but also personal reasons triggered this plot. Many senior officers disliked some of the
military appointments made by the government. For instance, General Gabeiras Montero claims that Milans
del Bosch’s participation in  coup was mainly due to Gabeiras’s appointment as  (Interview in ,
//, cassette Jbis).
Eduardo Serra as Undersecretary of Defence and Jesús Palacios as Secretary General of Economic Affairs.
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ship (Agüero :). However the consolidation of military subordination continued to
be an issue during Calvo Sotelo’s mandate.

e ‘Manifesto of the Hundred’ signed by  officers on December  in defence of the
 plotters and against military subordination to civilian rule was a new sign of contestation.
Conspiracy groups such as the ‘Union Militar Española’ () continued to operate. Finally a
hard-line coup seeking to prevent the elections of October , ‘Operación Cervantes’, was
aborted (Bañón :; Busquets and Losada :, –). Although some of the
plotters’ claims and fears were shared by the majority of the military, overall the armed forces
had stopped endorsing insurgency. Many top rank officers during transition had fought in
the Civil War and were preoccupied with the idea of a new bloodshed during the transition.
Other younger officers had not fought the war but had lost their parents during the conflict
and shared those concerns (Barrachina :). Finally, the socialist party, , won the
general elections and took over government without any further military interference. 
is
peaceful transfer of power can be considered as the end of the military threat and the culmi-
nation of the transitional process (Linz and Stepan :).
6.3.3 The First socialist government

e landslide victory of Felipe González in October  elections granted his government
the legitimacy and a solid parliamentary majority to conduct fundamental reforms. 
e gov-
ernment restructured and liberalised the economy, developed the autonomous communities’
territorial model, negotiated the membership to , introduced some education and social
reforms and, most importantly, profound transformations in the defence and military poli-
cies. 
is was the first left-wing government in more than four decades, and paradoxically
it suffered much lower contestation to its reforms than the previous centre-right  gov-
ernments. 
e growing popular support for democracy reinforced military subordination to
the government (Danopoulos :). Even among conservative voters, those supporting
democracy were a majority. 
is new context enabled the government to implement the
necessary in-depth changes in the control toolkit to ensure military subordination (Chapter
, ).
Narcís Serra, an economist and former mayor of Barcelona, was appointed Defence Min-
ister. Serra spent his first year in office analysing the Ministry and the armed forces and
designing a plan to increase centralisation and strengthen the power of the government vis-
à-vis the military as a requisite for further reform and modernisation (Agüero :).
González and Serra, conscious that ideological change within the ranks was not achievable in
the short-term, concentrated their efforts on obtaining material obedience and on developing
a regulatory framework aiming at profound transformations in the long-term. 
ey approved
a set of reforms that eliminated the ambiguity introduced by the  governments the inter-
pretation of which had led the military to enjoy an excessive level of autonomy (Comas and
Mandeville :).

e percentage of people preferring democracy to any other form of government rose from  in 
to  in  (Gunther et al. :–).
He was the fourth Defence Minister of the democracy and third civilian that occupied this position after
Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún (–) and Aberto Oliart (–).
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e reforms launched by the first socialist government were far-reaching and served to
consolidate civilian supremacy. 
e Organic Law of Defence / that replaced the Law
/ unambiguously stated the supremacy of the Prime Minister and centralised powers
in the hands of the Defence Minister, who became an active player in international relations,
the link with the Parliament, in charge of arbitrating conflicts of interest and budgets within
the armed forces (Serra :–). 
e command of the King as Chief of the Armies
became basically symbolic. In order to improve coordination the position of Chief of the
Joint Staff () was created and hierarchically subordinated to the Defence Minister. 
e
reforms also tackled the ‘brutal excess of personnel’ that compromised most of defence bud-
gets for personnel costs hindering military modernisation and rejuvenated the Army, which
during transition had the oldest average officer corps in the world. 
e socialist government
reinforced the policies of early retirement initiated by Calvo Sotelo’s government in ,
planning a  reduction of the officers (Comas and Mandeville :). Other impor-
tant measures were the regulation of the military service (Law /), the introduction of
conscientious objection (Law /), the homologation of benefits with those of the civil
administration (Laws / and /) and the separation of the armed forces and the
State Security Forces, National Police and Civil Guard (Law /) (Chapter  Section .).

e consolidation of civilian supremacy was facilitated by Spain’s integration into .
After several years of negotiation, Spain officially became a member on  May . 
e
military welcomed this decision. 
e Navy, which collaborated closely with , was espe-
cially keen on Spanish membership but the support to  was also majoritarian in the Air
Force and the Army. González, who as leader of the opposition had previously been opposed
to , understood its importance with regard to military subordination and changed his
discourse to the extent that, in ,  was the main defender of the ‘yes’ in referendum
that confirmed  membership.  doctrine justified changes in the territorial organi-
sation and strategic planning of the armed forces, a growing presence of civilian personnel in
the Defence Ministry and increases in defence budgets.
Overall, the reforms by the first socialist government meant a reinforcement of the De-
fence Ministry and a centralisation and modernisation of the processes of defence manage-
ment (Agüero :–). 
ese reforms were inspired by  templates and involved
all categories and subcategories of control tools (Chapter ). 
ey were more profound than
those attempted by  governments. 
e military cooperated with these reforms because
they were concerned with the future of the armed forces and individual prerogatives rather
than because they fully endorsed democratic values (O’Donnell and Schmitter :–).
General adherence to democratic values was not a precondition for the success of this transi-
tion but an outcome of a longer period of adaptation (Rustow :–). Probably the
clearest expression of the success of the  government was the changing nature of military
See interview with General Saez de Tejada (, //, cassette Jbis) and with Admiral Liberal Lucini
(, //, cassette J).
Interview with , Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (, //, cassette J).
For instance, all members of the Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in favour of the incorporation
into  (Interview with former President of  Lieutenant General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui, , //,
cassette Jbis).
Although especially in the Army some officers feared that  would diminish the traditional weight of
the Army (Interview with the first  Admiral Liberal Lucini, , //, cassette J).
Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis).
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discontent (Agüero :). Protests now came from specific problems found during the
implementation of the reforms, such as promotions and career patterns, bureaucratic excess
or preferential treatment of some units, and from structural deficiencies. With the exception
of a plot by a small group of hardliners to assassinate the King and some members of the
government during a military parade in La Coruña in , quickly unveiled by the secret
services, no further serious challenge was posed to civilian supremacy. By , most military
had realised that the catastrophic predictions of the defenders of authoritarianism had proved
exaggerated and Spain was better off under democracy.
6.4 Summary
Spain experienced processes of political transformations during the twentieth century that
were similar and parallel to those of Portugal. Nonetheless, the evolution of Spanish civil-
military relations was very different. 
e Spanish Armed Forces were more cohesive and sub-
missive to the dictator than the Portuguese ones. During the Civil War the Spanish Armed
Forces had been purged. For the rest of the dictatorship the military became strong supporters
of Franco and his regime. He concentrated more power in his hands than Salazar and never
saw his authority seriously threatened internally. 
e regime suffered an embargo and insu-
lation from the international arena until the early s, however, it never faced an external
challenge of the scale of Portuguese Colonial Wars. 
us, Franco did not have to be so con-
cerned with military intervention and moreover the basic control resources available were not
depleted in the same way than the Estado Novo’s (Chapters , ).
After the death of Franco the situation changed drastically. 
e military, very critical the
political democratic reforms undertaken by the Suárez’s governments, withdrew their support
and became a growing threat. 
e  governments faced several different socio-economic
and political problems, which limited their resources and capacity to undertake action. How-
ever, the defeat of the military plots, in particular the  coup in , and the landslide 
victory in  again changed the civil-military relations in Spain. 
e reactionary military
plotters were discredited and the armed forces understood that the democracy was irreversible.
Moreover the electoral results and the socio-economic and political reforms granted the first
Gonzalez’s government legitimacy and capacity to undertake the actions required for the con-
solidation of military subordination.
Chapters  and  show that tool choices also reflected the specific circumstances in Spain in
terms of civil-military relations. 
ere were clear discrepancies in tool choice vis-à-vis Portugal
and also different uses of the toolkit according to time periods.


7 Francoist tools of government
7.1 Introduction

is chapter analyses the tools that the Francoist regime utilised to keep the military subordi-
nated. Many of these tools were similar to those observed during the Estado Novo (Chapter
). However there are some fundamental discrepancies concerning the intensity or salience of
some types of tools that contribute to rejecting the hypothesis of the existence of a common
‘authoritarian’ style of control in both countries.
Table  summarises the fundamental features of the Francoist control toolkit developed in
this chapter. It suggests that the first period of the regime (–) was characterised by a
very intensive use of coercive organisation (Section ..) and inquisitorial nodality detectors
(Section ..). Repression was much stronger than in Portugal. However, after the thorough
purges in the armed forces and coinciding with the fall of the Axis in Europe, Franco changed
his stance on military subordination. 
e use of courts-martial, imprisonments and executions
decreased. Moreover (unlike in the Estado Novo), the paramilitary militias were banned and
the use of the secret services to spy the military was kept at low levels. Rather than punishments
and inquisitorial surveillance, the regime sought to maintain military loyalty through rewards
and incentives. Franco trusted ‘his’ armed forces and adopted a softer control approach. 
e
scarcity of treasure (Section .) was compensated with organisation, nodality and authority
rewards. For instance the regime provided services, jobs and goods to the military and their
families (Section ..); ideological gratifications through propaganda, laudatory speeches
and censorship (Section ..); promotions, special functions in the regime apparatus and
high degree of lenience with the military that did not follow a professional conduct (Section
..). Franco’s governments utilised organisational design following a ‘divide-and-rule’ logic
to prevent the emergence of any figure or group with the capacity to defy his power. Military
education and training were never a central concern and the impulse to professionalisation and
modernisation of skills and procedures reached Spain late, in the s (Section ..). 
ese
features contrast with the Portuguese case, where the  influence during the s had
produced an emergence of defence coordination bodies, such as the Defence Ministry and
the , and important reforms in military education and training (Chapter  Section
..). 
e recourse to treasure was minimal. Military salaries were low in general and until
the s the equipment was scarce and obsolete (Section .).
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Table : Summary of tools of government during Francoism (–)
Tools Trajectory
Organisation Coercive (Section ..): Summary executions, courts mar-
tial, prisons until mid-s. Paramilitary militias were not
allowed and the security forces were controlled by the Army
and not used as a check on the military
Very intensive utilisation from  to , then es-
sentially abandoned
Non-coercive (Section ..): Formal military education and
training. Exchanges with the  Armed Forces
Reintroduced in . Until late s military ex-
ercises were rare and the military education served to
instil Francoist values
Emphasis on professionalism and development of
modern skills fostered from the s
Organisational design following a ‘divide-and-rule’ logic Stable
Provision of services and goods to the military and their fam-
ilies. Provision of jobs in the public administration
Very important during the post-war period. Declining
from the s
Nodality Information effectors (Section ..): Propaganda and censor-
ship. Intensive use of public speeches, media and specialised
publications praising Franco, increasing the status of the mil-
itary and diverting the attention away from the scarcity of
resources
Very intensive throughout the regime
Information detectors (Section ..): Many different intelli-
gence services collected information about the military (such
as , ‘Tercera del Alto’, Brigade for Social Investigation,
 and ).
Very important during the war and decreased after-
wards. 
e information services were fragmented and
intensive espionage on the military was avoided. Cen-
tralisation and increase in salience in the s.
Friendship networks within the military Important throughout the regime.
Authority Rewards and incentives (Section ..): Appointments of
loyal officers to high responsibility positions in the state ap-
paratus and armed forces
Very important throughout the regime, especially at
the end of the Civil War.
Special powers granted to the military related to the mainte-
nance of public order (judiciary and security forces)

e powers of the military in the justice system de-
creased from the mid-s.
Tolerance with secondary employment and abuses of privi-
leges
Decreased from the s.
Integration of militia fighters as permanent officers in the
Armed Forces
Very important at the end fo the Civil War and after
the Sidi-Ifni war.
Sanctions and constraints (Section ..): Reduction of retire-
ment age and limitations to the size of the armed forces
Basically in the s.
Prohibitions in order to enhance a distinct sprit de corps.
Honour Trials
Stable
Relocations and demotions to those holding critical view Important after the monarchic plots in the s.
Indirect: prohibitions to carry arms for civilian, anti-liberal
and repressive laws on society at large
Stable
Treasure Staff expenditure (Section ..): Salary rises (often through
extraordinary budget allocations) to compensate inflation
and special circumstances that could provoke military unrest
Low salience in the overall control strategy
High salaries and benefits to reward loyalty of top-rank offi-
cers
Stable
Equipment expenditure (Section ..): Acquisition (and pro-
duction) of modern weapons and other material means. Mil-
itary materials ceded by the 
Low. 
e scarcity of equipment and military materials.
From , new equipment was introduced. How-
ever not in-depth modernisation efforts, the economic
growth of the country was not matched by a similar
increase in military expenditure.
Increasing in the s

O
7.2 Organisation

is section shows the evolution of organisation control tools during Francoism. 
e utilisa-
tion of coercive means such as imprisonments, summary trials and executions was central from
the outbreak of the Civil War until the mid-s. Once the armed forces had been thor-
oughly purged, Franco drastically reduced the use coercive organisation means to control the
military. Among the non-coercive control tools, education and training were not central but
increased their salience form the s. Franco also used the institutional design of the armed
forces with a divide-and-rule logic and the provision of goods, services and jobs, especially in
the aftermath of the civil war when the complete state apparatus had to be reconstructed.
7.2.1 Coercive organisation
In Spain, imprisonments and executions were instruments of political cleansing within and
outside the ranks. 
e penitentiary and judiciary became control tools at Franco’s service.
However from the mid-s the use of coercive organisation tools decreased rapidly. Security
and paramilitary forces had a much smaller role than in Portugal. Franco knew that the use
of these forces would be considered intrusive by the military and thus be counterproductive.
From  to , organisation was intensively used in a repressive manner by Franco’s
government on both civilians and the military. During the war, martial law was imposed and
summary executions conducted frequently. Tens of thousands were executed the goal was to
eliminate the opposition to the regime within and outside the ranks (Payne :–).

ere is no agreement on the exact number of people executed, partly because the official
records were often destroyed to remove all evidence. 
e latest research by local historians
estimates about , judiciary executions. To that figure it should be added about ,
people executed without even the of a trial (Preston  []:). Beevor (:)
estimates , deaths, including the official executions, the random killings during the
war and the deaths in prison. 
ese figures exclude the killings in the Republican camp.

e judiciary and penitentiary systems were coercive organisation tools at the service of the
government during and after the war. 
e High Court of Military Justice, from , and
later the Supreme Council of Military Justice, from , undertook continuous ordinary and
summary inquisitorial processes (Gonzalez Padilla :–). Military courts counted
on the complicity of important segments of the population (Anderson ). At the end
of the war , soldiers were kept in concentration camps (Puell de la Villa :).
Franco also punished many former members of the Republican Army forcing them to work in
‘disciplinary battalions of worker-soldiers’ (Preston  []:). For instance, ,
prisoners were sent to  labour battalions and , to special military workshops (Beevor
:).

e Law of Political Responsibilities launched on  February  officially regulated re-
pression after the war. After Franco’s victory, around , people were executed (Preston
:). 
e military that had served in the Republican camp were court martialed and
It seems that the rhythm of executions considerably decreased from . See for instance, Solé i Sabaté
(), Moreno Gómez (), Dueñas ().
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when found innocent normally expelled from the armed forces (Cardona :). About
, officers were purged (executed, imprison or exiled) after the end of the war (Preston
:–; Fernández López :). General Varela, Army Minister from  to
, was especially central to the purges. He organised ‘Honour Trials’, expulsed military,
forced retirements, relocations and other types of administrative repressive means to purge
the Army of any suspected Masonic, liberal or republican officer (Losada :; Cardona
:).

rough these purges Franco managed to shape the armed forces, to the extent that ever
since they were considered the ‘Francoist Armies’: a new institution almost completely dis-
connected from its immediate past as Armies of the Second Republic.
Nonetheless by  the coercive instruments of control of the regime began to show signs
of overstretch. From  to , the Regional Courts of Political Responsibilities tried
, cases but they had still , cases pending. Similarly the Military Courts had
also over open , cases. Moreover, the number of prisoners greatly exceeded the normal
capacity of the Spanish penitentiary system (Beevor :–). At the beginning of the
Second Republic, Spain had , prisoners. 
is number reached , prisoners in
. 
e number of prisoners decreased after the war but in  there were still ,
inmates (Jordana and Ramió :).

e government was forced to drop many cases and reduce the severity of punishments.

e Law of Political Responsibilities was reformed and softened in . 
e judiciary reform
of  reduced both the presence of the military in courts and the general levels of repression
(Dueñas :–) However, executions and long prison sentences continued until 
(Delgado :). A series of laws were launched to reduce the prison population (Gonzalez
Padilla :). 
e number of inmates dropped to , in  and then continued to
decrease gradually so that in the s, Spain reached levels similar to those of the beginning
of the Second Republic (Jordana and Ramió :). 
e Law of Political Responsibility
was finally revoked in  but only in  were the people condemned under this Law
amnestied and liberated (Dueñas :).

us, Franco had stretched to its limits the capacity of the penitentiary and judiciary sys-
tems. Moreover the Armed Forces had been purged completely so the government decided to
reduce the utilisation of coercive organisation tool on the armed forces.
Finally, unlike many other authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century, such as Salazar’s,
Tito’s or Mussolini’s, Franco’s government did not use the civilian paramilitary forces to con-
trol the military. 
e paramilitary militias Falangist (fascist) and Carlist (conservative tradi-
tionalist) that had played an important role during the war were unified and placed under
military command in April  and disarmed in July . Even during the war military
officers were used to control the militia battalions rather than the other way around. Many
military officers disliked Falange’s pro-Axis and anti-monarchic views. Any attempt to use
Falange militias as a check on the military would have produced unrest within the ranks.

is idea remained entrenched even after the end of the regime. For instance Lieutenant General Sáenz de
Tejada in an interview (//) speaks of ‘an Army born from a military victory in ’, ‘a new Army’ or
‘the Army of the victory’ (, cassette J).
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e defence and security forces were the sole ones authorised to carry arms, and therefore
the security forces were the unique organistions that could develop any kind of coercive power
to oppose the military. However the most important security forces, the Armed Police and
the Civil Guard were militarised bodies in which most of the officers proceeded from the
Army. 
ere is no evidence showing that the paramilitary or police forces played any role
countervailing the coercive power of the armed forces.
In brief, neither armed militias nor security forces were used as organisation deterrent tools
against the Armed Forces. 
us from mid-s, the utilisation of the state organisation
capacity in a coercive way on the military was practically inexistent due to the saturation of
the judiciary and penitentiary system and the completion of the purges within the ranks.
7.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

e most important non-coercive organisation tools in the Francoist regime were: formal
military education which was used until the late s primarily as a means of indoctrination;
organisational design which followed a ‘divide-and-rule’ logic; and the provision of services,
goods and jobs in the administration.
First, military instruction was part of the control strategy. Franco, who was a former director
of the General Military Academy of Zaragoza, was aware of the impact of education in shaping
military beliefs and attitudes. In , the General Military Academy was re-opened and in
 the Navy Academy was transferred from San Fernando to Marín and the Air Force
Academy was founded in San Javier. Military education gave prevalence to indoctrination of
the regime’s religious, moral and social values rather than to technology or strategy (Preston
:). 
e Army Ministers Generals Varela (–), Asensio (–), Davila
(–) and Muñoz Grandes (–) strongly contributed to the indoctrination
process and to the prioritisation of ideology in military education. General Barroso (–
) tried to break that tradition.
After , some young military officers spent long periods training and doing courses
in the  and other Western countries, such as Germany, France and Italy. 
is helped in-
troducing new ideas and a growing concern for military professionalism. On average 
officers were trained by the  each year. 
e  Armed Forces became the doctrinal, tactical
and organisation reference for the Spanish military (Platón :, –; Barrachina
:–, –). 
e impact on the Navy was particularly strong. 
e exchanges
with these more modern and better organised armies, as well as, the Sidi-Ifni conflict served
to highlight the severe deficiencies of the Spanish Armed Forces. 
e necessity of emphasis-
ing capacity and operational aspects over indoctrination became evident. 
e Army Minister
General Barroso’s reforms from  were the first steps towards professionalisation. 
e size
of the officers’ corps was reduced, barracks were built away from cities and there was a much
stronger effort to organise military manoeuvres (Payne :–).

is initial impulse was followed by further reforms in military education in  and
. 
e fundamental goal of these reforms was to increase the mutual knowledge among
the different branches and to unify doctrine and procedures. In , the Centre of National
See for instance Decree-Laws /, / and /.
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Defence High Studies () was created to coordinate the military academies and to
develop a joint military doctrine and the education of military cadres. It was inspired by
the encounters with foreign military education systems and its purpose was to modernise the
Spanish Armed Forces.  contributed to the process of convergence with Western
standards and to shift from a doctrine of national security into that of national defence. 
e
logic of the internal enemy lost prominence in military education (Agüero :–,
). 
e professional reforms and new roles adopted by the military during the transition
were based on discussion and debates that took place in  (Barrachina :–
).  was also fundamental to bridge the gap between the military and civilians and
to introduce ideas from other armies, especially the . Following this growing concern about
military education, the Higher School for Army Generals and the High Staff School for chiefs
and officers were merged (), the Service of Operational Military Research () and the
Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies () were established and the military curriculum was
reformed to introduce academic standards in an effort to bring the military closer to society
() (Salas López :–; Olmeda :).
In brief, the reforms in military education aimed to create institutions that served the gov-
ernment as non-coercive organisation instruments, initially to indoctrinate the military in
Francoist values but later also to professionalise and modernise the armed forces.
Second, Franco also relied on organisational design to reinforce the subordination of the
military. He had the capacity to shape the structure of the state apparatus, including the de-
fence institutions, at his will. 
e division of the armed forces into three different ministries
and that of the territory into many different military regions for each of the branches can be
seen as an exercise of ‘divide-and-rule’ (Wheeler b:; Preston :). 
e Law of
Re-organisation of the Central Administration of the State in  produced the fragmenta-
tion of the National Defence Ministry into three different ministries directly subordinated to
Franco. 
us, no military or civilian other than Franco could dominate the military institu-
tions. Moreover, the scarce budgetary allocation to the inter-branch coordination body, the
High General Staff, usually less than  of the military expenditure shows the weakness of
this organ as a coordination instrument (Olmeda :). Franco never wanted to create
any organ or position concentrating too much power nor did he want to eliminate the rivalries
and jealousies among ministers (Puell de la Villa :, –).

e multiplication of structures hampered coordination in the armed forces. 
is was
revealed during the Sidi-Ifni conflict (–), which forced the creation of an inter-
ministerial commission for the improvement of the organisation and coordination. Despite
the coordination problems, the government preferred to maintain this structure and it was not
until  that a unified command for the Canary Islands was created. In sum Franco em-
ployed the organisational design as a control tool reinforcing his central power and preventing
the rise of any alternative source of military leadership (Olmeda :).

e , created by the Decree / (//) was responsible for prestigious courses such as
 and .
After the war, Spain was divided in eight military regions (Ministerial Order //). A ninth military
region was later added (Order //). Spanish territorial waters were divided in  maritime zones (Organic
Law //). Initially Spanish air space was divided in  air regions and  air zones (Decree //) but
later reorganised into three air regions and one air zone (Decree //) (Guaita Martorell ).
Ministerial Order //.
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ird, Franco also used the machinery of the state as a tool. 
e provision of services and
goods free of charge or at reduced prices for the military and their families compensated low
salaries. Housing, transportation, education, health, food and medicine were provided for free
or at reduced prices. 
is was an especially important privilege during the post-war period
which characterised by the extreme poverty and high numbers of disabled veterans. Although
most of these benefits were maintained until the end of the regime, the priority given by
the technocratic governments to economic development restrained military budgets heavily
affecting the provision of services and goods from the s (Puell de la Villa :–).

e provision of jobs in the public sector was another crucial tool for the co-optation of
the military and fulfilled several purposes. 
rough the provision of jobs the regime rewarded
loyalty while enabling the military an alternative source of remuneration, influence and pres-
tige. It also helped improving control on the administration through strategic posting of loyal
military and contributed to reducing the size and age of the officers’ corps. 
e annihilation
of the Republican Administration created an opportunity for the government. In , 
of the new civil service positions were reserved to those having fought in the Francoist Armed
Forces and in  that quota was increased up to . From  to , . of the
jobs in politics were occupied by military (Viver Pi-Sunyer ). Moreover Spanish security
forces also became an important job destination for the military. 
e reforms aiming to re-
duce the size of the Army in the s meant the absorption of many reserve military officers
by the central and local administrations (Busquets :–). Finally, the development
of a signficant defence industry under the umbrella of the National Institute of Industry ()
meant new job opportunities for many military and ex-military. Although from the s,
it became gradually less acceptable for the military on active duty to undertake second jobs
in the administration and to appoint military to the public sector, this practice persisted until
the transition.
7.2.3 Conclusion
During the Francoist regime there was an evolution of the type of organisation tools used
by the government to control the armed forces. It initially favoured coercive means on the
military such as martial courts, imprisonments and summary executions. In Spain, there was
a more intensive coercive component of control than in Portugal but its use quickly declined
after the armed forces had been purged and the repression tools showed signs of saturation in
the mid-s. Unlike Salazar and Caetano, Franco did not grant the security or paramilitary
forces the function of controlling the military.
Some officers resold products in the black market as a source of extra income (Payne :).
Decree //.
Law //.

e officers in the Civil Guard came from the General Military Academy or the Infantry and Cavalry Corps
and those of the Armed Police came from the latter (Olmeda :).
See Section ..

e  (created in ) comprised among others the aeronautic industry  (set in ); the Ship-
yards ‘Bazán’ (); the weapon and ammunition company ‘Santa Bárbara’ (); the components industries
‘Experiencias Industriales S.A.’ and ‘Empresa Nacional de Optica’ (); and the research centre ‘Instituto
Nacional de Electrónica’ () (Daguzan :).
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With regards of the non-coercive use of organisation tools for control purposes, the govern-
ment used military education, the design of the military organisation and the capacity of the
state to supply services, goods and jobs. Until the late s, military education was mainly
used as a control device prioritising the indoctrination of Francoist values the preparation of
the military to the new modern requirements of warfare. After the contacts with the  Armed
Forces and the Sidi-Ifni conflict, there was a gradual change aiming to modernise the educa-
tion and develop professionalism and increase operational capacity. Organisational design was
used according to a ‘divide-and-rule’ logic. 
e idea was to maintain internal competition and
to preclude the concentration of power in any military figure that could challenge Franco’s au-
thority. Finally, the government provided goods, services and jobs to improve the well-being
of the military and their families. 
e utilisation of the state organisational capacity for the
provision of goods, services and jobs, was very important to increase military living standards
and therefore their satisfaction with the regime. Although this supply function had its peak
during the post-war and later gradually declined, it never stopped being important for the
government’s control strategy.
7.3 Nodality

e Francoist regime relied heavily on information manipulation tools such as propaganda
and censorship to maintain the military under control. Nodality effectors were employed
to exaggerate Franco’s leadership, indoctrinate the military in the regime values and make
them rationalise the poor material conditions in which the worked, overstate the threats Spain
faced and hide inconvenient news and developments that could have undermined Franco’s
rule. Nodality detectors were important during and after the war to control civil society.
However, they were not as intensively used to control the military. 
ere were many different
information services during the regime, but Franco, aware of the unrest that their use would
create, avoided intensive espionage on the military. On the other hand, Franco’s continuous
personal interaction with the military constituted a valuable source of information and means
to influence the military.
7.3.1 Information effectors
Franco’s propaganda machinery was established during the Civil War and used initially to
assert his leadership over other potential rivals. All the media were controlled by the govern-
ment including the radio, the press, military publications and later the official cinema news
report No-Do. Moreover, Franco and his government continuously used military speeches as
information effector. Propaganda became a fundamental weapon in the Spanish Civil War,
which is claimed to be the first war to have been photographed for a mass audience (Broth-
ers :) and to have been instrumentalised by competing international powers (Wingeate
Pike ; Barrera :). 
e military were continuously exposed to it. Not only polit-
ical parties and unions produced pamphlets and newspapers, most army corps, divisions or
brigades also produced their own publications. Franco took advantage of this context to
Beevor (:, –) provides more than thirty examples from both camps.

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consolidate his leadership. 
e media, the nationalist administration, Falange and even the
Church excessively praised him as a military and political genius. Any comment against him
could be considered as treason (Cardona :).
After the war, propaganda was used to increase the prestige of the armed forces and as a
means to compensate their poor salaries and working conditions. 
e propaganda acclaimed
the institutional values of the Spanish military such as discipline and courage, and stressed
their past glories as imperial armies and the Civil War victors (Cardona :). 
e gov-
ernment instrumentalised the symbolic power of military achievements during the war. An-
nual military parades such as those of the ‘Pascua Militar’ ( January), Day of the Victory (
April), Day of the Uprising ( July) and Day of the Caudillo ( October) became ideological
gratifications. For instance an enormous parade, with , ex-combatants, commemorated
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the uprising against the Republic (//). 
is was ac-
companied with a campaign in the official Army magazine ‘Ejército’ framing the Civil War as
a Crusade. 
e continuous displays of public recognition had an important impact on the
morale of the troops, which were otherwise badly paid and equipped. 
e military felt that
their status under Francoism was high.

e propaganda machinery diverted the attention away from the penury and professional
problems suffered by the military, especially until the mid-s when the exchanges with the
 began. In fact, the government could not afford the motorisation of the Army and there
were very few tanks, most of them from the Civil War (Losada :–). 
e necessity of
more modern and ample material supplies was questioned by government propaganda. For
instance, General Mendoza wrote in ‘Ejército’ that having secured a minimum of military ma-
terial, the only important things in war were ‘morale, drill and discipline’. 
e government
conveyed the idea that Franco won the war thanks to his moral principles not to superior ma-
terial means. During the Second World War the propaganda overemphasised the relevance
of any war action in which traditional cavalry was involved while minimizing the importance
of motorised cavalry. 
e influential military ideologist Jorge Vigón rejected the findings
of some studies that showed the impact of the diet on troops’ efficiency. He argued that
these were arguments ‘lacking spiritual sense’. Franco in the ‘Pascua Militar’ speech in 
emphasised that in warfare ‘despite the perfection of the machine and the accumulation of
numbers, the man, the tactics and the spiritual and moral values continue to have primacy.’
See monographic issue in ‘Ejército’ n.  July . 
is coincided with the withdrawal of troops from
Morocco and with the the most far-reaching propaganda campaign of the regime ‘ years of peace’ (Aguilar
:).
‘Ejército’ n. , January : ‘Los Ejércitos modernos ante el material’. ‘Ejército’ appeared in  as
‘Revista de las Armas y Servicios del Ejército de Tierra’, and was Published by the Central Joint Staff. It was the
magazine of the Army and the Navy and the Air Force had their own publications.
‘Ejército’ n. , April , ‘Con ocasión del  de abril’.
Some officers defended the view that the allies had committed a mistake by not using traditional cavalry.
Monasterio and other important generals opposed to the replacement of horses by armoured vehicles alleged that
that was an act of cowardice. Lieutenant Colonel Valero Valderrabano proposed a mixed cavalry with tanks and
horses in Ejército n. , January  ‘La caballeria y la mecanización’. 
e doubts about the mechanisation of
the Army were not exclusive of the Spanish Army (Liddell Hart ; Harris ); it is nonetheless striking
that these doubts persisted in .
Vigón ( []: ) criticises an article appeared in ‘Military Review’ (September ) that argued
that the diet had an impact on military efficiency.
Ejército n. , January , ‘Discurso de la Pascua Militar’.
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In sum, nodality effectors were used to convey the idea that moral values were more important
than material means so that the military would not be demoralised.
Nodality effectors were also used to claim for military unity against internal threats. For in-
stance, Franco and the ministers blamed communists and Masons for Spain’s problems (López
Rodó :–; Preston ). On  April , in a military speech, Franco justified
the return of the troops following Morocco’s independence as a means to concentrate on the
‘internal front’ (Cardona : ). 
e military speeches of the vice-president Admiral Car-
rero Blanco on  April  (Carrero Blanco :–), that of the Captain-General
of the Canary Islands Pérez Luna, on  October  (Celhay :, ), as well as the
several speeches made by the government after the Carnations Revolution in  show that
the threat of the internal enemy was a recurrent element of Franco’s propaganda.
In addition to manufacturing and diffusing information in favour of the regime, the govern-
ment also censored information deemed dangerous. 
e Press Law, inspired by Italian fascism
and enacted in April , during the war, was very restrictive and was in effect for many years
(Martín de la Guardia :). 
e Falange was initially in charge of censorship until the
establishment of the Ministry or Information and Tourism in . 
e government con-
trolled the production of news, appointed editors, restricted the number of newspapers and
journalist licenses and exerted an intense censorship (Barrera ). 
e goal was to suffocate
and prevent any opinion that could jeopardise the stability and continuity of Francoism.
Francoist censorship was a crucial device to maintain the morale of the troops during the
Civil War and post-war, limit the monarchic ideas in the barracks and keep the military un-
aware of many of the international political developments. For instance, after the defeat of
the Axis, Don Juan the heir in exile published a Manifesto in Lausanne, requesting Franco to
abandon power and reinstitute the monarchy. 
e Francoist censorship prevented the doc-
ument to be spread throughout the barracks (Cardona ). Censorship was employed to
minimise the information available about the Sidi-Ifni war, which had revealed the lack of
operational and logistic capacity of the Spanish Armed Forces fighting with a comparatively
very weak adversary (Segura Valero ). 
e new Press Law in , which replaced that
of , aimed a relaxation of the censorship in Spain. However its effects were not very
profound. It was quickly countered by the Law of Official Secrets in  that brought the
suppression and withdrawal of many publications and censored themes such as the decolonisa-
tion of Equatorial Guinea, the Matesa corruption scandal and some cases of terrorism (Martín
de la Guardia :–). In the final years of the regime, the number of political articles
increased, including those dealing with political intervention of the armed forces. Hardliners
tried to politicise the military in order to prevent democratisation (Olmeda :–).
In brief, propaganda and censorship tools became fundamental in the governmental control
strategy. 
e strong use of propaganda and censorship during the Civil War paved the way for
the continuation of the manipulative use of information during peace time. Nodality effectors
were important to create symbolic rewards and enhance military prestige, to drive the attention
away from the material and organisation deficiencies of the Spanish Armed Forces, to reinforce
the sense of unity against the internal threats and to limit to exposure of the military to certain
developments that otherwise would have created unrest.
Although some monarchists were aware of the situation, when Don Juan requested his partisans to resign
from their function only the Duke of Alba and the General Alfonso de Orleans obeyed him (Cardona :).
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7.3.2 Information detectors

e regime’s intelligence services were fundamental control tools for the subordination of the
military during the Civil War but they lost prominence afterwards. Many relatively small
intelligence systems emerged during and after the war. Franco feared the concentration of
power in one single service. Moreover, as a military he was aware of the unrest that intelligence
services created among the ranks. After the war the intelligence services began to shift their
attention to the control of civil society and to collect military information for administrative
rather than for strict control purposes. Informal information networks developed by Franco
and entourage replaced a more formal surveillance on military attitudes. Only in the final years
of the dictatorship did intelligence services again acquire salience in the military subordination
strategy.
During the war, the Francoist camp had several different small information structures that
aided his war effort; some linked to the Civil Administration, others to generals and even
businessmen (Mola :–). 
e most important organisations were: the Fifth Col-
umn, which was a decentralised organisation that operated in the Republican zone with acts
of sabotage, propaganda and disinformation, the Military Police of Vanguard, which para-
doxically acted as a counter-information and anti-infiltration organisation, and the Service of
Information of the North-East Frontier (), founded by the politician Francesc Cambó
and the businessman Juan March, which connected the rebels with foreign powers. 
e 
was transformed in  in the Service of Information and Military Police (), which had
military and political control functions and was directly controlled by Franco’s headquarters.
New information detectors were created at in  to ensure military subordination. Fol-
lowing the ‘divide-and-rule’ logic, Franco avoided that intelligence functions were concen-
trated in a single organisation. For example, the Service of Personal Information () aimed
to identify subversive tendencies within the armed forces but quickly became a merely bu-
reaucratic body that compiled data about the new recruits. 
e defence information service
of the High Joint Staff, the ‘Tercera del Alto’, had precarious means and ended up investigating
civilian subversive groups in Spain. From , it was in charge of military counter-espionage
functions. Finally, the Brigade of Social Investigation was an information service linked to
the Staff Offices of the three branches and aimed to eliminate any trace of republicanism in
the ranks. However, its control capacity was also very limited. Other intelligence services that
operated during the regime were: the ‘Brigadilla’ of the Civil Guard, the information systems
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police, Falange, the ‘Hermandad de Alfereces Provi-
sionales’ and the ‘Servicio de Informacion de Presidencia’. 
ese sometimes monitored the
military but mainly focused on civilian affairs (Ros Agudo ; Díaz Fernández ). 
e
lack of resources and coordination of the information services constrained their effectiveness
as control tools. Moreover, Franco was aware of the unrest that information services created
among the ranks. 
us, once the war was over and the Armed Forces purged these types of
information detectors were not very intensively or intrusively used within the ranks.
 Interview with José María de Areilza (, //, cassette J).
According Díaz Fernández (:, –) the military intelligence services were less developed than
in most of the other European countries.
Also known as ‘Segunda Sección’ or ‘Segunda Bis’
Interview with José María de Areilza (, //, cassette J).
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After the agreements with the  regarding the use of military bases, the intelligence services
began to develop again, but fundamentally for defence and civilian control purposes. Only
in the s, the intelligence services acquired again salience in the government toolkit. 
e
Central Documentation Service () established in  and composed of Army officers
but hierarchically linked to the Prime Minister was the first step towards the organisation of
a powerful service concentrating different intelligence functions including counter-subversive
action. Despite the emergence of , a myriad of intelligence services coexisted until
the end of the regime. By , there were still eleven different intelligence services most of
them controlled by the military (Ynfante :–). Most of them were relatively weak
and focused on countering subversion within civil society. 
e sole well-known example of
the utilisation of the intelligence service against military was the detection and arrest of the
 members by the Brigade for Social Investigation (Díaz Fernández ).
Finally, the lack of strong formal surveillance on the military in Spain was compensated by
informal information networks. Over the years, Franco built a far-reaching social network
within the armed forces. His privileged position in the centre of that network allowed him to
receive and spread information as a non-intrusive nodality detector and effector. He used the
phone, letters and his official office. 
e salience of Franco’s personal involvement as infor-
mation detector in the armed forces is indicated by the extremely abundant private audiences
he held with the military. For instance, in  alone, there is evidence that Franco granted
personal audiences in his official office to more than  military men.
Franco invested personal efforts as a government tool to win the favour and convince some
of the critical generals, sometimes dividing them and pitting them against each other (Pre-
ston :, ). For instance, following a letter signed by eight generals requesting the
restoration of the monarchy in September , Franco spoke to each of them separately and
convinced them that the country was not ready for a monarchy yet (Payne :–).
To counter the effects of Don Juan’s Manifesto in March , Franco immediately organised
a seminar with the highest rank generals in which he personally explained why his regime
was necessary by stressing the communist threat. In the presence of Franco, only Kindelán
defended the return of the monarchy. No single general dared to challenge Franco’s rule (Car-
dona :). In  when some generals proposed again the restoration of the King,
Franco spoke personally with each of them and applied different sanctions and rewards to
ensure their subordination. Some generals were threatened, some arrested, some promoted
and others simply flattered to dismantle the conspiracy. 
e fact that Juan Carlos was sent
to the three military academies to study was part of a plan devised by the government to build
a social network similar to that previously enjoyed by Franco around the future King. Later,
Juan Carlos’s personal ties proved useful to appease the military during the  coup.
7.3.3 Conclusion
Nodality instruments were very important means of control of the military, especially during
and right after the war and in the s. 
e government fundamentally promoted manip-
 replaced the National Counter-subversive Organisation () founded in .

ere are more than  documents about military audiences in Franco’s Personal Archive in .
Interview with José María de Areilza (, //, cassette J).
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ulative information effectors that spread the regime propaganda and censored inconvenient
news and ideas. Military speeches, specialised publications and the mass media were used to
raise the morale of the military and to divert the attention away from their professional prob-
lems. 
us, nodality was used to overstate Franco’s leadership skills, the supremacy of moral
values over material means, the glorious past of the Spanish Armed Forces and the internal
threats as means to reinforce unity. With regard to information detectors, the intelligence ser-
vices, although very important during the war, lost prominence and did not play as central a
function as in Portugal. Franco knew the military disliked being spied on and minimised the
utilisation of this type of tools. Moreover he feared the concentration of power and decided
to maintain multiple smaller intelligence services. Franco’s friendship networks, built before
the war, and the constant meetings he held with many military served as a less intrusive but
equally effective means to assess the levels of satisfaction and to counter contestation within
the ranks.
7.4 Authority
Authority-based rewards and incentives were very important in the government’s strategy to
control the military. 
e main authority-based rewards used were: appointments of military
to top positions in the state apparatus; the special functions that the military were granted in
the Francoist regime, mainly related with the maintenance of the public order (police and ju-
diciary functions); the tolerance of second jobs and lenience regarding certain transgressions;
and finally the integration and recognition of militia fighters as officers. Authority-based sanc-
tions and constraints were also used as means of control among which the most important
were: the regulations aiming to the size of the Army; the constraints imposed to the military,
in an attempt to reinforce their distinct esprit de corps and conservative values; the sanc-
tions imposed on those that did not fully endorse Franco’s decisions; and the legal restrictions
imposed in the civilian sphere aiming to attract the support of the most conservative military.
7.4.1 Rewards and incentives
First, political appointments to senior positions became a fundamental way of rewarding al-
legiance. Franco, who had been promoted to the rank of General at a very young age thanks
to the merit system of the Republic, re-established the seniority principle after the Civil War.

e merit-based system of promotions that operated during the Republic had been strongly
criticised in the ranks and Franco decided to abolish it. Nonetheless, in such a centralised
regime, Franco and his government enjoyed the authority necessary to reward loyal military
by granting them key positions in the state apparatus. Under normal circumstances, a Captain
would only be promoted to the rank of Major according to his seniority but could aspire to be
appointed civil governor or union leader on the basis of merit or allegiance to the regime (Car-
dona :). 
e appointment of military to senior political/administrative positions was
extremely important to ensure loyalty throughout the regime (Viver Pi Sunyer :–;
Jerez Mir ; Preston :) (Table  and Table ).
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Table : Percentage of military ‘procuradores’ (MPs) in Spanish Francoist Cortes
Session Years Percentage of Military
Procuradores
 – .
 – .
 – .
 – .
 – .
 – .
 – 
 – 
 – .
 – .
Source: Aguero (:)
Table : Military presence in the senior positions in the administration ()
Ministers Undersecretaries General Directors Total
Jan –Jul  . . . .
Jul –Jul  . . . .
Jul –Feb  . . . .
Source: Aguilar Olivencia (:)
Second, although seniority was the general rule, there were special circumstances in which
military promotions and distinctions were used to reward allegiance to the regime. 
e di-
vision of the armed forces into many military regions and the reintroduction of the ranks
of Captain General (), Lieutenant-General and Admiral () created an opportunity
used by the government to reward loyal senior generals (Guaita Martorell :, Aguilar
Olivencia :–). Suspicious of a monarchist military conspiracy in , Franco re-
acted by promoting  generals to the rank of Lieutenant-General and awarded the Medal
of Military Merit to  generals and admirals. In March , Franco repeated the tactic
by making appointments in order to prevent a new monarchist plot. Muñoz Grandes was
appointed Captain-General of Madrid, Moscardó Chief of the Military House and Solchaga
Captain-General of Barcelona (Payne :–). In April , Franco, aiming to di-
vide the monarchist camp, bought the allegiance of some of their most prominent figures. He
appointed the monarchist José Monasterio and Juan Bautista Sánchez as Captain-Generals
(Cardona :). At the end of , in order to counter the malaise of the military due
to the decolonisation of Morocco, the incidents in the Sahara and the bottleneck in the pro-
motion system, the government decided to exceptionally promote , captains to majors in
one week (Busquets  []:–; Cardona :). Finally, Franco even created

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nobility titles to reward loyal officers; Moscardó was named ‘Conde del Alcazar de Toledo’
and Juan Antonio Suanzes ‘Conde de Fenosa’.

ird, Francoist government also granted the military some special functions to make them
feel empowered and in control, and therefore more inclined to support the government. 
ese
functions were fundamentally related with the maintenance of public order, i.e. police and
judicial functions. Although the Army was not directly involved in the maintenance of public
order as during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, military officers were in charge of leading
the Security Forces (Delgado :–). 
e Law of Police in  established that the
cadres of the Armed Police were military officers and the statutes of the Civil Guard in 
established its integration in the Armed Forces structure and its military character (Blanco
Valdes :–). 
e military officers in the security forces which had sided with the
Republican camp were purged, especially from  to . Only from June to July 
more than  military were expelled from the security forces. 
ese positions were filled by
ex-combatants from the nationalist camp (Delgado :–).

e military played an important role in the judicial system. 
ey had the capacity to judge
civilians and political crimes while they reserved the right to be judged exclusively by military
courts. For instance, the Special Tribunal for the Repression of the Freemasonry and Com-
munism established in  was led for several years by General Saliquet. 
e Law of Political
Responsibilities in  provided that the Regional Courts for political crimes always had to
include military judges (Dueñas :–). In addition, the powers of ordinary military
courts were far-reaching: , people were court martialed in  (Olmeda :–
). After  offences against the public order were equated to military rebellion and
subject military jurisdiction. Equally the Code of Military Justice of  provided that
any information jeopardising national defence could be prosecuted by military courts. Al-
though the far-reaching scope of the military justice was gradually reduced, military courts
continued to judge civilians until the end of the regime. In  and , military courts
handed down sentences for  ‘political crimes’, mainly due to verbal offences directed at
the armed forces (Oneto :–).
Fourth, the level of tolerance with some unprofessional practices can be considered as tool
aiming to incentivise the military for the regime. Spanish officers were permitted to take sec-
ond jobs or take long-term leave in order to work in private business or the administration to
compensate the very low salaries. As mentioned in Section .. a high number of positions
in the administration were legally allocated to the military. Usually the work in the quarters
was interrupted very early during the day and in the afternoon officers left to do other jobs
to compensate the poor salaries. 
is practice was so widespread that officers often protested
and tried to avoid military exercises due to the problems they posed for the working routines
in their other jobs. It seems that in the late s two thirds of the officers in Madrid and
one third of those in the provinces had a civil job in parallel (Puell de la Villa :). 
is
Fenosa was a public company ‘Fuerzas Eléctricas del Noroeste, Sociedad Anónima’.
See Ballbé (:–). Moreover the extremist and terrosist activities against public order were
equated to military rebellions (decrees of // and //) until the creation of a civil tribunal of
public order in .
For instance, the Penal Code of , the Spanish Bill of Rights of  and the Decree-Law against
Banditry and Terrorism of  removed some crimes from military jurisdiction (Payne :)
From  reserve military officers could take full-time positions in the Administration.

F   
practice extended to all levels. For instance, General Gabeiras maintained a secondary job
until he became Brigadier; General Gutiérrez Mellado took a leave of several years to work
in the private sector due to financial problems; even General Barroso, after launching Army
reforms aiming professionalisation, requested Franco in a private letter to recommend him
for a position in the board of Tabacalera, the national tobacco company.
Often the government turned a blind eye to Army corruption as a means to maintain the
military under control, especially in the post-war period. Senior officers with business interests
used troops and even prisoners of war as cheap labour; they used the official cars for private
business and conscripts as handymen or baby-sitters (Preston :–). In order to
control the generals, Franco gave them great levels of leeway and often tolerated their abuses
of their position of power (Cardona :). It was common for officers to resell the goods
and materials destined to the military on the black market (Payne :). Even physical
abuses by officers were permitted by the Code of Military Justice supposedly as a means to
maintain discipline of the troops (Cardona :). In sum, the inaction in these cases were
positive-authority tools that enabled many military to enjoy some unofficial benefits.
Finally, the incorporation of militia fighters in the officers’ corps in the armed forces was
another example of the use of authority as a control instrument. 
is recognition aimed to
reinforce loyalty for Francoist principles within the ranks while counterbalancing the monar-
chist aspiration of many career officers (Preston :). Out of the , ‘alféreces pro-
visionales’ that fought in the Francoist camp, , remained in the Army after the conflict
(Busquets :–). 
e government granted these militia fighters the rank of officers
after an eight months period in military academies that were created ad hoc. 
e favours
to the ‘alféreces provisionales’ continued throughout the regime, in  out of the ,
officers the government decided to promote through an extraordinary procedure,  were
‘provisionales’ (Cardona :). For Franco their political loyalty compensated their lack
of military training and the eventual bottleneck this abrupt influx of officers created in the
system of promotions.
In sum, Franco rewarded and incentivised loyalty through appointments to senior positions
in the state apparatus; military promotions and distinctions; a special role in the maintenance
of internal order through their participation in the security forces and the far-reaching scope of
military justice; a high degree of permissiveness with non-professional practices; and privileges
for militia fighters.
7.4.2 Sanctions and Constraints

e Francoist dictatorship used sanctions and constraints such as limitations to the retirement
age to reduce the size of the armies; limitations on the private life of the military in order to
enhance a distinct esprit de corps; discharging or relocating the military suspected of not en-
dorsing the government; and imposing prohibitions and constraints to other actors of Spanish
society in order to please the military.
 See, Puell de la Villa (:–) interviews with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (,
//, cassette Jbis), Lieutenant-General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado (, //, cassette J), and
letter signed by Barroso (//) (Franco’s Personal Archive, , document ).
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First, Franco believed that given limited financial resources a smaller Army could be better
paid and equipped, and thus more satisfied. Franco used regulation to reduce the size of the
Army. 
e two years reduction in the retirement age in  and the laws stimulating an
early passage to the reserve (with generous economic compensations) in  and  were
the most significant examples. Nonetheless, in the long run the success of these instruments
was limited; especially the law of  did not result in significant reduction of the number
of officers. 
e problem of oversize persisted after the end of the dictatorship.
Second, legal constraints were used to reinforce the conservative principles of Francoism
within the ranks and to maintain a separate and homogeneous esprit the corps. Secret so-
cieties were forbidden and prosecuted, officers suspected to be Masons were placed under
surveillance; the military could only marry catholic Spanish, Latin American and Filipino
women; officers were banned from participating in sports teams, and, until , to dress as
civilians. Most importantly, the Code of Military Justice of  introduced the notion of
crimes against military honour such as cowardice, unjustified surrender or homosexuality and
imposed severe punishments for them. 
e military ‘Honour Trials’ acted as an authority tool
based on peer control. Officers could be tried and punished by their peers for any behaviour
deemed deviant even in their private lives outside the barracks.

ird, any displays of military insubordination or criticism against the regime or Franco was
reprimanded or sanctioned with demotions and relocations (Comas and Mandeville :).
After the monarchic plots in the s, many generals were relocated or sacked. Orgaz went
from being high commissioner in Morocco to being Central Chief of Staff, Saliquet was ap-
pointed head of the Supreme Council of Military Justice, both positions without command of
troops. Varela was sent to Morocco and therefore far from Madrid and Kindelán was sacked
from the Army Higher School and confined in Tenerife. General Aranda was temporarily
exiled in Portugal in  and after demanding political asylum in the  embassy, he was
arrested for two months and sent to Mallorca in  (Cardona :, ). Generals
Beigbeder and Kindelán were arrested in . In , Juan Bautista Sánchez, the Captain-
General of Barcelona died when he was about to be discharged for his possible participation
in a new monarchic plot, and two colonels close to him were fired.

e ‘liberal’ military were also sanctioned by the regime. 
e government decreed the
dissolution of ‘Forja’ in . Forja, created in , was a group of military officers seeking
to develop professional and religious values within the military. Although Forja members
were never subversive, they criticised the lack of professionalism in the armed forces. Some of
the ideas first promoted by Forja were later embraced by the  (Busquets :–).
In  the reformist Chief of the Joint Staff General Manuel Díez-Alegria was dismissed
According to Pérez Muinelo (:) the retirement age was the hightest in Europe.
Ministerial Order (//) and Laws of Reserve (// and //)
In fact, the number of military officers in the Army grew from . of the country’s population in 
to to . in  (Olmeda :–, ).
Franco’s Personal Archive, , documents , , .
Some rumours claimed that the heart attack of Bautista Sánchez was provoked by a bitter discussion with
a colonel of the Legion (the Legion has been sent to Catalonia for military exercises although the real purpose
was to control a potential monarchic uprising) or even that he was suffocated with a pillow (Busquets :;
Cardona :).
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for holding an interview with the exiled leader of the  Santiago Carrillo. 
ese sanctions
satisfied many conservative officers.
Finally, some of the restrictive laws and norms directed at other social actors were very
often requested by the military and can be construed as tools aiming to increase military
satisfaction. For example, the prohibition to carry arms to the Falangist and Carlist militias
after the war; the prosecution of dissidents by the Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry
and Communism from  onwards; the Law of Security of the State in  that made
strikes and spreading rumours against the regime and the armed forces illegal; the Law of
Repression of Banditry and Terrorism in , which reduced individual liberties; the Law of
Official Secrets in ; and the suppression of the habeas corpus for six months in  are
examples of the use of authority aiming indirectly to foster military satisfaction and therefore
having a positive impact on their subordination. Francoist armed forces were very conservative
they liked the repressive measures that the regime imposed on society.
7.4.3 Conclusion
Franco enjoyed high levels of support from the military, which granted him the capacity to
effectively use authority as a source of power. 
e authority rewards and incentives were cru-
cial control tools. Unlike the Estado Novo which used the ‘escolha’ as an ordinary mechanism
for promotions to the senior ranks, the Francoist government reintroduced the seniority prin-
ciple. Nonetheless, Franco still had the capacity to reward loyal officers through military
distinctions and appointments not only to especially prestigious positions in the armed forces
but also in the political-administrative apparatus. 
e special functions conceded to the mil-
itary related to the control of internal public order, the general tolerance towards vis-à-vis
secondary jobs and the favourable treatment of ‘alfereces provisionales’ became salient tools
for military subordination specific of Spain.

e authority-based sanctions and constraints were for the most part similar to those in
the Estado Novo. Some regulation was launched to downsize the armed forces to alleviate the
scarcity of material means and to enhance the distinct conservative ‘esprit de corps’ of the mil-
itary. Sanctions were imposed on military who had been critical of the regime. 
e ‘Honours
Trials’ established by Franco, through which the military had the capacity and obligation to
control their peers and the utilisation of more constraining laws on Spanish society in order
to increase military satisfaction differentiate his from the Portuguese regime.
Overall there were no major changes in the use of authority tools throughout the regime.
For instance on  December , a delegation by captain generals Fernández de Córdoba, García Rebull,
Pérez Viñeta and Chamorro asked Franco to suppress the habeas corpus; Franco accepted (Preston :).
On  September , when Franco was already seriously ill, the prime minister Arias Navarro ceded to the
pressures of military hardliners and ratified the last death sentences of the regime: 
ose of hree members of the
 and two of  (Cardona :).

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7.5 Treasure
In Spain, as in Portugal, the poor economic conditions during the regime precuded the util-
isation of treasure tools. In the s, when the economy grew and therefore more financial
resources were available, the government prioritised social expenditure and investment in in-
frastructure over defence or military expenditure. Nonetheless, there is still evidence of the
utilisation of some treasure tools; fundamentally salary rises. 
is section briefly analyses the
evolution of defence budgets explaining whether these changes were linked to efforts to impact
military subordination.
7.5.1 Evolution of military budgets

e disastrous socio-economic situation and the oversized Army inherited from the Civil War
limited the leeway of the government. 
e economic situation of the country after the Civil
War was extremely dire (Jiménez Jiménez ). 
e Second World War aggravated the crisis.

is is evidenced by the fact that against the official pro-axis discourse and with the mediation
of Portugal, Spain secretly accepted the provision of thousands of tons of food products funded
by the  government in , phosphates by the French government in  and diesel
fuel from the  in . Nonetheless, after the end of the Second World War, the  did
not offer Marshall Plan aid to Spain, which continued the autarchic economic policy adopted
in . It is estimated that until  Spain did not recover the per capita level of income
and industrial activity of  (Pérez Muinelo :). Military expenditure remained
high during the Second World War; some years, it accounted for more than half of the total
budget of the State. After the Second World War budgets declined, both as a percentage of
the  and of the total public expenditure (Figure , Figure ).
From , the economic aid received from the  through cheap raw materials, food
and credits as well as the liberalisation of the economy through the Stabilisation Plan (–
) and the Economic Development Plan (–) reinforced economic growth in
Spain (Pérez Muinelo :). However, the general improvement in the economy did not
translate to military budgets. During the s and s, the economy and total public
expenditure constantly grew but there was a decline in the weight of military expenditure,
fundamentally due to the strong increases in other budgets, especially those of public infras-
tructure, education, and agriculture (Comín and Diaz :–). 
e technocrats that
A report classified as top secret (//) explains the British plans for the provision of , tons
of wheat for Spain in a triangular procedure called ‘Anglo-Spanish clearing’ (//-, Folder , Section
, Pages –). See Salazar’s handwritten comments (ibid. pages –); Document of the British gov-
ernment listing vessels and quantities of grain already diverted to Spain (over , tons) (ibid. page );
Document from the Foreign Affairs ministry (//) confirming the acceptance of the proposal and the
quantities wished by the Spanish delegation; , tons valued at ,  (//-, Folder , Sec-
tion , pages –) and an amendment to the triangular agreement by Spain requesting an increase in the
supplies (up to a value of , ) (//) (//-, Folder , Section , Pages –).
See agreement with French Morocco for the supply of phosphates in the document about the emergency
aid to Spain (//) (//-, Folder , Section , page ).
See Foreign Ministry note (//)(//-, Folder , Section , page ). See extensive
evidence of this type of triangular agreements with Portugal in Salazar’s personal documentation (//-
, Folders –).
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controlled Francoist governments since  prioritised the developmentalism of the coun-
try over military and defence problems (Aguilar Olivencia :). Despite the nominal
increases in the budget of the three branches (Figure ) there was a continuous decline of
military expenditure as percentage of total public expenditure (Figure ).
Figure : Spanish military budget as a percentage of the total budget (–)
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Source: Based on Olmeda (:)
 Figures include Military Administration, Military Security and Public Order Forces (Guardia Civil and Direc-
ción General de la Seguridad). See detail in Olmeda (:–)
Figure : Spanish military budget as a percentage of GDP (–)
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Source: Based on Olmeda (:)
Overall, after the Second World War military budgets were low as a percentage of the
 (see comparison with  countries in Chapter  Table ) and per soldier. For in-
stance, in  the military expenditure in Spain was , dollars/soldier, similar to that of
Portugal (,) and far below other Western European countries, such as the  (,),
France (,) and Italy (,) (De Miguel :). In , the military expenditure

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Figure : Spanish military budgets in constant pesetas of  (including extraordinary
allocations)
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Sources: Inflation from Maluquer de Motes (:). Military budgets and extraordinary budget
allocations in Comín and Diaz (:, ).
in Spain was , dollars/soldier, more than that of Portugal (,) but still far below the
 (,), France (,) and Italy (,) ( :).
7.5.2 Staff Expenditure
Franco’s government saw its capacity to use staff expenditure as a means to control the mil-
itary constrained. In the armed forces, as in the rest the public administration, the evolu-
tion of staff expenditure was determined by law. Budgetary incrementalism and repetition
of the allocations was a general practice during the regime (Gunther :–; Olmeda
:–). Although the share of the total military budgets devoted to staff was very
high (Figure ), most of the financial resources were allocated to officers’ salaries and the
general living costs of the troops. Expenditure in military salaries was determined by size of
the Army (nearly , men) and, as in Portugal, by the disproportionately high level of
senior officers whose salaries were very high (Table , Table ).
However, Francoist governments still had some flexibility to use treasure tools. During the
s, the government utilised important extraordinary budgetary allocations for the military
ministries. 
ese allocations were treasure tools to offset the high inflation in the s (
accumulated in the decade) which was also damaging the purchasing power of the military
(Maluquer de Motes :). 
us, salary raises kept discontent under control. For
instance in , Franco increased the salaries of the military officers:  for colonels, 
for captains and  for first lieutenants. Another  pay rise took place in  (Payne
:, ). 
e next significant general pay raise took place in  to counter military
discontent resulting from the loss of Morocco:  for majors and lieutenant-colonels, 
for first lieutenants and  for generals (Cardona :).
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Table : Percentage of generals among total officers in active duty in Spain, Portugal
and the US
Spain Portugal 
Year Generals/
Officers ()
Year Generals/
Officers ()
Year Generals/
Officers ()
Army  .  .  .
 .  .  .
 .  .
Navy  .  .  .
 .    .
 .  .
Air Force  .    .
 .  
Sources: Based on Jordana and Ramió (:–); Carrilho (:); Janowitz (:).
Table : Military annual salaries and annual per capita consumption in Spain (in
pesetas)
Ranks –   
Captain General , , , –
Lieutenant General , , , ,
Major General , , , ,
Brigadier General , , , ,
Colonel , , , ,
Lieutenant Colonel , , , ,
Major , , , ,
Captain , , , ,
First Lieutenant , , , ,
Second Lieutenant , , , ,
Average per capita an-
nual consumption
, , , ,
Sources: Based on Payne (:, ); Nicolau (:–) and Maluquer de Motes
(:).
 Total per capita consumption includes food and tobacco, clothing, rent and utilities, hygiene and personal
care, transportation, leisure and others.
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Figure : Defence budget distribution of expenditure in percentage (–)
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Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:).

e government was more concerned with the loyalty of senior officers than with that of
junior officers. Junior officers’ salaries, despite the nominal pay raises, were not enough to
cover the expenditures of a family, which in the case of the military tended to be very large
(Table ). 
ey relied heavily on secondary jobs and on the services and goods provided
by the regime. Top rank officers, in addition to higher salaries, enjoyed other benefits and
subsidies that increased their income over . For instance, in  about , senior
officers retired with their full salary (Payne :–, –).
In sum, despite the rigidity of the budgeting process linked to regulations and structural fea-
tures, the government used some extraordinary salary raises, essentially as palliative measures,
attempting to counterbalance the degradation of purchasing power and to limit military dis-
content. 
e clear bias in favour of senior officers can also be considered as a treasure control
tool.
7.5.3 Equipment expenditure
As the government’s financial resources were extremely constrained the living conditions of
the military were prioritised over the expenditure on weaponry and material means more
directly linked to the defence function. After the Second World War, the external threats and
the emphasis on improving military capabilities dwindled. 
e government prioritised other
types of expenditure and investment and largely relied on American military aid to partially
modernise equipment. 
e use of treasure for equipment expenditure remained very low until
the s, when new programmes for material acquisitions were launched.
Although the part of the defence budget in equipment was higher that that on staff until
the late s this was to a great extent due to the investment and expenditure in military
housing, hospitals, food-stores and pharmacies, highly appreciated especially during the pe-
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riod of extreme economic deprivation that followed the Civil War. For instance at the end
of the s the Armed Forces managed  hospitals and  health centres compared to 
hospitals, and  health centres in the early s (Massons :–).
Overall, the Spanish Armed Forces were poorly equipped. 
e large quantities of weapons
acquired during the Civil War became technologically obsolete and there was a lack of spare
parts (Preston :–). 
e gold reserves of the Bank of Spain had been depleted due
to the military effort of the Republican government and the Second World War limited the
capacity to import weapons and even the availability of basic resources for their manufacture.
Before the agreements with the  in  the equipment of Spanish Armed Forces was even
older and more inadequate than that of the Portuguese ones. In  Spain, with a larger
Army, had only  trucks,  modern tanks and  pieces of artillery while Portugal had
 military trucks,  modern tanks and  pieces of artillery (Telo :, ).
Later, Spain became a valuable ally for the  thanks to its geographical location, its re-
sources in terms of raw materials and its relatively large Army (Liedtke :–). 
e
Madrid Pact signed in  allowed the  to establish Air Forces and Navy bases on Spanish
soil in exchange for help in rebuilding and modernising Franco’s armed forces. 
e financial
aid received from the was very important for the morale of the Spanish military. 
e impact
of this support was particularly positive for the Air Force that until  was using airplanes
from the Civil War. From  to , Spain received military aid of  million dollars
value and extra economic aid of  million. In addition, Spain obtained  billion dollars
from American private institutions and  million from the  Export-Import Bank. 
e
value of the materials received from the  was higher than the ordinary allocations for in-
vestment in materials in the defence budgets. 
e agreements with the  had also paved
the way for the restoration of military cooperation with France, Germany, Italy and the 
and the membership to some international organisations. Franco had become an acceptable
ally. Spain bought weapons from Germany, France or the  and produced in its military
industrial complex equipment that had been patented by its European allies. 
us, thanks
to the better relations with Western developed countries the government managed to supply
better materials and weapons to the military (Liedtke :–).
Still, the funds received by Spain from  to  were very low compared to those
received by the European beneficiary countries of the Marshall Plan (Barciela López ).
For instance, France and the , received six times as much from the ; Italy four times;
Germany three times; Greece and Turkey twice as much (Cardona :). Moreover,
despite the agreements with the , the new financial aid agreed was considerably lower. For
instance, in  Franco obtained a  million dollars loan from the  Export-Import
Bank,  million dollars in military equipment and the permission to buy  million dollars
worth of materials. 
e financial aid obtained by the renegotiation of the pacts in  was
reduced to  million dollars of military aid and  million dollars in loans (Salas López
:–; Liedtke :–).
Interview with Lieutenant-General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui (, //, cassette J). See a similar
account by his brother General Emiliano José Alfaro Arregui interviewed by Mérida (:).
See Payne (:) and Liedtke ().
According to Pérez Muinelo (:) the aid received was  million dollars, equivalent to , mil-
lion euros (at  value) while the ordinary budgetary allocation for investment in materials for the same period
was equivalent to , million euros.
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e agreements of mutual defence with the  and the cooperation with other Western
countries injected significant quantities of military materiel and were very positively perceived
by the military, but they also entailed some important downsides. First, the concessions of
sovereignty in return for the financial support created unease in the ranks. Second, the
military industry became gradually more dependent from the  and other Western European
powers. 
e Spanish military industry was crowded out and the investment in military
research reduced. Finally, American military aid made led the government to believe that
they could rely exclusively on foreign aid to modernise equipment. In the successive years,
governmental funds that should have been normally destined to the military ministries were
diverted to other ministries. Figure  shows the drastic reduction of the percentage of
equipment expenditure in military budgets after Spain started receiving  military aid.
Moreover, military expenditure was largely devoted to salaries. Little attention was paid to
the equipment of the armed forces and military working conditions remained poor. Only in
the s did the modernisation of the equipment become a priority for the government. 
e
Law / sought to launch a new programme of investment and renewal of equipment
of the Armed Forces during the period – and in  the Council of Ministers
declared the National Defence a priority (Pérez Muinelo :). 
is more important
utilisation of treasure to improve military material conditions can be observed in Figure .
Figure : Defence equipment expenditure (including investments) in constant million
euros of  (–)
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Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:)

ere were five American bases on Spanish soil. Moreover, the  put pressure on Spain to abandon
Morocco. 
e independence of Morocco meant that from  to , , soldiers had to return to Spain.

e military had always seen Morocco as a place to accelerate their careers and where the standards of colonial
life were very good. 
ese aspects had a negative impact in the military morale (Preston :).
See Daguzan’s explanation of the dependence relation (:–).
According to Gabriel Peña Aranda, former Director of the Defence Division of the  (Seminar ‘Armed
Forces and Democratic Consolidation’, //, , cassette CF).
Interview with Almiral Liberal Lucini in , //, cassette J and //, cassette J).
Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste (:).
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7.5.4 Conclusion
Treasure was a scarce resource for Francoist government and its utilisation vis-à-vis the military
was constrained by the size of the Army and also the excessive proportion of senior officers.
Treasure was a resource that had been depleted due to the Civil War. When the economic sit-
uation improved, the government preferred to invest in the industrial and social development
of the country rather than in the military and defence. Most of the resources of the regular
military budget were devoted to salaries and other living expenses for the Army, such as hous-
ing, hospitals, pharmacies and food stores. Salary raises and economic benefits were subject
to regulations and there was little flexibility in the use of salary expenditure to ensure military
obedience. Nonetheless, Franco used extraordinary budget allocations and salary raises, but
these were fundamentally designed to compensate the impact of inflation and loss of pur-
chasing power of the military. 
e high salaries and economic benefits received by top rank
officers shows the government was more concerned with the subordination of senior officers.

e purchase of equipment and weapons for the military were not central to the strategy of
military subordination. No modernisation was conducted after the Civil War and the situ-
ation remained dramatic until . After the defence agreements of , thanks to the
 military aid, Franco’s government acquired equipment and materials which improved the
defence capacity of the armed forces and the morale of the military. However, overall, the
government did not pay attention to the quantity and the adequacy of the material means
of the armed forces until the s when equipment expenditure was prioritised and grew
steadily.
7.6 Summary
During the Civil War and the early s the utilisation of coercive organisation power was
very intense. Franco’s initial totalitarian repressive strategy served to cleanse the armed forces
(and civil society) but also overstretched the Spanish judiciary and prison systems. Coin-
ciding with the demise of the Axis and totalitarianism in Western Europe, the government
decided to reduce drastically the use of coercive organisation tools vis-à-vis the military. 
e
non-coercive uses of organisation became more important than the coercive ones. For in-
stance, indoctrination through the military education system, a organisational design based
on a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy and the capacity of the state to supply services, goods and jobs
were used for control purposes. Overall, the organisational power of the state was used not
so much to improve the military professional skills or enhance Spanish defence capabilities
but to reward loyalty. 
is shows a discrepancy with Portugal where from , due to 
membership, important reforms had been introduced in organisational design, military ed-
ucation and training aiming at improving defence coordination and professionalisation. In
the s, the Estado Novo abandoned these reforms due the Colonial Wars. Conversely, the
Sidi-Ifni War (–) and the cooperation with other western armed forces betrayed the
deficiencies of the Spanish armies and triggered some gradual changes in military education
s.

e utilisation of nodality effectors to keep the military away from politics and loyal to the
regime was very similar to that in Portugal. Propaganda and censorship were pervasive. In
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Spain, the intensity was higher especially due to the importance that information control had
acquired during the Civil War and to the longer insulation of the regime and of the Spanish
military. Franco disliked the idea of spying on the military. He largely trusted them (after
the purges), felt close enough to them to obtain information through informal/friendship
networks and knew they would feel harassed if spied upon by other state institutions.
Franco had centralised the executive and legislative powers and had shaped state institutions
to his convenience, acquiring an extensive capacity to use legality, through authority tokens, as
a means of control not only of society but also the military. Authority incentives and rewards
were extremely important. A fundamental difference with the Estado Novo can be found
in the system of military promotions. Salazar introduced the ‘escolha’ merit-based system.
Franco restored the seniority principle for military promotions but used his power to appoint
loyal officers to important positions in the government and the political-administrative appa-
ratus of the state. 
e armed forces enjoyed important powers in the regime. 
ey controlled
the security forces and held broad judiciary powers. Franco’s government also enacted laws
to allow militia fighters to integrate into the permanent structure of the Army. 
is was a
means to reward those who had fought in his camp and to introduce in the Army men that
strongly endorsed the values of the new regime and that would later act as an internal check
on dissent within the ranks. To a lesser extent, authority was also used in a constraining
fashion to reinforce the ‘esprit de corps’, reduce the size of the armies and to sanction those
suspected disloyal to the regime. For instance, the ‘Honour Trials’ granted the military the
authority (and obligation) to self-regulate deviant behaviour. Moreover, repressive or action
constraining tools applied on society usually had a positive effect on the satisfaction of the very
conservative Spanish military. Franco’s regime did not tolerate any type of criticism from the
ranks. Nonetheless, overall Franco opted for a ‘carrot’ approach to authority with the military.
Finally, the utilisation to treasure tools in Spain was constrained by a lack of resources.

ree years of civil war had a devastating impact on the Spanish economy. Simultaneously,
the international context of instability and the wars pushed the governments to maintain a
large Army that, due to the profusion of senior rank officers, limited the flexibility in terms
of the allocation of financial resources. Although there is evidence of the utilisation of di-
rect treasure tools, general salary raises and generous financial compensations for the senior
officers, the impact on subordination was mild. Despite the fact that most defence budgets
were spent on salaries, these remained low, especially for lower rank officers. Organisation,
authority and nodality instruments became necessary to compensate for the frustration that
could have emerged for the poorly paid services of the military. 
e utilisation of equipment
expenditure was even less relevant. 
e resources devoted to the acquisition of materials and
equipment were minimal. Some ideas and perceptions underpin these choices. Franco, like
Salazar, believed the main threat came from the internal enemy. 
erefore a modernisation
of the weaponry and equipment necessary for conventional warfare was not a top priority.
Moreover, the military became used to the outdated and meagre equipment and ended up,
thanks to government propaganda, believing than moral values were more important than the
material. From  onwards, the  began to supply foreign military aid that enabled a rela-
tive modernisation of the equipment and pushed new defence doctrines. Nonetheless, in the
approach to treasure remained largely unchanged. In Spain the economic paradigm embraced
by the technocratic governments channelled the funds available thanks to the economic boom
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in the s to other non-military expenditures. Treasure tools continued to be used until the
s when some efforts were made to improve the material conditions of the military.

8 Tools of government in the Spanish
transition to democracy
8.1 Introduction1

is chapter analyses the control strategy developed by the governments from the death of
Franco in  to the end of the first  government in . It shows that the transi-
tional governments deeply transformed their control tool-mix to face the new challenges that
the military posed and to enhance professionalism in the ranks. 
e role and attitude of the
military in the Spanish transition was completely different than that of the Portuguese one
(Chapters , ). While in Portugal the military defined and controlled the political trans-
formations, in Spain the military were excluded from the most important political decisions.
Whereas in Portugal, left-wing military dominated the ranks, in Spain extreme right-wing of-
ficers were the most influential. Whilst in Portugal the military pushed for thorough reforms,
in Spain the military wanted to keep an authoritarian regime and resisted most changes that
the governments launched. 
ese different circumstances had a strong impact on the choice
of control tools, in particular during the period of  governments (–). Suárez
enjoyed great legitimacy only in the eyes of civil society, not the military. Suárez, afraid that
some control tools could generate more discontent in the armed forces, adopted a somewhat
‘laissez-faire’ approach to military subordination. 
is strategy was proven inadequate by the
growing military disloyalty and various anti-government plots (Chapter  Section . .).

e first  government (–) undertook many changes in the control strategy in
order to consolidate military subordination. González counted with wider social support and
did not have to face as serious military challenges as Suárez.
Table  synthesises the findings of this chapter. Coercive organisation tools were marginal
before the  coup and inexistent afterwards (Section ..). 
ere were important changes
in the use of non-coercive organisation, in particular after . Military education was re-
formed to stimulate professionalism and emphasise technical skills over indoctrination. Mil-
itary training was also reinforced thanks to the closer collaboration with . Very impor-
tant changes were conducted in the organisational design to centralise power in the Defence
Minister and . 
e provision of services grew but that of jobs was abandoned for being
considered counterproductive for military professionalism (Section ..). As for nodality,
information detectors gained relevance to the detriment of information effectors. 
e gov-
ernment dismantled the Francoist propaganda and censorship machinery but reinforced the
secret services (specially after the  coup) (Section .). Authority incentives and rewards

is chapter refers to the transitional process in a broad sense, encompassing also the period of constitu-
tional governments and democratic consolidation until .
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were more intensively used during the  period. Liberal military were promoted to im-
portant positions. Symbolic rewards and high levels of autonomy were granted to the armed
forces (Section ..). From , the socialist government intensified the use of sanctions
and constraints in order to enhance professionalism and limit the autonomy and power that
the military had enjoyed since the inception of the Francoist regime (Section ..). Although
treasure remained the least salient category in the toolkit, its relative weight increased, in par-
ticular that of equipment expenditure (Section .).

Table : Summary of tools of government in Spain (–)
Tools Trajectory
Organisation Coercive (Section ..): 
e Army acted as a self-control
device. Civil Guard and Police forces were minimally used
Very low utilisation (none after the  events)
Non-coercive (Section ..): Military education abandoned
the emphasis on moral indoctrination. Training was rein-
forced alongside the process of modernisation of the equip-
ment and incorporation into 
Education and training grew especially after 
Provision of services was reinforced () Provision of services grew from .
Provision of jobs in the public administration Abandoned during transition
Organisational design employed to increase coordination
centralise power in the hands of the government
Extremely important. It salience grew with the 
governments
Nodality Information effectors (Section ..): Media were used to gain
support for the democratic reforms: Public  and main-
stream private press. Lack of control on the reactionary press
Lower utilisation than during Francoism. 
e govern-
ment dismantled the propaganda and censorship ma-
chinery. Free press law and elimination of the state-
owned press
Use of formal and informal meetings, visits, public speeches
to convince the military and in particular the senior ranks
of the advantages of the new political system and democratic
values. Personal involvement of Suárez, Defence Ministers
and the King
Decreasing importance during the  government
which focused on achieving material obedience rather
than on changing the ideology
Information detectors (Section ..): 
e secret services spied
on the military and neutralised some military plots

e use of secret services increased. First centralisation
of functions into  and after the  coup reor-
ganisation of 

e personal network of the defence ministers Stable

e independent media, academics and politicians were used
as a source of information
Growing salience
Authority Rewards and incentives (Section ..): Appointments and
promotions sometimes decided by the government circum-
venting the seniority principle

e interference of the government in promotions de-
creased in practice during the socialist period
Symbolic rewards: centrality of the armed forces in the Con-
stitution, new military statutes and the figure of the King as
(honorary) supreme commander
Mostly during  governments
Degree of autonomy of the armed forces. Ambiguity in the
line of command
Very high until the  government then drastically
reduced
 membership pleased many officers and created incen-
tives to maintain subordination
Growing salience since 
Sanctions and constraints (Section ..): Legal constrains
aiming to enhance professionalism (prohibition to political
activities or expressing political views, elimination of multi-
job situation, reduction of size of the Army and retirement
age)

e regulation aiming to increase professionalism and
reduce non-defence functions were initiated by 
but reinforced under the socialists
Punishment to officers responsible for acts of indiscipline or
anti-government plots
Very abundant but soft sanctions during  govern-
ments. Severe sanctions to the few acts of insubordi-
nation under ’s rule
Limitations to the power held by the military. 
eir power
within the defence sphere was reduced and the functions as
guardians of internal order (police and justice) eliminated

e process was initiated by the  but the  gov-
ernment gave a strong impulse making it a priority.
Treasure Staff expenditure (Section ..): General salary raises to
prevent protests, compensate inflation and achieve exclusive
dedication (professionalism). In parallel with the effort of re-
duction of the size of the Army. Pensions were increased to
stimulate early retirement
More frequent utilisation than during Francoism. 
e
weight of staff expenditure decreased during Suárez’s
governments and remained stable during González’s
first mandate
Equipment expenditure (Section ..): Modernisation of
weaponry and materials. Expenditure in equipment was pri-
oritised and some flexibility introduced in the budgetary pro-
cess. Centralisation of investments. Lower salience of Amer-
ican military aid but increasing cooperation with other west-
ern allies and the reinforcement of Spanish defence industry
favoured rearmament. Rationalisation of the process of ac-
quisitions
Increasing concern for military material means until
. Prioritised over staff expenditure
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8.2 Organisation

e government continued to prefer non-coercive organisation tools over coercive organisation
tools the utilisation of which had become marginal since the s. Although there were a few
examples of utilisation of coercive power, in Spain only the military could effectively control
the military by violent means. Moreover the memories of the Civil War made coercive organ-
isation tools undesirable. Non-coercive organisation tools were extremely important for the
military subordination. 
e provision of services replaced the provision of jobs in the public
administration. Military education and training and, more importantly, the organisational
design sought to improve the defence capacity of the Spanish Armed Forces and the profes-
sionalism of the military so that they would concentrate on their duties and not challenge the
government.
8.2.1 Coercive organisation
Coercive organisation tools of control were uncommon during this period. Nonetheless at
least in two occasions they were employed. First the state’s organisational capacity was used
as a deterrent tool during an illegal demonstration of members of the Armed Police and Civil
Guard, which had military status, in Madrid on  December . 
e Armed Police and
the Brunete Armored Division of the Army () were deployed to control the demonstra-
tors. Eventually, the demonstration was dissolved and a violent intervention was not necessary
(Fernández López : ). Two-hundred and eighty policemen and civil guards were ar-
rested and kept in custody in the prison of Soria,  were sanctioned, among which  were
dismissed (Delgado :–).

e second and best-known case of utilisation of coercive organisation tools can be found
during the  coup attempt in . 
e deterrent capacity of the  and the police forces
was important for the neutralisation of the  coup. Although initially insurgent officers
deployed some of the  units to control strategic targets, such as  and radio stations
and the congress, the intervention of the Captain-General of Madrid Quintana Lacaci and
the  General Sáez de Tejada reversed the situation. 
ey persuaded the heads of the 
units to return to the quarters and to use their coercive power to neutralise the insurgents. 
e
plotters had lost the coercive superiority and their chances to succeed militarily (Fernández
López :–). Moreover, the National Police, following orders of General Sáez de
Santamaría, surrounded the congress to prevent any type of support to the group of  civil
guards that kept the members of the parliament hostage. 
e special operations units from
Guardia Civil and National Police had a plan to free the congressmen by force. In the end the
use of force was not necessary (Prego :). 
e plotters were convinced to follow the
orders of military hierarchy and the King and surrendered without offering resistance.
Despite these examples, the use of coercive organisation tools to control the military re-
mained marginal, no state organisation had the power to deter the Army and moreover the
government did not want to challenge the military. 
e approach was to show confidence in
the obedience and self-control of the armed forces. 
e memories of the Spanish Civil War
were very strong among political leaders and society at large and ruled out the use of violence
as a control device during transition (Pérez Díaz ; Aguilar ).
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8.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

e non-coercive use of organisation continued to be important for governments after the
death of Franco although some evolution can be identified. Military education and training
were emphasised. 
e provision of services by the state organisation was reinforced but that
of jobs was reduced. 
e utilisation of organisational design gained salience in the control
strategy. Contrary to the ‘divide-and-rule’ logic that Franco employed, transitional and early
democratic governments tried to increase the centralisation of power and coordination among
the branches.
First, military education was used to bridge the gap with civil society by introducing demo-
cratic values, to enhance cooperation among branches and to stimulate professionalism. 
e
study of the Constitution and some changes were introduced in the curricula by the  gov-
ernment (Rodríguez Sahagún :). 
e need for inter-branch coordination was em-
phasised. Later, the  government tried to shape the process of socialisation in the armed
forces and make the military accept the changed social values and the new political system.

e military could not continue to act as guardians of authoritarianism. 
e responsibilities
for military education were also transferred to the coordination body of the Defence Ministry
and the autonomy of the branches was reduced. 
e emphasis on indoctrination and moral
values over professional training, which Franco had imposed was gradually reduced. 
and the Institute of Strategic Studies were two fundamental tools in this endeavour in which
military from the three branches cooperated (Agüero ; Barrachina ). From ,
the General Direction of Information and Social Relations of Defence () served to pro-
mote wider and more professional information about defence, workshops, cultural activities
and collaboration with universities and research centres and thus to converge the military and
civilian spheres (Ministerio de Defensa, : –).
Moreover, military training improved.  membership introduced a series of joint mil-
itary exercises and courses with other armed forces providing the Spanish military with a
benchmark in terms of professionalism and promoting a change in their views.
Despite all these efforts a gap in terms of values and preoccupations between Spanish and
other military from western countries persisted. In  Spain, there was a paternalistic con-
ception of education that prioritised the instruction of values over that of skills. 
e gap and
lack of exchanges between civil and military education persisted. 
e most part of the mil-
itary rejected the plots against the new democratic system but it seems that this was not due
to a change in their values and political ideas but to their sense of discipline and loyalty to the
King and the senior rank that supported the government.
Second, the provision of services to the military was enhanced by the early transition demo-
cratic governments. 
e goals and financial efforts linked to the developmentalism of the
s undermined military salaries and social services (Aguilar Olivencia :). 
e
Interview with Lieutenant-General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui (, //, cassette J).
Interview with General Sáez de Tejada (, //, cassette Jbis).
Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette J). He stresses the impact on the Navy
and Air Force.
See the seminars ‘Comparative perspectives on military education’ organised by Bañón and Rodrigo in
Cangas de Onis in  with the participation of German, Italian, Argentinian and  experts (, //
and //, cassettes A–, A–, A– and A–).
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fundamental instrument to correct this trend during transition was the Social Institute of the
Armed Forces (). 
e institute was created in  and began to deliver its services in
. Its purpose was to get closer to the level of health services provided to civil servants,
which after the reform of the Spanish Social Security at the end of the dictatorship were of
higher quality (Puell de la Villa :–; :–). 
e  provided services
to over , members.  also organised cultural and leisure activities, supported retired
officers and, particularly, promoted the construction of military housing (Rodríguez Sahagún
:). For instance, up to  of the military enjoyed military housing in  (Bañón
). On the other hand, the provision of jobs in the administration, crucial during the
dictatorship, was severely reduced. Having more than one job became incompatible with
the standards of professionalism. 
e traditional positions reserved for the military in the
Administration or public companies were eliminated. 
e government believed that to im-
prove their efficiency and reach civilian supremacy the military had to be disentangled from
the political-administrative apparatus and concentrated exclusively on military duties.

ird and most important, the government used its capacity to modify the organisational
design of the defence and military institutions as a tool of control. 
e logic was the opposite
to that of ‘divide-and-rule’ that Franco has imposed. Increased coordination of the branches
and centralisation of the power in the hands of civilians became the underlying principles. 
e
military reforms initiated by General Gutiérrez Mellado and the  governments aimed to
change the organisation of the armed forces and to gradually regroup and adapt the structures
that were scattered among the military ministries so to increase coordination. 
e reorgani-
sation was very ambitious and affected , people. 
e goal was to improve the opera-
tional capacity and efficiency of the armed forces but also to consolidate civilian supremacy
(Rodríguez Sahagún :–). Nonetheless, the process of re-design of the defence
organisation was gradual and followed several steps.
In February , the re-organisation of the armed forces was launched with the creation
of a Board of Chiefs of Staff () hierarchically linked to the Prime Minister. 
e insti-
tutionalisation of  sought to guarantee the coordination of the military branches under
civilian control. 
is new institution worked to create a unified doctrine, integrated plans of
defence, and to advise the National Defence Board (Junta) on military policy. 
is tool was
an intermediate step to establish a unitary Defence Ministry because it started separating op-
erational from administrative tasks previous to the reunification of the three ministries. 
e
second step important step by Suárez’s governments was the regulation of the functions and
organisation of the Defence Ministry and the re-definition of the functions of the higher
defence institutions including the , the National Defence Board and the Chiefs of Staff
of the military branches.
However the new configuration of these defence bodies can still be characterised as a dual
stucture due to the separation of political-administrative and military affairs and due to the fact
Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (, //, cassette Jbis).

e , General Gabeiras Montero argues that the situation of the Army was ‘disastrous’ in terms of
organisation (ibid.).
Law / (//). Navajas Zubeldia (:) claims that it initiated the ‘military transition’.
See Seminar ‘Armed Forces and Military Consolidation’ (, //, cassette CF).
Royal Decree / (//).
Law / (//).
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Table : Percentage of the total Defence Budget allocated to the central coordination
bodies
           
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Source: Based on Muinelo Pérez (:)
that the General Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force were integrated in this new
structure but not the three branches as such (Navajas Zubeldia :; Serra :).

is ambiguity was mainly introduced because most military did not want to give up their
autonomy in military affais, did not share the ideal of civilian supremacy in defence issues and
wanted two different hierarchical chains for civilians and the military.

e same concern and ambiguity was reflected in the new Organic Law / that regu-
lated the basic criteria of National Defence and Military Organisation. 
e law did not make
explicit the subordination of the  and the newly created Chief of Defence Staff ()
to the government. Although the  and  were created following the American
model for which civilian supremacy was a basic principle, most of the military continued to
think that Defence Minister and the Government remained merely administrators of military
budgets (Puell de la Villa :).

e organisation of the Defence Ministry was reformed by the  government, mainly
through the Organic Law / and the Royal Decree /. 
e reforms launched by
the new Defence Minister, Narcís Serra, concentrated power in civilian hands and limited
the autonomy of the military. 
e central coordination body of the Defence Ministry was
restructured into three sections, two of them led by civilians, and its personnel grew steadily.
Many competences were transferred to the central coordination body from the three branches,
which lost much of their autonomy (Table ). 
e Defence Minister was in charge of
the elaboration and implementation of military policy and, by delegation from the Prime
Minister, of the command, coordination and leadership of the Armed Forces (Ministerio de
Defensa :). Civilians saw their participation in the Ministry grow and their influence
gradually surpassed that of the military (Agüero :–).

e  passed from being the supreme collegiate body in the chain of command to be-
ing merely an advisory board for the Defence Minister. 
e unified command of the armed
forces was placed under the direct authority of the Minister, contrasting with the  period
when the head of the  played that role (Powell :). With the Law /, the
 became the main assistant of the Minister in the planning and execution of operative
aspects of military policy and represented the Minister and armed forces in international or-
See interview with General Sáez de Tejada (, //, cassette JT).

e first, headed by the , was in charge of operational military matters. 
e second, under a Secretary
of State, dealt with the management of financial resources, procurement and investment in infrastructure. Finally,
the third block was headed by an Undersecretary of State and dealt with personnel policy and military education
(Viñas :).
See interview with General Sáez de Tejada (, //, cassette JT and Jbis).
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ganisations (Ministerio de Defensa : ). 
e new unified intelligence service ()
and the Civil Guard were directly subordinated to the Defence Minister, although the former
was functionally dependent on the Prime Minister and the latter on the Interior Minister. In
, the territorial organisation of the armed forces was simplified. Spain was divided in 
military regions and  military zones for the Canary and Balearic Islands (previously, there
had been  military regions plus  maritime zones and  air zones). Finally, in , the
relationships within the Defence Ministry were regulated with the purpose of overcoming red
tape and to facilitate information flows.
In sum, the reorganisation launched by the socialist government intended to reduce the
frictions between the branches and increased the contacts and collaboration among them.
Most changes in the design of defence organisations aimed to enhance the coordination and
centralisation of decisions into civilian hands.
8.2.3 Conclusion
During the Spanish transition the use of the organisation capacity as a control tool evolved.

e changes can be mostly spotted in the non-coercive tools. 
e use of the coercive organ-
isation instruments on the military such as the Armed Police or Civil Guard continued to
be marginal. 
e fighting capacity of some Army units could not be challenged by violent
means. 
e memories of the Civil War and the fear to the repetition of any type of armed
conflict disqualified coercive tools as valid control methods.

e government preferred non-coercive organisation tools. Among them, the institutional
and organisational design was the most salient for the subordination of the military. Franco
had shaped the organisation of the armed forces with a divide-and-rule logic to eliminate any
concentration of power and potential challenge to his personal leadership. On the other hand,
the transition governments aimed to improve coordination among the branches and efficiency
as well as to gradually concentrate decision-making power in the hands of the civilians in
the Defence Ministry. Gradually military education switched from indoctrination of values
to development of skills and training was reinforced, especially after  membership in
. 
e development of professionalism was expected to reduce military interventionism.
Following the same logic, the governments stopped providing jobs for the military in the
public administration because these diverted the attention away from purely military duties.
In parallel, the government increased the provision of services for the military, mainly through
the , as a means to increase their well-being and to compensate low salaries.
8.3 Nodality

e use of nodality by the governments changed drastically after the death of Franco. 
e
propaganda and censorship machinery that Franco had used to indoctrinate the military and
society were dismantled. 
e governments used formal and informal channels of communi-
Royal Decree / (//). See Guaita Martorell (:).
Ministerial Order / (//).
See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis).

N
cation to persuade the military of the virtues of the political and military reforms. However,
fuelled by the reactionary media, antidemocratic attitudes persisted in the armed forces. 
e
socialist government reduced its reliance on information effectors prioritising material sub-
ordination over ideological endorsement. Additionally, information detectors gained impor-
tance, especially after the  coup. 
e independent media and the new centralised secret
services became a check on the military.
8.3.1 Information effectors

e tight control of the information that Franco enjoyed thanks to his propaganda and cen-
sorship machinery was not reproduced in the transitional and early democratic period. Pro-
paganda and censorship had been identified with the authoritarian rule and the democratic
government tried to avoid them. 
is feature contrasts with the Portuguese transition were
propaganda and censorship were very important until the coup in November . Some
nodality effectors continued to be used but their salience and effectiveness in the military
control strategy was drastically reduced. Rather than eliminating or imposing manufactured
information, Suárez’s governments used the media, meetings, speeches and official commu-
nications to convince the military, and society at large, of the advantages of the political and
military reforms. Since the results of Suárez’s information strategy within the ranks were mild,
the socialist government modified its approach.

e will of the Suárez’s government to break with the information control of the author-
itarian period is revealed by the Royal-Decree Law /, which established the freedom
of expression and information, which was later also enshrined in the  Constitution. 
e
propaganda machinery was also dismantled. 
e official cinema news report - disap-
peared in May  and most state-owned newspapers were closed in June .
However, the media continued to be important tools in the military subordination strategy.

e Office for Information, Diffusion and Public Relations was established in order to im-
prove the image of the Defence Ministry and the armed forces in the media. 
e government
needed to counter the effects of the extreme right-wing newspapers, such as ‘El Alcazar’ and
‘El Imparcial’, which launched a smear campaign against the government. 
e privately
owned mainstream press, such as ‘’, ‘Diario ’ and ‘El País’, built a consensus in favour
of the political reforms during the and provided nuanced opinions on the military (Cayón
:–). 
us, the mainstream media played a stabilising role minimising the ten-
sions between the armed forces and society at large (Busquets and Losada :; Preston
:).
Suárez used the influence of the Spanish national television to consolidate his image in
public opinion, the support of which served to shield the government from attacks from the
extreme right and facilitated the reforms (Preston ; Morán ). 
e live  coverage of
the  coup was especially important to raising the awareness of the military threat. Suárez,
skilfully used his oratory skills to achieve a great impact on Spanish public opinion.
‘Arriba’ was the most important. With the competition from the new private press they were not econom-
ically viable. In May , the last state-owned newspapers were closed (Martín de la Guardia :–).
Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis).
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Notwithstanding, Suárez’s media strategy was also criticised and for allowing ‘an antidemo-
cratic island in a more and more democratic ocean’ (Busquets and Losada :) and also
for a supposed lack of pedagogic effort, failing to persuade the armed forces of the necessity
of reforms (Osorio :–). 
e government did not censor the extreme right publi-
cations that incited the military to plot. ‘El Alcazar’ was probably the most significant of the
publications that promoted military subversion and an instrument for the military bunker.
Tens of thousands of copies of the journal were sent free of charge to all military units. 
is
shows that Suárez’s government was afraid of the reactionary sectors in the armed forces and
did not dare to take action against their preferred media.
In addition to the media, Suárez’s governments used other nodality effectors such as per-
sonal communications with top officers, military speeches and official reports. Many formal
and informal meetings were conducted between members of the governments and senior mil-
itary leaders; although with mixed results for military subordination. A landmark of nodality
use was the meeting that Suárez held with the top rank generals on  September  to
explain his plans of reforms and convince them to support the upcoming Law of Political Re-
form. However, this meeting ended up being counterproductive. During the meeting Suárez
insinuated that he would not legalise the Communist party, which he did next year during
Easter break without consulting with the generals creating serious unrest among the ranks.
For instance, the Higher Council of the Army issued a formal objection, the Marine Minister
Admiral Pita da Veiga resigned and several generals sent a protest memorandum to the King.
Some individuals became also important information effectors. 
e Deputy Prime Minister
Gutiérrez Mellado often visited military quarters addressing officers and troops, e.g. when
he undertook a campaign to explain the Constitution. 
e effectiveness of this approach
was unclear since Gutiérrez Mellado often encountered displays of indiscipline and insults in
his visits, as in the Cartagena quarter and the funerals of military assassinated by terrorists.

e first civilian Defence Minister, Rodríguez Sahagún, also tried to develop a close personal
relation with the military in order to earn their trust, even playing cards or going to restaurants
with them. Despite these efforts the government struggled to penetrate certain sectors of
the military where antidemocratic values were deeply rooted due to the previous Francoist
indoctrination.
Juan Carlos was also a significant nodal effector. 
e King played a crucial role in appeasing
the military and in transmitting the ideal of civilian supremacy. 
rough his visits to military
institutions and speeches he highlighted the need to keep the military away from politics
and the necessity of cooperating with the reforms in the armed forces (Agüero :).
He maintained very good personal relations with many senior officers, partially due to his
education in the three military academies (Bernecker :–). 
ey recognised him
as the rightful successor of Franco and respected him as their supreme commander (Tusell
:). He used his influence whenever he perceived a threat from the armed forces. His
intervention was fundamental to discourage a military putsch after the legalisation of the
Interview with José Maria de Areilza (, //, cassette Jbis).
Bañón (:, ). Although the meeting reassured some generals, it did not completely persuade
them, all military representatives in the Cortes voted against the law. 
ere are many different accounts about
what happened during the meeting. See for instance interview with Vega Rodríguez (, //, cassette
J); Osorio (); Gutiérrez Mellado y Picatoste (:); and Fernández López (:–).
Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis).
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communist party by the  government in . During the  events, he personally
called every top rank general to announce his opposition to the coup and to command them
to capture the insurgents.
Military speeches and official communications were also important information tools. 
ey
aimed to inculcate political neutrality and respect of the government’s reforms and to counter
the growing number of episodes of military indiscipline. For instance, military speeches and
communications emphasised the need to preserve discipline, hierarchy and loyalty; the de-
gree of military autonomy; rehabilitated the image of liberal officers; stressed the apolitical
character of the military and tried to calm to the military.
Nodal effectors were not very salient during the  government, which preferred infor-
mation detectors. 
e military held an ideological position even more distant from that of the
. Informal negotiations, visits and speeches lost prominence. On both sides unexpected
political reforms and secret plots had generated suspicion. 
e government continued to use
some nodal effectors to gain the confidence and respect of the military but gave up in the goal
of convincing the military to change their values and wholeheartedly embrace the reforms
(Cardona :). 
e government emphasised the most appealing aspects of its military
policy to justify many of the reforms, such as the non-intervention in the promotion system
or the virtues of  membership (Rodrigo :; :). Moreover the  gov-
ernment also enjoyed a favourable support from the mainstream media that wanted to avoid
a return to authoritarianism.
In sum, the Spanish government abandoned the Francoist nodality strategy that had been
grounded in intensive propaganda and censorship. Suárez’s governments tried to persuade
the military to support the political and military reforms through press releases, appearances
in the media, meetings and informal negotiations with senior officers and public speeches.
Notwithstanding, the deeply rooted anti-democratic values in the ranks and the pressures
form the bunker limited the success of these tools. 
e Socialists were aware of the poor results
that the nodality strategy had for their predecessors and of the ideological gap that separated
them from the military and accordingly their reliance on nodality effectors decreased.
Interview with Alfonso Osorio (, //, cassette J–).
See Preston (), Tusell (); Powell (). Juan Carlos’s stance against the plot legitimised the
monarchy in the eyes of most Spaniards (Preston :).
See for instance, Fernández López (:); Gutiérrez Mellado (:–); El Pais  January 
‘Los militares deben obedecer también al mando político’.
For instance Gutiérrez Mellado’s speech in Seville in  and in the Parliament in  claimed that the
Chiefs of Staff were the ‘first authority in the military command chain’ (Gutiérrez Mellado :, –).
El Pais  January  ‘El general Vega elogió la capacidad militar de Lister y Modesto’
For instance, Gutiérrez Mellado’s intervention at a conference at Seville’s general headquarters (//)
and the General Report / of the Defence Ministry issued in September  (Gutiérrez Mellado :–
, –).
For instance, the General Reports of the Army / in September  and the General Report of the
Defence Ministry / issued in October .
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8.3.2 Information detectors

e information detectors gained salience during the transition. Suárez’s governments cen-
tralised and rationalised the secret services although these remained dominated by conservative
military hampering their capacity to control reactionary plots. 
e reorganisation and civil-
ianisation of the secret services after the events of  improved their value as a control tool
for González’s government. In addition, personal informal networks continue to be a valuable
means to obtain information. 
e media, academics and politicians also served as valuable
‘ear trumpets’ to monitor the military.
During the transition the intelligence services were concentrated. ‘Tercera del Alto’ and
 merged in  into the Higher Centre of Defence Information, . 
e Brigade
for Social Investigation was dissolved in  and its functions passed to . 
is meant
a change from the authoritarian regime during which the information services were scattered
so that none of them had much power. 
e  collected all internal affairs information
and became very powerful in the armed forces. From then on the intelligence services were
progressively civilianised (Díaz Fernández :–, ). Although the secret services
served to prevent some military plots, including the ‘Operación Galaxia’ in , their overall
attitude towards military insurgence remained ambiguous. 
ey were dominated by con-
servative officers and have been accused of passivity and even participation in the  coup
(Fernández López :–; Díaz Fernández ; Palacios ). Colonel San Martín,
one of the plotters sentenced for his participation in the  coup had been the head of 
until .
After the events of the , the  was reorganised and fighting reactionary military
coups became its priority (Serra :–). 
e new director of , Colonel Alonso
Manglano Manglano, created a network to spy on the armed forces. 
e  reported di-
rectly to the Prime Minister. Among other contributions, the  exposed the ‘Operación
Cervantes’ in October  and the assassination attempt on the King and several members
of the government in La Coruña in  (Díaz Fernández :–, ). After 
military conspiracy was no longer the main priority for the secret services.

e nodal location of some important figures in the government served to obtain first
hand information valuable to assess the situation in the barracks and to inform decisions. For
instance, many of the top-rank officers during the transition were old colleagues of Gutiérrez
Mellado, from the time of the General Academy and the High Staff School (Puell de la Villa
:, ). As mentioned earlier, Rodríguez Sahagún and, in particular, Juan Carlos also
used friendship as a means to collect relevant information. Narcís Serra spent his first year as
Defence Minister analysing the Ministry and the Armed Forces, supported by military aides,
studying the experience of other European countries and meeting weekly with the President of
the Government (Agüero :). 
is process of information collection was fundamental
to establish the new defence policy and the reforms that ended up consolidating military
subordination.
Finally, the function of oversight developed by journalists, academics and politicians was
made possible by the new rights concerning freedom of speech and the effective limitation of
See interview with General Saez de Tejada (, //, cassette Jbis).
Royal Decree / (//).

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the jurisdiction of military justice. 
e moderate media played an extraordinary role detect-
ing relevant information. Not only did they support most democratic political and military
reforms but they also acted as a detector and deterrent against military insubordination. 
ey
reproduced and criticised any declaration of relevant officers or politicians against the reforms.

e government could easily monitor the acts of indiscipline and subversion and take disci-
plinary measures with greater legitimacy. 
e media paid an enormous attention to military
affairs. One of the clearest examples of the detection function can be found in . 
e
director of ‘Diario ’, Miguel Ángel Aguilar, accused General Torres Rojas of preparing a
plot against democracy and the government quickly removed him from the command of the
powerful . 
e role of the media was especially important during the  coup and
its aftermath. Equally the academic and political elites became more concerned about mil-
itary subordination. Research and publications proliferated and in the parliament defence
commissions acquired more relevance. 
e  and  also assisted the govern-
ment monitoring the military and establishing links with the media, universities and research
centres (Ministerio de Defensa ).
8.3.3 Conclusion
With the advent of democracy, the Francoist approach to nodality tools became discredited.
Guided by democratic ideas, Suárez’s governments dismantled the propaganda and censor-
ship machinery and guaranteed freedom of information and opinion. His governments used
the media, formal and informal meetings, visits to the quarters and public speeches to con-
vince the military of the necessity of reforming the political system and to subordinate the
military to civilian authority. 
e political instability and lack of information control was op-
portunistically used by anti-democratic elements to undermine the image of the government.

e number of acts of indiscipline and military plots indicates the limited success of the in-
formation campaign of the government within the ranks. González’s government learnt the
lesson shifting efforts from information effectors to information detectors. If convincing the
military was not possible, the priority became to monitor military behaviour and to punish
any deviance. 
e new powerful information services, , the personal networks of the
members of the government and the King, the media, as well as academics and politicians
became useful sources of information for the government in the endeavour of controlling the
military.
8.4 Authority
Authority-based rewards and incentives as well as sanctions and constraints were used to change
some behaviours and practices that were not compatible with the new democratic model and
to achieve military subordination. Suárez’s governments placed liberal military and civilians
in key positions and granted great autonomy and special functions to the Armed Forces. 
e
For instance, Barrachina () counts  news items in El País related to the Armed Forces in .
Paradoxically, Miguel Angel Aguilar was then tried by a military court for ‘insulting’ the armed forces
(Ballbé :–).
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 government relied less on military promotions and symbolic rewards and reduced mil-
itary autonomy.  membership became a tool in their control strategy. A series of con-
straints were imposed on the military in order to increase professionalism. Sanctions for in-
discipline and anti-democratic behaviour as well as the legal restrictions imposed on the scope
of military justice had been timid until the advent of the  government. From  the
socialists perfected the legal framework that established the boundaries of military functions
and imposed punishments for indiscipline. Overall, there was a gradual shift from rewards
and incentives, preferred during the  period, towards sanctions and constraints during
 period.
8.4.1 Rewards and incentives

e transition and democratic governments continued to use authority tokens to provide in-
centives for military subordination, although this decreased over time. 
e capacity of the
government to decide on certain promotions and appointments, symbolic rewards, a high de-
gree military autonomy granted to the armed forces and  membership can be construed
as authority-based tools that motivated the military to endorse the democratic system.
Franco had used his authority to appoint military to key positions in his administration
but had respected seniority as the promotion criterion within the ranks. After the death of
Franco this practice was reduced and completely abandoned during the  government.

e transitional government used promotions within the armed forces to reward loyalty and
to ensure endorsement of the upcoming reforms inside the military. Seniority was not strictly
respected in the promotion of senior officers. Political loyalty or other merits were consid-
ered. For instance, Arias Navarro promoted Vega Rodríguez to Captain-General of Madrid
and Gutiérrez Mellado to the rank of Lieutenant-General and Central Joint Staff. During
Suárez’s rule, the appointment of Gutiérrez Mellado as Vice-President (–) and De-
fence Minister (–) aimed to avoid military opposition to the reforms. Gutiérrez
Mellado also used strategic posting to consolidate his power. He relied on graduates of the
prestigious High Staff courses that had experience working with foreign armies to implement
the reforms (Puell de la Villa :, –). 
e appointment of Generals Ibáñez Freire
and José Timón de Lara as heads of the Civil Guard and Armed Police in ; the promotion
of Ibáñez Freire as Captain-General of the  Military Region in ; and the appointment
of General Gabeiras Montero as  in  were some of the most important, albeit con-
troversial, measures aiming to replace reactionary generals by more moderate ones. 
e
appointments of Eduardo Serra and Jesús Palacios as the first two civilians in the Defence
Ministry and later that of Rodriguez Sahagún as Defence Minister in  held a symbolic
importance, too (Preston :).
Calvo Sotelo’s government passed the Law / (//) to regulate military pro-
motions in the Army. It established that the generals had to be promoted by the government
For instance, José Vega Rodríguez resigned in protest against the promotion of Ibáñez Freire as Captain-
General which did not respect the seniority principle (Preston :– and interview with Alfonso Osorio
in , //, cassette J–). Gabeiras Montero claims that this was one of the main causes of the 
coup, because it deeply upset Milans del Bosch (interview in , //, cassette Jbis).
Serra as Undersecretary of Defence and Palacios as Secretary General of Economic Affairs in the Defence
Ministry.

A
and that colonels who were not promoted for six years would pass to the reserve. 
is law,
together with the Law / of Active Reserve (//) were intended to renew the con-
servative top tier of the armed forces. Nonetheless, these laws created unrest in the ranks.
Finally, the socialist government, although it still had the capacity to appoint senior officers,
decided to follow a policy of non-interference. 
ey made clear that any act of disobedience
or public declaration related to politics would result in expulsion but also that the government
trusted the capacity of the military to select their own elite.
Second, some authority tokens were used as symbolic rewards aiming to increase military
status and self-esteem emphasising the salience of their functions. For instance, the armed
forces were dignified by the  Constitution whose Article . established that their mission
‘is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity
and the constitutional order.’ 
e idea was to make the military feel at least in control of the
situation and as participants in the fight against regional separatism that was one of the main
concerns they expressed during transition. 
e fact that the Constitution recognised the
King, a military, as supreme commander of the armed forces was also as a symbolic reward
for the military who acknowledged him as rightful successor of Franco. 
e enactment of
new military statutes, ‘Reales Ordenanzas’ was also used as a symbolic reward. 
ese statutes,
which substituted the previous ‘Ordenanzas de Carlos ’ of , were not very restrictive and
recognized many rights of the military. 
eir drafting was entrusted to a military committee
and approved by the Parliament without any significant amendment (Bañón :). 
e
statues also set limits to the obedience principle. 
e article  of the ‘Reales Ordenanzas’
established that the military were not obliged to follow orders from their commanders when
they were in conflict with the Constitution. 
us, the military were given the capacity to
reject orders from superiors attempting to attack the regime.

ird, the  governments granted a great degree of autonomy to the military expect-
ing to motivate them and reinforce their allegiance. Although the Defence Ministry made
some strategic choices, the military took most day-to-day decisions without any interference
or control from the ministry. For the military there was a difference between ‘authority’, held
by the government, and ‘command’ held by the military top ranks. 
is legal ambiguity,
introduced with the creation of the Defence Ministry, was not corrected by the new Organic
Law / (//). 
e sense of autonomy was reinforced by the fact that the military
occupied most of the positions in the Defence Ministry too. However, the  government
See interviews with General Séez de Tejada (, //, cassette Jbis) and with Admiral Liberal
Lucini (, //, cassette J).
See Rodrigo (:–) and seminar ‘Armed Forces and Military Consolidation’ organised by Powell
and Bañón (, //, cassette CF).
See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis) and Ballbé ().
Article , section h), that ‘[i]t is incumbent upon the King (. . . ) [t]o exercise supreme command of the
Armed Forces’. Nonetheless his supreme command over the Armed Forces was limited by Article  which
requires the actions of the King to be ratified by the government. 
e Spanish King, similarly to British or
Norwegian monarchs, holds a merely honorific mandate (Lafuente Balle :–).
Law / (//).
See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis) and Gutiérrez Mellado (:
, –). Nonetheless, the  Constitution asserted the principle of civilian supremacy. Article  states
that ‘[t]he Government shall conduct domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration and the
defence of the State.’
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put an end to the autonomy the military. 
e Organic Law of Defence / (//)
was the fundamental authority tool that set the pillars for the new military organisation and
unmade the ambiguity of the military subordination to the Government. 
e law also elimi-
nated the requirement of being a military to occupy certain positions in the Defence Ministry,
accelerating the process of civilianisation (Puell de la Villa :). Military autonomy, al-
though it had been initially positively perceived among the ranks, also fuelled anti-democratic
attitudes.
Finally, the adhesion to can be considered an authority-based incentive for the military.
It created opportunities for the military to develop a more professional career and created in-
centives for military subordination. 
e Spanish government signed the North Atlantic Treaty
in  and ratified it after a referendum in . Many Spanish political leaders campaigned
for the Alliance (Arenal and Aldecoa :–). 
e majority of the military were also
in favour of the integration, in particular those in the Navy.  membership served sep-
arate the military from domestic politics away from domestic politics (Gillespie :),
to expose them to the company of new allies with more democratic values (Fernández López
:) and to provide a new powerful enemy, the Eastern Block (Aguilar :). 
contributed to improve civilian expertise on military affairs and helped the government to
justify many of its reforms by arguing that these were a membership requirement (Rodrigo
:). Even the , previously opposed, once in power decided to support  mem-
bership as a means for increasing professionalism and reducing reactionary attitudes. 
is
shift in the stance of the  leadership was welcomed by the military and helped dissipat-
ing some of their fears. 
e socialists seemed to have abandoned their ideological dogmatism
towards a more pragmatic standpoint.
8.4.2 Sanctions and constraints

e governments after Francoism also used their legal authority to establish limitations and
sanctions in order to prevent and punish non-compliant behaviour. 
ese authority tools
aimed to reverse many of the attitudes and practices developed during the dictatorship. 
us,
legal constraints were imposed to enhance military professionalism, punish rebellious officers
and limit the powers and functions of the armed forces to avoid their interference with political
decisions.
First, the government imposed a series of legal constraints to military life and rights in order
to enhance professionalism and subordination. 
e Royal Decree / (//) prohib-
ited political and union activities to members of the armed forces. It banned the military from
the expression of political views in public and holding political positions until retirement. An
exception was made for the military ministers. In , Gutiérrez Mellado, as a means to
enhance professionalism extended the regular working hours until pm. 
is was intended
to prevent the military from undertaking second jobs in the afternoon, which until then had
See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (, //, cassette Jbis). Agüero (:) stresses that
in the Army many were opposed to  integration, especially those linked to the legacy of Africanism.

is decree was further amended by the Royal Decree /. Osorio stresses that following to the
criticism of the exception made for the ministers, Gutierrez Mellado ended up giving up military career. Interview
with Alfonso Osorio (, ––, cassette J–).
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been a common practice. Extra funds were allocated to compensate their loss of purchasing
power. Secondments to the administration or public companies were also eliminated.

e Law / (//), regulating the passage to the reserve, also served as a mech-
anism to reinforce professionalism through the reduction of the size of the armed forces and
the rejuvenation of its cadres. Younger and smaller armed forces could be better paid and
equipped, more open to change and develop professionalism. 
is law also limited the ca-
pacity of the military to decide on the promotions to the top ranks. Notwithstanding, the
oversize and the excess of officers persisted. 
e reforms initiated by the  government
were more successful when it came to reducing the size and rejuvenating the armed forces.

e Law / (//) defined the maximum number of officers in active duty per
rank in the Army; the Law / (//) reduced the length of mandatory military
service to  months; and the Law / (//) introduced the possibility of con-
scientious objection. 
ese authority tokens contributed to improve professionalism and
indirectly military subordination.
Second, the government dismissed the senior officers acting or speaking against the gov-
ernment. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister General de Santiago was obliged to resign due
to his disagreements with Suárez in September . In October , Suárez’s government
decreed the passage to the military reserve of the generals De Santiago and Iniesta Cano.
General Félix Álvarez-Arenas was sacked on  as Director of the Army Higher School due
to the mishandling of a breach of discipline. General Prieto López was also discharged from
the command of the Sixth Zone of the Civil Guard due to his criticism of the government
in a funeral speech (Fernández López :–). General Campano was substituted by
General Ibañez Freire as head of the Civil Guard and General Aguilar by General Timón de
Lara in the Armed Police after the illegal demonstrations of Police and Civil Guard agents in
Madrid in  (Gomáriz :–).
Although sanctions for insubordination were very common they were not severe. In many
cases, the sanctions were simply reassignments to different positions, usually of a similar level.
For instance, in , the reactionary General Milans del Bosch was removed from the 
but was appointed Captain-General of the 
ird Military Region. General Armada was sacked
from the secretariat of the King’s military household for urging people to vote for the right-
wing party Alianza Popular during the  elections but then put in charge of the Army
Higher School. In August  Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero wrote an open letter to the
Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (, //, cassette Jbis).
Between  and , the number of officers rose by almost  (Bañón :). 
e periods of
effective command for senior officers were very short and the average age continued to be higher than that in
most Western armed forces (Serra :–).
As a means to reach this number, Royal Decree / (//) introduced the ‘transitory reserve’
that allowed the military to pass to the reserve, maintaining their full salary.
According to Puell de la Villa (:, ) the General Plan for the Modernisation of the Army (),
initiated in  and concluded in , halved the number of officers. Fusi and Palafox (:) claim that
the Armed Forces passed from , officers and sub-officers and , soldiers in  to , and
, in .
El País  October  ‘Pase a la reserva de Iniesta Cano y De Santiago’. 
is was a controversial decision
because it was done by loosely applying a law from  that in theory was to be applied only to ex-combatants
from the civil war (Fernández López :–).
El País  February  ‘Hubo careo Suárez-Armada en el otoño de ’.

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King, published in the front page of ‘El Imparcial’, criticising the government. Only a minor
penalty was imposed (Fernández López :–, ). Minor disciplinary sanctions
were taken against seven officers who participated in an illegal meeting with the extreme-right
leader Blas Piñar in Ceuta in March . General Atarés Peña, who, during a visit of
Gutiérrez Mellado to Cartagena in November , had insulted and attacked the govern-
ment, was acquitted without any charges from a court-martial. During the funerals of two
officers of the Armed Police and a Civil Guard assassinated by  in January  and
that of General Ortín, assassinated by , in January , some officers insulted Gutiérrez
Mellado and the government. Only some of them military received (minor) sanctions (Gutiér-
rez Mellado and Picatoste : –). 
e prestige that the outspoken military earned
from their reactionary colleagues compensated the minimal punishments imposed (Fernández
López :–).
Contrary to the severe punishment against the clandestine liberal group , the sanc-
tions against the reactionary military that attempted to overthrow the democratic system were
very soft during the  governments. For instance, the sanctions against ‘Operación Galaxia’
plotters in November  were minimal. Captain Sáenz de Ynestrillas was sentenced to only
six months of preventive arrest and was soon after promoted to the rank of Major. Tejero was
imprisoned for seven months and soon given a post as head of a transport unit. General Luis
Torres Rojas, commander of the  that had been involved in a plot in January , became
military governor of La Coruña (Ballbé :–; Preston :–). After the 
coup, only  plotters were tried, among which  sentenced to prison. 
e infrequent sanc-
tions to overt anti-democratic attitudes within the armed forces had ended up reinforcing the
ultras’ conviction of the likelihood of success of a military intervention.

e  government, aware of the failure of the soft policy in terms of punishments started
a non-tolerance policy. After , the Ministry began to use regularly sanctions against
anti-constitutional attitudes as a sign of firmness and control. For example, Captain-General
Soteras was sacked for trivialising the importance of the  coup, General Fernández Tejeiro
for a laudatory speech on Franco, and Vice Admiral Moreno de Alborán for circulating a
memo criticising the government (Agüero :). Serra also appealed against the reduc-
tion of the sentence for the authors of the ‘Operación Cervantes’ decided by a military court
(Busquets and Losada :).

ird, the government constrained the powers of the military, reducing their capacity to
interfere with other institutions of the new democratic regime. 
e Royal Decree /
(//) that created the Defence Ministry, the  Constitution (//), the Or-
ganic Laws of Defence / (//) and / (//), as well as the other reg-
ulations that accompanied them meant a transfer of functions and powers away from the
military. 
rough these legal reforms, the coordination and control of the armed forces, the
command in case of war, the definition of the strategic goals and the approval of military poli-
cies were assumed by the Prime Minister. 
e Defence Minister exercised the management
of defence policy and of the armed forces. All collective decision bodies in the armed forces
 (//) ‘Expedientados en Ceuta siete militares por una reunión con Blas Piñar’.
El Pais (//) ‘El general Atarés, absuelto’.

e sentence against the  members may be seen not only as a sanction against its members but also as
the use of legal authority in order to appease the reactionary generals that opposed the reforms (Busquets and
Losada :).

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were transformed into advisory bodies as a means to reinforce discipline and effectiveness in
the chain of command and to clarify individual responsibilities (Serra :). Some mil-
itary prerogatives were eliminated, such as the exclusive capacity over promotions, logistics,
infrastructures and military education, which were transferred from the military branches to
the new Defence Ministry. All companies controlled by the armed forces became part of the
.
Formal constraints were introduced to gradually eliminate their previous role as guarantors
of the internal order, to limit police and judicial functions of the military. 
e process re-
stricting the powers of the military was initiated in  with the elimination of the Public
Order Tribunals in which the military had played an important role. In , the Constitu-
tion established a clear separation between the Armed Forces and the Security Forces (Articles
 and ; Ballbé : ) and limited the scope of Military Justice (Article ). 
e Or-
ganic Law / (//) reformed the Code of Military Justice. However, the ‘Honour
Trials’ were not abolished (Busquets :) and the implementation the new formal prin-
ciples was met with many obstacles (Ballbé :–). Some of the limitations imposed
on the military were not effective. 
ey were always judged by other military officers and
often suffered minimal or no punishment for their actions. Moreover the military continued
to use their powers on civil society. For instance, in  a military court tried and sentenced
some actors of the theatre group ‘Els Joglars’ for offending the military institutions in the play
‘La Torna’. 
e film director Pilar Miró was tried in , because her film ‘El Crimen de
Cuenca’ ‘offended’ the Civil Guard (Cardona :). In , the journalist Miguel An-
gel Aguilar was tried for denouncing a military putsch (Ballbé :–) and the union
leader Romualdo Irujoa for insults against the Armed Forces.

erefore, the  government launched further reforms circumscribing the scope of mil-
itary justice and further separated the Police and Armed Forces. 
e Organic Law /
(//) developed a new Disciplinary Regime of the Armed Forces re-defining military
offences and their sanctions. 
e Organic Law / (//) introduced a new Mili-
tary Penal Code that specified which could be considered crimes against the military institu-
tion and the limits of military jurisdiction. Some crimes, such as military sedition during peace
time or espionage, were integrated into the Ordinary Penal Code by Law / (//)
(Valenciano Almoyna :–). Ultimately, the government also incorporated military
justice into the civilian justice system through the Organic Law / of Competences and
Organisation of Military Courts (//). 
is law replaced the Supreme Military Coun-
cil by a Military Chamber (Fifth Chamber) within the Spanish Supreme Court. 
e Military
Chamber was composed equally of military and civilian judges and limited the competences
traditionally held by Captain-Generals. 
is law concluded the process of delimitation of
military justice (Agüero :).
During the transition some military still used their prominent role in the security forces and their far-
reaching justice powers to interfere in Spanish political life. For instance, they commanded the suppression of
left-wing demonstrations especially in  and  (in some occasions civilians died and even legal demon-
strations were repressed such as in Malaga in  at Tejero’s orders); prosecuted civilians for political crimes and
imposed soft sentences on those responsible for exacerbated police repression or clearly anti-democratic actions.

e Tribunals that prosecuted political crimes had been created after the dissolution of the Tribunal for
the Repression of the Masonry and Communism in .
 (//) ‘Consejo de Guerra contra un dirigente de Comisiones Marineiras’.

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Moreover, the Organic Law / of State Security Forces (//) eliminated the
military nature of the police forces. Only the Civil Guards kept a military status but be-
came independent from the Army and were jointly administered by the Defence and Interior
Ministries. Troops were redeployed away from the main urban areas. 
e Brigades of Op-
erative Defence of the Territory eliminated and their functions assumed by the Civil Guard
(Payne : ). 
us, from , the preservation of internal public order was exclusively
assigned to security forces independent from the military branches.
8.4.3 Conclusion

e utilisation of authority tools evolved greatly during this period. Overall, during the 
governments authority was primarily used through incentives and rewards. Conversely, the
 government introduced many legal constraints to limit the military’s autonomy and
power. In general, loyalty was not rewarded by appointments to the public administration
or state owned companies but by military promotions. 
e government promoted ‘liberal’
generals and civilians to key positions in the Defence Ministry to facilitate the reforms. 
e
prominence and autonomy that the new legal framework granted to the armed forces sought
to motivate the military and to attract their support for the democratic reforms. 
e armed
forces occupied a privileged position in the constitutional text which established them as de-
fenders of Spain’s territorial integrity and of the constitutional order. 
ey were also initially
entrusted with great autonomy and decision-making powers although later the  govern-
ment drastically reduced them.  membership from  can be seen as fundamental
political instrument for civilian supremacy. 
e participation in the Alliance created many
incentives for the military to accept their subordination and the political reforms.
On the other hand, authority tokens were also used to establish constraints on the capacity
of the military to interfere with the political system and society beyond their strict functions
as well as to punish disobedience. 
e prohibition of political activity and secondary jobs as
well as the laws limiting retirement age and the size of the Armed Forces were the most salient.

ey helped addressing some of the problems that had hindered professionalism during the
dictatorship, such as lack of dedication, politicisation, excess of officers and opposition to
change and modernisation. 
e evidence shows that the sanctions to deviant behaviour were
soft and not systematic and that the reforms limiting the reach of military justice were in-
sufficient during the period of  governments. Authority-based sanctions and constraints
increased their salience during the  government. Punishment of deviant behaviour be-
came more severe. 
e power of the military concerning defence, military education and the
armament industry was limited. 
e reform and subordination of military justice to civilian
justice as well as the effective separation of the Armed Forces from the Security Forces was
achieved. In brief, through a series of regulations, the  government managed to re-define
the boundaries of military functions and to consolidate the principle of civilian supremacy.

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8.5 Treasure

is section shows that after the death of Franco, Spanish governments tried to increase the
amount of financial resources devoted to defence and to change the structure of military ex-
penditure restoring the balance between staff and equipment expenses. 
e goal was not sim-
ply to increase the defence capacity but also to motivate the military and contribute to their
depoliticisation and professionalisation. 
is section, first, analyses the evolution of military
budgets and its distribution between staff and equipment expenses and investments. Second,
it shows that the successive governments wanted to modernise equipment and increase salaries
as a means to increase professionalism. Military budget allocations grew, especially those spent
in equipment. However, military expenditure remained low in comparative terms and the ex-
cess of staff in the Army hindered not only the increase of of salaries but also investments in
weapons and materials.
8.5.1 Evolution of military budgets
Military expenditure grew during the transition and during most of the first socialist govern-
ment. 
e admiration and extreme loyalty to Franco had served to keep down the criticism
directed at the poor economic and material conditions of the military. After his death, the
military became less willing to accept poor working conditions under a government that was
dismantling the regime they had served and defended for several decades. 
e government
understood that the symbolic rewards were not sufficient anymore and that in a situation
of instability and discontent military loyalty had to be, at least partially, bought. 
e util-
isation of treasure that had been intensified at the end of Francoism (Figure ) received a
new impulse after the end of the regime. Treasure gained salience in the governments’ control
strategy in democracy. In order to improve the efficiency of treasure as a tool of control the
distribution of expenses was adjusted and the budgeting and investment processes centralised
and modernised. Nonetheless military budgets grew less than other budgets in the public
administration and in comparison with other countries they remained low.
Defence budgets grew in nominal and real terms, as well as a percentage of Spanish 
from  to  (Figure , Figure ). 
e most important increases coincided with the
years of higher political instability. 
us, right after the death of Franco, in  and 
defence budgets grew . and .. In , the year of the general elections and one year
after the  coup attempt the budget rose by  (Pérez Muinelo : ). 
e new impetus
to the utilisation of treasure tools during the first democratic governments were possible due to
the success of the far-reaching economic plans launched following the Moncloa Pacts. 
ese
were cooperation agreements signed in October  by the political and economic elites. 
e
pacts created a social climate of stability necessary to tackle the structural economic problems
inherited from the rapid development of the previous decade and the oil crisis (Tarrow ;
García Díez ).
As during Francoism, defence budgets grew slower than other public budgets. Public ex-
penditure grew  from  to . Spain, as well as Portugal, was still far behind most
European countries in terms of economic development and social welfare and other invest-

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Figure : Total Defence budget in constant million euros of  during Francoism
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Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:)
Figure : Total Defence budget in constant million euros of  (–)
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Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:)

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Figure : Defence budget as a percentage of GDP in Spain (–)
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Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:)
ments and expenses were prioritised. Although in the final years of the dictatorship and the
initial years of transition the weight of defence budgets increased, from . in  to
. in , later their share of the total public expenditure gradually shrank to .
in  (Figure ). 
e mild increase in defence budget in  did not compensate the
inflation and in real terms, the defence budget decreased by .
Figure : Defence budget as a percentage of the total public expenditure in Spain (–
)
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See data on social expenditure in Comín and Diaz ().

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Governments not only increased the quantity of resources dedicated to the military but
also adjusted the distribution of financial resources and the budgeting and investment proce-
dures to enhance the professionalisation of the armed forces. 
e  government increased
investments and acquisitions of weapons and materials so that equipment passed from 
of the total defence budget in  to  in  (Pérez Muinelo :). Calvo Sotelo
also aimed to further change the structure of the consumption of financial resources reducing
staff expenses to  of the total defence budget. However, this target was never achieved.
During the first  government (–) the balance between staff and equipment re-
mained basically unchanged (Figure ).
Figure : Defence budget distribution of expenditure in percentage (–)
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Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (:)
Aware of the problems of coordination among the three branches, the governments devel-
oped a centralisation strategy for the military economic policy. 
e Defence Undersecretariat
was created in  to coordinate the allocation of financial resources and the acquisition of
equipment. From , the State Secretariat of Defence was in charge of budget planning
and control of financial resources. An Economic Affairs General Directorate was introduced
to improve the budgeting process. 
e government aimed to coordinate and rationalise mili-
tary expenditure and investments. 
e responsibilities for procurement were transferred to the
Defence Ministry and the branches had to plan and justify their staff and equipment demands
and to compete for the allocation of economic resources. Overall the process of evaluation
of needs and planning of military expenditures was greatly improved.
Law / (//).
Royal-Decree / (//).
Royal-Decree / (//).
Interview with Lieutenant-General Sáez de Tejada (, //, cassettes J-T and J-bis).
See seminar ‘Armed Forces and Military Consolidation’ (, /, cassette CF).
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Notwithstanding, military expenditure was considerably lower when compared to other
western democracies and Mediterranean countries as percentage of  ( ). For
instance, from  to , the average military expenditure in Spain was . of the 
while the average of European  members was . (Cosido Gutiérrez :).
8.5.2 Staff expenditure
As during the dictatorship, salaries were periodically raised to counter inflation and to reduce
military unrest. Higher salaries were also considered necessary to a achieve professionalisa-
tion and exclusive dedication in a time when second jobs had become a widespread problem
(Gutiérrez Mellado :). Salary increases were possible thanks to the reduction in mil-
itary personnel. However, salaries remained low and the governments did not manage to
durably reduce the share of staff expenses in the military budgets in imitation of other more
advanced western allies as they had wished.
Suárez’s government increased military emoluments not only as a response to protests but
also to foster professionalism. 
e goal was to increase military salaries to the level of civil
service salaries, which at the time were  higher. In  there was a general increase of
, pesetas and in  a reform in the salary regulation to equate military conditions to
those of Spanish civil servants. Next, in , the government announced new raises; salaries
grew  for the top ranks and  for the lower ranks and pensions increased between 
and . 
ese overall raises were accompanied with a change in the salary structure that
largely benefited lower rank officers, and with the introduction of a salary supplement for
exclusive dedication to gradually eradicate secondary jobs (Bañón :–; Puell de la
Villa :–).
Although salaries increased more by than , on average they did not noticeably reduce
the pressures against liberalisation from the ranks (Preston :). 
e most reactionary
military and political leaders interpreted these concessions to the military simply as signs of
weaknesses of the government and continued to promote insubordination. Moreover, salaries
continued to be lower than those in the civil service and other western armed forces.
Calvo Sotelo’s government intended to protect salaries while reducing staff expenses by
diminishing the size of the officers corps. 
e reduction particularly affected the senior
ranks. However, as officers continued to earn their salaries in the reserve, the impact of
this policy cannot be appreciated in the short term, and expenditure in staff remained almost
constant in the following years (Figure ).

e  government followed a similar logic, trying to increase salaries while reducing
the cost of staff and attempting to strengthen professionalism. 
e Law / reduced
the length of the mandatory military service to  months and Law / again raised
salaries to make them equivalent to those of civil servants, simplified the benefit system and
introduced new remuneration for technical abilities, level of responsibility, productivity and
Royal Decree-law / (//) and Decree-law / (//).
Law / (//). It aimed to retire from active service , officers between  and 
(Comas and Mandeville ).
For instance the number of lieutenant-generals was halved (Interview with General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui,
, //, cassette Jbis).
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Figure : Distribution of defence budget (equipment -including investments- and staff)
in constant million euros of 
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extraordinary services (Ministerio de Defensa :–). 
e cost of early retirement
policies aiming to reduce the proportion of senior officers, combined with the salary increases,
thwarted the government’s goal of increasing material and investment expenditures to 
(Powell :).
8.5.3 Equipment expenditure
Expenditure and investment on equipment were prioritised to achieve not only stronger but
also more professional and obedient armed forces. 
e  and  governments were
aware of the poor material conditions of the Spanish military and committed themselves to
modernisation. Funds allocations were increased (until ) and budgeting and investment
procedures improved. 
e development of a defence industry and cooperation with other
western countries contributed to the rearmament and modernisation, which were, however,
slowed down by the needs in terms of staff spending.
Following that initial boost by the Law / the expenditure in materials continued
to grow during the transitional period (Figure ). 
e salience of the American direct
aid had been greatly decreased by the beginning of the transitional period down to only 
between  to . 
e government aimed to expand and update military budgetary re-
sources in order to fulfil the plan of modernisation of materials and weaponry for the period
 to . In , the government granted , million pesetas for the modernisa-
tion of materials to make credible the commitment to professionalisation of the armed forces
(Rodrigo :–). Moreover, the governments also facilitated defence acquisition pro-
See seminar ‘Armed Forces and Military Consolidation’ (, //, cassette CF).
Decree-Law / (//).
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grammes by remiting the pending debts of the military ministries in  and by financing
the interests of some of their credits (Pérez Muinelo :–).
From  to   governments made an effort to renew and modernise military
equipment that had been neglected during the dictatorship. During this period the running
costs and investments in new equipment and materials increased from  to more than 
of the total defence budget (Figure ).  aid continued to decrease to . although Amer-
ican loans accounted for . of supplementary funds for equipment acquisitions (Pérez
Muinelo :). 
e first Strategic Global Plan of Defence () (/) aimed to
help the Spanish defence industry and reduce the dependency from external suppliers. Spain
acquired technology and agreements for joint production with other countries such as Ger-
many, France, Italy and the  (Rodríguez Sahagún :). Nonetheless this plan suffered
several delays and was not fully implemented until the advent of the socialist government.

e  government continued to promote the acquisition of equipment. Law /
established that budget for acquisition and running costs of equipment and weapons would
be at least increased on average by . annually in real terms from  to . 
e
Spanish defence industry, military research and development as well as the cooperation with
supranational organisations were reinforced. 
e government exempted the import of equip-
ment from taxation. Furthermore the government obtained , million dollar loans from
the Federal Financing Bank from  to . 
e acquisition of F-s and the plan of
naval modernisation can be considered amongst the most relevant investment programmes.
However, the targeted increase in equipment expenditure was not achieved because the
government also established a ceiling to the maximum average increase of the defence budget
(. excluding some budget allocations) but did not manage to cut staff expenses suffi-
ciently. In the end, the objective of modernisation was partially hindered by the increases in
staff expenses. Another problem was that sometimes the needs in running costs were underes-
timated in the budgets which made later reallocations necessary. In fact, in real terms in 
equipment expenditure (including investment) was slightly lower than in .
8.5.4 Conclusion
Treasure gained salience in the government control strategy after the death of Franco. Many
military questioned the authority of the government and were not willing to continue oper-
ating with the same conditions of penury than during the dictatorship. Many of the sym-
bolic and material rewards they had been receiving during Francoism were abandoned. 
e
government embraced the idea, widespread in the  area, that better paid and equipped
military would develop a more professional dedication and abstain from interfering in poli-
tics. Military expenditure grew continuously until , but not as fast as other social and
Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste (:).
Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (, //, cassette Jb).
Law / (//).
Here, Pérez Muinelo’s book (:, –) published by the Defence Ministry contradicts Powell
who claims during the first  legislature there was a increase in defence investment, rising from  of the
total state investment in  to . in  (Powell :).
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infrastructure expenditures. 
e procedures for budgeting and investments were modernised
and centralised in order to increase the impact treasure tools.
Although both staff and equipment expenditures were used to control the military, globally,
the governments tried to enlarge the share devoted to equipment. 
us, in order to increase
salaries while reducing the proportion of staff expenditures, the size of the Army was reduced.
Several salary raises were decided in , ,  and  and in parallel pensions were
increased to stimulate early retirement. 
ese measures served to bridge the economic gap
between civil servants and the military while countering the unrest created by the political
instability. 
e  government revitalised the modernisation plan initiated in . 
e
governments tried to facilitate acquisitions of equipment and materials by condoning previ-
ous debts, reducing import taxation, supporting the Spanish defence industry and acquiring
foreign technology. 
e three branches had to plan their needs and compete for funds. Equip-
ment expenditure was increased to the level of staff expenditure. In the short term, staff costs
remained high due to the extraordinary payments and pensions inherited from the policy of
reduction of personnel. Overall, the growth of military spending slowed down during the
socialist government when the military threat had vanished and Spanish defence budgets one
of the lowest in western developed countries.
8.6 Summary
After Franco’s death there were deep transformations in the patterns of utilisation of control
tools. 
e underlying principle was that more professional, better prepared and equipped mil-
itary would concentrate on their duties and not interfere in politics. Many of the prerogatives
they had enjoyed during the dictatorship had to be sacrificed. 
e changes were for the most
part gradual and can be observed in each of the four types of tools of government.
Coercive organisation tools were minimally used but non-coercive tools acquired new sali-
ence and were utilised in a different fashion than during Francoism. Military education and
training were intensified, especially after  membership in . Gradually the attention
shifted from inculcating distinct moral values to introducing technical skills and approaching
the military to society. 
e state organisation capacity replaced the provision of jobs by the
provision of social services. Organisational design became the most important mechanism of
control.  and  governments introduced far-reaching reforms abandoning the Fran-
coist ‘divide-and-rule’ logic. 
ey created a unified Defence Ministry and shaped the armed
forces to improve coordination and centralise decision-making powers under civilian author-
ity. During the  governments the incipient administrative machinery of the ministry
was fragile and the laws and regulations that established it were ambiguous and incomplete,
leaving room for interpretations incompatible with the western democratic principle of civil-
ian supremacy. During the  government, the bureaucracy and legislation grew, steadily
achieving a transfer of competences to the Ministry and a reduction of the autonomy of the
three branches. Moreover, the new organisational design demarcated the functional bound-
aries of the military making explicit civilian supremacy.
Franco’s approach to nodality was also reversed. Information effectors saw their relevance re-
duced. 
e propaganda and censorship apparatus was dismantled. Rather than indoctrination
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and limited access to information, the democratic approach favoured persuasion and freedom
of information. Public speeches, meetings and the media were used to convince the military
of the need of political reforms and civilian supremacy during the Suárez’s rule. González’s
government was not convinced of the effectiveness of information effectors in changing mili-
tary mentality and put emphasis on detecting threats from the ranks and learning from them.
Information detectors grew in importance. 
e information services were strengthened. Aca-
demics, politicians and, in particular, the media contributed to monitor military insubordi-
nation.
Authority-based sanctions and constraints grew in salience while some of the traditional re-
wards were abandoned. 
e  governments limited the seniority principle to promote loyal
liberal generals but did not appoint military outside the ranks. 
e special treatment that the
military received in the Constitution, the honorary role of the King as supreme commander,
the new military statutes and, in particular, the high degree of autonomy of the armed forces,
intended to foster military support for the new political system. However, these formal recog-
nitions were not comparable to all the prerogatives and symbolic rewards received during the
dictatorship. Probably the most effective authority-based incentive was the decision to join
 that encouraged professionalism and subordination. 
e limitations to military auton-
omy and to their prerogatives became crucial mechanisms of control, in particular under the
 government. 
e regulations launched by the  government clarified that the mil-
itary were completely subordinated to the government, imposed a new disciplinary regime
and completed the process of limitation to their judicial and police powers.
Finally, the approach to treasure tools also evolved in this period. 
ese tools became more
salient in the control strategy. 
e contact with the western allies had made evident that the
Spanish armies were badly paid and armed. Salary raises were believed to be necessary to
achieve exclusive dedication. In order to increase salaries the governments tried to reduce the
size of the Army. A smaller Army would allow better salaries and material means. Franco,
being more concerned with the internal than with the external enemy, did not attach great
importance to equipment expenditure. 
e democratic governments wanted to maintain the
military exclusively concerned with the defence of the country from external threats. 
e
modernisation of equipment and rearmament became a top priority in order to achieve a
greater degree of professionalism in the military. Military investments and acquisitions were
stimulated and the budgeting process was modernised and centralised. Equipment expen-
diture reached the level of staff expenditure during the initial years of the socialist govern-
ment. Notwithstanding the growth of defence budgets was slower than of other ministries,
and the extra costs derived from the early retirement policy constrained the modernisation
of the armed forces. Once the danger of military intervention declined the budgets shrank,
especially those dedicated to equipment.
In sum, during this period many important changes were introduced in the control strategy.
Two broad different trends in control can be observed. First, Suárez’s government, afraid of
the reactions of the most conservative sectors in the armed forces, adopted a somewhat ‘laissez-
faire’ approach with low interference in military affairs and great levels of tolerance towards
the acts of indiscipline. Second, after the  coup attempt and in particular during the first
 government (–), more decisive actions were taken to restrain the autonomy
and powers of the military.
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9 Comparative analysis: trajectories in
tool choice
9.1 Introduction

is chapter compares the trajectories in tool choice from a country perspective and the evolu-
tion of each of the four basic resources (organisation, nodality, treasure and authority). Finally,
it addresses the first two analytical claims, introduced in Chapter , about general styles of
control. Due to its long time period covered, this study focuses on the trajectories at the meso
and macro-level and not in the micro-level decisions concerning the design or calibration of
particular tools.
Section . compares the basic trajectories in tool choice and civil-military relations from a
country perspective. It shows that the most significant changes in the trajectories of tool choice
coincide with important historical junctures. 
e Spanish Civil War, the Second World War,
the creation of , the colonial conflicts, the fall of the authoritarian regimes as well as
the military coup attempts in Portugal in  and Spain  coincided with the points of
departure and/or closing stages for distinct trajectories. 
is chapter shows that although the
trajectories in Portugal and Spain sometimes converged (such as during the s and in the
s) most of the time the patterns in tool choices were different (such as during the Spanish
Civil War, after the creation of , during Portuguese Colonial Wars and during the initial
stages of their transitions). Chapter  develops further the impact of the legacies of these
macro-historical events on tool choice.
Section . explains the most salient features from the point of view of the four types of
basic resources showing that organisation and nodality tools experienced more variance across
countries and time than authority and treasure. For instance, in Spain coercive organisation
tools, which had been very important during and in the aftermath of the Civil War, were aban-
doned in the mid-s. In Portugal the utilisation of coercive organisation tools remained
constant until November  and then abandoned. 
e utilisation of non-coercive organ-
isation tools was notably intensified in Portugal during the s and in Spain after the end
of Francoism, in particular during the first  government. As for nodality, the utilisation
of information detectors was very different in both dictatorial regimes. Salazar spied on the
military while Franco preferred to detect threats through his own personal close relationships
with the hierarchy of the armed forces. Conversely, propaganda and censorship were central
information effectors for both regimes but abandoned in . In Spain this happened right
after the death of Franco while Portugal did so when the -Moderates displaced the Radi-
It is assumed that micro-level decisions concerning specific tools are embedded into wider scale meso-level
and macro-level choices linked to mixes of tools and government styles (Hall ; Howlett ).
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cals from the government. 
ere were also some significant changes in authority and treasure
tools (Chapters , , ,  Sections  and ) but overall in these countries, organisation and
nodality were better indicators of the transformations in governments’ control styles.

ird, this chapter concludes that no stable distinctive style of control can be associated
with geopolitical factors or regime type. 
e hypothesis of an existence of unique ‘Portuguese’,
‘Spanish’, ‘Iberian’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘transitional’ styles of control can be rejected. Although
the there are signs indicating common trajectories from , the evidence is insufficient to
confirm or reject the existence of a ‘democratic’ style of control.
9.2 Trajectories in Portugal and Spain

is section outlines that there were periods in which the trajectories of civil-military rela-
tions and tools of government in the Iberian countries were divergent and periods when they
converged. 
e Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the creation of , the colonial
conflicts, the fall of the authoritarian regimes as well as the military coup attempts in Portugal
in  and Spain in  coincided with the points of departure and/or closing stages for
distinct trajectories.
Portugal and Spain developed different patterns of tool choice during their dictatorships.

e inception of the regimes profoundly impacted civil-military relations, including the con-
trol toolkit. 
e rise of fascism in the s and Spanish Civil War shaped the paths of
civil-military relations and control policies in both countries although more profoundly in
Spain. At the level of tool choice, the immediate effect was to create a window of opportu-
nity and incentive for a more repressive approach to control with very intensive utilisation of
coercive organisation instruments as well as intrusive nodal detectors and effectors.

e Civil War introduced profound and lasting changes in Spanish civil-military relations.
It allowed Franco to purge the armed forces from anyone suspected critical of his regime.
Moreover, Franco’s legitimacy as ruler was built on his military victory against the Republic
(Aguilar Olivencia ). He managed to transform the Spanish Armed Forces to the extent
that ever since they were considered the ‘Francoist Armies’; a new institution virtually discon-
nected from its past as Armies of the Second Republic. Franco’s armed forces were cohesive
and professed fervent admiration for the dictator. 
e levels of contestation in the ranks were
very low after the purges. 
is put civil-military relations on a different path in Spain and
Portugal.
In Portugal, the military appointed Salazar as . His legitimacy was not based on a military
victory but on his capacity to lead the government. 
e Portuguese Armed Forces were not
purged and homogenised, the allegiance to the figure of the dictator in Portugal was not near as
strong as in the case of Spain (Duarte ). 
ese were not the ‘Salazarist Armies’. Often the
government’s decisions were contested from the ranks and military coups attempts occurred
periodically. 
e degree of military subordination in the Estado Novo was not comparable to
that in Francoist Spain. Civil-military relations were less stable and more susceptible to crises.
Salazar had to maintain a more active strategy of control vis-à-vis the military.
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During the s, a relative convergence in both tool choice and civil-military relations
can be observed. In Spain, the repressive approach to control of the military was gradually
reduced. 
e armed forces had been already thoroughly purged and the defeat of the Axis
had contributed to the discredit of the control mechanisms associated with totalitarianism.
At the same time that Franco softened his control approach on the military, Salazar managed
to use the threat of the Second World War in order to consolidate his political leadership
and reinforce his authority. Moreover, the Western Allies rewarded the Estado Novo for its
collaboration by inviting Portugal to join  at its inception.  membership brought
about some changes in the tools of control and within the Portuguese Armed Forces, putting
Portugal’s civil-military relations on a path divergent from that of Spain.
At the level of tool choice, Portugal’s membership triggered an increase in the intensity
of education and training and changes in organisational design (non-coercive organisation).
It is also associated, albeit to a lesser extent, with modernisation of weaponry and materials
(treasure), and a gradual decline in information manipulation (nodality effectors). 
e goal
was to maintain the military concentrated on their professional tasks and to improve their co-
ordination and operational capacity vis-à-vis external threats. Wheareas Franco’s armed forces
became self-complacent and did not question the dictator, the Portuguese military mentality
was strongly affected by their participation in the Alliance. 
e Spanish military continued
to be isolated, concentrated on the internal threats and recalling their past glory. 
e control
toolkit remained stable. On the other hand, many Portuguese military went to study abroad
or participated in  bodies and activities. 
ey became aware of the deficiencies of the
Portuguese Armed Forces and the political system. 
is contact transformed a generation of
young officers, the ‘ generation’. 
ese officers became influential and later developed
and spread critical thinking within the ranks, which was one of the main causes for the fall of
the Estado Novo (Carrilho ; Telo ).

e path of civil-military relations that  had initiated in Portugal was, nonetheless,
truncated by the Colonial Wars. 
e Colonial Wars forced Portugal to change its military and
defence strategy and priorities. During the Colonial Wars the changes made to the control
toolkit throughout the s were reversed. Moreover, the wars drained the government’s
resources and legitimacy. Quickly it became evident that Portugal had little chances to reach a
definitive victory and retain the colonies for long. Military dissatisfaction grew steadily. After
the replacement of Salazar by Caetano in , the of government’s position vis-à-vis the
military weakened and the military put an end to the regime in . In sum, the Colonial
Wars provoked a process of regression in terms of civil-military relations and became the cause
of the regime’s downfall (Ferreira :).
Conversely in Spain from the late s there were signs of evolution in some aspects of mil-
itary policy. Franco reshuﬄed the cabinet in  and the new technocratic ministers pushed
for the abandonment of the previous autarchic ideas and initiated a moderated liberalisation
(mainly in the economic sphere) that made Spain more permeable to ideas and normative
pressures from the international actors. In this context the contacts with the  and French
armies and the experience in the Sidi-Ifni war made the government and the military realise
that the reality of the Spanish Armed Forces was far from the optimistic image projected by
the official propaganda. In order to overcome some of the serious deficiencies limiting defence
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capabilities, reforms in military education and training (non-coercive organisation tools) and
a modernisation of equipment were launched.
Finally, the end of the dictatorial regimes led to deep but very distinct changes in civil-
military relations in both countries. In Portugal the military subverted the traditional relation
of power. 
e government was subordinated to military executive bodies such as the  and
later the . Although the  and its revolutionary model meant to be a response against
the previous regime and its military policies, the tools of military control employed ended
up being to a great extent similar to those used during the Estado Novo, especially in terms
of coercive organisation, intrusive nodality effectors and detectors and low intensity treasure.
Moreover, military supremacy in politics did not contribute to military subordination in the
barracks. Ideologically, the military were very fragmented and posed constant challenges to
the governments during  and . 
e continuous political instability discredited the
government led by Gonçalves and the -Radicals. 
e -Moderates stepped into power
and after the left-wing November  coup abrupt changes were adopted in the control
toolkit. Coercive organisation, propaganda and censorship were abandoned. 
e special func-
tions granted to the armed forces in internal affairs were eliminated. Non-coercive organisation
tools and authority constraints gained more salience. Professionalisation replaced politicisa-
tion as a guiding principle. Nonetheless, the  Constitution prolonged the situation in
which the military held important political powers and had complete autonomy from the
civilian government. 
e  Constitutional reform and the new defence law put Portugal
on a civil-military relations path similar to that of most of its western allies, including Spain.

e Spanish transition also showed an important degree of political contestation in the
armed forces but overall, the trajectory of civil-military relations was very different. In Spain
the military lost the agenda-setting power and did not participate in the core political deci-
sions. In Portugal there was, at least initially, an approach to control similar to that of the
previous regime, which was followed by a drastic reversal from late . In contrast, Spanish
transitional governments gradually introduced a new toolkit after the death of Franco. 
e
re-design of the defence organisation became a fundamental tool of control. Franco’s logic of
‘divide-and-rule’ was replaced by coordination and centralisation of decision-making power
under the Defence Minister. Information effectors and authority rewards were less intensively
used; at the same time, nodal detectors and authority constraints gained relevance. 
e mod-
ernisation of equipment initiated at the end of the dictatorship was further developed as a
means to facilitate professional dedication and divert the military’s attention away from poli-
tics. Finally, after the  coup attempt and the ascent to power of the socialist party in ,
far reaching reforms in military and defence policy opened a new trajectory in civil-military
relations consolidating civilian supremacy.
In sum, the divergences between the two countries originate from the Spanish Civil War,
which enabled a more repressive approach to control. Later, during the s both coun-
tries converged: Franco softened his grip on the military and Salazar gained legitimacy by
capitalising on his management of the Second World War crisis. Next,  membership in
 marked the beginning of a new direction in Portuguese civil-military relations. How-
ever this direction was truncated by the Portuguese Colonial Wars (–). During this
period, in which Salazar was replaced by Caetano, there was fundamentally a regression in
civil-military relations. In the meantime, in Spain the new technocratic cabinet appointed
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in  initiated a slow process of opening the regime that together with the bad experience
in the Sidi-Ifni War coincided with reforms in the Spanish Armed Forces somewhat similar
to those undertaken in Portugal after joining  in . Finally, the fall of the regimes
initiated in both countries a period of instability in terms of civil-military relations. Spain,
embarked on a gradual process of reform of civil-military relations after the death of Franco.
After  the socialist government intensified reforms. In Portugal, after two years of rev-
olutionary experience, the government implemented drastic changes. 
is process received a
final impulse in  putting Portugal on a path similar to that of Spain.
9.3 Trajectories in basic resources

is section outlines the most striking features in the evolution of the four categories of gov-
ernment tools. It does not attempt to capture all the changes observed in specific instruments
but to establish some generalisations regarding the utilisation of the four basic resources. It
shows that organisation and nodality experienced more variance across country and time than
authority and treasure.
First, organisation tools are probably those whose patterns of utilisation more distinctively
contributes to demarcate different trajectories in the control approach. Paramilitary and secu-
rity forces such as the /, ,  and Portuguese Legion acted as deterrent devices on
the military throughout the Estado Novo, often participating in the neutralisation of military
rebellions. Nonetheless, the contribution of these bodies was limited and the participation
of loyal army units was fundamental to counter most rebellions. 
e fighting capacity of
these organisations was very small compared to army units. Moreover, as Martins claims
(:), the government strategy was to minimise the use of terror. Salazar’s Estado Novo
had a comparatively low level of political imprisonment and avoided bloodshed as was com-
mon in the neighbouring country during the late s and early s (Pimlott and Seaton
:). Although Caetano continued to rely on the coercive power of these paramilitary
bodies (Porch :–) on  April  the loyal ,  and Legion unambiguously
failed to defend the Estado Novo from a few insurgent army units. Despite abolishing the
/ and Legion, the -led provisional governments in transition intensified the util-
isation of coercive tools. In addition to the ad-hoc created special military unit  and
, the security forces, the judiciary, penitentiary services and even groups of armed civilians
actively participated in shaping the control strategy in  and . Coercive organisation
tools were abandoned in November .
In Spain on the other hand, the use of organisation power in a coercive way was crucial from
the beginning of the war until the mid s. Loyal military units, courts and prisons served
Franco to completely purge the armed forces. However, the Falangist and Carlist militias
were disarmed after the Civil War and once the purges were concluded, coercion as a means
of subordination of the Spanish military was abandoned for the rest of the dictatorship. 
e
transition governments did not rely on coercive organisation control either. Even at the height
of military insubordination during the  coup d’état, its utilisation remained minimal.
Non-coercive organisation tools, in particular military instruction and organisational design
also help distinguishing changes in governments’ control approach. Although some reforms in
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the military education system took place in both countries in the s, these were insufficient
and the general level of instruction and professional preparation remained deficient. Franco
was not very concerned with the levels of professionalism or with an external threat. Little
attention was paid to education and training in the sense of developing stronger defence skills
and professionalism. 
e emphasis was on moral values, the strengthening of discipline and
obedience to Franco as well as on the reinforcement of the image of a victorious army (Aguilar
Olivencia ). In the case of Portugal, Salazar always recognised that professionalism would
make the military less prone to intervene in politics but at the same time he feared them
acquiring government skills and therefore maintained an outdated education system (Wiarda
:). Due to the lack of equipment and ammunition, military exercises were very rare
in both countries. Regarding organisational design, the multiplication of command structures
reinforced the power of the dictators and prevented the rise of any alternative source of military
leadership. Both dictators followed a ‘divide-and-rule’ logic (Wheeler b:; Preston
:).
However,  membership initiated in-depth changes in the utilisation of non-coercive
organisation tools in Portugal during the s. A series of reforms promoted by the  
produced what Telo () calls a ‘quiet revolution’ in the armed forces, which contributed
to the modernisation of procedures and skills and to professionalism. Education and training
became a priority. Hundreds of officers travelled to the  to undertake military training, new
courses were introduced, education institutions were created and military exercises acquired a
greater dimension. 
e organisation of the armed forces was also reformed in order to improve
coordination. 
e creation of the National Defence Ministry and , in , was a
cornerstone in the new organisational design. Nonetheless, the colonial conflicts brought
new concerns to the government and Portugal drifted apart from  and the . -led
reforms were abandoned in Portugal.
In contrast, in Spain no relevant changes can be observed in the utilisation of non-coercive
organisation tools until . Precisely when in Portugal the organisation-based efforts aiming
to enhance professionalisation started to be sidelined due to the incipient colonial conflicts, in
Spain they acquired significance. From  to the end of the dictatorship, military education
and training were significantly reinforced following the  doctrine. 
e influence of the
the western allies became gradually stronger, in particular in the Navy and Air Force. Moreover
while the provision of services, goods and jobs to military families decreased in Spain during
the s, in Portugal the utilisation of this type of non-coercive organisation instruments
increased in order to compensate for the effects of the Colonial Wars.
During the period of transition, organisational design became a central tool of control in
both countries. In Spain, there was a gradual reorganisation aiming to improve coordination
among the branches and efficiency as well as concentrating decision-making power in the
newly created Defence Ministry. In Portugal, two different trajectories can be observed. Dur-
ing  and , new military organisations were introduced to ensure military control on
the political sphere and the politicisation of the armed forces. 
e result was decentralisation
and fragmentation of power. From , this trend was reversed, the Portuguese constitu-
tional governments shaped the defence and military structures to centralise decision-making
power and coordination. 
e defence structures were converging in both countries following
 templates. In , this trajectory was strengthened in both countries. Spain joined
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 and Portugal abolished the  and integrated the armed forces into the hierarchy of the
Defence Ministry.
As for the other non-coercive organisation tools, the importance of education and training
was low immediately after the end of the dictatorships but increased gradually. 
e emphasis
on indoctrination of moral values was progressively replaced by a focus on technical skills. 
e
goal was to improve professionalism and develop mutual awareness of the military and civilian
spheres. Although there were no very significant changes in the provision of services there was
a drastic reduction in the provision of jobs in the public sector for military personnel. 
e
government believed that exclusive dedication to military issues would contribute to drive the
military’s attention away from politics.

e evolution of nodality tools also highlights different approaches to control. During the
dictatorial regimes, propaganda and censorship were key instruments for the control of society
at large but also of the armed forces in both Portugal and Spain. 
e information that the
government supplied always exaggerated the figures of the leaders: Salazar as an ‘economic
and political mastermind’, Franco as a ‘military and political genius’. Moreover, the military
were always portrayed as the saviours of the country, in Portugal thanks to their ‘peaceful
revolution’ and in Spain due to the ‘glorious victory against the communist menace’. 
e
goal was to increase the self-esteem and status of the military as in order to compensate for
the poor salaries and inadequate material conditions as well as to divert the attention away
from political problems. Nevertheless, the fundamental difference in terms of nodality tools
of government can be observed at the level of information detectors. Salazar and Caetano
prioritised espionage on the military as a means to prevent plots against the government. In
Spain, once the Civil War was over and the armed forces had been purged, there was little use
of intelligence services. Franco did not attach great importance on spying within the ranks
of the already purged Spanish Armed Forces. He trusted his close relationships with many
senior officers as a reliable information detector.
One of the main sources of criticism levelled at the Estado Novo was its manipulation of
information. Paradoxically, the fall of the regime did not lead to the rejection but to the in-
tensification of the information tools employed on the military. Propaganda, censorship and
surveillance of military activities were carried out by organisations such as the Fifth Division,
 and  until . Later, in both countries the propaganda and censorship appa-
ratus was dismantled and freedom of information and opinion were guaranteed. 
e inde-
pendent media began to act as a check on military. Nonetheless, the two countries’ strategies
concerning the information services differed: In Portugal in  most information detec-
tors were abolished and until the establishment of the new centralised secret services ()
in , the government had no intelligence services capable of controlling the military. In
Spain, on the other hand, the new centralised intelligence services  established in 
became an important tool of control, especially after the  coup attempt in .
In Portugal and Spain the utilisation of treasure tools was comparatively low and relatively
stable. Salaries were in general not high but absorbed most of the military budget due to the
large size of Portuguese and Spanish armies and the high proportion of senior officers. General
salary raises barely compensated the effects of inflation. 
e economic growth experienced in
the two countries was not reflected in clear increases of the financial resources spent to grat-
ify the military or to improve their equipment. In the s, Spanish governments favoured

C :    
infrastructure and social expenditure, in Portugal the Colonial War effort restrained the gov-
ernment’s flexibility to adjust military budgets. 
e sole significant change observed was a
gradual increase in the salience of equipment expenditure with the introduction of moderni-
sation programmes first in Spain, from the early s, and then in Portugal, from .

e most important feature in the evolution of authority tools is that during Franco’s dicta-
torship, during the Estado Novo’s as well as during the period of provisional governments in
Portugal and ’s governments in Spain, rewards and incentives were more intensively used
than sanctions and constraints. 
e military enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, symbolic
rewards and developed important special functions in the regime beyond their pure defence
tasks. Governments were in general very permissive with them. From , this trend changed
and in both countries regulations were then implemented to restrict the military to defence
activities, increase professionalism and reduce their autonomy. 
us, with some exceptions,
the utilisation of authority was very similar in Portugal and Spain.
9.4 Distinct styles of control and civil-military relations?
As noted throughout the previous chapters, the governments of Portugal and Spain chose
a combination of multiple tools for the purpose of military subordination. All four basic
categories of tools coexisted at all times, although their degree of utilisation varied. Tools
were not completely unrelated to each other or purely the outcome of random selection.

e evidence shows that most tool choices were purposefully taken and that governments
followed some patterns in their choices. 
is section assesses whether it is possible to identify
well-defined styles for governing the military, linked to the geopolitical context and the type
of regime. Based on the empirical evidence, the existence of a constant ‘Iberian’ or country-
specific style of control or model of civil-military relations is rejected. Similarly, it is argued
that there is not one single style associated to the type of regime.

e existence of some underlying Iberian ethos and a common political culture is often
assumed in social sciences (Chapter  Section .). Could the same be said about the style of
control, i.e. is it accurate to speak about an ‘Iberian style’ of control or model of civil-military
relations?

e answer is no, as the different trends identified in Portugal and Spain in this thesis refute
the existence of a unique distinctive Iberian style of control or a common system of civil-
military relations. 
is rejection, nonetheless, should not be expanded beyond the military
sphere and the period analysed.
A superficial analysis of civil-military relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury before the Estado Novo and Francoism points to many similarities in both countries
(Appendixes A, B). Equally, after  there seems to be a convergence in both countries
(Chapters , ). It would be necessary to confirm that these prima facie convergences hold
true through an in-depth analysis of tool choices and extend the analysis to other countries in
order to verify that such common style is unique or specific to the Iberian Peninsula.
In Portugal, the military promotions of senior officers during the Estado Novo was based on ministerial
appointments and approvals (‘escolha’) while in Spain seniority was strictly respected until the advent of democ-
racy.
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e rejection of an ‘Iberian style’ needs to be further qualified. Despite not having identified
an overall single ‘Iberian’ model it is important to acknowledge that the utilisation of authority
and treasure was very similar in both countries for most periods analysed. Moreover there are
two phases in which we can observe a general convergence in the toolkit of both countries,
namely the s and after .

e analysis of the trends in the control toolkit also refutes the existence of a stable Por-
tuguese or Spanish style of control. As Section  of this chapter shows, there were fundamental
changes in both countries throughout the periods analysed. Not only did the degree of mili-
tary subordination vary from country to country but the control toolkit also diverged.
Is it possible to establish, at least, common patterns associated to the type of regime? Again
the evidence rejects the existence of cross-country ‘authoritarian’ and ‘transitional’ styles of
control on the military. 
is thesis has unveiled many differences in the control toolkit during
the authoritarian periods (Chapters  and ) and in the case of the transition to democracy
(Chapters  and ). 
e differences go beyond tool choice and reach other aspects of civil-
military relations.
Despite the many similarities between the Estado Novo and Franco’s regime, the civil-
military relations in these countries were very different. 
is thesis confirms Diamond’s ar-
gument () showing that authoritarian regimes, as well as democratic ones, differ among
themselves in significant ways. In Portugal there was no total support for the authoritarian
government within the ranks. In addition, the fact that Salazar, and especially Caetano, had
been appointed by military men limited their authority (Rebelo de Sousa :). Franco
was a military leader before he became a ruler and enjoyed higher levels of support in the
armed forces. Franco and Salazar had different personalities as well as different preferences
and priorities concerning military and defence policy (Medina ). 
e political institu-
tional structure of the regimes also varied. Much more power was concentrated in the hands
of Franco for whom the military were not a veto actor. On the other hand Salazar and Cae-
tano had to share their power and face challenges from the military (Fernandes ; Duarte
).
Moreover, while Spain opted for a certain degree of isolationism especially after the Na-
poleonic invasions and the Congress of Vienna, Portugal tried to participate in all important
international issues concerning Europe and Africa (Ferreira :). 
e Estado Novo was
more exposed to the international actors and events. 
e traditional English-Portuguese Al-
liance, the Spanish Civil War, the (First and) Second World War,  and the Colonial Wars
strongly affected Portuguese civil-military relations. 
e seclusion of Spain was aggravated
due to the repression during and after the Civil War and the alignment with the Axis pow-
ers. Only after the defence agreements, the establishment of  military bases in the s
and the liberalisation of the economy in the s, did Spain very gradually integrate into
the western bloc and become more susceptible to the influence of international actors (Salas
López ). As Section . shows, these differences contributed to different patterns in the
utilisation of the tools of government in both regimes. Overall no one single ‘authoritarian’
model of civil-military relations or style of control can be identified in this research.
During the transition to democracy the discrepancies in terms of civil-military relations
were accentuated. Although the Portuguese and Spanish transitions mutually influenced each

C :    
other (Sánchez Cervelló ) and both countries shared the problem of military insubordina-
tion, many of the features of their civil-military relations diverged. 
e Portuguese transition
originated from a military coup and a revolutionary movement. 
e Spanish transition was
not rooted in the collapse of the former system and a military intervention, but, among other
factors, by pressures from inside the existing regime (Fishman ). 
e composition of the
Portuguese Armed Forces was much more heterogeneous, both ideologically and socially, than
that of the Spanish Armed Forces, in part due to the massive recruitment for the Colonial Wars
(Carrilho ). While in Portugal the military provided the impulse for the democratisation,
in Spain many of them, if not the majority, opposed the process. 
e role of the military was
also completely different. In Portugal the  military occupied the main posts in the govern-
ment and advisory bodies, in Spain the military lost the agenda-setting power and remained
mainly spectators of the changes (Agüero ). Whereas in Spain the military were reluc-
tant to be subordinated to the transition governments, in Portugal the military controlled the
transition governments.

ese factors conditioned the strategy and tools of control for the subordination of the
military, which differed greatly, particularly during the initial stages of the transition period
(Section ., Chapters , ). 
erefore it would also not be accurate to refer to a common
‘transitional style’ of control.
However, these countries experienced a process of convergence in civil-military relations,
mainly from  onwards, which was also reproduced in the control toolkit. In Portugal the
failed military coup of  November  was a turning point in the process of democratic
institutionalisation and a first step for the withdrawal of the military from politics, later ac-
complished with the reforms launched in  (Pinto :). In Spain, after the  coup
attempt in  and  membership in , the new socialist government gave a decisive
impulse to the process of military subordination and consolidation of democracy (Preston
; Agüero ). Accession to the  in  confirmed that Portugal and Spain had
developed western liberal democratic systems. 
e underlying strategy for the governments to
strengthen civilian supremacy was to instil professionalism in the ranks (Danopoulos ).

e convergence in political and civil-military dimensions was accompanied by a convergence
in the control toolkit. Non-coercive organisation tools such as formal military education and
organisational design were used to foster professionalism and coordination; the new inde-
pendent media and centralised secret services acted as nodality detectors to prevent military
interference with politics; Authority sanctions and constraints were redefined to limit military
autonomy; and utilisation of treasure aimed primarily at the modernisation of equipment.

ese common features indicate that a common ‘democratic’ or ‘western democratic’ cannot
be rejected on the basis of the analysis made by this thesis. More research beyond  and
Spain and Portugal would be necessary to confirm such a common ‘democratic style’.
From  to  the Portuguese case seems to confirm the idea that after the fall of an authoritarian
regime some countries enter a ‘political gray zone’ in which the path towards democracy is not certain (Carothers
:).
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9.5 Summary

is chapter has shown the evolving nature of civil-military relations and tool choice in Por-
tugal and Spain. It has revisited the main findings of Chapters  to  in order to establish and
compare trajectories across countries, types of regimes and basic resources. It has concluded
that there is no distinct single ‘Iberian style’ of civil-military relations or tool choice. 
e
control toolkit employed by the Portuguese and Spanish governments was significantly dif-
ferent. Moreover, military attitudes and levels of subordination also varied between the two
countries. Only during the s and after  was there a clear process of convergence.

e changes observed in each of the countries across time, for the most part in organisation
and nodality tools, helps rejecting the existence of one stable Portuguese or Spanish ‘style’ of
control. Finally, this chapter has also rejected common authoritarian and transitional ‘styles’
but hints at the possibility of the development of a ‘democratic style’ after . Next chap-
ter explains the changes in civil-military relations and the control toolkit by contrasting two
different neo-institutional interpretations that focus on the impact of historical legacies and
on that of environmental factors.


10 Explaining change in tool choice
10.1 Introduction

e preceding chapters have illustrated the value of the  scheme as comparative frame-
work for the study of civil-military relations. Building on the scheme’s empirical application
(Chapters , , , ), Chapter  evaluated and rejected the first and second research claims pre-
sented in this thesis about the existence of ‘Iberian’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘transitional’ styles of
control. Chapter  introduces neo-institutional theory to the study of civil-military relations
in Portugal and Spain. It tackles the third and fourth research claims (presented in Chapter 
Section .), by examining the explanatory reach of two different neo-institutionalist interpre-
tations; one based on ‘historical causes’ and the other on ‘constant causes’ (Chapter  Section
. ). Although these approaches have some limitations, this chapter shows that they do ad-
vance the understanding of the evolution of civil-military relations and policy instruments in
the cases discussed and potentially beyond.

us, Section  focuses on the third research claim and assesses to what extent the evolu-
tion of civil-military relations and tool choice can be explained by path-dependence. First, it
analyses the legacies of the main macro-historical events associated with the most important
political and military changes in the Peninsula (Chapters –). It shows that these events
altered the toolmix, creating critical junctures and new paths of civil-military relations. Sec-
ond, it explores the patterns of stability and change observed in tool choice and whether they
match path-dependence accounts. Finally, it concludes that although history matters, path-
dependence is not sufficient to explain the change in the toolkit and civil-military relations.
Section  analyses the fourth research claim about the role of context in shaping tool choice. It
revisits some of the findings exposed in the empirical chapters (–), focusing on the impact
of three sets of environmental factors: ideas, political institutional structure and the inter-
national environment. Finally, Section  recapitulates the main findings of this chapter and
argues that both types of explanations are intertwined and complement each other. It high-
lights that the macro-historical events produced junctures and new trajectories but that these
were in most cases not path-dependent. 
e specific cognitive and institutional context in
which choices were made also shaped the trajectories between critical junctures. 
is section
concludes by criticising ‘orthodox’ explanations based exclusively on historical or contextual
factors and suggesting that a combination of both approaches provides a more comprehesive
account of change in tool choice.
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10.2 Path-dependence: the legacies of macro-historical
events

is section explains the major changes observed in the trajectories of tool choice and civil-
military relations against the backdrop of the legacies of some macro-historical events. Many
authors in the sphere of historical neo-institutionalism interpret institutional change as a path-
dependent course of action in which dynamics triggered by a past events or process would
reproduce themselves even in the absence of the initial event or process. 
e empirical evi-
dence (Chapters –) suggests that the beginning and end of certain patterns in tool choice
coincided with some non-controllable overarching historical events, such as the Spanish Civil
War, the Second World War, the Colonial Wars and transitional political processes. 
is
section analyses whether these events left a legacy on civil-military relations and tool choice
which would exhibit the characteristics of path-dependence explanations. 
us, it examines
whether these events triggered endogenous self-reinforcing mechanisms and whether the evo-
lution of tool choice followed a pattern of punctuated equilibria. 
is section argues that the
macro-historical events acted as catalysts creating ‘critical junctures’ and change in the con-
trol toolkit. It shows that there were periods of relative stability followed by periods of change
(sometimes gradual and sometimes more abrupt) in the control toolkit. Moreover, it illustrates
the action of some self-reinforcing mechanisms and how temporal sequence affected choices
and outcomes. However, the analysis reveals some important limitations of path-dependence
explanations, which overall fail to completely capture the evolution observed in Portuguese
and Spanish civil-military relations.
10.2.1 Legacy of the Spanish Civil War
In Spain, the Civil War ‘legitimised’ to a great extent the use of violence (coercive organisa-
tion), manipulation of information (nodality effectors) and the concentration of military and
political power in the hands of Franco. 
e Civil War also produced the annihilation of the
previous state institutions, enabling Franco to provide jobs in the civil service and to appoint
military to political positions (non coercive organisation and authority tools). It also increased
the size of the army, depleted the treasury of the State, and created a long economic crisis that
constrained the availability of treasure severely (Chapters , ).
Beyond the direct impact on the basic resources, the Civil War entailed some other deeper
and more durable implications that set Spain on a distinct path of civil-military relations
which had important implications even after the dictatorship. 
e victory in the war ce-
mented Franco’s political and military leadership. Franco’s image was mythicised thanks to
support of the propaganda machinery (Blanco Escolá ; Cardona :). To the ex-
tent that even the ‘liberal’ military men who guided the reforms after his death continued to
For instance, Krasner (), David (, ), Arthur (), Hacker (, ), Mahoney ()
and Pierson (, , )
Although previous macro-historical events such as the First World War (Ferreira ; Telo ; Duarte
) or the Spanish colonial conflicts in Morocco (Cardona ; Balfour ; Navajas Zubeldia ) had
a strong impact on civil-military relations, the spotlight here is on those that occurred within the time-spam of
the research (–).
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declare themselves admirers of Franco. 
e systematic purges and the influx of heavily indoc-
trinated militia officers produced ideologically extremely homogeneous and obedient armed
forces. Moreover, the scarcity of material means made military education prioritise moral in-
doctrination over technical preparation. 
e official discourse portrayed the war as a crusade.
Discipline was emphasised as a moral and religious virtue (Chapter  Sections .., ..;
Chapter  Sections .., ..).
Due to the atrocities committed during and immediately after the war and the association
with the Italian Fascists and German Nazis, Franco’s regime was isolated by the international
community (Chapter  Section ..). 
is isolation limited economic exchanges but also
contacts with other armies and obstructed the influx of new ideas and had long-term con-
sequences in civil-military relations. 
e isolation also aggravated the already dire economic
situation of post-war Spain and negatively affected military salaries and equipment (Chapter
 Section .). 
e wide gap in terms of material conditions between Spain and most West
European armies and the lack of resources to bridge it pushed the government to accentuate
ideological indoctrination and isolation as a means to shield the military from a sad reality.
Later, self-recruitment as well as the education and socialisation of the military also acted
as self-reinforcement mechanism perpetuating a frozen military ideology (Chapter  Section
..). In sum, the Civil War deeply changed the armed forces (and the government) and
introduced a series of self-perpetuating mechanisms that contributed decisively to an extraor-
dinary degree of obedience to the figure of the dictator and created an ideologically cohesive
military (Busquets  []; Cardona ).

e positive impact of the Civil War on Franco’s control on the military can be better
appreciated when compared to the Portuguese case. 
e inception of the Estado Novo did
not follow the collapse of the previous military regime or a war. It was the result of a peaceful
transfer of power from the military to Salazar. However, Salazar and especially Caetano saw
their power over the armed forces limited by the fact that they had been chosen by the military,
which retained much power in the institutional arrangement. Many military were not pleased
with their appointments and others considered that the dictators were indebted to them.

roughout the regime there were always large groups within the armed forces that did not
support the government or even conspired against it (Rebelo de Sousa : ; Gunther
: ; Chapter  Sections .., ..). 
us, although both were civilian authoritarian
regimes their different inceptions introduced different durable inertias at the level of military
allegiance to the respective dictators.

e Spanish Civil War also affected Portugal, but on a lesser extent. Salazar shaped his
military and international relations strategy due to the threat that the instability in Spain
posed (Ferreira ; Ferreira :). 
e army grew to face a potential invasion which
slowed down the effort of a general modernisation of the armed forces launched in the early
s. Salazar took advantage of the war threat to divert the attention away from internal
affairs and to personally command the War Ministry from  despite the opposition of the
military hierarchy (Telo :). 
e conjuncture of the Spanish Civil War also allowed
Salazar to launch fundamental reforms for military subordination in  (Faria ; Duarte
).
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10.2.2 Legacy of the Second World War

e Second World War made forced Portugal to continue increasing the size of the armies in
order to face an eventual invasion. Salazar’s foreign and defence policies successfully managed
to maintain Portugal in a delicate balance vis-à-vis the pressures from the international powers
while steering internal tension between the military who were also divided in their support for
the Allies and the Axis (Rosas ; Telo ; Carrilho /ed.). During this period the
external threat seems to have reduced military conspiracy against the regime and legitimised
Salazar’s direct control over the War Ministry which he maintained until  (Chapter 
Section .).

e Second World War also produced a new configuration of the system of international
relations consolidating two blocs. 
is precipitated the creation of  in  to which
Portugal was invited not only owing to its strategic potential but also as a reward for its coop-
eration with the Allies during the War, especially through the cession of the Azores military
bases. Despite the insistence of the Portuguese government, Spain’s accession to  was ve-
toed due to its association with the Axis.  marked a new trend in civil-military relations
until the outbreak of the Colonial Wars (Chapter  Section ..). It mainly led to an increase
in the intensity of education and training and changes in organisational design, and, albeit to
a lesser extent, to the modernisation of weaponry and materials and a gradual decline in the
salience of nodality effectors (Chapter ). In this case a temporal separation between the event
that triggered the process, the Second World War and the change in tool choice trajectory can
be observed. 
is confirms that in some cases the manifestation of change in a social pattern
can be delayed from it causal mechanism (Pierson , ). Following Collier and Col-
lier’s critical juncture framework (:), the Second World War can be considered as an
antecedent to or condition for Portuguese membership in , which constituted the critical
juncture in the control toolkit.
 membership set Portugal on a path pushing the government to effect changes in the
control toolkit. However, these changes can also be interpreted not simply as the result of non-
controllable external shocks, as path-dependence explanations often assume but as the result
of a process of policy transfer or lesson-drawing (Rose ; Dolowitz and Marsh ; Lodge
and James ) in which the Portuguese government chose to apply a transnational template
of military organisation and control (Sahlin-Andersson ). Using Powell and DiMaggio’s
terminology (), the adoption of  templates better fit a process of normative than of
coercive isomorphism. 
e government was seeking legitimacy and support from the military,
who in a large majority advocated the  doctrine. 
e fact that the  allies could do
little to prevent Portugal to abandon (or reverse) most of these reforms when the colonial
conflict broke out confirms this point.
When the defeat of the Axis was likely, it became advisable for Franco to abandon the tools
of control associated to totalitarianism in order to gain the sympathy the Allies. After 
the utilisation of coercive organisation was reduced and almost completely abandoned after
 (Chapter  Section ..). However, the saturation of the judiciary and prison systems
caused by the repressive control policy and the fact that the armies had already been purged
For instance in  Franco announced a reduction of sentences for political prisoners as a means to change
the Allies’ negative perception of the regime (Preston :).
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were the fundamental reasons for this change of strategy (Dueñas ). 
us, the change
in the toolkit in this case seems to be the result of mechanisms of diminishing returns (or
self-undermining process) initiated during the Spanish Civil War rather than of a new critical
juncture.

e fundamental impact of the Civil War on Spain is related to the new international system
that it created. 
e ideological alignment with the Axis and the support received from Italy
and Germany during the Civil War provoked the rejection of Spain by the western allies. As
explained earlier, the isolation of Spain and its armed forces as well as the lack of resources
contributed to create a stable path of civil-military relations and tool choice until the semi-
liberalisation and opening in the late s. 
e apparent stability in civil-military relations
after the Second World War masks what could be described as a sort of ‘static process of
departure’ when considered against the backdrop of the general transformations that occurred
in civil-military relations in most countries in the western sphere, including Portugal. 
e lack
of changes in Spain gradually increased the gap vis-à-vis the model of civil-military relations
and armed forces in the West.
10.2.3 Legacy of the Colonial Wars

e colonial conflicts were the next macro-historical event that shaped Portuguese and Span-
ish civil-military relations. 
e Suez crisis in  meant a defeat of the traditional European
colonial attitude and marked the beginning of a cascade of nationalist independence move-
ments that expanded throughout Africa (Telo :–). 
is crisis can be considered a
direct antecedent to the Sidi-Ifni War in the Spanish North-African possessions (–)
and to the longer and more extensive Portuguese Colonial Wars (–).
In Spain, the colonial problem had a limited impact on civil-military relations. Despite the
efforts of the regime to hide the information about the Sidi-Ifni War, this conflict highlighted
the deficiencies of the armed forces and triggered the first crisis in the Armed Forces since the
Civil War (Losada ; Segura Valero ). 
e timid modernisation effort launched by
the Army Minister General Barroso in  can be linked to the problems of organisation,
training and scarcity of materials that the Sidi-Ifni conflict revealed. Nonetheless, the gradual
changes in terms of the control toolkit since the late s seem to be more directly correlated
to the opening of the regime and the exchanges with the  military than with the colonial
conflict. Moreover no major changes in the attitude of the military or the government can
be associated to the colonial conflict (Chapter  Sections ., ., .; Chapter ).

e impact of the colonial conflicts was much stronger in Portugal. Salazar’s colonialist
stance was very unpopular among most  allies and the Portuguese officers that had em-
braced the new  doctrine. 
e violence used to suppress a rebellion in Angola in ,
A similar argument was used by Paul Pierson, in his lecture ‘Welfare State Reform Over the (Very) Long-
run’ at the  (//), who argued that the apparent stability of welfare indicators after  was hiding
a deep impact on redistribution and social policy when considering all the socio-economic changes that took
place after that date.
For instance the article ‘El año militar’ in , (//) stresses the important visits of senior officers to
the , including that of General Barroso who visited the main military facilities and the Pentagon and discussed
the need for modernisation.
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the likely fraud in the presidential elections of , the steps towards decolonisation by
France and the  and John F. Kennedy’s presidency marked a change in the international
community’s stance towards Portugal. Salazar’s rigid colonialism often embarrassed its 
allies (Robinson :). From , Portugal began to detach itself from  and the 
and abandoned the -inspired reforms. 
e change in the military and defence strategies
and priorities was accentuated in  when the Defence Minister Botelho Moniz, who had
launched many of the -related reforms, failed his coup against Salazar and was forced
to resign (Maxwell :–). Salazar was aware of the American collaboration with the
plotters and the independence movements in Africa (Mahoney ). 
e inflexible attitude
vis-à-vis the military who surrendered Goa to Indian Armies in December , underscores
Salazar’s firm decision to prioritise the defence of the colonies over all other considerations.
Portugal was, thus, locked into a long Colonial War with little chances to secure a durable
victory in the long-term. 
is war constrained all basic control resources, limited the effective-
ness of many of the control tools and enormously increased military dissatisfaction (Chapter
 Sections ., .; Chapter )

e impact of the Colonial Wars on Portuguese civil-military relations also reveals what
Pierson calls a ‘slow-moving causal process’ and ‘threshold effect’ (Pierson , ). 
e
long Portuguese Colonial wars had a cumulative effect on military satisfaction. Many military
began to feel gradually more detached and dissatisfied with the regime. 
e enactment of the
Decree-Law  in , which granted privileges to conscript officers, was a landmark in
the deterioration of civil-military relations. Military discontent reached a critical level and the
coup against the Estado Novo was triggered, transforming civil-military relations.
In Portugal the effect of the Colonial Wars was also amplified by the previous impact of
 on the Portuguese military. 
is can be construed as an example of how sequences
of events matter and can produce unintended consequences (Mahoney ). 
rough the
contacts with other armed forces, the Portuguese military had developed a more critical per-
spective on their professional role and on the policies of the regime. 
e decisions of the
government concerning the colonial conflicts were against many of the ideas introduced by
the ‘ generation’. Gradually, dissatisfaction increased until the military decided to plot
against the government. Had Portugal not joined  and not been exposed to different
military and political ideas, the effect of the Colonial Wars might have been very different. In
Spain, the process of decolonisation did not produce any visible impact on military allegiance
to Franco. Salazar had previously used the threats of the Spanish Civil War and the Second
World War as a means to strengthen his leadership. However, the Colonial Wars became a
fundamental cause of the fall of his regime.
10.2.4 Legacy of the Political Transitions

e transitions into democracy in the two countries can be interpreted as macro-historical
events producing critical junctures in civil-military trajectories. In Spain, after the death of
Franco, some of the political transformations and terrorist violence became a source of dis-
content in the ranks. 
e transformations in the control policy introduced during the Suárez’s

e change of priorities in defence policy was not made official until  (Telo :–).
See abundant information in , divisão , secção , caixa .
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governments did not succeed in preventing military insubordination. 
e strategy of granting
a high degree of autonomy and imposing soft sanctions on insubordination did not seem to
generate a positive feedback. On the contrary, this strategy reinforced the determination of
the military conspirators who interpreted it as a sign of government weakness. 
e failure of
the  coup in  as well as Spanish membership to  and the land-slide victory of
the socialist party in  created the opportunity for new, deeper changes in the government
toolkit and contributed to the subordination of the military (Chapter  Section .; Chapter
).
In Portugal, the political instability generated throughout  and  delegitimised the
revolutionary approach of the Gonçalvist sector of the. As during the military dictatorship
from  to , the insensitivity of the military-led governments to the country’s problems
made the governments unpopular and convinced most military of the need to hand power
back to civilians. 
e failed coup attempt by the revolutionary left in November  served
to consolidate the-Moderates in power and paved the way to depoliticisation of the armed
forces and profound changes in the control toolkit (Chapter  Section .; Chapter ).
In both countries the transitions from authoritarian rule were complex processes that did
not directly result in a new stable path of civil-military relations and control toolkit. 
e con-
trol policies launched immediately after the end of the dictatorial regimes did not generate
any equilibrium or self-reinforcing dynamics that would have contributed to a stable path of
military subordination. On the contrary, they contributed to create a window of opportunity
for military plotters to try to overthrow the newly established governments. Yet, in both coun-
tries the coup attempts failed and ended up strengthening civilian authority and legitimising
transformations in the control toolkit.

e coup of November  in Portugal and in part that of February  in Spain can be
considered critical junctures. 
ese were not merely the result of non-controllable exogenous
shocks but to a great extent endogenously generated by civil-military relations. 
is is in line
with some critiques of pure path-dependence that tend to ignore the endogenously generated
turning points in institutional or policy trajectories (Greif and Laitin ; Howlett b).
10.2.5 Patterns in change

is section shows that the trajectories that followed the critical junctures did not always
conform to the stable self-reinforcing dynamics that path dependence would predict. Path-
dependence explanations usually depict change through punctuated equilibrium models and
underestimate incremental changes across time (
elen ; Peters et al. :). 
ey
have focused on critical junctures that elicit dramatic shifts followed by periods of stability. 
e
previous sections have confirmed that some macro-historical events unleashed critical junc-
tures, truncating trajectories and inducing changes in civil-military relations and tool choice.
However in order to assess the fitness and sufficiency of orthodox path-dependence explana-
tions it is also required to scrutinise the modes of institutional change that can be observed
in Portugal and Spain throughout the period analysed. 
is section synthesises the dynamics

e Spanish Civil War can also be considered a to great extent endogenously-generated critical juncture.
Since its causes fall out of the time-boundary of this research it has not been mentioned earlier.

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observed between different junctures showing that change in the toolkit was not a homoge-
neous process. Sometimes changes were abrupt, correlated to specific events and conducive
to distinct new paths and stability (as path dependency would predict). Nonetheless, at some
other times, changes were gradual and cannot easily be linked to the legacy of cathartic events.

e most abrupt changes in the control toolkit following historical junctures took place
in Spain at the start of the Civil War and under the  government; and in Portugal after
 accession, the outset of the colonial conflicts and the failed left-wing coup of November
.

e Spanish Civil War triggered an escalation in the utilisation of violent means unpar-
alleled in contemporary Spanish history. Violence suddenly became a control mechanism
employed extensively on civilians and military outside the battlefield. Political trials, impris-
onment, torture and executions were systematically applied to those suspected of disloyalty or
allegiance to the rival camp (Payne ; Preston  []). Equally, nodality tools quickly
reached a new height. Newspapers, pamphlets, posters, radio programmes and a multiplicity
of publications in the armed forces contributed to a far-reaching propaganda campaign aim-
ing to ensure loyalty and motivate the military. Many new information services were created,
collecting military and political information (Chapter ). 
e reforms launched by the social-
ist defence minister Narcís Serra were the other example of rapid and drastic changes in Spain
and can be easily linked to the legacy of the transitional process and the  coup. Having
learnt from the problems faced by the ’s hesitant reform agenda, the socialist government
opted for more decisive and swift action (Agüero ). From  a set of military reforms
were implemented, generating profound changes in the utilisation of all four basic resources
and decisively contributing to military subordination (Chapter ).
In Portugal,  membership in  quickly triggered important changes. From 
to , the partial modernisation of materials and weaponry and, most importantly, funda-
mental reforms of the organisation, working methods, education and training were introduced
following the model of the  Armed Forces. However, the rise of African independentist
movements in the late s and the prospect of a colonial conflict produced new drastic
changes. 
e onset of the Colonial Wars led to the quick reversal of most of the reforms
initiated during the s. 
e  withdrew its material support to Portugal. 
e need of
larger armed forces and the decentralisation and remote geographical situation of the con-
tingents quickly produced a step back in the process of improvement of military education
and centralisation of decision-making stimulated by  (Chapter ). Immediately after the
fall of the Estado Novo, there were substantial changes at the level of civil-military relations
but not so many at the level of the control strategy. Only after the failed November 
coup attempt did the new -moderate government drastically change its control approach.
Coercive organisation instruments as well as propaganda, censorship and political surveillance
on the military were removed from the toolkit, and authority rewards and incentives were
replaced by sanctions and constraints (Chapter ).
Although the First Carlist War (–) produced many casualties in the battlefield, arguably political
repression was not as systematic.

ese changes had profound repercussion on civil-military relations and can be connected to Botelho
Moniz’  coup attempt and the  Carnations Revolution (Duarte :).
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Orthodox path-dependence interpretations would expect that abrupt changes occurred in
critical junctures are followed by stable trajectories. 
ere were only four periods in which
these stable paths can be observed: in Portugal during the s and during the Colonial
Wars; and in Spain during the Civil War and from  to the late s. As explained earlier
(Sections .., ..; Chapter ), in Portugal the Spanish Civil War did not produce very
strong changes in the control toolkit and the impact of the Second World War was delayed
until the formation of . 
us, from the reforms launched in December  to those
linked to membership there were few significant variations in the control toolkit (despite
many transformations at the level of foreign policy and defence strategy associated to the
Second World War). 
e quick reversal of the -led reforms after the outbreak of the
colonial conflicts was followed by a period with few changes in the control mix that lasted
until November . 
e-led provisional governments did not produce any considerable
change, except arguably for changes in the intensity of some of the tools (Chapter ). In Spain,
the control toolkit adopted in  at the onset of the Civil War remained unaltered for the
rest of the conflict. After  the isolation of the regime and the low levels of contestation
within the ranks also contributed to a freeze in the control style until the reforms initiated in
the late s (triggered by the exchanges with the  Armed Forces and the Sidi-Ifni War)
(Chapter ).

e abrupt changes originated at historical junctures and the stable paths outlined above
could match a path-dependence and punctuated equilibrium accounts. Notwithstanding, not
all of the evolution observed fits this pattern. 
ere were several other periods characterised
by less abrupt but important transformations in tool choice such as the gradual changes im-
plemented in Spain from the end of the Civil War to the mid s, those from the late s
to the first  government; and in Portugal the reforms in the s and after .
In Spain, during the Second World War there was a gradual abandonment of the repressive
means of controlling the military. 
ese changes are partially associated with self-undermining
mechanisms introduced during the Civil War but also reflect the loss of legitimacy of the
repressive means of control associated with fascism and totalitarianism. In parallel to the grad-
ual opening of the regime, from the late s until the end of the dictatorship, moderate
attempts of modernisation of equipment and organisational design were undertaken (Chap-
ter ). 
ese changes can be very limitedly correlated to any of the macro-historical events
analysed earlier. 
e substantial alterations in the control toolkit during the transition were
also introduced in a piecemeal fashion and did not elicit a stable equilibrium or trajectory.
In Portugal, several successive reforms progressively altered the control toolkit and civil-
military relations throughout the s. Overall this period cannot be clearly considered a
critical juncture or a stable equilibrium. After major transformations occurred in the wake of
the coup of November , the control toolkit experienced new, gradual changes at the level
of military education, the modernisation of equipment and the development of intelligence

ese changes can be linked to the saturation of the organisation capacity of the state and the fact that the
armed forces had already been purged of all discordant voices.

e Sidi-Ifni war had an impact but cannot be deemed the major driver for change.

is was due to the relative political weakness of the government and the opposition encountered within
the ranks (Busquets and Losada ).

ese reforms were slowed down and partially hindered by the different contradictory views within the
armed forces and by the changing nature or international threats (Faria ; Duarte ).
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Table : Patterns in the evolution of tool choice
Portugal Spain
Times of abrupt changes After  membership
Outbreak of the Colonial
Wars
After the coup of Novem-
ber 
Outbreak of the Civil War
After 
Periods of stability s Civil War
Colonial Wars From  to late s
Periods of gradual changes s Second World War
From  to  From late s to 
services (Chapters , ). 
ese choices were not contingent upon the legacy of one specific
external shock.
In sum, in both countries there were periods of relative stability and periods of incremental
or abrupt change in the tool trajectories (Table ). 
e fact that change was often gradual
and not directly correlated to any internal mechanism of self-reproduction triggered during
a critical juncture disconfirms orthodox path-dependence explanations and punctuated equi-
librium models and suggests that beyond the impact of past historical events there were other
factors contributing to changes in tool choice.
10.2.6 Summing up: path-dependent civil-military relations?
Most concepts associated with path-dependence explanations (Chapter  Section ..) have
been identified in the context of Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations. 
ey can
explain many of the changes observed in civil-military relations in the Peninsula. However,
they are by themselves insufficient to capture the entire evolution observed in tool choices.
History matters but is not enough to fully explain the evolution of the control toolkit.

e evolution observed somewhat matches path-dependence explanations if considered in
a broad sense as what occurred earlier in time affects the outcomes in a sequence of events
(Sewell :–). Some macro-historical events, such as the Spanish Civil War, the
Second World War, the Colonial Wars and the political transitions acted as ‘historical causes’
that put the control toolkit on a particular path different from that of the other country which
shared similar initial conditions. 
us, like path-dependence explanations, this thesis suggests
a certain sense of contingency in the unfolding of events (Mahoney ). Moreover, some
features of path-dependence explanations have been identified in this chapter, such as the
enduring legacies of external shocks, sequence effects and self-reinforcing dynamics (Section
.).
However, if path-dependence is understood in a more restrictive orthodox way (Arthur
; Mahoney :; Rixen and Viola ) then it fails to explicate civil-military rela-
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tions and tool choice in the Peninsula. 
e evidence shows that choices were not completely
locked into paths or the result of increasing returns or positive feedback mechanisms gen-
erated by past external shocks (as orthodox path-dependency would predict). 
e empirical
evidence also suggests the importance of agency and that some of the critical junctures may
have been largely endogenously generated by the system of civil-military relations. Moreover,
what seems a path at one level of analysis is not necessarily one at a different level. Finally
path-dependence can illustrate why the opportunity for change is created but it does not help
predicting the direction or specific nature of change in the toolkit.
As Section . has shown, the evolution of the control toolkit and of civil-military relations
in general in the Peninsula does not completely fit a model of punctuated equilibria. Portugal
and Spain experienced some critical junctures and periods of quick changes but these were not
always followed by stable trajectories. Although these critical junctures created new patterns
in the utilisation of tools it would be very difficult, at least at the level of the control toolkit to
find periods of complete stasis. 
ere were variations between critical junctures not directly
linked to the legacies of the events that induced them. Even during the times of relative
stability, such as the s in Portugal and from the mid-s to the mid-s in Spain, if
analysed closely enough, it is easy to perceive some changes (Chapters , ).

e phenomenon of inertia or institutional reproduction (North ; 
elen ; Pier-
son ) can be observed at two stages. First, it is portrayed at the level of military ideology
and attitudes in Spain. All the officers considered liberal or critical with Franco’s regime were
purged during and after the Civil War. 
e military who remained in the armed forces were
very conservative and loyal to Franco groomed the following generations of military. 
is was
a self-reinforcing mechanism that made the Spanish Armed Forces increasingly homogenous
and loyal. Later, the isolation from other armed forces that followed the Second World War
reinforced this inertia. Second, the limited availability of treasure, an excess of officers and
the oversize of the armies, generated by the wars, ‘locked’ Portugal and Spain into a pattern
of low utilisation of treasure that was compensated by an important utilisation of ‘cheaper’
tools such as authority-based rewards and incentives and intensive propaganda. Equipment
expenditure was very low and the weapons and technical means for the defence of the coun-
tries became obsolete for the new type of warfare the Second World War had introduced.
In order to compensate the lack of material means and preserve military morale, the Iberian
regimes emphasised manpower and moral values over material means. Moreover, the Second
World War proved that the Portuguese Armed Forces could not defend alone the country
and complicated the acquisition of modern equipment by the Francoist regime. 
ese facts
contributed to shift the role of the military from defence against the external enemy to the
defence against internal threats. 
is new role was more compatible with and the tool mix in
place, i.e. high utilisation of authority incentives and nodality effectors and low use of treasure
(Chapers , ).
However, self-reinforcing dynamics were not all-pervasive. For instance, the significant re-
duction of the utilisation of coercive organisation tools in Spain from  to  seems
to be associated with a process of diminishing returns. In the case of Portugal, it is difficult
to identify clear patterns of positive feedback that contributed to the stability of the model
As explained in Chapter  Sections .. and .., the contacts of Portuguese officers with other armed
forces created the opposite effect.
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of civil-military relations. On the contrary, it seems that the circumstances surrounding the
inception and the institutional arrangement of the Estado Novo facilitated continuous chal-
lenges to the civilian supremacy and therefore introduced elements of instability. Despite the
absence of apparent mechanisms of reinforcement sometimes the control toolkit remained
stable, for instance in Portugal after the overthrow of Caetano. 
is suggests that other types
of forces beyond the initial ‘historical causes’ and the existence of a certain degree of agency
beyond pure structural or deterministic explanations were at play (Hall and Taylor ; Hay
and Wincott ; Peters et al. ). In this case stability in civil-military relations and
the reproduction of the toolkit seems to be due to the active involvement of some political
actors which were influenced not only by past legacies but also by the current cognitive and
institutional context in which they took decisions.
Additionally, orthodox path-dependence explanations would attribute the initial impulse
for change to forces exogenous to the systems of civil-military relations (Chapter  Section
..). However, the evidence suggests that individuals and institutions within the system had
the capacity to effect changes and shape policy outputs (Chapters –; Chapter  Section
..). Moreover, some of the macro-historical events that triggered critical junctures, if
analysed with the sufficient historical distance, can be considered as endogenously generated
by the system of civil-military relations. 
is is the case for the Spanish Civil War, the collapse
of the Estado Novo and the coups of November  in Portugal and February  in Spain
(Chapter , ). 
ese historical events were, to a great extent, brought about by past decisions
from within the system of civil-military relations.

e level of analysis is also problematic (Waltz ; Singer ; Schonhardt-Bailey
). Policy elements are embedded or ‘nested’ in interrelated but not completely syn-
chronous levels. 
ree levels of analysis or abstraction can be distinguished: a macro-level of
general policy styles and abstract policy goals for civil-military relations; a meso-level related
to alternative policy objectives and tool combinations; and a micro-level of choices surround-
ing specific policy targets and tool calibrations. 
is thesis shows that at different levels of
analysis the patterns of evolution observed may vary. 
erefore the inertias or paths observed
at one level may not be as stable from a different level of analysis.
Probably the most interesting illustration of this can be found in the case of Portugal from
the Colonial Wars until the end of . In this period from the macro-perspective of civil-
military relations there was a clear break, especially manifested in the Carnation Revolution
and the fact that the military took over power (Chapter  Section .). However, if this
period is analysed from the meso-perspective of the control toolkit it can be concluded that
there were no fundamental changes, that the logic of control remained to a great extent similar
and that the governments continued to rely on a similar mix of basic resources. Finally, at the
micro-level, when examining the specific tool choices it needs to be stressed that the stability
in the meso-level did not imply a complete stasis. After the fall of Caetano the provisional
governments replaced many of the tools they were using by similar ones. For instance, the
/, Legion, Mocidade and the Estado Novo’s propaganda machinery were replaced
by the , , the Fifth Division and  which performed similar control tasks

is distinction is inspired by Howlett (:–). 
is thesis mainly focuses on the trajectories at a
macro and meso level. See ideas about embeddedness of different levels or orders in Hall () and Howlett
().
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(Chapter ). 
erefore, different patterns and types of explanation can be identified according
to levels of analysis adopted. 
e impact of macro-historical events, and probably also that of
other contextual factors and individual actions, can be asymmetric at different institutional
and policy levels.
Finally, although the external shocks explain why previous courses of action were truncated
and new windows of opportunity for action were opened at the level of civil-military relations,
they are less effective in explaining the specific nature of change or direction at the level of the
tool mix. Path-dependence explanations fit some of the choices of specific tools but overall
the explanatory value of the macro-historical events decreases when descending the ladder of
abstraction and looking into the specific choices. 
e next section shows that other explana-
tions that take into account not only structure but also agency complement path-dependence
accounts.
In sum, all four overarching contextual events examined generated critical junctures in the
control toolkit and in civil-military relations and produced distinct legacies or trajectories.
Path-dependence provides an interesting way conceptualise ex-post the evolution of civil-
military relations and partly that of the tools of government. 
e analysis of these trajectories
reveals a variety of the fundamental features or mechanisms associated with path-dependence
explanations. However, at the same time they also underline some of the main limitations of
pure path-dependence interpretations, such as the existence of mechanisms beyond positive
feedbacks or inertia, the absence of attention to endogenously generated change and the prob-
lems of accommodating different levels of analysis (Table ). History matters but it does not
provide the whole picture and narrow path-dependence interpretations are ‘too contingent
and too deterministic’ (
elen :) to capture all choices and major changes observed
in this thesis. 
erefore, alternative and complementary explanations need to be explored in
order to qualify accounts based on path-dependence.
10.3 Environmental factors: the continuing action of context

e previous section has argued that path-dependence models do not appear to be good indi-
cators to predict change. External shocks produced by macro-historical events help explain-
ing the emergence of new trajectories but not their nature or direction. Persistence and inertia
do not account for all the change observed. Neo-institutionalism also provides other analytical
concepts that are rooted in the ideational and institutional context and can serve to refine the
explanations about the evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations (Chapter  Section
..). 
is section examines three sets of environmental factors (ideas, the political institu-
tional structure and the international environment) and provides examples that illustrate how
the ongoing action of context shaped civil-military relations and tool choice.
Similar criticisms have been made by Raadschelders (), Peters (:–) and Weyland ().
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Table : Summary of the evaluation of path-dependence explanations
Analytical
concepts

eoretical claims fitting path-
dependence

eoretical claims not fitting path-
dependence
Critical junc-
tures
All macro-historical events observed
produced critical junctures and deep
changes in civil-military relations
Did not always produce stable paths in
civil-military relations. Moreover its im-
pact can be asymmetric at different lev-
els of analysis
Exogenous
shocks
All change observed has been directly
or indirectly associated with external
shocks
In the long-term some of the macro-
historical events were partially
endogenously-generated
Punctuated
equilibria

ere were periods of stability and peri-
ods of drastic changes
During some periods changes were
gradual and did not follow a clear stable
path
Self-
reinforcing
mechanisms
Some events produced long term lega-
cies on civil military-relations through
self-reinforcing (and self-undermining)
dynamics
Choices of tools do not seem completely
locked-in by self-reproducing mecha-
nisms
Sequence
and timing
Some events saw their effects ampli-
fied due to the specific timing or se-
quence in which they took place. Many
choices were shaped by earlier choices,
outcomes and events
Some choices do not seem directly cor-
related to or constrained by past events
and choices but fundamentally to the
current circumstances
10.3.1 Ideas

e cognitive dimension of the context shapes the toolkit in several ways. Decision-makers
operate within an interpretive framework of ideas or policy paradigm that specifies not only the
problems and goals but also the tools that can be used to solve a problem (Hall :–).

e shared ideologies of government and control, the economic and technocratic ideas, and
the personal past experiences and individual perceptions of decision-makers, help explaining
some of the trends portrayed in the previous chapters.
First, shared ideologies of government and control doctrines affected civil-military rela-
tions and tool choice. 
e origins of these regimes were saturated with the fascist autocratic
ideologies that emerged in Europe in the s and s and that legitimised an intrusive
approach to control and military participation in the state apparatus. Indoctrination and a
partial politicisation of the armed forces were carried out through intensive censorship, pro-
paganda and a significant participation of the military in the state apparatus. Other features
of the control toolkit that are associated with these ideologies are the utilisation of paramili-
tary forces, such as the Carlist and Falangist militias during the Civil War and the Portuguese
Legion; the secret political police //; the political purges conducted in the Span-
Chapters ,  Sections .. See Campinos () and Payne (). However, Salazar’s and Franco’s were
not fascist totalitarian but authoritarian conservative regimes in which a series of different ideologies coexisted
(de Miguel :–; Medina : ; Linz: ).
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ish Armed Forces until ; and the concentration of power in the hands of the dictators
(Preston , Medina ).
Salazar’s and Franco’s initial admiration for the fascist governments and their partial imi-
tation is well-documented (Ferro ; Salazar ; Preston ; Loff ). 
e adop-
tion of these approaches to control can be interpreted as a process of mimetic isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell ) in the context of a very unstable and changing national and
international environment. 
us, uncertainty made the dictators imitate some of the control
mechanisms implemented by Mussolini and Hitler. Imitation was also a way to acquire le-
gitimacy and support from these regimes. Later, with the fall of the Axis and in the context
of the Cold War, authoritarian and totalitarian views became discredited in the eyes of the
international community in the West. 
e easing of repression in Spain from  as well as
the gradual decrease in the intensity of propaganda and censorship (Chapters  Sections .,
.) can be interpreted partially as the result of new normative pressures from the West and
the search for legitimacy and international recognition.
Second, economic ideas also affected on the control toolkit. 
e austerity approach to
public spending that Salazar strongly advocated in the s seriously constrained salaries and
the modernisation of equipment (Chapter  Section .; Faria ). Although the impact of
the great depression had not been very strong in Portugal, Salazar was convinced that austerity
was the best way to reduce trade imbalances. 
e initial success of his economic measures
reinforced his conviction and austerity remained a driving principle throughout his mandate;
only the advent of the Colonial Wars made him soften the grip on military expenditure (Mata
and Valério :–).
In Spain, the ‘developmentalist’ economic ideas implemented by the technocratic govern-
ments from  to  also severely constrained the availability of treasure for military
purposes (Chapter  Section .). Defence expenditure was not a priority for the technocrats
- to the extent that Finance Minister Navarro Rubio considered the military budget was an
‘unproductive drain on the economy’. 
e economic boom of the s served to increase
expenditure on public infrastructure, education and agriculture, which was considered prior-
ity for the development of the country, but not to increase noticeably military expenditure
(Preston :; Comín and Diaz :–). Equally, technocratic ideas during the
s made officers’ appointments to jobs in the administration and government less accept-
able (de Miguel :). Developmentalist ideas also contributed to the constant decline of
defence budgets relative to total public expenditure and a drop of the percentage of military
working in the public administration during the transition and early democratic stages in both
countries.

ird, the ideas and perceptions of decision-makers, including personal inclinations, ex-
periences or interests, had an impact on the choice of instruments. Although bounded by
history and context, decision-makers are still capable of taking purposeful decisions (Katznel-
son ). 
is was especially obvious during the dictatorships. Franco’s and Salazar’s personal
preferences were to a great extent reflected in their governments’ policy choices. For instance,
their paternalistic view of the regime can be linked to the use of the state apparatus as a means
Speech delivered in the Francoist Cortes in . 
ese ideas were not shared by the military. Army Min-
ister Barroso proposed to submit Navarro Rubio to a military trial for his remarks. However, Franco supported
Navarro Rubio’s military budget cut plan (Navarro Rubio :–).
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to dispense services, goods and jobs to the military as well as a justification for information
control and censorship (Crollen :; Bañón :–; Medina :).
Franco’s experience as a field officer during the Rif War (–), during which he
led several repression campaigns against the local rebels and sometimes had to take harsh
disciplinary measures on his troops, had hardened him. 
is experience can be understood as
an antecedent for the repressive control measures he adopted during the Civil War (Preston
). Franco always considered himself a military and maintained close contact with them.
He constantly granted private audiences to officers, often gave military speeches and used
his network of acquaintances in the armed forces as a nodality tool (Chapter  Section .).
Franco, as many other military, believed the armed forces should have an important degree
of autonomy and develop their own internal mechanisms of self-control. He avoided the
utilisation of paramilitary or police forces and civilian intelligence services as a check on the
armed forces and restored seniority as a principle for promotions (Chapter  Sections ..,
.., ..).
Salazar was a reserved man, he maintained more distant relationships with the military and
did not enjoy public acts of glorification (Ferro  [–]:–). Salazar’s past as a
law professor was also shaped his somewhat legalistic approach to government and control.
For example, Salazar managed to renew completely the top tier of the Portuguese Armed
Forces and to stimulate adherence to the regime, almost exclusively using a set of decrees
enacted in  (Chapter  Section .). He did not trust the military as much as Franco and
relied on espionage and external paramilitary bodies to control them.

e personal experiences of the Portuguese officers in the Colonial Wars also influenced
the control toolkit during transition. 
e counter-insurgency techniques that were intensively
used in Africa profoundly marked the strategic thinking of the military (Teixeira :).

e intensive utilisation of nodality, the politicisation of the military and the implication of
the civilian population in anti-insurgent action are the clearest examples of this. 
e use of
propaganda stemmed from the military exposure to the propaganda techniques used among
the pro-independence movements and counter-insurgency in the s and s. 
e
psychological action on the local population and the enemy during the Colonial Wars acquired
enormous relevance (Chapter  Section ..). 
e military were also exposed to socialist and
communist ideas during their fight, to the extent that many of officers embraced them. 
e
creation of a parallel structure of political control imitated to a great extent the organisation
of some contemporary leftist parties and organisations. Finally, the use of loyal civilians to
counter military insurgency, as in November , could have been inspired by the utilisation
of paramilitary groups of settlers in the African conflict.
Franco joined the Spanish forces in Africa in . He received several combat distinctions and was pro-
moted to the rank of major at the age of  and to that of brigadier-general at the age of . From  to 
he was the second in command in the Spanish Legion; an elite colonial corps equivalent to the French Foreign
Legion.

e Estado Novo was characterised by Unamuno as a ‘sort of academic fascism’or as a ‘military-academic
dictatorship’. Originally published in ‘Ahora’ on  July  (Medina :–). See also Massis’s depiction
of Salazar (Massis ).
For instance Otelo who was one of the most influential figures during the revolution had worked on
psychological warfare in the colonies. Spínola was also deeply involved in counter-insurgency in Angola.
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During the Spanish transition, the vast majority of the military, including the reformists
such as Defence Minister Gutiérrez Mellado, felt a strong sense of attachment to Franco and
his regime (Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste :–). Most members of the transitional
governments had been involved in the previous regime apparatus and were averse to drastic
changes. 
is contributes to explain the insufficient military reforms and high degree of mili-
tary autonomy during Suárez’s governments (Barrachina :–; Busquets and Losada
:). 
e majority of the military continued to think that the Defence Minister and the
Government remained merely administrators of military budgets (Puell de la Villa :).
Moreover, the traumatic memories of the Civil War also made decision-makers behave very
cautiously and avoid measures that could disturb hardliners and provoke their intervention in
politics.
In sum, these examples show that ideas altered policy preferences and choices. First, the rise
and fall of fascist ideologies can be associated with the introduction and later dismissal of some
control tools. Second, the economic austerity and technocratic ideas affected the utilisation
of treasure. Finally, the personal experiences and views of decision-makers also influenced tool
choice. Especially, Franco’s and Salazar’s individual interests, experiences and inclinations left
a clear imprint in the toolkit.
10.3.2 Political Institutional Structure

e political setting influenced tool choice by making available and constraining basic re-
sources and their utilisation. Dictatorial political arrangements facilitated the implementation
of the rulers’ preferences in the control toolkit. 
e political transformations which resulted
in a distribution of power among diverse actors and institutions were also reflected in the tool
choice dynamics. Political conflict and bargaining initially hindered the adoption and imple-
mentation of some reforms, but later contributed to stability in civil-military relations and
tool-choice.
Salazar and Franco designed their new political and administrative institutional orders.
Hence the high concentration of power they enjoyed is not surprising. 
e state appara-
tus became a malleable instrument in the hands of the dictators, especially in Spain where
the previous institutions had been completely dismantled during and after the war (Richards
:). 
e new political system was conceived to avoid checks to Franco’s actions. He
held the absolute authority and was not to be held accountable for his decisions (Chapter 
Section ..). Rather than to the strength and supreme authority imposed by the dictator,
the longevity of the Estado Novo was more due to Salazar’s management of equilibria among
the elites (Rosas ; ). 
e Estado Novo maintained some institutional features of
liberal origin such as the National Assembly, some laws, the higher autonomy of the Church
and armed forces. 
us, although in the Estado Novo there was no real scrutiny or political
opposition there were more actors with a capacity to influence or oppose decisions from the
government than in Spain (Chapter  Section ..).
Equally, the high degree of centralisation of decisions and information flows strengthened
nodality as a control resource. Salazar and Franco held the executive and legislative powers and
no judge would rule against their decisions, the use of authority instruments was fully at their
discretion. Salazar and Franco also controlled budgets and if they had deemed it necessary they

E    
could have used treasure more intensively as well. Overall, the institutional characteristics of
the regime stimulated the availability of the four basic resources for the dictators and did not
constitute any relevant hindrance for their flexible utilisation (Chapters , , , ).
During Caetano’s rule there was a shift from a system that concentrated most power in the
Prime Minister to a system in which power was shared in an unstable equilibrium between the
President of the Council of Ministers and that of the Republic (Rebelo de Sousa :).
Caetano also faced stronger political opposition and pressures from the military (Graham
; Fernandes ). 
e veto power of the military and the power shift created some
rigidity and contributed to the continuation of certain policies and tools despite the prefer-
ences of the government. Moreover, during Caetano’s rule the changes in the military strategy
were constrained by the highly legalistic and bureaucratic institutional framework that slowed
down reforms and precluded more energetic actions to counter upheavals (Chapter  Section
..; Maxwell :).
Executive and legislative power was much more fragmented after the end of the dictator-
ships. 
e supremacy of governments was reduced and new actors acquired the capacity to
shape or obstruct policy choices. In Spain, during Suárez’s minority governments the military
gained autonomy and the capacity to shape civil-military relations (Chapter  Sections ..,
..). 
e newly created Defence Ministry was in a weak position vis-à-vis the branches;
in  only  of the budget was controlled by the central coordination body of the min-
istry (Rodrigo :). 
e formal legal subordination of the armed forces to civilian rule
remained ambiguous (Puell de la Villa :). 
e veto power of the military became
evident. Some of the reforms were slowed down by the military ministers and other top
rank officers, the practice often did not follow the formal principles and regulations (Ballbé
:–). For instance, three years were necessary to launch the  after its legal
inception in  (Puell de la Villa :–). 
e Socialist government, having a com-
fortable majority in the parliament and wide public support, managed to curb the autonomy
and veto power of the military and to introduce fundamental reforms (Chapter ).
Compared to Spain the fragmentation of power and institutional volatility marked more
profoundly civil-military relations in the Portuguese transition. During the period of pro-
visional governments, the continuous reshuﬄes of governments, the multiplicity of bodies
sharing governmental functions and the decisions to link the armed forces hierarchically to
the President and not to the Defence Ministry undermined the capacity of the government to
reform civil-military relations (Chapter  Section ). 
e middle management in the public
administration that had served during the previous regime was removed, accelerating the pro-
cess of fragmentation. 
e public sector grew and political appointments increased (Graham
:, –). 
e over-bureaucratisation of the administrative apparatus hindered
the consolidation of strong independent political parties (Opello :). In this scenario
characterised by reversals in policy choices, bureaucratic barriers and internal grievances gov-
ernments held on to a control strategy that was basically a continuation of that of the Estado
Novo. Inertia and red-tape prevailed and the control mix remained essentially unchanged
until  (Chapter ).
For instance the changes in budgets were problematic and therefore there was little flexibility for the utilisa-
tion of treasure-based tools. 
e fragmentation made the different governing factions rely on nodal effectors such
as speeches, pamphlets, posters and press releases in order to impose their view on the model of civil-military
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From  to , veto actors such as the , the President of the Republic, political
parties and the military can be considered responsible for slowing down and hindering some
of the reforms in civil-military relations. 
e best example can be found in the Law for Con-
stitutional Reform that faced intense institutional opposition during its drafting process. 
e
 and the  opposed the law and President Eanes tried to veto it. 
e reform was finally
approved by the Assembly in  and contributed to approach Portugal to the western model
of civil-military relations by abolishing the  and therefore the formal veto power that the
military had held since the fall of the Estado Novo (Graham ). 
e consolidation of a
western democratic type of regime characterised by a division of powers among different polit-
ical institutions and several legal checks contributed to the stability in the path of convergence
observed in these countries after .
In sum, the political-institutional structure acted as a ‘constant cause’ facilitating and/or
hindering tool choices and institutional change in civil-military relations. 
e highly cen-
tralised political-institutional structure created the opportunity for Salazar and Franco to make
use of the government’s basic resources without political or administrative constraints. How-
ever, the political-institutional context became a limiting factor for Caetano and for the tran-
sitional governments in Portugal and Spain. Power-sharing among a higher number of actors
and institutional instability slowed down reforms in military and defence policies, hindering
some choices of tools and perpetuating others.
10.3.3 International environment
Some international actors, countries and organisations influenced choices and civil-military
relations though normative pressures and by stimulating the availability of some resources.
As shown in Section ., sometimes these international actors acted as ‘historical causes’
creating critical junctures and durable paths that outlived their initial action. However, in
other cases they merely operated as ‘constant causes’ in the absence of which the effects on
tool choice and civil-military relations disappeared.

e origins of the Estado Novo and that of Francoism were intertwined with the rise of
fascism and political instability in Europe (Pinto ; Saz Campos ). Portugal became
one of the targets of the Nazi propaganda machinery in the second half of the s. Germany
put pressure on Portugal and assisted Portuguese secret services and cultivated institutions such
as the Legion and the Mocidade (Stone : ). Italy and Germany became the source of
inspiration for some of the control choices in Spain and through their military participation in
the Civil War they also contributed to the creation of Francoist regime. Normative pressures
from these international actors can be construed as fundamental reasons for the adoption
of some nodality and organisation tools such as modern propaganda, censorship, emphasis
on mass speeches, public displays of power, paramilitary and youth movements and political
purges in the armed forces.
After the fall of the Axis, many of the nodality and organisation tools they had promoted
remained in place. 
is indicates that these totalitarian regimes acted as ‘historical causes’
relations. 
ese policy instruments could be employed without agreement within the ruling bodies and at a
relatively low cost. In addition, the institutionalisation of the  as a parallel hierarchy to the command chain
in the armed forces facilitated the use of nodality tools on the military.
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triggering durable paths in Salazar’s and Franco’s control strategies. However, these interna-
tional actors can be also interpreted as ‘constant causes’ because after their collapse, many of
the effects that they were producing on Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations van-
ished. For instance, Germany and Italy were very important suppliers of weaponry making
a limited modernisation of equipment (treasure) in Spain and Portugal possible. Nonetheless
the process of re-armament and modernisation was interrupted as soon as Germany and Italy
stopped supplying equipment. Additionally, German and Italian political support increased
the legitimacy of the dictators in the eyes of the military, which for the most part were pro-
Axis. 
e repressive model of control exerted by the fascist regimes also served as an excuse
for the atrocities committed in Spain during and immediately after the Civil War. 
e fall
of the Axis meant the loss of important political support for the Iberian dictatorships and
although it did not result in the abandonment of the tools of control in place, it contributed
to reduce their intensity. 
e grip on the information control was gradually softened and in
Spain executions and imprisonments were reduced (Chapters , ).
After the Second World War, Spain and Portugal were politically isolated from the interna-
tional community and were not accepted as members of the  until . 
is isolation was
partially a choice of the governments and partly imposed by the foreign powers. Nonethe-
less, the political isolation was not mirrored at the level of defence and military cooperation.

e Iberian countries continued to be exposed to foreign influence. In , Portugal was
invited to join  due to the strategic value of its Atlantic Isles and signed defence agree-
ments with the  for the utilisation of the military bases in the Azores (Beirôco :–).

e action of  and the  produced important changes in civil-military relations and of
the tools for control of the military during the s (Rosas ; Telo ; Chapter 
Section ..; Chapter ). Many -led reforms were implemented throughout the s
despite the reluctance of the regime. 
is is an example of how international normative
pressures (from  and the  ) shaped tool choice and civil-military relations. Spain,
thanks to its geographical location, its resources in terms of raw materials and its relatively
large Army, also became a valuable ally for  government in the context of the Cold War.

e Pact of Madrid signed in  allowed the  to establish military bases on Spanish soil in
exchange for material and logistical support, rebuilding and modernising the Spanish Armed
Forces (Liedtke ). Spanish and Portuguese Armed Forces were underequipped and poorly
trained. 
e  and its allies facilitated the acquisitions of material and supported the edu-
cation and training of Portuguese and Spanish officers (Chapters , ).

e evolution of tool choice in Portugal and Spain suggests that the  and  allies
acted as ‘constant causes’. 
e relations between Portugal and its  allies were drastically
reduced due to their opposition to the colonial conflict (Porch :). As they drifted apart
many of the reforms promoted by  were abandoned and the control toolkit became
Due to their autarchic ideas and fear of ‘contamination’ with liberal and democratic ideas.

e West disliked their authoritarian stance and the Eastern Bloc their declared anti-communism. In the
case of Spain, the seclusion was aggravated by the repression during and after the Civil War and the alignment
with the Axis powers during the Second World War (despite its officially non-belligerent status).
Salazar had a different strategy concerning the military and defence (Duarte :) and tried to limit
the exposure of the officers to external ideas that could create unrest among them (Telo :).
Although there was an important influx of material, technological and financial aid, comparatively speak-
ing the modernisation remained partial and insufficient (Telo :–; Cardona :; Barrachina
:; Teixeira :).
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again similar to that of the s (Chapter ). Section . argues that  membership
was a critical juncture that opened a new path in the control toolkit. Nonetheless, rather
than endogenous self-reinforcing mechanisms, what contributed most to the new trajectory
in the control toolkit during the s was the continuing pressure of international actors.
Arguably, the reversal of this trajectory could have been caused not only by the absence of
forces maintaining it but also by the emergence of new pressures in a different direction. For
instance,  blocked the sale of equipment to Portugal during the conflict, contributing to
dearth of materials and unrest among the military in the African fronts. Spain gradually
integrated into the Western Bloc due to the defence agreements with the  in the s
and the liberalisation of the economy in the s. 
us, Spain became more prone to the
ongoing influence of international actors and gradually adopted many of the organisation tools
and templates that  proposed (Salas López ; Chapter ).
During their transitions Portugal and Spain became countries searching for legitimacy and
recognition. 
e international community maintained direct contacts with the Portuguese
political and military leaders after the  April coup but the ideological fragmentation of the
 impeded a coherent strategy concerning foreign affairs. For instance, Vasco Gonçalves
sought international support in the Eastern Bloc, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in Cuba and
Rosa Coutinho in Velasco’s Peru. 
e  kept good relations with the , however, the
Soviet influence and participation was limited. Both German states were actively involved
in the process, East Germany supporting the communist approach and West Germany the
western democratic model (Ferreira :–). 
e  initially maintained a distant ap-
proach that can be captured by Kissinger’s reference to the Portuguese revolution as a ‘vaccine’
against future communist revolutions.  put pressure on the  governments (Ferreira
:–). Once the -Moderates gained control of the government, Portugal was
gradually integrated in the western sphere again. 
e influence of  allies became stronger
and was used by the political leadership to legitimise many changes in the control toolkit that
would contribute to consolidate military subordination (Chapter ).
In , Spain signed a new treaty of cooperation with the  and applied for  mem-
bership. Spain became member of the Council of Europe in November . In  the
negotiations for the accession to the  started. After the  coup in , the idea of join-
ing  became a priority. Politicians considered this as a means of diverting the attention
of the military away from domestic politics. 
e adhesion was made official in . 
e
normative pressures from  and the more frequent exchanges with other western armed
forces can be interpreted as the main explanation for the convergence of the trajectories control
toolkit and civil-military relations in the peninsula (Chapter , ).
In sum, throughout the period analysed it is clear that the international actors affected tool
choices and civil-military relations through normative pressures and templates and also by
constraining and stimulating the availability of some resources. Section  suggested that the
international actors sometimes created critical junctures, triggering new paths in civil-military
relations. 
is section has shown that the international environment is not only responsible
for the initiation of new trajectories but also for sustaining them through its continuing effect.
Abundant documentation in  and .
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10.4 Explaining change in tool choice

is chapter has illustrated, thanks to the evidence collected on Portugal and Spain, how both
history and context contribute to shaping civil-military relations and control tool choices. It
has shown that path-dependence accounts based on external shocks, timing and self-reinforcing
mechanisms need to be qualified and that in addition to the ‘historical causes’ there are envi-
ronmental factors acting as ‘constant causes’ intervening along the trajectories in civil-military
relations and shaping tool choices. 
is section argues that macro-historical events and en-
vironmental factors are linked in many ways. 
us, an explanatory model of the evolution
of choices needs to combine explanations based on the action of macro-historical events and
path-dependent dynamics with those obtained from the analysis of the environmental factors
present at the time of decisions. 
en, it recapitulates how context and history affect specific
tool choices through a basic explanatory representation of change in tool choice trajectories.
Macro-historical events and the environmental factors studied overlap and constrain the
explanatory capacity of models based exclusively on one type of account.
First, often the impact of macro-historical events can only be explained by referring to
environmental factors. 
e environmental factors acted as intermediaries, channelling the
effects of macro-historical events into tool choices. For instance, the Spanish Civil-War can be
considered as a macro-historical event that influenced tool choice through the transmission of
certain control ideas and the replacement of the political institutional structure; the outcome
of the Second World War is associated with the normative pressures on civil-military relations
by  and the  during the Cold War; and the Colonial Wars transformed the personal
experiences and perceptions of the leaders that left an imprint in the control toolkit during
the Portuguese transition.
Second, the trajectories initiated in some critical junctures were later altered by the envi-
ronmental factors which sometimes reinforced or complicated choices. In the period between
critical junctures, contextual factors account for much of the variation observed in the pol-
icy toolkit (Section .). 
e ongoing context was fundamental in the configuration of the
control policy and in providing opportunities and incentives for change on some occasions
and for stability on others. 
e continuous effect of context accentuated and/or attenuated
the legacy of previous macro-historical events. For instance the crisis of fascist totalitarian
ideology contributed to the moderation in the use and even the abandonment of some of the
control instruments.

ird, the macro-historical events created critical junctures not only in tool choice but
also in the environmental factors. 
e Civil War and the Second World War, for instance,
shattered existing institutional settings and transformed the system of international relations.

e evolution of the interpretive frameworks of decision-makers is also linked to history and
conjunctures. For example, the ideologies that inspired some of the choices of the dictators
shaped and were shaped by macro-historical events. As Hall () argues, under exceptional
circumstances, usually associated with crises, the framework of ideas changes; a new paradigm
involving policy problems, goals and, more important for this thesis, instruments replace the
previous ones. 
us, macro-historical events not only opened windows of opportunity for
Hall () describes the evolution of ideas as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’. A similar interpretation of the
evolution of policy ideas is mentioned by Peters et al. (:) who, like Hall, is inspired by Kuhn ().
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change and left legacies in the control toolkit but sometimes also influenced the broader con-
text which, in turn, induced tool choices too. Even when acknowledging that a great deal of
the evolution observed was linked to the continuing action of context, the role of inertia and
persistence cannot be underestimated. 
e legacy of past events sometimes did not manifest
itself directly through the creation of (endogenous) self-reinforcing mechanisms in the sys-
tem of civil-military relations, but indirectly through the continuing action of environmental
factors which sometimes had been locked in paths at previous critical junctures.
Fourth, if observed with the sufficient historical distance, some of these macro-historical
events were not simply the outcome of entirely stochastic processes as determinist path-depen-
dence explanations would claim. 
e interaction of some environmental factors and previous
tool choices can be described as causal mechanisms for some of the macro-historical events.
For example, the Spanish Civil War and the Carnations Revolutions were the result of new
waves of ideas (fascist, revolutionary and liberation ideologies); the crisis of the existing politi-
cal institutional structures (Spanish Republican and Estado Novo political models); the action
of international actors (Italy, Germany, independentist forces in the Portuguese colonies); as
well as previous tool choices (creating military dissatisfaction and making them more likely
to intervene). It still remains unclear whether the origin of change is to be found exclusively
outside the system of civil-military relations. Tool choices and civil-military relations were
not simply the result of individuals’ strategic decisions or the mere reflection of exogenous
environmental forces (March and Olsen :). 
erefore a ‘chicken and egg’ problem
without a clear solution emerges: what came first? Environmental factors and tool choices or
macro-historical events?
Finally, policy elements are ‘nested’ in not completely synchronous levels. At different levels
of analysis, different patterns of evolution can be observed (Section ..). Although more
specific research it is necessary at this point, this seems to suggest that the impact of past
events and that of the current context is asymmetrical across levels of analysis. So at some
levels the trajectories can be better explained by the action of endogenous self-reinforcing
mechanisms caused by past exogenous shocks and at other levels of analysis the evolution
seems to be linked to the ongoing impact of the context. Furthermore, sometimes what is
considered an endogenous self-reinforcing dynamic triggered by a ‘historical cause’ may turn
into an exogenous ‘constant cause’ when the analysis is conducted at the micro level.
As these five reasons show, the interplay between different factors and levels of analysis
makes difficult to fully isolate the effect of these two types of mechanisms on the control
toolkit and therefore to fully assess their independent explanatory value. ‘Orthodox’ expla-
nations based exclusively on one of the approaches presented in this thesis (path-dependence
or environmental factors) will miss important aspects. Moreover, as suggested above, path-
dependence explanations are not incompatible with those emphasising the continuous im-
pact of context. On the one hand, path-dependence accounts often rely on the mechanisms
or forces used by other neo-institutional accounts to explain institutional genesis at critical
junctures (
elen :; Martin and Sunley :). On the other hand, the evolu-
tion of the ideational, institutional and international environment, on which other streams
of neo-institutionalism base their explanations, cannot be easily depicted without considering
macro-historical events, critical junctures and inertias.
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Figure : Explanatory model of trajectories in tool choice
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In sum, this chapter has shown how neo-institutionalism helps providing alternative ex-
planatory narratives for civil-military relations and tool choice. 
e two explanations intro-
duced have virtues and disadvantages. None of these frameworks is clearly better for the study
of the evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations; they seem to be two sides of a same
coin. Figure  provides a graphical representation of an explanatory model that combines
both ‘historical causes’ and ‘constant causes’. 
is model is not an attempt to capture change
in tool choice in its entirety but to illustrate the interplay (and complexity) observed between
the two neo-institutionalist angles analysed in this chapter. In doing so, it builds on the social
science tradition that considers important the dialogue across theoretical schools or streams of
thoughts. As this thesis has illustrated, policy-makers confronting complex policy problems
usually choose a combination of different policy instruments. Similarly, political scientists
facing the study of complex policy problems can also rely on a combination of theoretical
frameworks and perspectives, such as those explored in this thesis.
See a similar argument in Immergut (), Peters (), Sil (), Baxandall (), Peters et al.
(), Hay () and Sil and Katzenstein ().
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11 Conclusions
11.1 Introduction

is thesis has analysed the tools of control employed by the Portuguese and Spanish gov-
ernments to keep the military subordinated through the authoritarian, transitional and early
democratic periods. It has identified and compared the combinations of tools and their evo-
lution, paying special attention to the impact of some past macro-historical events and en-
vironmental factors. For that endeavour, this thesis has relied on historical research of mul-
tiple primary and secondary sources, on a comparative framework borrowed from the field
of public policy (Hood’s  scheme) and on neo-institutionalist theory. 
is final chapter
recapitulates the theoretical contribution of this thesis from the point of view of each of the
elements of accumulation in social research highlighted by Mahoney (:–). 
us,
it summarises the descriptive (Section .) and causal (Section .) knowledge claims as
well as the input of this work at the level on knowledge generation tools with reference to the
methodological (Section .) and meta-theoretical contribution (Section ) of this thesis.
11.2 Civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain
Portugal and Spain, despite having experienced similar political regimes and socio-political
transformations, developed very different civil-military relations and levels of control on the
armed forces. 
is research did not aim to fully explain this discrepancy in civil-military
relations but to explore one of the reasons behind these different trajectories, i.e. whether the
governments in these countries used different instruments to control the military.

is is a restricted but novel approach to civil-military relations that has gone beyond most
usual case-studies and the typical sociological angle. Rather than assessing the level of military
subordination or turning it into an independent variable, as the majority of authors in the field
do (Chapter  Section .), this thesis has sought a better understanding about what is done to
control the military and why. Instead of developing a general explanation of military control,
it has analysed, as narrower dependent variable, the tools of control. 
is meant moving the
focal point backwards in the causal chain aiming to contribute to a less divisive common
ground of knowledge and more stable basis for further academic research. 
is is consistent
with the complex nature of civil-military relations and control choices exposed throughout
this thesis. 
is complexity would suggest a shift from a holistic to a more fine-grained partial
analysis in order to reach a more nuanced understanding.

rough the analysis of wide-ranging empirical evidence and its classification and compari-
son according to Hood’s four basic resources (organisation, nodality, authority and treasure) this
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thesis has revealed important findings about the control strategy in both countries. Govern-
ments always used combinations of multiple tools. 
is confirms what the dominant literature
on policy instruments have anticipated. However, the degree of utilisation of these tools (in
particular organisation and nodality tools) varied across-country and across-time. 
e com-
parative analysis from a resource and country perspective leads to the conclusion that there
was no common ‘Iberian style’ of control or civil-military relations. 
e changing trajectories
within each of the countries also disconfirm that there were stable Portuguese or Spanish styles
throughout the period analysed. 
us, the existence of well-defined styles for governing the
military arising from geopolitical features can be rejected. Furthermore no clear style can be
directly linked to the type of regime. 
e analysis shows that overall there were no common
‘authoritarian’ and ‘transitional’ modes of control. Although the Estado Novo and Francoist
dictatorships shared many features their control tool-mix portrayed some important discrep-
ancies that were later accentuated during the transitional periods. However the converging
trends observed from , indicate that the existence of a common ‘democratic’ style cannot
be discarded. Supplementary research would be needed to confirm or reject this hypothesis
(Chapter  Section .; Chapter ).
Finally, the analysis developed here can be interpreted as a contribution to the study of both
military history and political transformations in the peninsula. 
is thesis, by focusing on the
tools of government and establishing systematic comparisons, has developed an alternative
narrative about military history in these countries. 
e goal was to provide a more structured
and analytical account.
Moreover, this research has provided a wider picture of the political changes experienced
in the twentieth century in the Iberian Peninsula. Many of the findings in terms of control
tools and civil-military relations here are associated or precede similar patterns in the control
mechanisms and relations of these governments with society at large. 
ese findings could,
therefore, inform or support further social enquiry in these countries.
In sum, this thesis has proposed a different angle in order to counter some of the shortcom-
ings in the existing literature. 
rough the application of the  framework, new patterns
in governmental actions and civil-military relations have been revealed. 
is thesis has shown
that governments adopted different strategies and used different tools to control the military
and that these strategies evolved over time. 
e existence of an ‘Iberian’ or country-specific
style of control or a model of civil-military relations has been rejected. Likewise it was ar-
gued that no unique style associated with the type of regime has been identified. 
is thesis
has not directly assessed the degree of control or the relative success of the tools employed.
However, by unveiling the existence of different mixes of tools, it points at one plausible ex-
planation of the divergence regarding the degree of subordination and the evolution of civil
military relations in Portugal and Spain. Moreover, the extensive evidence collected, classified
and analysed and the narrative built around civil-military relations has aimed to contribute to
Hood (:) argues that the action of the government in practice always involves a mixture of the
whole range of types of tools available. In the same vein Howlett claims that “administrative practice usually
involves the use of multiple tools or ‘policy instrument mixes’ ” (Howlett :) and Bemelmans-Videc and
Vedung () maintain that policy instruments come in packages rather than in isolated form.

is contribution is more relevant because military history in the Iberian Peninsula has often been guided
by political interests and focused on isolated facts and heroes and not so much linked to the wider political
context (Teixeira ).
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military history and provided an alternative angle to the complex socio-political developments
that Spain and Portugal experienced from the s to .
11.3 Complexity in tool choice
Once the changing trajectories in tool choice of Portuguese and Spanish governments had
been outlined this thesis discussed why such choices diverged and/or converged. Rather than
exploring the causes of specific micro-choices, the analysis has focused on the factors that
produced changes in the general patterns of the control tool mix and has shown that his-
tory and context decisively shaped most choices. Historical legacies, ideas, institutions and
international actors both facilitated and hindered ways of action.

is research applied the  framework to extensive historical evidence collected in the
area of civil-military relations and established cross-temporal and cross-country comparisons.
Most evidence examined defies ‘technical’ choice models. Neither the primary or secondary
sources scrutinised suggest that tool choices were mechanical exercises in which decision-
makers simply matched the attributes of the problem to those of the instruments available.
Different tools were used to tackle similar problems. 
e evidence collected in this thesis
confirms what many authors had anticipated; that is, instruments are generally used in com-
binations or mixes and therefore it is extremely important to move beyond single instrument
approaches. Similarly, the evidence challenges pure ‘self-interest’ and pure ‘political’ models
that, assuming complete technical substitutability between instruments, explain choices based
either on the calculated maximisation of individual benefits or by proximity to cultural values
and ideology. 
is thesis has relied on neo-institutionalist theory to provide an alternative
explanation.

e tools of control or policy instruments studied in this thesis can be considered as the
institutions that structure the relationship between the governments and the military. 
is
research has analysed the processes of stability and change in the control toolkit against the
background of two contending types of interpretations: on the one hand, path-dependence
accounts based on external shocks, timing and self-reinforcing mechanisms (historical cau-

e policy instruments literature recognises that the main problem is linking instrument choice with the
factors that stimulated them (Linder and Peters :–; Howlett and Ramesh :, ).

e need for new comparative empirical work has been noted in the literature in policy instruments (Landry
and Varone :; Lascoumes and Le Galès :).
For instance, Bruijn and Hufen () argue the analogy with tools like hammer, screwdriver, etc. does
not hold, for each problem there is not a single better instrument. Howlett claims that understanding the use
of ‘bundles’ or ‘portfolios’ of instruments rather than that of single tools is necessary, especially in the context of
increased sophistication of networks of citizens and available tools and the new ‘governance’ approach to public
purposes (Howlett :–). See also Bemelmans-Videc et al. (/eds.) and Eliadis et al. (/eds.).
See Howlett and Ramesh’s (:–) account on ‘technical’ and ‘political’ models. 
e former usually
assume the choice of the most ‘efficient’ instrument for the problem faced. 
is approached is also termed as
‘instrumentalism’ (March and Olson ; Linder and Peter :–). 
e latter assume the choice closer
to the values or ideology of the decision maker. Howlett and Ramesh do not explicitly refer to ‘self-interest’
explanations but implicitly refer to authors that use ‘public choice’ theory and self-serving behaviour to explain
instrument choices, as well (:). 
e evidence (Chapters , , , ) shows that decision-makers did
not always select the same types of tools and that their individual interests and political preferences were not
completely determinant as new ideas, external pressures and pre-existing institutions conditioned their options.
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sation) and on the other hand those grounded in the continuing impact of environmental
factors (constant causation).

e empirical evidence suggests that the beginning and end of distinct trajectories in the
utilisation of a certain mix of tools coincided with some non-controllable overarching macro-
historical events. Chapter  has taken a closer look at the legacy of the Spanish Civil War,
the Second World War, the colonial conflicts and transitional political processes and has
shown that these events triggered ‘critical junctures’ in the control toolkit. 
ese exoge-
nous shocks generated sometimes endogenous self-reinforcing (or self-defeating) dynamics
that contributed to the stability (or reversal) of certain patterns in tool choice and civil-military
relations. Chapter  also illustrated how temporal sequence influenced choices and outcomes
and that formative periods usually conditioned later developments.

is research has also revealed some limitations of orthodox path-dependence explanations.

e evolution of the control toolkit and of civil-military relations in the Peninsula in general
does not completely fit a model of ‘punctuated equilibria’. Portugal and Spain experienced
critical junctures and periods of cathartic changes but these were not always followed by sta-
ble trajectories. 
e periods following certain critical junctures showed gradual changes not
directly associated to the legacies of the macro-historical events analysed (Chapter  Sec-
tion ..). Self-reinforcing dynamics were not pervasive and in some cases the stability of
a trajectory can be attributed to the continuous effect of contextual factors that were not di-
rectly related to the ‘historical causes’ that initated the trajectory. Moreover the evidence has
confirmed the role of agency and suggested that some of the events that triggered critical
junctures can be considered as endogenously generated by the system of civil-military rela-
tions (e.g. the Spanish Civil War, the collapse of the Estado Novo and the coups of November
 in Portugal and February  in Spain). 
ese findings contradict the contingency
and determinism that the most orthodox path-dependence interpretations suggest.
Although history matters, path-dependence interpretations need to be qualified. Accord-
ingly, this thesis has examined the impact of three categories of environmental factors: ideas,
political institutional structure and international environment (Chapter  Section .).

is research has confirmed that these factors acted as ‘constant causes’ shaping trajectories
in civil-military relations and tool choice: ideologies as well as the personal experiences and
preferences of decision-makers (in particular Franco and Salazar) influenced tool choice. 
e
political institutional structure affected the availability of some basic resources. For instance,
the centralisation of power and the absence of veto actors amplified the capacity of dicta-
tors to implement their preferred tool choices. 
e political transitions that resulted in the
redistribution of power among diverse actors and institutions were also reflected in the tool
choice dynamics; political conflict and bargaining initially hindered some reforms but later
contributed to stability in civil-military relations and tool choice. Finally, international actors
(countries and organisations) shaped tool choices and civil-military relations through nor-

ese two alternative explanations are presented in Chapter  Section .. 
ey correspond to the third
and fourth research claims introduced in Chapter  Section . and are later addressed in Chapter .
Chapters , ,  and  suggest that some decisions were extremely linked to personal beliefs or interests of
some of the leaders in the government. Chapter  Section .. more explicitly refers to this issue.

e goal in this thesis was not providing a holistic explanation of the action of context but identifying
general patterns in its direct and/or indirect impact on tool choice and the evolution of civil-military relations
in Portugal and Spain.
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mative pressures and by constraining and stimulating the availability of some resources (in
particular treasure and organisation). 
us, this thesis corroborates at the empirical level what
many theorists agree on: the fact that the antecedents and the context influence tool choices.
Last, it was been argued that the ‘historical’ and ‘constant causes’ observed in each of the
two cases were deeply intertwined and therefore it is important to take both of them into
consideration to better explain the trajectories. 
e environmental factors often translated
effects of past macro-historical events into tool choice. 
ese events at times created critical
junctures in the environmental factors which in turn often offset or magnified the trajectories
of civil-military relations and tool choice. 
ese overarching events were sometimes the result
of the interaction of some environmental factors and previous tool choices. Furthermore,
the conceptual differences of both alternative types of explanations for the evolution of tool
choice and civil-military relations, although initially important, blurred gradually as the fo-
cal point of the study travelled through the time dimension and through different levels of
analysis. Current contexts become past legacies from a future perspective; stable trajectories
may turn into changing paths if the time segment analysed is longer and some endogenous
mechanisms of self-reproduction become exogenous environmental factors when looking at
an institutional subset. 
e assessment of these two alternative types of approaches would
have a different explanatory capacity according to the time scope and units of analysis chosen.

us, it can be concluded that tool choices are the result of complex social processes that do
not fit a simple causal model with well-defined independent and dependent variables. 
ere
are interactions between the factors and feedback effects. 
is thesis has proposed a simple
explanatory framework that merges both the impact of history and the context in which de-
cisions are taking place to explain the evolution of tool choice (Chapter  Section .).
In sum, this thesis has provided ‘causal findings’ by illustrating how historical legacies and
environmental factors shaped the trajectories of civil-military relations and in particular the
combinations of control tools employed by the governments. 
e empirical analysis has shown
that pure path-dependence explanations have some weaknesses that limit their explanatory
value and has hinted at ways to bridge these theoretical gaps, namely by looking at the on-
going impact of ideational and institutional environmental factors. Finally, although more
research is necessary in this regard, this thesis has confirmed that establishing sharp distinc-
tions between the impact of past legacies and the current context is problematic and that the
explanations based on environmental factors cannot be completely disconnected from those
grounded in path-dependence or ignore the interplay between them.
11.4 Tools of government revisited
Many authors have previously discussed Hood’s  scheme but there have been very few
attempts to apply it systematically to a specific empirical case. 
is thesis contrasts the an-
alytical capacity of the  framework for the study of tools of government. Never before
have civil-military relations been studied through the lenses of a policy instruments frame-
Neo-institutional accounts, as those studied here, are better fitted to explain stability and changes in
an existing control tool-mix than to explain its initial configuration. See a similar argument in Peters et al.
(:–).

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work. As explained above, this innovative approach has helped in depicting trends, establish-
ing comparisons and, therefore, widening the understanding of civil-military relations and
other major socio-political transformations in the Iberian Peninsula. However, not only the
field of civil-military relations and Iberian studies gains from this exercise; the subfield of pol-
icy instruments also benefits from it. One of the shortcomings of this literature is precisely
the scarcity of in-depth empirical studies. 
e historical data on civil-military relations in
the Iberian Peninisula have offered the opportunity to test the heuristic value of Hood’s 
scheme and substantiate several of its advantages and limitations.

is research has shown that systematically linking each of the basic resources (or subcat-
egories) with specific policy problems or policy goals is extremely difficult (if at all possible).

e wide variety of instruments that each of these generic categories encompasses (see below)
as well the impact of history and context (on the nature of the problems, availability of re-
sources and policy implementation) turn this endeavour into a fool’s errand. Although the
choice of some (but not all) instruments within a category can sometimes be associated to a
specific period or style of government, these associations do not hold beyond these subsets.

e evidence reveals that not all the instruments that integrate each category evolved syn-
chronously, suggesting that analytic associations would better be explored at the instrument
level, not at the level of Hood’s generic categories. 
is is consistent with Hood’s work
which, despite presenting some canons of ‘intelligent policy design’ or ‘good application’ of
government tools, never clearly links them to the basic resources.
Indeed, the wide diversity of tools that can be attributed to each basic resource limit the
capacity of Hood’s  scheme as explanatory framework for tool choice. 
e availability
of the basic resources can be directly linked to choices but still this readiness can be seen
as just a mechanism mediating the impact of other historical and environmental factors on
tool choice, as this thesis has shown. 
is thesis has escaped this problem by decoupling the
comparative from the explanatory framework. 
is thesis has restricted the role of the 
scheme to that of a ‘marker’ or ‘indicator’ of change in tool choice and has relied on two
approaches to neo-institutionalism as explanatory framework.
Hood’s  framework is better suited for the classification and comparison than for in-
forming a theory of instrument choice. It is a resource-based framework and focuses on what
governments actually do, not so much on their intentions and, thus, it reduces the level of
subjectivity and simplifies the task of classifying tools. Moreover, the  framework has
proved to be flexible and parsimonious enough to capture and process all the empirical ev-
idence encountered in the research (Chapters , , , ) and to establish meaningful cross-
temporal and cross-country comparisons (Chapter ). 
e  framework has allowed pro-
cessing enormous amounts of information from different sources, covering more than fifty
For instance during the Civil War and its aftermath Franco intensively used many coercive organisation
tools and nodality effectors. Conversely, the use of non-coercive organisation tools and nodality detectors was not
especially relevant during that period. Other examples can be found in Chapters , , , , .
A similar problem has been found with the subcategories introduced in this thesis.
Hood (:–) and Hood and Margetts (:–).
See a similar critique in Linder and Peters (: –).
Lascoumes and Le Galès () also stress the value of policy intruments as indicators of policy change.
Chapter  Section . outlines some of the advantages of resource-based frameworks vis-à-vis other classi-
ficatory schemes.

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years in the history of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain. All the tools of control
elicited from the scrutiny of the primary and secondary sources have been classified in one of
the four categories: organisation, nodality, authority and treasure. None of Hood’s categories
was found to be redundant. 
e distribution and evolution of these tools within these cat-
egories has served to delineate trajectories in the control strategy of the governments. Multi-
dimensional models would have made the comparisons more difficult, especially in a context
where most control tools cannot be quantitatively measured. By grounding distinctions in
kind and not in degree, Hood’s framework facilitates the categorisation of tools.
However, the simplicity and flexibility of this framework also entails some problems. First,
Hood’s basic categories are very broad and not always mutually exclusive. 
ey accommo-
date much variance within and therefore can hide very disparate attitudes towards military
subordination. In order to counter this shortcoming, this thesis has introduced two new sub-
categories in each of the four basic types. 
ese are different from Hood’s subcategories and
reflect the way in which the basic resources are used (Chapter  Section ..). 
ese sub-
categories have enabled to establish a more nuanced, and still balanced, classification of the
control tools and helped establishing sharper depictions and comparisons of the action of the
governments without over-complicating the analysis.
Second, occasionally instruments can be assigned to more than one category. 
e tools of
government can be considered as the building blocks of policies, but they are not indivisible
or homogeneous units (Chapter  Section .). 
e evidence on tools for military subordina-
tion confirms that often control instruments are bundles of different ‘smaller’ instruments
or that they rely on more than one basic resource. For the sake of simplicity this thesis has
allocated each tool to only one basic resource. Although some of the instruments could be
arguably placed in other categories this does not completely obviate the use of Hood’s frame-
work in this analysis. As explained above, its fundamental purpose is to act as indicator to
trace institutional change. 
rough several consistency checks in the classification of tools,
this work has aimed to mitigate this problem. 
e hybridisation in the context of Hood’s
basic resources remains a question for future research.

ird, it is important to note that the  framework is not time, country or sector spe-
cific. 
is thesis has stressed its value as basis of the analysis of civil-military relations. Despite
As Chapter  Section .. suggests, these four resources synthesise most of the categories proposed in the
other generic typologies and accommodates well both substantive and procedural types of instruments.
As explained in Chapter  Section .., more ambitious multi-dimensional frameworks were discarded
for the goal here is not the systematic scrutiny of all different dimensions, characteristics or valuation criteria
inherent to policy instruments but simply to detect patterns and changes in tool choice, compare them and then
explain the variations observed.
Hood (:, ) divides the four basic categories, into effectors and detectors. Subsequently he classifies
effectors into ‘particular’, ‘group’ and ‘general’ according to their levels of application and detectors into an
‘active/passive’ scale according to their degree of mobility or the level of government initiative. In all, he suggests
twenty-six subcategories of instruments which would have made the comparison extremely difficult.

is is anticipated by Lascoumes and Le Galès () who distinguish instruments, techniques and tools
according to the level of observation.
For instance, the censorship effort, despite being mainly a nodality tool, has an important organisation
component (teams of censors scrutinising the information) or even an authority component (since there is a law
that prohibits or constrains certain information, people will exert self-censorship not to commit an offense).

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the changing nature of security problems and civil-military relations a generic policy instru-
ment framework is useful for the analysis of past, present and future civil-military relations
because it does not focus on the specific goals pursued by a government at a particular time but
on the tools employed and the generic resources they draw their power from. 
e revised 
framework could be similarly applied to other countries with salient civil-military relations
issues (e.g. Turkey, Greece, 
ailand, Pakistan and Egypt) or to other areas of government
action within the same countries (e.g. public order, fiscal policy and education). Additional
research in this sense would contribute to complete and refine the debate here intitiated about
governments’ styles.
In brief, the  scheme is flexible and parsimonious; it is not time, country or sector
specific; it focuses on what governments do rather than on what they intend to achieve and
establishes distinctions in kind not in degree. 
e empirical evidence fits the framework well,
showing a somewhat balanced distribution of potential tools that the government can employ
across all categories. 
is thesis has corroborated the strength of this generic classificatory
scheme as basis for depicting patterns and change in tool choice and establishing comparisons.
11.5 Bridging meta-theoretical divides

is research has borrowed elements from different disciplines or traditions within the social
sciences. 
is stance is not merely the reflection of a pragmatist standpoint adopted to
facilitate the analytical task and to fill up the gaps that orthodox approaches usually leave.
It is also a conscious effort to contribute to overcome the boundaries that separate different
epistemic communities. 
ree features illustrate this effort.
First, the application of a policy instrument angle in the analysis of civil-military relations
is a novelty. 
ere had been little, if any, cross-fertilisation between these two literatures. 
e
study of policy instruments can be traced back a few decades but it can be still considered an
undeveloped body of literature with scarce examples of comparative empirical works (Chap-
ter  Section .). Although in most cases the literature on civil-military relations analysed
adopts historical or sociological analytical angles, the evidence that it provides serves here to
substantiate the theoretical discussion about political science and policy instruments. Besides,
the literature on civil-military relations, which has been criticised for being excessively self-
referential (Chapter  Section .), can also gain from the policy instrument approach. 
e
extension the analysis of control instruments to other countries could a new path of cumula-
tive comparative work that would contribute to bridge the gap between civil-military relations
literature and mainstream political science.
Second, this thesis combines historical research with a comparative framework from the
field of public policy. Its findings are grounded in the historical analysis (including archival
work) of Portugal and Spain. 
is has involved the effort of deconstructing chronologically-
based historical narratives into the concept or category-based types of interpretations that
See for instance Williams (:–), Luckham (:–) and Forster (:–).
Sil and Katzenstein () develop a similar argument in-depth.
For a discussion of the philosophical premises of analytical pragmatism see Rorty () and Bernstein
().

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public policy and political science research require. 
e translation of historical data into the
revised version of Hood’s public policy framework entails some downsides. Especially those
not very familiar with the history of the Iberian countries might feel that the substitution of
a timeline-based narrative for different partial accounts around eight subcategories of tools
may detract from clarity and introduce some repetition. Nonetheless this translation carries
a virtue that compensates for these shortcomings; it allows to establish comparisons and to
depict general trends in government actions which no other civil-military study dealing with
Portugal and Spain has done so far. Moreover, this thesis has also proved that historical analysis
and political science approaches are not incompatible, especially once the rigid epistemological
positions that sometimes dominate these disciplines are circumvented and the theoretical value
of both singularity and generalisations is recognised. History provides evidence to test political
theories and these in turn help informing and guiding historical research.

ird, this thesis has contrasted two different neo-institutionalist explanations about change
in tool choice and suggested a basic explanatory model that merges elements from both of
them (Chapter ). It has highlighted advantages and limitations of path-dependence ac-
counts and the necessity to complement them with other explanations that take into consid-
eration the continuing action of the ideational and institutional context at a national and also
international level. History matters and social phenomena should not be studied in isolation
from their temporal dimensions but pure path-dependence does not easily capture how indi-
viduals relate to institutions and puts excessive emphasis on contingency and determinism. In
brief, the empirical analysis of civil-military relations and choice of policy instruments con-
firms what several authors had already suggested; i.e, orthodox approaches to neo-institutional
theory usully miss an important part of the picture. It is possible to deconstruct these suppos-
edly competing explanations into their basic concepts and mechanisms and then to redesign
new explanations that recombine elements from the previously separated streams. 
e ‘walls’
that separate different streams of neo-institutionalism have been helpful to support the ‘scaf-
folding’ that permitted the development of many useful (often parsimonious and elegant)
theoretical concepts and analytical tools. However, some of the theoretical divides such as
‘structure vs. agency’, ‘culture vs. calculus’ and, as this thesis shows, ‘legacy of the past vs.
continuing action of the ideational and institutional context’ are not Gordian knots that can
be cut or unravelled. As the scrutiny of the empirical evidence on government tools of
control has shown, these ‘walls’ are to a great extent artificial. 
e proponents of different
paradigms could potentially fill gaps in their own theoretical developments by exploring al-
ternative approaches.
In sum, explanations from one single theoretical lens normally involve the oversimplifi-
cation of the problems and causal explanations. Dialogue and exchange between different
analytical approaches can contribute to a deeper understanding of complex multifaceted so-
cial phenomena. 
is work has not been an iconoclastic effort against well-defined research
traditions nor an attempt to amalgamate or synthesise them into a new overarching one.
Rather, the meta-theoretical goal here has been more modest: to develop a better understand-
ing of several different disciplinary angles and practices and to show that it is possible to build
bridges over the analytical ‘walls’ that separate them.
See similar arguments in Hall and Taylor () and Bieler and Morton ().

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A Civil-military relations in Portugal from
the fall of the ancien regime to the
Estado Novo

is section analyses the period that preceded the Estado Novo, from the Liberal Revolution
of  to the military dictatorship established after the fall of the First Republic. 
is period
was characterised by intensive military intervention in politics.
A.1 From the Liberal Revolution to the Republic
Portugal, like Spain, had a long tradition of military intervention in politics in contemporary
history to the extent that from the  Constitution to the establishment of the Estado Novo
in , most prime ministers were military men. 
e end of absolutist era led to a higher
involvement of the military in politics. 
e Liberal Revolution was initiated by a military
coup, pronunciamento, in Porto in  that followed the failed military conspiracy of 
and the execution of its leader General Gomes Freire. 
e Liberal Revolution resulted in the
expulsion of the British who had established a protectorate in Portugal after the Napoleonic
invasions and the introduction elections and a constituent process, which culminated with the
Constitution of . 
is rebellion was inspired by the American and French revolutions as
well as by the Spanish liberal Constitution of . In addition to the introduction of liberal
principles and institutions this revolution also aimed to release the Portuguese military from
the strict control and subordination imposed by the ‘de facto’ military governor of Portugal,
the British General Beresford (Ribeiro dos Santos :). 
is revolution contributed to the
consolidation of the bourgeoisie and the military as fundamental political actors (Gallagher
Manuel Inácio Martins Pamplona Corte Real (–); Pedro de Sousa Holstein (Duke of Palmela)
(–; ), Luís da Silva Mouzinho de Albuquerque (; ), Cândido José Xavier (), João
Carlos Oliveira e Daun (Duke of Saldanha) (; –; –; ); Jose Jorge Loureiro (–
); Vitório Texeira de Andrade Barbosa (), António José Severim de Noronha (Duke of Terceira)(;
–); José da Gama Carneiro e Sousa (), José Bernardino de Portugal e Castro (); Bernardo de
Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo (Marquis of Sa da Bandeira) (–; –; ; –); António
Dias de Oliveira (), Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro de Almeida Carvalhais (), José Lúcio Travassos Valdez
(–), Fontes Pereira de Melo (–; –; –), João Crisóstomo (–),
Francisco Ferreira do Amaral (), Azevedo Coutinho (–); Pimenta de Castro (), Sidónio Pais
(–), Tamagnini Barbosa (–); Paiva Couceiro (); Alfredo Sá Cardoso (); Manuel
Maria Coelho (); Cunha Leal (); António Maria da Silva (); Gomes da Costa (); Óscar
Fragoso Carmona(–); Vicente de Freitas (–); Domingos de Oliveira (–).
In Spain in  another revolution restored the liberal Constitution of  that had been abolished in
.

P          E N
:). King João  dissolved the Parliament (Cortes) in . He suppressed an absolutist
military coup led by his son Dom Miguel in April  (‘Abrilada’) but died in  without
leaving a heir.
Dom Pedro, First Emperor of Brazil and elder brother of Dom Miguel was proclaimed
King on  April  and five days later he enacted a new Constitutional Charter trying
to reconcile liberal and absolutist ideas. He abdicated in favour of his daughter Maria da
Gloria in  and betrothed her to Dom Miguel. Dom Miguel was named regent but soon
after, he proclaimed himself King and abolished the Constitution of . 
is initiated a
period of civil war between the partisans of both brothers that concluded with the defeat and
exile of Dom Miguel in . Dona Maria  was crowned but tension within the military
loyal to the  constitution (‘setembristas’) and those to the Charter of  (‘cartistas’)
forced successive changes in government and military command. 
e situation of indiscipline,
instability and military pronunciamentos ended up with the enactment of a new Constitution
in  that would reflect middle ground between the Constitutions of  and the Charter
of . 
ese two stances were also reflected in the new bipartisan political system, the
‘Progressistas’ and the ‘Regeneradores’ (Caerio : –).

e political turbulences continued. According to Mascarenhas (:) there were twenty
changes in the government from  to . Costa Cabral, Marquis of Tomar, a former
‘setembrista’ who had developed a less liberal attitude, became the most powerful figure in
Portuguese politics. In  a military uprising led by Marshall Saldanha forced his resigna-
tion. 
e ambitious project of regeneration of Portugal by Saldanha was formalised in the
Constitutional Reform ‘Acto Adicional’ of  . 
e reign of Pedro V (–) was
characterised by relative stability. His successor, Luis I with the support of Marshall Sá da
Bandeira defeated a new military putsch commanded by Saldanha in  (‘Saldanhada’).

ese two rival military leaders can be considered the most important figures in that period of
Portuguese history due to their participation in most governments and pronuciamientos from
the s to the s (Caeiro :–).
In Africa, Portugal competed with England and a new emerging colonial power, Germany.

is created new tensions within the ranks. In  the British Empire set an ultimatum for
Portugal to force them to abandon the aspiration of uniting the territories of Mozambique
and Angola. 
is ultimatum and the acceptance of the conditions imposed by the British
opened a period of governmental crisis and the emergence of nationalist and republican ideas
(Silva Rego :, –; Teixeira , Antunes :). In  a group of officers
revolted (‘Revolta do Porto’) and attempted to establish a republic, imitating the proclamation
of the Republic in Brazil in . 
e rebellion failed and those involved were imprisoned
or exiled. 
is was the last violent military intervention in politics during the nineteenth
century in Portugal. Since , the military had been gradually turning their attention away
from internal politics and focusing on their external enemies (Caeiro :–). With
Dom Miguel returned from exile on  February , swore on the Constitution on  February but on
 July he declared himself absolute monarch. Dom Pedro became king.
Note that these wars were contemporary with the first Carlist civil war in Spain (–).

e most important pronunciamentos in that period were the Revolution of September  led by the
National Guard that proclaimed again the  Constitution; the absolutist ‘conspiração das Marnotas’ in 
and the ‘revolta dos Marechais’ in  that opposed Marshalls Saldanha and Terceira (‘cartistas’) to Marshall
Sá da Bandeira (‘settembrista’).

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the exception of the rebellion in Porto, direct military participation was lower during the
reign of Carlos I (–). Ferreira claims that, unlike in Spain, the military did not
actively intervene in Portuguese society during the second half of the nineteenth century.
He argues that the Portuguese Armed Forces were not a unified institution and became a
docile instrument in the hands of the monarchy (Ferreira :). However, republican ideas
persisted especially within secret societies such as the Carbonari and Masons. 
e military
again played an important role in the Revolution that, in , deposed the last king of
Portugal, Manuel , and established the Republic.
A.2 The Portuguese First Republic and the military
dictatorship

e military distanced themselves from the traditional monarchic parties and they did not
support the latter when the republicans launched their coup (Valente :–). 
e rev-
olution was initiated by a social movement but the involvement of some groups of military
was very important for its success. Nonetheless, many problems affect the new Republic.
Portugal was a country in which most of the population lived from agriculture, not very in-
dustrialised, with a low per capita income by European standards, high levels of illiteracy and
insufficient health and communication infrastructure. In addition, a significant part of the
economy was in foreign hands (wine, minerals, transport, telephone and power) and there
was a dependency on the exports of primary products (Robinson :). 
e Portuguese
First Republic was politically very unstable, counting  different governments in  years
(Porch :–). 
e military were disillusioned by the sense disorder and disunity in
the new regime and multiplied their interventions. Up to  different pronunciamientos and
coups are identified by Pabón (:).

e continuous military attempts to shape policy aggravated the problems of the young
Republic as well as the cohesion and unity of the armed forces. 
e military reform and purge
of the monarchic officers initiated by War Minister Correia Barreto in  had increased
polarisation within the ranks. 
e creation of the National Republican Guard () in 
and the suspension of voting rights for soldiers in  also became controversial measures
(Caeiro :–). In addition to acts of insubordination and mutinies, a series of military
coup attempts took place in Portugal, for instance a radical republican revolutionary attempt
in  and the monarchic revolts of , ,  and . 
e beginning of the First
World War in  increased the instability, radicalisation and politicisation of the military.

e action of secret societies and personal rivalries compounded the problem. In January
, a large group of officers of different ideologies leaded by Captain Martins de Lima
forced the resignation of the government and the appointment of General Pimenta de Castro
as Prime Minister. Accused of dictatorial policies, the government was again toppled by
an armed revolution organised by the Democratic Party in May  (Serrão and Marques
:; Wheeler a: –).
See Carrilho (:–) and Ribeiro dos Santos (:–). Alternatively see Torre and Cervelló
(:–) for whom the military involvement was minimal.

e ‘Movement of the Swords’.
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Portugal entered the war. Over , men were recruited and nearly , fought
in either the European or African theatres. In addition to the thousands of casualties, the
war effort was economically very costly and had an enormous impact for Portugal (Wheeler
:–). In this context Major Sidónio Pais became Prime Minister through a military
coup in . He imposed a centralised personal system of control and initiated fundamental
reforms to create an authoritarian ‘New Republic’ (‘República Nova’), the precursor of the
Estado Novo. Unlike previous military governments, his was led by middle rank officers
(Caeiro :–). After the assassination of Sidónio Pais in December  and the
attempt to restore the monarchy by a military revolt in Porto in January  a democratic
government declared the return to the ‘Old Republic’. 
is period saw the emergence of
new parties and politicians but the instability did not decrease. 
e government strengthened
the  as means to shield itself from armed intervention. However, in  some officers
of the  planned a revolutionary movement and assassinated the Prime Minister António
Granjo and some other important political and military leaders. Army Colonel Manuel
Maria Coelho assumed power by the Revolutionary Junta but soon afterwards had to resign
due to his suspected involvement with these assassinations (Wheeler : –).

e crises deepened, insurrections and terrorist attacks became common. After a fail coup
attempt in April , the Republic was finally put to an end by a nationalist and anti-
parliamentary revolution in . On  May , the Army under General Gomes da
Costa revolted in Braga and marched into Lisbon to end the political and economic instabil-
ity of the Republic and established a military dictatorship (–). Although initially the
 May Revolution was ideologically very heterogeneous, the conservatives eventually domi-
nated (Antunes : ). After a series of internal fights, prime minister, General Antonio
Oscar de Fragoso Carmona forced the resignation of Costa da Gomes and assumed the Pres-
idency of the Republic (Ribeiro dos Santos :). Carmona became a dictator and was
confirmed in office by the presidential elections of . António de Oliveira Salazar was
appointed Finance Minister and he took advantage of the government crises to set the foun-
dations for the longest-lasting authoritarian regime in twentieth century Europe, the Estado
Novo.
Led by Captain Paiva Couceiro who also participated in those of  and . 
ey declared a monarchy
in the north of Portugal.
It was called the bloody night or ‘Noite Sangrenta’.
He had previously been appointed to the same position in  but resigned after  days .
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B Civil-military relations in Spain from
the fall of the Napoleonic Invasion to
Franco’s regime
B.1 The period of ‘Pronunciamientos’
In the nineteenth century, the military rebellions also called pronunciamientos were often char-
acterised by their liberal character and tried to preserve the system against absolutism (Ballbé
; Seco Serrano ). 
e Napoleonic invasion (–), the independence wars
in American colonies (–) and the Carlist civil wars (–, – and
–) had created an excess of officers which aggravated the lack of resources and slowed
down the process of promotions. 
e low levels of resources, insufficient training and over-
bureaucratisation prevented the Spanish military from obtaining any great victory in the in-
ternational arena. With the decline of the empire, the military and the governments blamed
each other for the military defeats. 
e military elites that had traditionally participated in
politics, many of them as members of the parliament, felt that they needed to restore their
lost legitimacy (Alonso Baquer :–). 
e military saw upheavals as the means to
achieve their goals. 
is process was fostered by the politicisation of the armed forces, where
generals were often appointed on the basis of political allegiance to a party and by the public
support to many of the pronunciamientos.
Several important pronunciamientos succeded in shaping the political arena during the nine-
teenth century. In , General Riego launched an anti-absolutist military uprising. Riego
led an army that had been initially reunited to suffocate the rebellions in the American colonies.

ey forced the King Fernando  to reinstate the  Constitution initiating a short liberal
period in Spanish government. In , with the aid of the French Army, the King restored
absolutism and had Riego executed. 
e three year-old Isabel  inherited the throne in 
after the death of Fernando . 
e regency of Isabel’s mother, Maria Cristina, was marked
by the first Carlist war (–). 
e Carlist wars were civil wars that had their origin in
the dispute between the partisans of Isabel  and the pretender to the throne, Carlos María
Isidro de Borbon, daughter and brother of the previous King Fernando . 
e supporters of
Isabel generally held liberal and modernising views while those of Carlos had more traditional
and conservative ideas. During the first Carlist War, a military mutiny in La Granja forced
the regent to approve the Liberal Constitution of . At the end of the war in , Maria
Nonetheless Baquer (:–) stresses that alongside ‘liberal pronunciamientos’, those aiming to
address public opinion claims, there were other ‘royalists’, aiming to restore rights and powers to the monarchy,
and ‘military’ ones, aiming to give voice to corporatist claims.
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Cristina was forced into exile and General Espartero appointed regent. During his regency
(–) he successfully suppressed the military coups of Generals Concha and Diego
de Leon, but he was eventually overthrown by conservative General Narváez (Christiansen
).
Although the government managed to defeat of the second Carlist uprising (–) sta-
bility would not last. In , liberal generals O’Donnell and Dulce launched a new military
rebellion that resulted in the appointment of General Espartero as President of the Council of
Ministers. Later, Espartero was forced to leave government after another pronunciamiento by
O’Donnell in . In , another military coup led by liberal generals Prim and Serrano
and Admiral Topete, the ‘Glorious Revolution’, terminated the reign of Isabel . 
e provi-
sional military-led government launched the  Constitution and appointed Amadeo I as
new king. Subsequently, a new Carlist Rebellion took place (–). Due to the great
political instability the King resigned and left Spain, paving the way for the First Spanish Re-
public (–). 
e political turbulences and social violence continued. General Pavia’s
coup in January  imposed a new government-led by General Serrano but did not manage
to prevent the collapse of the Republic. In December, General Martinez Campos’ coup gave
the power to Alfonso  restoring the Bourbon dynasty (Carr ; Alonso Baquer ;
Fontana ).
B.2 From the restoration of the monarchy period to the
Civil War
During the period of the restoration of the monarchy, civilian governments, mainly the ones
led by the Conservative Antonio Cánovas del Castillo successfully reduced the influence of
military in politics but did not eliminate it completely. 
e military continued to be an impor-
tant pressure group with abundant representation in the Parliament (Fernández Bastarreche
:–). Moreover, the period from  to  witnessed several coup attempts
such as those in Badajoz (), Cartagena () and Madrid (). 
ese coups were
planned by the republican politician Ruiz Zorrilla. 
ey enjoyed little civilian support among
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and ultimately failed (Alvarez Junco :–). 
e
loss of the last colonies (the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba) in , the intensification
of the labour and social struggles in Spain as well as the hazardous military campaigns in Mo-
rocco (–) aggravated the dissension between the military and civilian spheres. A
generational change in the military elites influenced by the historical events produced a shift
in the ideology towards conservatism and a dissonance with the civilian elites (Alonso Baquer
:–).

e use of the Army to control and repress demonstrations created resentment between
civilians and military (Ballbé :–). Constant criticism from left-wing parties and
unions fuelled the confrontation (Shubert :–). 
e military was in an environ-
ment with external and internal threats. 
ey developed an excessive preoccupation for the
public order, strong catholic beliefs and especially a growing corporatism (Payne :–
; Boyd :–, –, –; Olmeda :). Favouritism in military pro-
Cánovas del Castillo was President six times from  and his assassination by an anarchist in .
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motions and jurisdictional disputes with the civilian sphere became significant sources of dis-
content. 
e military organised Defence Juntas in order to protect the interests of different
service corps. 
ese powerful pressure groups operated mainly from  to  (Boyd
:–; Cardona :–; Seco Serrano :–). By , five governments
had already been toppled by the Defence Juntas. In , the military disaster in Annual in
Northern Morocco, where Spain lost more than , soldiers in five days, created a pro-
found government crises which deepened the divide between the military and political class.

e Juntas were abolished in  but in , a new military coup with the connivance of
King Alfonso , granted dictatorial powers to General Miguel Primo de Rivera who gov-
erned the country until  (Fernández Bastarreche :–).
Despite Primo de Rivera’s policies aiming to increase military satisfaction and the victory
in the Moroccan campaign, his government was undermined by the confrontation with the
Artillery Corps, which embraced republicanism and attempted to overthrow him in .
Primo de Rivera also lacked the support of the political class and resigned in  (Fernán-
dez Bastarreche :; Navajas Zubeldia ). 
e short-lived government of General
Dámaso Berenguer (–) also suffered a military coup attempt and was replaced by
Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar’s. However, the triumph of the republican parties in the local
elections in  led to the exile of King Alfonso  and the proclamation of the Second
Republic.

e far-reaching reforms implemented by the first War Minister of the Republic, Manuel
Azaña, were initially supported by the population and the military. However, Azaña’s effort
to revert all policies of the previous authoritarian government of Primo de Rivera, that he
considered illegitimate, quickly dissatisfied the military. 
e new system of promotion was
perceived as an attempt of politicisation of the armed forces. 
e new policies incentivising
early retirement did not succeed in removing the reactionary elements from the ranks. 
e
attempts to professionalise the armed forces and dissociate the military from politics failed due
to the lack of resources, the urgency in which they were implemented and political instability
(Alpert ; Cardona ; Fernández Bastarreche ). 
e ‘Africanistas’, military officers
that had been hardened by the experiences in the Moroccan wars, began to occupy the top
echelons in the armed forces. Moreover, the socio-political situation of the Second Republic
(–) was very unstable (Jackson ; Payne ). Especially the ‘Africanistas’ such
as Sanjurjo, Mola and Franco played a crucial role in the uprisings against left governments
during the republic, including the first serious military challenge to the Second Republic, the
 ‘Sanjurjada’, and the coup on  July  that provoked the Civil War (Payne ;
Balfour ).
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C Chronology of Events
Table : Brief chronology of events
Portugal Spain
 Coup against the First Portuguese
Republic led by General Gomes da
Costa. Military Dictatorship is
established
Failed Military coup attempt
(Sanjuanada) against the dictator
General Primo de Rivera
 Salazar is appointed Finance Minister Opus Dei is founded
 Stock market crash. 
e Great
Depression.
International Exposition of Barcelona
Military Rebellion (‘Revolução do
Castelo’)
Coup attempt by artillery officers
 National Union movement is set.
Portuguese Colonial Act
General Primo de Rivera resigns as head
of state
 Ambitious plan of the rearmament and
modernisation of the armed forces
(proposed by Major Barros Rodrigues).
Second Republic is established. King
Alfonso  goes in exile. Centre-Left
governments are elected.
Military rebellions in Madeira and in
Lisbon
War Minister Manuel Azaña’s military
reforms
 Salazar becomes Prime Minister
(‘Presidente do Concelho’)
Failed military coup attempt of General
Sanjurjo
 Estado Novo Constitution. General
Carmona is elected President and
appoints Salazar as Prime Minister.
 and the  are established
Anarchist revolt of Casas Viejas Right
wing government elected. Fascist like
party Falange Española is founded
 Military rebellion of Marinha Grande.

e extreme right National-Unionist
Party is banned
Leftist revolution in Asturias repressed
by the Army
 Salazar is (self ) appointed War Minister.
Captain Santos Costa is appointed
Undersecretary of State. 
e
paramilitary Portuguese Legion and the
youth organisation ‘Mocidade’ are
created. Communist Navy revolt in
Tagus.
Left wing Popular Front wins the
elections. 
e military with the support
of right wing groups attempt a coup but
it fails ( July). Beginning of the
Spanish Civil War. Franco is appointed
chief of the state by the military Junta
Continued. . .

C  E
Portugal Spain
Germany substitutes the  as the main
weapons supplier
 Military reforms introduces the
ministerial approval, ‘escolha’ in
substitution of seniority for promotion
and the creation of the elite High Staff
Corps. New recruitment laws following
the model Nation in Arms and the
reduction of the permanent Army
Franco unifies right wing parties into
‘ de las ’ that is assigned the
control of the Press and Propaganda.
Battles of Jarama, Brunete, Santander
and Belchite. Bombing of Guernica.
Santoña Pact between the forces linked
to the Basque Nationalists
 Military plots in March, April and May Battles of Teruel and Ebro
 Signature of the Iberian Pact of Defence
with Spain. Beginning of ; Salazar
declares Portuguese neutrality
End of the Spanish Civil War. Political
repression continues. Purges in the
armed forces
 Military plot in May. Signature of the
Additional Protocol of Defence with
Spain. Concordat with the Vatican
Spain adopts a non-belligerent position
in .
General salary raises for officers
 
e Blue Division begins its
deployment.
 Agreement with the  for the
utilization of Azores bases.

e Blue Division begins its withdrawal.
 End of . Military reform is
launched eliminating some units and
undertaking the construction of many
new military quarters. 
e  is
refounded and becomes 
Spanish Fueros (Bill of Rights) and the
Code of Military Justice are enacted.
Some Monarchic Generals consider to
plot against Franco
 Military rebellion ‘revolta da Mealhada’.
Portugal membership to the  is
vetoed by the .

e General Assembly of the 
recommends the rejection of Spanish
membership
 First Army Officers’ statutes are enacted.
Independence of India from the .
‘Abrilada’ military plot
Law of Succession that establishes Spain
as a Monarchy is enacted
 Portugal becomes a founding member
of . Salazar accepts the Marshall
Plan for –
General  pay raise in the Armed
Forces.
 National Defence Ministry and the
 are established
 Defence Agreement with the . Groups
of military officers begin to be sent to
the  for education and training.

e Ministry of Information and
Tourism is created
Continued. . .
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Beginning of decolonisation of Africa
(Libya is the first one)
 Law  transforms the colonies in
overseas provinces.
Economic and military agreements with
the  (military bases in Spain).
Concordat with the Vatican
 Portugal joins the . 
e Warsaw Pact
is established
Spain joins the 
 Suez Crisis Spain recognizes the independence of
Morocco
 Sidi-Ifni war in Sahara (–).
Technocrats dominate the government
 Rebellion in Angola severely squashed Spain joins the ,  and the World
Bank.
 Portugal is a founder member of the
 agreement. Military rebellion of Sé
Economic Stabilization Plan.  is
founded
 Coup attempt by Defence Minister
Botelho Moniz. Portugal loses Goa,
Damau and Diu to India. Angola claims
independence. Portugal joins the 
and World Bank
Last Spanish troops abandon Morocco
 Military Rebellion in Beja.
Independence of Algeria
 Guinea and Cabo Verde claim
independence
Tribunal of Public Order is established
 Mozambique claims independence  is established
 Assassination of the opposition leader,
General Humberto Delgado in Spain,
supposedly by  agents
 Caetano becomes Prime Minister in
substitution of Salazar
Independence of Equatorial Guinea
from Spain
 Oil crisis. Caetano is forced to cancel
the Decree-Law , benefiting
conscript officers, due to the opposition
among academy officers
Carrero Blanco, Prime Minister of the
Francoist government is assassinated by
. Reform of the military curricula
 Military coup attempt in March.
Military coup of  April (Carnations
Revolution). Negotiation for the
independence of the colonies. Right
wing coup attempt (September)

e clandestine Democratic Military
Union is created
Continued. . .
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Portugal Spain
 Right-wing coup attempt (March). First
Pact -Political Parties (April). First
democratic elections (April). Left-wing
coup attempt (November). Law /
establishes the Council of the
Revolution
Last executions of the regime (  and
  members). Spain transferred the
sovereignty of the Sahara possessions to
Morocco and Mauritania. Death of
Franco.  is dismantled and its
members arrested
 Second Pact -Political Parties. 
apparatus is dismantled. Portuguese
Constitution is issued.  wins the
legistative elections.  is created
Suárez is appointed . Political Reform
Act produces the self-dissolution of the
Francoist regime
  wins the legislative elections. A
unified Defence Ministry is established
 Stand-by agreements with the  Spanish Constitution is issued.
Operación Galaxia plot is neutralised
 Centre-right coalition ‘Aliança
Democrática’ wins the legislative
elections
 wins the legislative elections
  Sá Carneiro and Defence Minister
Amaro da Costa die in a plane crash
National Defence and Military
Organisation Law
 Suárez resigns.  coup attempt is
neutralised
 Constitutional Reform and National
Defence Law. 
e  is abolished
Spains becomes a member of .
 wins the legislative elections
  wins the legislative elections
 Stand-by agreements with the .
Reunification of the secret services ()
Organic Law of Defence and creation of
the 
  wins the legislative elections Military coup in La Coruña is
neutralised
 Portugal becomes member of the  Spain becomes member of the .
 membership passed a referendum.
 wins the legislative elections

